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NASA NTRS2005

2004 NASA Seal/Secondary Air System Workshop, Volume 1

The 2004 NASA Seal/Secondary Air System workshop covered the following topics: (1) Overview of NASA s new Exploration Initiative program aimed at exploring the Moon, Mars, and beyond; (2) Overview of the NASA-sponsored Ultra-Efficient Engine Technology (UEET) program; (3) Overview of NASA Glenn s seal program aimed at developing advanced seals for NASA s turbomachinery, space, and reentry vehicle needs; (4) Reviews of NASA prime contractor and university advanced sealing concepts including tip clearance control, test results, experimental facilities, and numerical predictions; and (5) Reviews of material development programs relevant to advanced seals development. The NASA UEET overview illustrated for the reader the importance of advanced technologies, including seals, in meeting future turbine engine system efficiency and emission goals. For example, the NASA UEET program goals include an 8- to 15-percent reduction in fuel burn, a 15-percent reduction in CO2, a 70-percent reduction in NOx, CO, and unburned hydrocarbons, and a 30-dB noise reduction relative to program baselines. The workshop also covered several programs NASA is funding to develop technologies for the Exploration Initiative and advanced reusable space vehicle technologies. NASA plans on developing an advanced docking and berthing system that would permit any vehicle to dock to any on-orbit station or vehicle, as part of NASA s new Exploration Initiative. Plans to develop the necessary mechanism and androgynous seal technologies were reviewed. Seal challenges posed by reusable re-entry space vehicles include high-temperature operation, resiliency at temperature to accommodate gap changes during operation, and durability to meet mission requirements.

Source record↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

VEG-05 Tomato Crop Testing on the International Space Station

Production of fresh, nutritious, and tasty produce for astronauts during spaceflight may provide health-promoting, bioavailable nutrients, enhance the dietary experience, and reduce menu fatigue as we move into longer-duration missions. Growing and caring for plants may also reduce the psychological stresses associated with spaceflight and enhance connection to Earth. A diversity of crops will be required to provide nutrition, variety, and resiliency, however requirements for consistent growth under spaceflight environmental conditions remain unclear. VEG-05 is part of a series of experiments with pick-and-eat salad crops to better define best practices for crop production in space. VEG-05 and predecessor experiments VEG-04A and VEG-04B, grew salad crops in the Veggie vegetable production facilities on the International Space Station using different lighting treatments. In VEG-05 we grew ‘Red Robin’ dwarf cherry tomatoes under two different red: blue lighting spectra. Light can impact the growth habit, yield, nutritional composition, microbial levels, and even flavor attributes within crops, and our goal was to assess these characteristics in ‘Red Robin’ tomatoes during VEG-05. Considerable pre-flight verification testing was performed prior to launch in Nov. 2022. Prior to the flight and ground experiments, lighting in both Veggie units on ISS was measured and lights were standardized between flight and ground hardware. VEG-05 flight operations ran between December 2022 and March 2023, with a ground control initially 48 hours delayed. Due to environmental challenges of very low humidity during the first week of the experiment, seed germination was low for both flight and ground plants. The flight experiment ultimately had 4 - 5 plants per treatment out of the planned 6 plants, but the initial ground control had only three plants in one treatment and none in the other, so this ground control was restarted at the beginning of Feb. 2023 and ran through May, with successful growth of all 12 plants. Both flight and ground control ran 100 days, with harvests of fruit at day 83, day 90, and day 100. Flight plants had uneven growth, and following the early drying events, excess water was frequently observed, which led to a variety of plant stress responses including uneven plant growth, excess adventitious root formation, flower and fruit abortion, and visible microbial growth. In total, from the five surviving red-rich lighted plants, only 5 ripe fruit were produced, and from the four surviving blue-rich lighted plants, 10 fruit were produced with only 6 of these ripe by day 100. Because of the small fruit number and the unsatisfactory growth, crew members were not allowed to consume the tomatoes, and all fruit, as well as large branches with leaves, samples of the adventitious roots, two plant rooting pillows from each treatment, microbial sampling swabs, and some water samples were returned for analysis. Because of the small sample sizes and factors affecting growth on the ISS, objectives of assessing light quality effect (red: blue light treatments) will not be achieved. Revised objectives of this study include to compare stressed flight plants with normal ground plants to determine the impact of plant overwatering stress in space on food safety and the plant microbial community, to determine nutrient content changes in fruit and leaves from stressed plants, and to evaluate stress metabolism changes in returned tissue by transcriptomic analysis. Postflight analysis is underway with the following analyses being conducted: A. culturable microbiology and food safety as well as molecular microbial community analysis of 1. ripe fruit, 2. leaves, stems, and adventitious roots, 3. pillow components (roots, wicks, and substrates), 4. swabs, and 5. water samples from root mats before and after growth. B. transcriptomics of leaf tissue and adventitious roots, and C. elemental analysis of leaf tissue. If sufficient tissue remains elemental analyses will also be conducted on fruit. While not generating the desired information on spaceflight growth responses of healthy crops, our team is hopeful that these analyses will shed light on tomato responses to stress in this environment as plant overwatering stress is a mission-relevant condition that could occur in future space crop growth systems. This research was co-funded by the Human Research Program and Space Biology (MTL#1075) in the ILSRA 2015 NRA call.

