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NASA NTRS2012

Development of Human System Integration at NASA

Human Systems Integration seeks to design systems around the capabilities and limitations of the humans which use and interact with the system, ensuring greater efficiency of use, reduced error rates, and less rework in the design, manufacturing and operational deployment of hardware and software. One of the primary goals of HSI is to get the human factors practitioner involved early in the design process. In doing so, the aim is to reduce future budget costs and resources in redesign and training. By the preliminary design phase of a project nearly 80% of the total cost of the project is locked in. Potential design changes recommended by evaluations past this point will have little effect due to lack of funding or a huge cost in terms of resources to make changes. Three key concepts define an effective HSI program. First, systems are comprised of hardware, software, and the human, all of which operate within an environment. Too often, engineers and developers fail to consider the human capacity or requirements as part of the system. This leads to poor task allocation within the system. To promote ideal task allocation, it is critical that the human element be considered early in system development. Poor design, or designs that do not adequately consider the human component, could negatively affect physical or mental performance, as well as, social behavior. Second, successful HSI depends upon integration and collaboration of all the domains that represent acquisition efforts. Too often, these domains exist as independent disciplines due to the location of expertise within the service structure. Proper implementation of HSI through participation would help to integrate these domains and disciplines to leverage and apply their interdependencies to attain an optimal design. Via this process domain interests can be integrated to perform effective HSI through trade-offs and collaboration. This provides a common basis upon which to make knowledgeable decisions. Finally, HSI must be considered early in the requirements development phase of system design and acquisition. This will provide the best opportunity to maximize return on investment (ROI) and system performance. HSI requirements must be developed in conjunction with capability ]based requirements generation through functional. HSI requirements will drive HSI metrics and embed HSI issues within the system design. After a system is designed, implementation of HSI oversights can be very expensive. An HSI program should be included as an integral part of a total system approach to vehicle and habitat development. This would include, but not limited to, workstation design, D&C development, volumetric analysis, training, operations, and human -robotic interaction. HSI is a necessary process for Human Space Flight programs to meet the Agency Human ]System standards and thus mitigate human risks to acceptable levels. NASA has been involved in HSI planning, procedures development, process, and implementation for many years, and has been building several internal and publicly accessible products to facilitate HSI fs inclusion in the NASA Systems Engineering Lifecycle. Some of these products include: NASA STD 3001 Volumes 1 and 2, Human Integration Design Handbook, NASA HSI Implementation Plan, NASA HSI Implementation Plan Templates, NASA HSI Implementation Handbook, and a 2 ]hour short course on HSI delivered as part of the NASA Space and Life Sciences Directorate Academy. These products have been created leveraging industry best practices and lessons learned from other Federal Government agencies.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2014

iPAS: AES Flight System Technology Maturation for Human Spaceflight

In order to realize the vision of expanding human presence in space, NASA will develop new technologies that can enable future crewed spacecraft to go far beyond Earth orbit. These technologies must be matured to the point that future project managers can accept the risk of incorporating them safely and effectively within integrated spacecraft systems, to satisfy very challenging mission requirements. The technologies must also be applied and managed within an operational context that includes both on-board crew and mission support on Earth. The Advanced Exploration Systems (AES) Program is one part of the NASA strategy to identify and develop key capabilities for human spaceflight, and mature them for future use. To support this initiative, the Integrated Power Avionics and Software (iPAS) environment has been developed that allows engineers, crew, and flight operators to mature promising technologies into applicable capabilities, and to assess the value of these capabilities within a space mission context. This paper describes the development of the integration environment to support technology maturation and risk reduction, and offers examples of technology and mission demonstrations executed to date.

Othon, William L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

An Approach for Performance Assessments of Extravehicular Activity Gloves

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear‐entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for unique mission scenarios outside the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) Program realm of experience. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Game‐Changing Technology group provided start‐up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Project in the spring of 2012. The overarching goal of the HPEG Project is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for future implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability by 100%, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Project focused initial efforts on identifying potential new technologies and benchmarking the performance of current state of the art gloves to identify trends in design and fit leading to establish standards and metrics against which emerging technologies can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The first of the benchmarking tests evaluated the quantitative mobility performance and subjective fit of two sets of prototype EVA gloves developed ILC Dover and David Clark Company as compared to the Phase VI. Both companies were asked to design and fabricate gloves to the same set of NASA provided hand measurements (which corresponded to a single size of Phase Vi glove) and focus their efforts on improving mobility in the metacarpal phalangeal and carpometacarpal joints. Four test subjects representing the design‐to hand anthropometry completed range of motion, grip/pinch strength, dexterity, and fit evaluations for each glove design in pressurized conditions, with and without thermal micrometeoroid garments (TMG) installed. This paper provides a detailed description of hardware and test methodologies used and lessons learned.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2015

