Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “SHUTDOWN”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 181 records · Page 10

Technical Analysis of Installed Micro-Combined Heat and Power Fuel-Cell System

Combined heat and power fuel cell systems (CHP-FCSs) provide consistent electrical power and hot water with greater efficiency and lower emissions than alternative sources. These systems can be used either as baseload, grid-connected, or as off-the-grid power sources. This report presents a technical analysis of 5 kWe CHP-FCSs installed in different locations in the U.S. At some sites as many as five 5 kWe system is used to provide up to 25kWe of power. Systems in this power range are considered “micro”-CHP-FCS. To better assess performance of micro-CHP-FCS and understand their benefits, the U.S. Department of Energy worked with ClearEdge Power to install fifteen 5-kWe PBI high temperature PEM fuel cells (CE5 models) in the commercial markets of California and Oregon. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory evaluated these systems in terms of their economics, operations, and technical performance. These units were monitored from September 2011 until June 2013. During this time, about 190,000 hours of data were collected and more than 17 billion data points were analyzed. Beginning in July 2013, ten of these systems were gradually replaced with ungraded systems (M5 models) containing phosphoric acid fuel cell technology. The new units were monitored until June 2014 until they went offline because ClearEdge was bought by Doosan at the time and the new manufacturer did not continue to support data collection and maintenance of these units. During these two phases, data was collected at once per second and data analysis techniques were applied to understand behavior of these systems. The results of this analysis indicate that systems installed in the second phase of this demonstration performed much better in terms of availability, consistency in generation, and reliability. The average net electrical power output increased from 4.1 to 4.9 kWe, net heat recovery from 4.7 to 5.4 kWth, and system availability improved from 94% to 95%. The average net system electric efficiency, average net heat recovery efficiency, and overall net efficiency of the system increased respectively from 33% to 36%, from 38% to 41%, and from 71% to 76%. The temperature of water sent to sit however reduced by about 16% from 51⁰C to 43 ⁰C. This was a control strategy and the temperature can be controlled depending on building heat demands. More importantly, the number of shutdowns and maintenance events required to keep the systems running at the manufacturer’s rated performance specifications were substantially reduced by about 76% (for 8 to 10 units running over a one-year period). From July 2012 to June 2013, there were eight CE5 units in operation and a total of 134 scheduled and unscheduled shutdowns took place. From July 2013 to June 2014, between two to ten units were in operation and only 32 shutdowns were reported (all unscheduled). In summary, the number of shutdowns reduced from 10 shutdowns per month on average for eight CE5units to an average of 2.7 shutdowns per month for M5 units (between two to ten units).

combined heat and power↗

Nuclear Industry Input to the Development of Concepts for the Consolidated Storage of Used Nuclear Fuel - 13411