Gioia D. Massa↗

NASA NTRS2023

Climate and Human Impacts on Hydrological Processes and Flood Risk in Southern Louisiana

Satellite observations of coastal Louisiana indicate an overall land loss over recent decades, which could be attributed to climate and human-induced factors, including sea level rise (SLR). Climate induced hydrological change (CHC) has impacted the way flood control structures are used, altering the spatiotemporal water distribution. Based on “what-if” scenarios, we determine relative impacts of SLR and CHC on increased flood risk over southern Louisiana and examine the role of water management, via flood control structures, in mitigating flood risk over the region. Our findings show that CHC has increased flood risk over the past 28 years. The number of affected people increases as extreme hydrological events become more exceptional. Water management reduces flood risk to urban areas and croplands, especially during exceptional hydrological events. For example, currently (i.e., 2016-2020 period), CHC-induced flooding puts an additional 73km2 of cropland under flood risk at least half of the time (median flood event) and 65km2 once a year (annual flood event), when compared to a past period (1993-1997). A ten- to twenty-fold increase relative to SLR-induced flooding. CHC also increases population vulnerability in southern Louisiana to flooding; additional 9900 residents currently live under flood risk at least half of the time, and that number increases to 27,400 for annual flood events. Residents vulnerable to SLR induced flooding is lower (6000 and 3300 residents, respectively). Conclusions are that CHC is a major factor that should be accounted for flood resilience and that water management interventions can mitigate risks to human life and activities.

Augusto Getirana↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human-Autonomy Teaming Research in Support of m:N Operations

Since 2019, the NASA and industry partners have been involved in research focused on a novel paradigm for operations of remotely piloted aircraft. This paradigm involves multiple people sharing a fleet of multiple vehicles between them. Referred to as m:N (pronounced “em-to-en”), this configuration describes a ratio where m is the number of operators and N is the number of vehicles. Through force and asset multiplication, the m:N concept seeks to enable a scalable and resilient operation of remotely crewed vehicles. The primary means of obtaining such a robust operation is through allowing a flexible crew of variable size to dynamically attend to the needs of assets in while performing real-time operator workload management. It is in that sense that assets are shared between operators: as needed (such as in events of elevated workload) an operator in an m:N context can “handoff” the responsibility for some amount of assets, nh < N, to be absorbed by the m – 1 crew members on staff. At some time later, these nh assets could be returned to their original owner or they may be further distributed to other crew if called for by the mission. During this panel, I will elaborate on the research activity undertaken by the Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Laboratory at NASA Ames Research Center over the previous three years. The studies conducted by the HAT Lab range from interviews with subject matter experts, a cognitive walkthrough, a task analysis, and two simulation experiments to-date. During experimentation, pilots made use of an advanced Ground Control Station developed by the HAT Lab and industry partners to simulate m:N operations in two large, metropolitan areas of Southern California: Los Angeles and San Diego. Further experimentation planned over the next few years. Results from our research to-date indicates that pilots of a moderately sized fleet of about a dozen remotely crewed aircraft adequately maintained safety performance and situation awareness of their aircraft, even when presented with unexpected situations of heightened workload.