An Approach for Performance Based Glove Mobility Requirements

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear‐entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for exploration missions. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate's Game‐Changing Development Program provided start‐up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Element as part of the Next Generation Life Support (NGLS) Project in the fall of 2013. The overarching goal of the HPEG Element is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability in on‐pristine environments, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Element focused initial efforts on developing quantifiable and repeatable methodologies for assessing glove performance with respect to mobility, injury potential, thermal conductivity, and abrasion resistance. The team used these methodologies to establish requirements against which emerging technologies and glove designs can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The mobility performance testing methodology was an early focus for the HPEG team as it stems from collaborations between the SSA Development team and the JSC Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) that began investigating new methods for suited mobility and fit early in the Constellation Program. The combined HPEG and ABF team used lessons learned from the previous efforts as well as additional reviews of methodologies in physical and occupational therapy arenas to develop a protocol that assesses gloved range of motion, strength, dexterity, tactility, and fit in comparative quantitative terms and also provides qualitative insight to direct hardware design iterations. The protocol was evaluated using five experienced test subjects wearing the EMU pressurized to 4.3psid with three different glove configurations. The results of the testing are presented to illustrate where the protocol is and is not valid for benchmark comparisons. The process for requirements development based upon the results is also presented along with suggested performance values for the High Performance EVA Gloves to be procured in fiscal year 2015.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2015

Guidelines for CubeSat's Thermal Design

Thermal and Fluids Analysis Workshop 2015, Silver Spring, MD. NCTS 19104-15. What does it take to thermally designlow cost, low mass cubesats? What are the differences in the approach when you compare with large scale missions?What additional risk is acceptable? What is the approach to hardware? How is the testing campaign run? These aresome of the questions that will be addressed in this course, which is designed to equip the attendees to support thedevelopment of cubesats at their organization.

0000↗
NASA NTRS2016

An Approach for Performance Based Glove Mobility Requirements

The Space Suit Assembly (SSA) Development Team at NASA Johnson Space Center has invested heavily in the advancement of rear-entry planetary exploration suit design but largely deferred development of extravehicular activity (EVA) glove designs, and accepted the risk of using the current flight gloves, Phase VI, for exploration missions. However, as design reference missions mature, the risks of using heritage hardware have highlighted the need for developing robust new glove technologies. To address the technology gap, the NASA Space Technology Mission Directorate's Game-Changing Development Program provided start-up funding for the High Performance EVA Glove (HPEG) Element as part of the Next Generation Life Support (NGLS) Project in the fall of 2013. The overarching goal of the HPEG Element is to develop a robust glove design that increases human performance during EVA and creates pathway for implementation of emergent technologies, with specific aims of increasing pressurized mobility to 60% of barehanded capability, increasing the durability in on-pristine environments, and decreasing the potential of gloves to cause injury during use. The HPEG Element focused initial efforts on developing quantifiable and repeatable methodologies for assessing glove performance with respect to mobility, injury potential, thermal conductivity, and abrasion resistance. The team used these methodologies to establish requirements against which emerging technologies and glove designs can be assessed at both the component and assembly levels. The mobility performance testing methodology was an early focus for the HPEG team as it stems from collaborations between the SSA Development team and the JSC Anthropometry and Biomechanics Facility (ABF) that began investigating new methods for suited mobility and fit early in the Constellation Program. The combined HPEG and ABF team used lessons learned from the previous efforts as well as additional reviews of methodologies in physical and occupational therapy arenas to develop a protocol that assesses gloved range of motion, strength, dexterity, tactility, and fit in comparative quantitative terms and also provides qualitative insight to direct hardware design iterations. The protocol was evaluated using five experienced test subjects wearing the EMU pressurized to 4.3psid with three different glove configurations. The results of the testing are presented to illustrate where the protocol is and is not valid for benchmark comparisons. The process for requirements development based upon the results is also presented along with suggested performance values for the High Performance EVA Gloves currently in development.