EnergySolutions and its team partners, NAC International, Exelon Nuclear Partners, Talisman International, TerranearPMC, Booz Allen Hamilton and Sargent and Lundy, have carried out a study to develop concepts for a Consolidated Storage Facility (CSF) for the USA's stocks of commercial Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF), and the packaging and transport provisions required to move the UNF to the CSF. The UNF is currently stored at all 65 operating nuclear reactor sites in the US, and at 10 shutdown sites. The study was funded by the US Department of Energy and followed the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future (BRC), one of which was that the US should make prompt efforts to develop one or more consolidated storage facilities for commercial UNF. The study showed that viable schemes can be devised to move all UNF and store it at a CSF, but that a range of schemes is required to accommodate the present widely varying UNF storage arrangements. Although most UNF that is currently stored at operating reactor sites is in water-filled pools, a significant amount is now dry stored in concrete casks. At the shutdown sites, the UNF is dry stored at all but two of the ten sites. Various types of UNF dry storage configurations are used at the operating sites and shutdown sites that include vertical storage casks that are also licensed for transportation, vertical casks that are licensed for storage only, and horizontally orientated storage modules. The shutdown sites have limited to nonexistent UNF handling infrastructure and several no longer have railroad connections, complicating UNF handling and transport off the site. However four methods were identified that will satisfactorily retrieve the UNF canisters within the storage casks and transport them to the CSF. The study showed that all of the issues associated with the transportation and storage of UNF from all sites in the US can be accommodated by adopting a staged approach to the construction of the CSF. Stage 1 requires only a cask storage pad and railroad interface to be constructed, and the CSF can then receive the UNF that is in transportable storage casks. Stage 2 adds a canister handling facility, a storage cask fabrication facility and an expanded storage pad, and enables the receipt of all canistered UNF from both operating and shutdown sites. Stage 3 provides a repackaging facility with a water-filled pool that provides flexibility for a range of repackaging scenarios. This includes receiving and repackaging 'bare' UNF into suitable canisters that can be placed into interim storage at the CSF, and enables UNF that is being received, or already in storage onsite, to be repackaged into canisters that are suitable for disposal at a geologic repository. The study used the 'Total System Model' (TSM) to analyze a range of CSF capacities and operating scenarios with differing parameters covering UNF pickup orders, one or more CSF sites, CSF start dates, CSF receipt rates and geologic repository start dates. The TSM was originally developed to model movement of UNF to the Yucca Mountain repository and was modified for this study to enable the CSF to become the 'gateway' to a future geologic repository. The TSM analysis enabled costs to be estimated for each scenario and showed how these are influenced by each of the parameters. This information will provide essential underpinning for a future Conceptual Design preparation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Power Distribution Control Strategy of a Conceptual Soluble Boron Free SMR

In a commercial PWR, the two primary functions of control rods are to provide rapid shutdown and to control power distribution, whereas the initial excess reactivity associated with fuel loading is controlled by the soluble boron in the coolant and burnable absorbers. The required number of total control rods is determined by the shutdown margin of the reactor. The control rod grouping is also required to control power distribution. Therefore, removal of soluble boron requires extra reliance on the control rods to compensate excess reactivity. In a soluble boron free reactor which has highly negative MTC requires an increase in both worth and number of control rod assemblies to ensure adequate shutdown margin. In addition, since control rods are partially inserted into the reactor core, their presence adversely affects the power distribution and thus may make high peaking factors leading to an operating margin reduction. In this paper, the strategy of control rods operation to control excess reactivity and power distribution have been studied. Also, shutdown capability of the control rods was examined. A loading pattern for a Conceptual Soluble Boron Free Small Modular Reactor (CSBF-SMR) has been constructed. Two groups of regulating banks employ Ag-In-Cd to control excess reactivity and power distributions during the cycle operation and 1 group of shutdown bank made of B{sub 4}C were used.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Rigorous Two-Step Activation for Fusion Systems with PyNE - Paper 127

In fusion systems, high energy neutrons activate system components. After shutdown, the biological dose rate from photons emitted from these components must be estimated as a function of position and time for maintenance planning. High resolution results can be obtained using the mesh-based Rigorous Two-Step (R2S) method. A neutron transport simulation provides mesh-based neutron fluxes. Using these fluxes and an appropriate irradiation scenario, a nuclear inventory analysis code is used to determine the photon source density within each mesh volume element at any decay time after shutdown. The photon source density mesh is used as a source for photon transport. Photon fluxes are tallied at positions of interest and flux-to-dose rate conversion factors are used to estimate the biological dose rate. Previous work by the authors involved the creation of R2S-ACT, an open source R2S workflow, using the Direct Accelerated Geometry Monte Carlo (DAGMC) version of MCNP5 (DAG-MCNP5) for both transport steps and the ALARA nuclear inventory analysis code. Various use cases may require different combinations of transport and activation codes, and nearly all of the capabilities of R2S-ACT have broader utility. For these reasons, the individual components of R2S-ACT were reimplemented within PyNE. PyNE is a collaborative, trans-institutional, open source project consisting of Python, Cython, and C++ code pertinent to nuclear simulations and analysis. This work involved additions to the PyNE mcnp, mesh, material, alara, dagmc, and sampling modules. A lightweight r2s module was then added to connect the code from these modules. The r2s and sampling modules, together with DAG-MCNP5 and ALARA form a complete R2S workflow for obtaining shutdown dose rate results. Mesh operations, geometry discretization, physics code input/output parsing, and mesh-based source sampling capabilities have been added to PyNE generically, eliminating the need to duplicate this effort across multiple applications. The PyNE r2s module uses these capabilities to couple MCNP and ALARA to form an R2S workflow, which has been validated with the FNG shutdown dose rate benchmark. Future work will involve benchmarking the workflow using tetrahedral mesh and also non-analog sampling options. added so that they can be used interchangeably. This will allow for comparisons between results obtained by different physics codes with minimal human effort. Work will also be done to create and implement an importance sampling method for biasing neutron transport towards regions of phase space of high importance to photon dose rate tallies. This will improve the efficiency of obtaining shutdown dose rate results in large, highly-attenuating geometries. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Development and experimental qualification of novel disruption prevention techniques on DIII-D