multi-vehicle control↗

NASA NTRS2024

Looking to the Future: A Call to Action for Advanced GNC Algorithm Verification and Validation

Future space systems will rely on autonomous Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) functions to efficiently manage safe and precise self-directed operations in uncertain complex environments. Fundamentally, the GNC system plays a key role in mission performance and safety because it computes the ideal trajectory (Guidance), determines the actual trajectory (Navigation), and executes the ideal trajectory (Control) of a vehicle’s position and attitude. Our current GNC systems are highly automated and already have a high degree of complexity. As missions become more ambitious, GNC systems for launch vehicles and space platforms (e.g., spacecraft, probes, and landers) will require higher levels of performance and autonomous operation than previously encountered, for example, this includes GNC for optimizing aerodynamic and/or propulsion performance during planetary entry. This GNC Verification and Validation (V&V) paper highlights concerns with what undoubtedly will be a trend towards increased complexity as fully autonomous GNC systems are developed for future space missions. Clearly, complex GNC systems pose challenges in the prelaunch V&V phase, which is a relatively expensive part of a mission’s life cycle. Essentially the V&V phase is focused on checking that the system effectively meets all the design and operational requirements for the mission. The authors of this paper (i.e., the Inter-Agency Working Group of GNC subject matter experts) focused on this fundamental question over the past few years: Will the GNC engineering community of practice be sufficiently prepared to perform the necessary V&V on evolving GNC architectures that are driven by very demanding requirements for autonomy, resiliency, reconfigurability, adaptability, and mission cost-benefit balance? It is the viewpoint of our Inter-Agency team that the GNC V&V approaches and processes needed to address the next generation of complex GNC systems, which likely will employ various forms of modern GNC technology, are not currently established to the level the community will need in the future. While researchers and practitioners have made some progress in developing new GNC V&V methods for modern GNC systems, a good deal of work remains to be done to codify such methods in a comprehensive and systematic manner. Thus, the Inter-Agency team’s partner organizations [the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the European Space Agency (ESA), the National Centre for Space Studies (CNES), the German Aerospace Center (DLR), the French Aerospace Lab (ONERA), and ISAE-SUPAERO] have conducted preliminary investigations into advancing GNC V&V techniques, which resulted in the identification of the need for education, new V&V tools, and benchmark problems for the GNC community. The necessary proactive steps to be taken to meet the challenges and fill the gaps in GNC V&V are summarized in this paper. The first steps include identifying advanced analysis tools, developing a GNC V&V roadmap, and expanding education and training programs for GNC practitioners. This paper is a call to action and proposes a comprehensive set of recommended actions for all our stakeholders: space agencies, researchers, and industry.

Samir Bennani↗

NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Strategic Approach for Dense, Integrated, Vehicle Navigation

Drone usage has been on the rise in recent years with applications that include parcel delivery, wildlife protection, precision farming, law enforcement, and industrial inspection, just to name a few. Once regulations and safety policies are put in place to allow for the widespread use of unmanned drones, the number of aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS) is expected to skyrocket to millions, potentially congesting the airspace which increases the likelihood of separation violations and possibly incidents. Currently, flight infrastructure can only support a few thousand aircraft flying over the United States National Airspace System (NAS) at any given time. A delay at one airport can send ripple effects throughout the system, causing more delays and missed connections. In air traffic control, separation is the concept of keeping an “ownship” aircraft outside a minimum distance from “intruder” aircraft to reduce the risk of the aircraft colliding, as well as preventing accidents due to secondary factors, such as wake turbulence. Maintaining proper separation is often a safety critical property for fixed-wing drones in the airspace. This paper addresses drone separation in time and distance for high volume corridors (en route) and lanes (on ground), merging as well as crossing intersections of multiple corridors/lanes. In this paper, the term drone is applied to both Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and small Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) vehicles operating autonomously. There exists a gamut of approaches to the merging and crossing problems. At one end of the extreme are the conservative yet low cost and verifiable solutions of today that deal with two drones at a time. At the other end are complex Machine Learning-based solutions with high computing requirements for fully autonomous drones of the future that are expected to handle all contentions. This paper presents a feasible and verifiable strategic approach to these problems that is based on distributed cooperation between the drones and the infrastructure. Three phases of the strategic approach (Prepare, Adjust, Commit) are presented. Simulation results are presented that show the proposed approach is stable and resilient to induced perturbations and guarantees a set of fixed-wing drones to merge and cross intersections by adjusting their speed based on their distance to the aircraft in front of them while remaining in the equilibrium state. The equilibrium state is defined as the state when a set of n aircraft move at a relatively constant speed and uniform spacing from each other in a congested system. A congested system is defined as the state when at least one aircraft cannot move at its maximum allowed speed. Unlike existing centralized and pre-planned approaches, the proposed solution is fully distributed and enables autonomous aircraft to decide to adjust their speed and distance with respect to the preceding aircraft, dynamically. Simulation results are presented that assess the feasibility of the approach.