Aitchison, Lindsay↗
NASA NTRS2015

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Development and Testing of Harpoon-Based Approaches for Collecting Comet Samples

Comets, having bright tails visible to the unassisted human eye, are considered to have been known about since pre-historic times. In fact 3,000-year old written records of comet sightings have been identified. In comparison, asteroids, being so dim that telescopes are required for observation, were not discovered until 1801. Yet, despite their later discovery, a space mission returned the first samples of an asteroid in 2010 and two more asteroid sample return missions have already been launched. By contrast no comet sample return mission has ever been funded, despite the fact that comets in certain ways are far more scientifically interesting than asteroids. Why is this? The basic answer is the greater difficulty, and consequently higher cost, of a comet sample return mission. Comets typically are in highly elliptical heliocentric orbits which require much more time and propulsion for Space Craft (SC) to reach from Earth and then return to Earth as compared to many asteroids which are in Earth-like orbits. It is also harder for a SC to maneuver safely near a comet given the generally longer communications distances and the challenge of navigating in the comet's, when the comet is close to perihelion, which turns out to be one of the most interesting times for a SC to get close to the comet surface. Due to the science value of better understanding the sublimation of volatiles near the comet surface, other contributions to higher cost as desire to get sample material from both the comet surface and a little below, to preserve the stratigraphy of the sample, and to return the sample in a storage state where it does not undergo undesirable alterations, such as aqueous. In response to these challenges of comet sample return missions, the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GFSC) has worked for about a decade (2006 to this time) to develop and test approaches for comet sample return that would enable such a mission to be scientifically valuable, while having acceptably low risk and an affordable cost. A harpoon-based approach for gathering comet samples appears to offer the most effective way of accomplishing this goal. As described below, with a decade of development, analysis, testing and refinement, the harpoon approach has evolved from a promising concept to a practical element of a realistic comet sample return mission. Note that the following material includes references to videos, all of which are contained in different sections of the video supplement identified in the references. Each video will be identified as "SS##", where "SS" means the supplement section and "##" will be the number of the section.

Purves, Lloyd↗
NASA NTRS2017

Guidelines and Suggestions for Balloon Gondola Design

This paper discusses the current gondola design requirements for the Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility (CSBF). The CSBF is responsible for launching and supporting balloon borne scientific instruments and has some current updated guidelines that will be discussed in this presentation. As the sophistication of Payload systems have increased in size and complexity new guidelines have been implemented in order to make these instruments stay within the acceptable launch risks. Additionally, there is a requirement to submit a proper stress analysis report that states the flight design requirements have been met. Suggestions are discussed in this presentation that establish the proper guidelines to submit these.

Guidelines for Balloon Gondola Design↗
NASA NTRS2017

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations

Use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and emerging technologies often require space flight missions to accept elevated risk. The Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) flow includes environment definition, hazard evaluation, requirements definition, evaluation of design, and design trades to accommodate and mitigate the risk a project or program takes. Depending on the mission profile and environment, different missions may not necessarily benefit from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts. While this poses challenges for the radiation engineer, it also presents opportunities to tailor the RHA flow to minimize risk based on the environment or design criticality while remaining within budget. This presentation will focus on an approach to RHA amidst the present challenges, using the same RHA flow as in the past, with examples from recent radiation test results. The current challenges and the types of risk will be identified. How these risks drive requirements development and realization will be explained with examples of device results and data for single event effects (SEE) and in one case total ionizing dose (TID).

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA); Risk Managemen↗
NASA NTRS2017

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision E

The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems.

Roberts, Barry C.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Improved Calibration through SMAP RFI Change Detection

Anthropogenic Radio-Frequency Interference (RFI) drove both the SMAP (Soil Moisture Active Passive) microwave radiometer hardware and Level 1 science algorithm designs to use new technology and techniques for the first time on a spaceflight project. Care was taken to provide special features allowing the detection and removal of harmful interference in order to meet the error budget. Nonetheless, the project accepted a risk that RFI and its mitigation would exceed the 1.3-K error budget. Thus, RFI will likely remain a challenge afterwards due to its changing and uncertain nature. To address the challenge, we seek to answer the following questions: How does RFI evolve over the SMAP lifetime? What calibration error does the changing RFI environment cause? Can time series information be exploited to reduce these errors and improve calibration for all science products reliant upon SMAP radiometer data? In this talk, we address the first question.