Novel disruption prevention solutions spanning a range of control regimes are being developed and tested on DIII-D to enable ITER success. First, a new real-time control algorithm has been developed and tested for regulating nearness to stability limits and maintaining safety-margins. Its first application has been for reliable prevention of vertical displacement events (VDEs) by adjusting plasma elongation (κ) and the inner-gap between the plasma and inner-wall in response to real- time open-loop VDE growth rate (γ) estimators. VDEs were robustly prevented up to average open-loop growth rates of 800 rad/s with initial tunings, with only applying shape modification when near safety limits. Second, the disruption risk during fast, emergency shutdown after large tearing and locked modes can be significantly improved by transitioning to a limited topology during shutdown. More than 50% of emergency limited shutdowns after locked modes reach a final normalized current I_N < 0.3 before terminating, scaling to the 3 MA ITER requirement. Furthermore, this is in contrast to diverted shutdowns, the majority of which disrupt at I_N > 0.8. Despite improvements, these results highlight the critical importance of early prevention. Third, a novel emergency shut down method has been developed which excites instabilities to form a warm, helical core post-thermal quench. The current quench extends to ~100ms and avoids VDEs and runaway electron generation. Novel real-time machine learning disruption prediction has been integrated with the DIII-D proximity controller, and a real- time compatible multi-mode MHD spectroscopy technique has been developed. Results presented here were enabled by a focused effort, the Disruption Free Protocol, in DIII-D’s 2019-20 campaign to complement disruption prevention experiments with a large piggy-back program. In addition to testing novel techniques, it is estimated to have helped avoid 32 potential disruptions in piggyback operations with rapid, early shutdowns after large rotating n=1 or locked modes.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Development and experimental qualification of novel disruption prevention techniques on DIII-D

Novel disruption prevention solutions spanning a range of control regimes are being developed and tested on DIII-D to enable ITER success. First, a new real-time control algorithm has been developed and tested for regulating nearness to stability limits and maintaining safety-margins. Its first application has been for reliable prevention of vertical displacement events (VDEs) by adjusting plasma elongation (κ) and the inner-gap between the plasma and inner-wall in response to real- time open-loop VDE growth rate (γ) estimators. VDEs were robustly prevented up to average open-loop growth rates of 800 rad/s with initial tunings, with only applying shape modification when near safety limits. Second, the disruption risk during fast, emergency shutdown after large tearing and locked modes can be significantly improved by transitioning to a limited topology during shutdown. More than 50% of emergency limited shutdowns after locked modes reach a final normalized current I N < 0.3 before terminating, scaling to the 3 MA ITER requirement. This is in contrast to diverted shutdowns, the majority of which disrupt at I N > 0.8. Despite improvements, these results highlight the critical importance of early prevention. Third, a novel emergency shut down method has been developed which excites instabilities to form a warm, helical core post-thermal quench. The current quench extends to ~100ms and avoids VDEs and runaway electron generation. Novel real-time machine learning disruption prediction has been integrated with the DIII-D proximity controller, and a real- time compatible multi-mode MHD spectroscopy technique has been developed. Results presented here were enabled by a focused effort, the Disruption Free Protocol, in DIII-D’s 2019-20 campaign to complement disruption prevention experiments with a large piggy-back program. In addition to testing novel techniques, it is estimated to have helped avoid 32 potential disruptions in piggyback operations with rapid, early shutdowns after large rotating n=1 or locked modes.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Computational Analyses in Support of Sub-scale Diffuser Testing for the A-3 Facility: Unsteady Analyses and Risk Assessment - Part 2