Distributed↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Strategic Approach for Dense, Integrated, Vehicle Navigation

Distributed↗

NASA NTRS2007

Automated Target Planning for FUSE Using the SOVA Algorithm

The SOVA algorithm was originally developed under the Resilient Systems and Operations Project of the Engineering for Complex Systems Program from NASA s Aerospace Technology Enterprise as a conceptual framework to support real-time autonomous system mission and contingency management. The algorithm and its software implementation were formulated for generic application to autonomous flight vehicle systems, and its efficacy was demonstrated by simulation within the problem domain of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle autonomous flight management. The approach itself is based upon the precept that autonomous decision making for a very complex system can be made tractable by distillation of the system state to a manageable set of strategic objectives (e.g. maintain power margin, maintain mission timeline, and et cetera), which if attended to, will result in a favorable outcome. From any given starting point, the attainability of the end-states resulting from a set of candidate decisions is assessed by propagating a system model forward in time while qualitatively mapping simulated states into margins on strategic objectives using fuzzy inference systems. The expected return value of each candidate decision is evaluated as the product of the assigned value of the end-state with the assessed attainability of the end-state. The candidate decision yielding the highest expected return value is selected for implementation; thus, the approach provides a software framework for intelligent autonomous risk management. The name adopted for the technique incorporates its essential elements: Strategic Objective Valuation and Attainability (SOVA). Maximum value of the approach is realized for systems where human intervention is unavailable in the timeframe within which critical control decisions must be made. The Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer (FUSE) satellite, launched in 1999, has been collecting science data for eight years.[1] At its beginning of life, FUSE had six gyros in two IRUs and four reaction wheels. Over time through various failures, the satellite has been left with one reaction wheel on the vehicle skew axis and two gyros. To remain operational, a control scheme has been implemented using the magnetic torque rods and the remaining momentum wheel.[2] As a consequence, there are attitude regions where there is insufficient torque authority to overcome environmental disturbances (e.g. gravity gradient torques). The situation is further complicated by the fact that these attitude regions shift inertially with time as the spacecraft moves through earth s magnetic field during the course of its orbit. Under these conditions, the burden of planning targets and target-to-target slew maneuvers has increased significantly since the beginning of the mission.[3] Individual targets must be selected so that the magnetic field remains roughly aligned with the skew wheel axis to provide enough control authority to the other two orthogonal axes. If the field moves too far away from the skew axis, the lack of control authority allows environmental torques to pull the satellite away from the target and can potentially cause it to tumble. Slew maneuver planning must factor the stability of targets at the beginning and end, and the torque authority at all points along the slew. Due to the time varying magnetic field geometry relative to any two inertial targets, small modifications in slew maneuver timing can make large differences in the achievability of a maneuver.