Passive L-band radiometer↗
NASA NTRS2018

Realistic Covariance Generation for the GPM Spacecraft

A covariance realism process for NASA's Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) spacecraft is detailed. The GPM spacecraft is in a low earth orbit, and performs collision avoidance maneuvers few times a year. Currently GPM is below the International Space Station (ISS). So, in addition to cataloged debris objects, GPM must contend with smallsat/cubesat objects that are deployed from the ISS. Both operational scenarios require complete knowledge of the expected GPM prediction errors as a function of time. In this study, we present a method for generating realistic predicted covariance that uses linear propagation of the covariance with the addition of process noise. Further analyses are presented for the process noise ''tuning'' that generates an inflation factor based on the observed error statistics of the predictive satellite trajectories when compared to the definitive ones. Different tuning strategies are considered and compared via a Goodness-of-Fit testing for the Gaussian properties of the scaled covariance. SpaceNav's realistic covariance generation approach takes into account the contribution of predicted maneuver errors in the increased propagation uncertainty. Corresponding maneuver uncertainty is injected into the state uncertainty, and is used within the collision avoidance process to determine the collision risk for close approach events that follow a maneuver. This is a critical step in the maneuver planning process that provides the satellite operator with an accurate quantification of the collision probability for planned maneuvers. Using this information, an informed decision can be made to proceed with a maneuver if the collision risk is acceptable. This approach is validated by Monte-Carlo simulations and results are presented.

spacecraft uncertainty propagation↗
NASA NTRS2001

Developments and activities in solar sail propulsion

NASA's drive to reduce mission costs and accept the risk of incorporating innovative, high payoff technologies into its missions while simultaneously undertaking ever more difficult missions has sparked a greatly renewed interest in solar sails. This paper summarizes these on-going developments in solar sails.

solar↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Having a Come-Apart: Lessons Learned from Additively Manufactured Hardware Failures

NASA has been engaged with additively manufactured (AM) process and component development since the 2000’s. AM offers various technical advantages, such as enhanced hardware design complexity, part consolidation, and processing of novel alloys in addition to programmatic advantages for reduction in processing time and cost. The focus of much of the AM development at NASA has been to mature the various processes, characterize material properties, develop standards, produce demonstrator parts, and integrate AM hardware in liquid rocket engines. These aspects have been demonstrated through process and design iterations using a methodical characterization, test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned. In addition to these fundamental demonstrations of the AM process and hardware development, alloys that provide performance advantages in the high temperature and high-pressure environments have been matured for use in rocket engines. These environments are challenging for any alloy and any design, and the AM process is required to fully meet the intended design requirements. The importance of proper AM process was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality resulted from an AM process issue. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. In part, such concerns motivate the AM certification approach that NASA has recently adopted in NASA-STD-6030 “Additive Manufacturing Requirements for Spaceflight Systems”. This presentation provides an overview of the previously mentioned failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. The objective of this presentation is to provide awareness to the community working critical and non-critical AM components and the lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

Additive Manufacturing↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metal Additive Manufacturing for Rocket Engines: Successes and Failures

NASA has been developing additive manufacturing (AM) for various technical and programmatic advantages for complex rocket engine and aerospace components. This maturation has focused on various AM processes, new alloys, characterizing material properties, developing standards, producing demonstrator parts, and integrating AM hardware in liquid rocket engines through test-fail-fix cycles, as well as application and dissemination of lessons learned of the AM lifecycle. The importance of proper AM processing was made evident in the failure of a Laser Powder Bed Fusion (L-PBF) copper-alloy combustion chamber during a hot-fire test due to a degraded material quality. The hot-fire test aimed to demonstrate high duty cycle under a risk-tolerant development project, where consequences of component failure would be minimal. However, the unintentional component failure emphasized the necessity of robust material characterization and rigorous process control procedures for the safe use of AM components in critical applications. This presentation provides an overview of the development failure, a discussion on the evaluation of the failed chamber and supplemental chambers produced at the same time, a representative material samples that included intentional build witness lines, and a summary of the key results and recommendations from the evaluations. NASA continues to approach AM processes and designs with a level of risk and acceptance of failures that is appropriate for the project objectives, with the overall goal of safe implementation of AM technology and transferring AM technology into commercial space applications. This presentation with provide critical awareness to the community lessons learned on proper implementation of AM.

L-PBF↗