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With geopolitical tensions high around the globe (Ukraine, Russia, China…), our mission is more important now than at any point since the Cold War – Our people help ensure the reliability of the deterrent, detect weapons of mass destruction, and advance the frontiers of science, engineering and computing.
This is the seventy-third in a series of semiannual technical progress reports on fusion materials science activity supported by the Fusion Energy Sciences Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. It covers the period ending December 31, 2022. This report focuses on research addressing the effects on materials properties and performance of exposure to the neutronic, thermal and chemical environments anticipated in the chambers of fusion experiments and energy systems. This research is a major element of the national effort to establish the materials knowledge base for an economically and environmentally attractive fusion energy source. Research activities on issues related to the interaction of materials with plasmas are reported separately. The results reported are the products of a national effort involving a number of national laboratories and universities. A large fraction of this work, particularly in relation to fission reactor irradiations, is carried out collaboratively with partners in Japan, Russia, and the European Union. The purpose of this series of reports is to provide a working technical record for the use of program participants, and to provide a means of communicating the efforts of fusion materials scientists to the broader fusion community, both nationally and worldwide. This report has been compiled by Stephanie Melton, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Her efforts, and the efforts of the many persons who made technical contributions, are gratefully acknowledged.
The Yale School of Public Health's (YSPH) Humanitarian Research Lab (HRL), working in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Labs (ORNL), concludes with high confidence that approximately 21.5% of Ukraine’s estimated 57 million tonnes of crop storage capacity has been impacted by conflict since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Intentional and indiscriminate targeting of crop storage infrastructure can constitute a war crime and a crime against humanity under international law.
This report summarizes the IAEA Workshop on Compilation of Experimental Nuclear Reaction Data held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 13 to 16 December 2022. The meeting was attended by 23 participants representing 12 cooperative Centres from seven Member States (China, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA) as well as a participant from Mongolia and Spain. A summary of the workshop is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
This is the seventy-fourth in a series of semiannual technical progress reports on fusion materials science activity supported by the Fusion Energy Sciences Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. It covers the period ending June 30, 2023. This report focuses on research addressing the effects on materials properties and performance of exposure to the neutronic, thermal and chemical environments anticipated in the chambers of fusion experiments and energy systems. This research is a major element of the national effort to establish the materials knowledge base for an economically and environmentally attractive fusion energy source. Research activities on issues related to the interaction of materials with plasmas are reported separately. The results reported are the products of a national effort involving a number of national laboratories and universities. A large fraction of this work, particularly in relation to fission reactor irradiations, is carried out collaboratively with partners in Japan, Russia, and the European Union. The purpose of this series of reports is to provide a working technical record for the use of program participants, and to provide a means of communicating the efforts of fusion materials scientists to the broader fusion community, both nationally and worldwide.
The Berlinger Bottle (Figure 1, below) is the central part of the BEREG-Kit that has been used by anti-doping agencies worldwide for over 25 years. As documented in the World Anti-Doping Agency’s investigative report [Ref 1], in 2014, Russian state-level actors found ways to defeat these bottles and was able to secretly replace an athlete’s drug-laced urine with clean urine samples that had been collected earlier. This cheating scheme allowed rampant performance enhancing drug use by its athletes, and (before disqualifications) earned Russia 33 medals in the 2014 Sochi Olympics – more than double its haul of 15 medals at the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. All this activity was conducted despite the watchful eye of the World Anti-Doping Agency. Similarly, Lance Armstrong and the US Postal Team infamously used performance enhancing drugs and blood transfusions to win 7 Tour de France titles (again, before disqualification) in a row, all under the supervision of L’Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) and the US Anti Doping Agency. The inspection role of anti-doping agencies is similar in scope to the role of a Safeguards Inspector with the International Atomic Energy Agency: detect the misuse of facilities, and conduct scheduled and randomized testing to detect and deter would-be cheaters. This paper will explore the motivation, the means, and the mistakes which led to discovery – and will draw out commonalities between those who seek to cheat in sports, and those who seek to undermine international nuclear safeguards as Iraq tried in the 1980s.