Heatwole, Scott↗

NASA NTRS2002

Systems Architecture for Fully Autonomous Space Missions

The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center is working to develop a revolutionary new system architecture concept in support of fully autonomous missions. As part of GSFC's contribution to the New Millenium Program (NMP) Space Technology 7 Autonomy and on-Board Processing (ST7-A) Concept Definition Study, the system incorporates the latest commercial Internet and software development ideas and extends them into NASA ground and space segment architectures. The unique challenges facing the exploration of remote and inaccessible locales and the need to incorporate corresponding autonomy technologies within reasonable cost necessitate the re-thinking of traditional mission architectures. A measure of the resiliency of this architecture in its application to a broad range of future autonomy missions will depend on its effectiveness in leveraging from commercial tools developed for the personal computer and Internet markets. Specialized test stations and supporting software come to past as spacecraft take advantage of the extensive tools and research investments of billion-dollar commercial ventures. The projected improvements of the Internet and supporting infrastructure go hand-in-hand with market pressures that provide continuity in research. By taking advantage of consumer-oriented methods and processes, space-flight missions will continue to leverage on investments tailored to provide better services at reduced cost. The application of ground and space segment architectures each based on Local Area Networks (LAN), the use of personal computer-based operating systems, and the execution of activities and operations through a Wide Area Network (Internet) enable a revolution in spacecraft mission formulation, implementation, and flight operations. Hardware and software design, development, integration, test, and flight operations are all tied-in closely to a common thread that enables the smooth transitioning between program phases. The application of commercial software development techniques lays the foundation for delivery of product-oriented flight software modules and models. Software can then be readily applied to support the on-board autonomy required for mission self-management. An on-board intelligent system, based on advanced scripting languages, facilitates the mission autonomy required to offload ground system resources, and enables the spacecraft to manage itself safely through an efficient and effective process of reactive planning, science data acquisition, synthesis, and transmission to the ground. Autonomous ground systems in turn coordinate and support schedule contact times with the spacecraft. Specific autonomy software modules on-board include mission and science planners, instrument and subsystem control, and fault tolerance response software, all residing within a distributed computing environment supported through the flight LAN. Autonomy also requires the minimization of human intervention between users on the ground and the spacecraft, and hence calls for the elimination of the traditional operations control center as a funnel for data manipulation. Basic goal-oriented commands are sent directly from the user to the spacecraft through a distributed internet-based payload operations "center". The ensuing architecture calls for the use of spacecraft as point extensions on the Internet. This paper will detail the system architecture implementation chosen to enable cost-effective autonomous missions with applicability to a broad range of conditions. It will define the structure needed for implementation of such missions, including software and hardware infrastructures. The overall architecture is then laid out as a common thread in the mission life cycle from formulation through implementation and flight operations.

Esper, Jamie↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Verification and Validation of Safety-Critical Aircraft Systems Operating under Off-Nominal, Contingency, and Emergency Conditions

Verification and validation (V&V) of safety-critical technologies developed for loss of control (LOC) prevention and recovery and other aviation safety concerns pose significant challenges. Aircraft LOC can result from a wide spectrum of hazards, often occurring in combination, which cannot be fully replicated during evaluation. Technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery must therefore be effective under a wide variety of hazardous and uncertain conditions, and the verification and validation of these technologies must provide some measure of assurance that the new vehicle safety technologies do no harm (i.e., that they themselves do not introduce new safety risks). V&V technologies must also enable the identification of system limitations and constraints, as well as enable the identification of safe and unsafe operating conditions (and their boundaries). Additionally, the V&V of complex, increasingly autonomous systems is a fundamental concern. Scalable, reproducible and cost-effective techniques for the assurance of safety critical systems during their design and operation is a key barrier to fielding new systems or updating current systems. Moreover, these techniques need to provide artifacts that enable a comprehensive evidence-based approach to certification. This briefing summarizes research performed under NASA’s Aviation Safety Program and follow-on research for the V&V of safety-critical aircraft system technologies developed for LOC prevention and recovery and increasingly autonomous systems, and for a broad assurance capability in both current and emerging aviation applications. Note that, in this briefing, the term “validation” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation (e.g., algorithms etc.) is performing the intended function(s), as well as an affirmation of effectiveness in these functions. “Verification” refers to a confirmation that the system implementation in the software and hardware meets its (hopefully validated) specifications (e.g., correctly executes algorithms as designed).

Validation↗