Simulation technology can play an important role in rocket engine test facility design and development by assessing risks, providing analysis of dynamic pressure and thermal loads, identifying failure modes and predicting anomalous behavior of critical systems. This is especially true for facilities such as the proposed A-3 facility at NASA SSC because of a challenging operating envelope linked to variable throttle conditions at relatively low chamber pressures. Design Support of the feasibility of operating conditions and procedures is critical in such cases due to the possibility of startup/shutdown transients, moving shock structures, unsteady shock-boundary layer interactions and engine and diffuser unstart modes that can result in catastrophic failure. Analyses of such systems is difficult due to resolution requirements needed to accurately capture moving shock structures, shock-boundary layer interactions, two-phase flow regimes and engine unstart modes. In a companion paper, we will demonstrate with the use of CFD, steady analyses advanced capability to evaluate supersonic diffuser and steam ejector performance in the sub-scale A-3 facility. In this paper we will address transient issues with the operation of the facility especially at startup and shutdown, and assess risks related to afterburning due to the interaction of a fuel rich plume with oxygen that is a by-product of the steam ejectors. The primary areas that will be addressed in this paper are: (1) analyses of unstart modes due to flow transients especially during startup/ignition, (2) engine safety during the shutdown process (3) interaction of steam ejectors with the primary plume i.e. flow transients as well as probability of afterburning. In this abstract we discuss unsteady analyses of the engine shutdown process. However, the final paper will include analyses of a staged startup, drawdown of the engine test cell pressure, and risk assessment of potential afterburning in the facility. Unsteady simulations have been carried out to study the engine shutdown process in the facility and understand the physics behind the interactions between the steam ejectors, the test cell and the supersonic diffuser. As a first approximation, to understand the dominant unsteady mechanisms in the engine test cell and the supersonic diffuser, the turning duct in the facility was removed. As the engine loses power a rarefaction wave travels downstream that disrupts the shock cell structure in the supersonic diffuser. Flow from the test cell is seen to expand into the supersonic diffuser section and re-pressurizes the area around the nozzle along with a upstream traveling compression wave that emanates from near the first stage ejectors. Flow from the first stage ejector expands to the center of the duct and a new shock train is formed between the first and second stage ejectors. Both stage ejectors keep the facility pressurized and prevent any large amplitude pressure fluctuations from affecting the engine nozzle. The resultant pressure loads the nozzle experiences in the shutdown process are small.

Ahuja, Vineet↗

Network Flow Simulation of Fluid Transients in Rocket Propulsion Systems

Fluid transients, also known as water hammer, can have a significant impact on the design and operation of both spacecraft and launch vehicle propulsion systems. These transients often occur at system activation and shutdown. The pressure rise due to sudden opening and closing of valves of propulsion feed lines can cause serious damage during activation and shutdown of propulsion systems. During activation (valve opening) and shutdown (valve closing), pressure surges must be predicted accurately to ensure structural integrity of the propulsion system fluid network. In the current work, a network flow simulation software (Generalized Fluid System Simulation Program) based on Finite Volume Method has been used to predict the pressure surges in the feed line due to both valve closing and valve opening using two separate geometrical configurations. The valve opening pressure surge results are compared with experimental data available in the literature and the numerical results compared very well within reasonable accuracy (< 5%) for a wide range of inlet-to-initial pressure ratios. A Fast Fourier Transform is preformed on the pressure oscillations to predict the various modal frequencies of the pressure wave. The shutdown problem, i.e. valve closing problem, the simulation results are compared with the results of Method of Characteristics. Most rocket engines experience a longitudinal acceleration, known as "pogo" during the later stage of engine burn. In the shutdown example problem, an accumulator has been used in the feed system to demonstrate the "pogo" mitigation effects in the feed system of propellant. The simulation results using GFSSP compared very well with the results of Method of Characteristics.