This is a cost module that is part of the Advanced Fuel Cycle -- Cost Basis Report. Module D1-4: Nature of this module update (Rev 1) from previous advanced fuel cycle cost basis reports (AFCCBRs): new life cycle cost data on U,Pu SFR mixed oxide (MOX) fuels is derived from the Nonproliferation Assessment Systems Analysis Program (NASAP) conducted in the late 1970s. Highassay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) ceramic fuel is also discussed in more detail compared to earlier AFC-CBRs, since some advanced SFR concepts currently under development will require this HALEU fuel type for startup. Module D1-5: Nature of this FY-21 module update from previous AFC-CBRs: this module includes a few new references and a somewhat expanded discussion of vibrocompaction fuel fabrication technology. The WIT values for VIPAC are pegged directly to those for conventional LWR and SFR pelletized U,Pu MOX (note that this module now includes VIPAC MOX fuel for LWRs in addition to SFRs). Based on information from Russia, where VIPAC has been studied extensively, the unit costs are expressed as a percentage of those in the new updated Module D1-2 (pelletized U,Pu MOX) and new updated Module D1-4 (pelletized U,Pu MOX) for large NOAK fabrication facilities of the same production capacity. Since both ceramic pelletized MOX Modules D1-2 and D1-4 benefitted from analysis of 1970s NASAP data, by extension this Module D1-5 also benefits.
The past year has seen a significant increase in focus on strategic issues with the continued aggression by Russia, the rapid expansion of China’s military—particularly their nuclear capabilities, North Korea’s rapid improvements in intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) technology, and the increase in Iranian fuel enrichment. The U.S. continues to modernize Nuclear Command Control and Communication and all three legs of its nuclear Triad—Columbia-class submarines, Sentinel ICBMs, and B-21 bombers—for the Department of Defense (DOD). At the same time, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is updating its stockpile, producing the B61-12, the new B61-13, the W88 Alteration, the W87-1—with new pits, and the W80-4. This rework of the nuclear enterprise represents the most aggressive expansion of our capabilities and infrastructure in the modern era. At the same time, the Strategic Posture Commission completed its report to Congress and reported that the current modernization program, although clearly necessary, is insufficient to meet the threats that are emerging.
Russia’s nuclear saber rattling throughout the war in Ukraine, reports of China’s increasing nuclear modernization, and the 2023 release of Oppenheimer has reignited in the public talk of nuclear weapons. With the increasing prevalence of conversation around nuclear weapons comes increasing opportunity for mis- or disinformation to spread about them and the nuclear enterprise (NE). Mis- and disinformation are not new phenomena. However, the speed and reach offered by current digital communications technology is novel. What are the impacts of misinformation or disinformation about nuclear weapons to the American public?
The Director’s Strategic Resilience Initiative was created late in 2019 in recognition of the changing geo-political climate. The renewed strategic competition between Russia, China, and the United States, noted in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, put great power rivalry and competition at the forefront of national security considerations. At the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s March 1, 2018, speech and China’s October 1, 2019, National Day Military Parade, underscored the nuclear dimensions of this new strategic competition. Accompanying this changed strategic environment are rapid advances in an expansive array of relevant technological sectors including affordable and comprehensive global communication and reconnaissance assets, autonomous vehicles, quantum computing, advanced manufacturing, and artificial intelligence.
This is the seventy-fifth in a series of semiannual technical progress reports on fusion materials science activity supported by the Fusion Energy Sciences Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. It covers the period ending December 31, 2023. This report focuses on research addressing the effects on materials properties and performance of exposure to the neutronic, thermal and chemical environments anticipated in the chambers of fusion experiments and energy systems. This research is a major element of the national effort to establish the materials knowledge base for an economically and environmentally attractive fusion energy source. Research activities on issues related to the interaction of materials with plasmas are reported separately. The results reported are the products of a national effort involving a number of national laboratories and universities. A large fraction of this work, particularly in relation to fission reactor irradiations, is carried out collaboratively with partners in Japan, Russia, and the European Union. The purpose of this series of reports is to provide a working technical record for the use of program participants, and to provide a means of communicating the efforts of fusion materials scientists to the broader fusion community, both nationally and worldwide.
What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.
This report summarizes the IAEA Technical Meeting on the International Network of Nuclear Reaction Data Centres held at the IAEA Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 14 to 17 May 2024. The meeting was attended by 26 participants representing 13 cooperative Centres from eight Member States (China, Hungary, India, Japan, Korea, Russia, Ukraine and USA) and two International Organisations (NEA, IAEA). A summary of the meeting is given in this report along with the conclusions and actions.
In 2018, the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE-NNSA) began implementing dilute and dispose to remove 34 metric tons (MT) of surplus weapons grade plutonium from the US stockpile. Under this plan, surplus plutonium material is converted into plutonium oxide (PuO 2 ) before being stored in metal containers and sent to the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The dilute and dispose project was implemented as a more cost-effective method for abiding by the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) between the USA and Russia, as compared to producing mixed oxide fuel (MOX). The PMDA was originally signed in 2000 and amended in 2010.2 The disassembly of pits and conversion to PuO 2 as part of dilute and dispose is carried out through the Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) developed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The dilute portion of dilute and dispose is carried out at Savannah River Site (SRS). With this program in place, it is necessary to ensure the safe, long-term storage of the PuO 2 generated during this process until final disposal at WIPP is accomplished.
NREL evaluated rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) siting opportunities in the cities of Chernihiv and Lviv, Ukraine, leveraging very-high-resolution 3D elevation data to calculate technical potential. The study assessed total rooftop solar capacity and annual energy production. In Chernihiv and Lviv, 116,503 buildings were analyzed for their rooftop solar potential. The buildings in the study areas include a mixture of residential, commercial, and industrial buildings, characterized by diverse roof shapes and sizes. The total estimated rooftop solar capacity is 332 MWDC in Chernihiv and 873 MWDC in Lviv with annual energy production up to 376.2 GWhDC in Chernihiv and 995.5 GWhDC in Lviv. This accounting provides a clear estimate of the potential rooftop solar installations that could be realized under optimal conditions, considering both technical constraints and the geographic distribution of available rooftop space. Related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, NREL estimates loss from buildings damaged or destroyed of 2,754 buildings, 20.15 MWDC of capacity, and 22,869 MWhDC of annual energy production in Chernihiv as well as a loss of 1,316 buildings, 34.49 MWDC of capacity, and 39,369 MWhDC of annual energy production in Lviv. The study also assessed the feasibility of adapting this methodology on a national scale using either simulated digital surface models (DSMs) or a digital twin approach. While the very-high-resolution DSM provided more precise results, the simulated DSM demonstrated reasonable accuracy for broader applications in modeling aggregated distributed solar supply. The feasibility of using a digital twin for Ukraine's national rooftop solar potential is considered promising, with certain limitations in areas with highly variable building stock and heavy war damage.
This is the seventy-sixth in a series of semiannual technical progress reports on fusion materials science activity supported by the Fusion Energy Sciences Program of the U.S. Department of Energy. It covers the period ending June 30, 2024. This report focuses on research addressing the effects on materials properties and performance of exposure to the neutronic, thermal and chemical environments anticipated in the chambers of fusion experiments and energy systems. This research is a major element of the national effort to establish the materials knowledge base for an economically and environmentally attractive fusion energy source. Research activities on issues related to the interaction of materials with plasmas are reported separately. The results reported are the products of a national effort involving a number of national laboratories and universities. A large fraction of this work, particularly in relation to fission reactor irradiations, is carried out collaboratively with partners in Japan, Russia, and the European Union. The purpose of this series of reports is to provide a working technical record for the use of program participants, and to provide a means of communicating the efforts of fusion materials scientists to the broader fusion community, both nationally and worldwide. This report has been compiled by Stephanie Melton, Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Her efforts, and the efforts of the many persons who made technical contributions, are gratefully acknowledged.
The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.
Curation of the existing specimens, including Standard Operating Procedures: The Southern Urals Biophysics Institute (SUBI) will continue to manage the day-to-day operations of the biorepository, but will have to assume the financial costs of maintaining and purchasing equipment such as freezers; Standard Operating Procedures are already in place for all aspects of the operations, and the Georgetown University team will be available on a voluntary and ad hoc basis to answer any technical questions in the future. Acquisition and tracking of new specimens: SUBI will decide on the collection of new tissues and blood samples in the future, and on what scale, depending on available resources and research needs. The Georgetown University team is willing to provide advice on a voluntary and ad hoc basis. Procedures for receiving and approving specimen requests from users: SUBI can take over this function; Chris Loffredo and other qualified research scientists at Georgetown University would be willing to serve as Tissue Review Committee members on a voluntary and ad hoc basis. Biospecimens remaining at Georgetown University: pursuant to the original terms of the Biospecimen Transfer Agreement between SUBI and Georgetown University, all unused portions of specimens (FFPE blocks, slides, and frozen tissues) will be returned to SUBI at the conclusion of the approved scientific research for which they were transferred. It was anticipated that the return shipment of biospecimens would occur in the fall of 2023. However, at this time, due to international developments, there are no shipping companies who can provide such deliveries to Russia. For now, the biospecimens can remain at Georgetown University where they are stored at the Genomics and Epigenomics Shared Resource. There have not been any storage costs to date, but this could change in the future.