Bandyopadhyay, Alak↗

Analysis of Second Target Station Target Removal Dose Rates

The Second Target Station (STS) project at Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s spallation neutron source is a crucial initiative for maintaining U.S. leadership in neutron sciences. The STS aims to create the world’s brightest pulsed cold neutron source, enabling cutting-edge research across various scientific disciplines. To ensure safe and efficient maintenance operations, understanding the effects of shutdown dose rates from activated components within the STS target systems is essential. This study establishes a computational framework for calculating decay gamma sources and subsequent shutdown dose rates utilizing advanced methods to account for all activation channels, including high-energy interactions down to thermal neutron capture. This study describes a novel integration of multiple tools and provides an effective means of analyzing activation and shutdown dose rates at spallation neutron facilities. A custom-developed script automates the decay gamma source generation process, ensuring proper sampling during the variance reduction phase, which is critical for accurate predictions of shutdown dose rates.

Transmutation↗

Stranded Fuel, Orphan Sites, Dead Plants: Transportation Planning Considerations After the BRC Report - 13393

The author explores transportation, packaging and storage questions related to a primary recommendation of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future; i.e., that fuel from shutdown plants be removed to consolidated storage as soon as possible to enable final decommissioning and beneficial re-use of those sites. The paper discusses the recommendations of the BRC, the implications and challenges that implementing those recommendations present, and provides recommended solutions for beginning the multi-year planning, coordination, material acquisition, and communications processes that will be needed to move fuel from shutdown plants when a destination site becomes available. Removal of used nuclear fuel from shutdown reactor sites (which are serving no other purpose other than storing SNF and GTCC, at considerable expense) was a central recommendation of the BRC, for a number of reasons. This recommendation was one of the most widely acclaimed that the Commission put forward. However, there are significant challenges (such as availability of fuel canister overpacks, lack of infrastructure, handling constraints and others) that will need to be addressed, apart from the critically important identification of a suitable and workable storage destination site. Resolving these logistical challenges will need to begin even before a destination site is identified, given the long lead-times required for planning and procurement. Based on information available today, it is possible to make informed predictions about what will be needed to modify existing contractual arrangements with utilities, address equipment and infrastructure needs, and begin working with states, tribes and local governments to start initial preparation needs. If DOE, working with industry and other experienced parties, can begin planning and acquisition activities in the near term, overall schedule risk can be reduced and potential cost avoidance achieved. The most immediate benefit will accrue to the operators of the shutdown plants, but beginning to accept fuel as required under the NWPA will reduce the liability to the federal government, and also offer some assurance to other utilities and the public that DOE (or another entity if one is established) is capable of meeting its obligations under the NWPA. The indirect benefits, therefore, will be quite broad. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Regulatory Framework for Permanent Shut-down and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plant in Korea - 18101

Kori Unit 1, the first commercial NPP in Korea which was commissioned in 1978, was put on permanent shutdown for decommissioning on June 2017, after 40 years of operation. For permanent shutdown of the Kori Unit 1, an operation change permit was submitted in 2016 prior to the expiration since the NSA (Nuclear Safety Act) recognizes permanent shutdown as one of the operation stage. In preparation for the decommissioning of Kori Unit 1, the NSA related to decommissioning was revised and promulgated in 2015. The lower statues including Enforcement Decree and Regulation of the NSA, etc. were promptly revised to reflect decommissioning related requirements and procedures accordingly. For new NPPs, preliminary decommissioning plan is submitted and is being reviewed in the course of license review. Operating NPPs are also planning to submit the decommissioning plan by 2018 and receive approvals from Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. In case that an operator intends to decommission a nuclear installation, the operator shall apply for decommissioning and receive an approval from the NSSC. As discussed, framework for permanent shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have been well formatted by successful revision of NSA in Korea. Further detailed technical standards and regulatory guides on decommissioning will be developed to facilitate the relevant activities and ensure the nuclear safety. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

An Unsteady State Gas Transport Model in Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) for PWR Gas Management

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hydrogen gas management can be a challenge at Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) during shutdown, startup, and steady state operation. Poor hydrogen control can result in higher general corrosion rates for RCS components and increases in critical path time for shutdown or startup. Also, performance indicator penalties may be accrued by entry into Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Action Level conditions or by accrual of Chemistry Effectiveness Index (CEI) penalties established by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO). Furthermore, poor hydrogen control may increase industrial safety risk due to the creation of an explosive environment. Part of the hydrogen management difficulty arises from the interaction of several phenomena that require complex simulations to fully understand. While hydrogen gas transport models have been developed, the application of these models is limited by the computational intensity required to accurately model the dynamism inherent in plant shutdown or startup. Subsequently, a gas transport model is developed in a suitable computational program to meet these needs and provide input to an optimized RCS hydrogen management strategy for all operational modes. The gas transport model is used to model RCS hydrogen behavior for an example PWR during an End of Cycle (EOC) Forced Outage (FO) startup, a refueling outage (RFO) shutdown, and during nominal steady state operation. The computational software selected is Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB{sup R})

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Applying AI/ML Techniques to U.S. Nuclear Operating Experience Program

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has provided technical assistance to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in reliability and risk analysis including the operating experience (OpE) program since the 1980s. The U.S. nuclear OpE program provides input parameters to the NRC Standardized Plant Analysis Risk models and the industry probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) models. While earlier PRA focuses were on at-power, internal event analysis, the risks from external hazards and during low power shutdown (LPSD) operation could be significant and the needs to develop LPSD PRA and external hazards PRA are on the rise. One issue in developing LPSD PRA is the reasonable estimation of shutdown initiative event (SDIE) frequencies. INL has developed and is maintaining an SDIE database for the NRC. However, this database is based on the reviewing of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), which is believed to be only a subset of “actual” shutdown initiating events occurred in the industry. This paper investigates a new approach to identify and characterize shutdown initiating events from the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) industry database using machine learning techniques. The main process in this approach is to find out the relationship between key words in event descriptions and the SDIE categories as in the NRC SDIE database. The relationship can then be applied to the INPO database and search for SDIEs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Method for Projecting Cloud Shadows Onto a Central Receiver Field to Predict Receiver Damage

This work demonstrates methods of mapping high-spatial-resolution direct normal irradiance (DNI) data from satellites, Total Sky Imagers (TSIs), and analogous data sources onto a heliostat field for characterizing the spatial and temporal variation of the incident flux on a central receiver tower during cloud transient events. The mapping methods are incorporated into an optical software module that interfaces with CoPylot–SolarPILOT’s python API– to provide computationally efficient optical simulation of the heliostat field and the solar power tower. Eventually, this optical model will be incorporated into optimization models whereby a plant operator can understand the effects of cloud transient events on overall power production and receiver lifetime due to creep-fatigue damage and therefore make better informed decisions about receiver shutdown events. By more accurately modelling the effects of cloud events on receiver flux maps, this work may determine the magnitude and frequency of thermal cycling on receiver tubes and panels using actual or realistic cloud shapes instead of averaged DNI values–which may undercount the total cycle number. This work may also prevent unnecessary plant shutdowns due to overly precautionary control strategies and characterize the relative impact of various cloud types on receiver life. We plan to eventually integrate this methodology into the System Advisor Model (SAM) to improve performance model accuracy during periods of cloudiness. In this paper, we demonstrate generating DNI maps and mapping them to a solar field in CoPylot using 10 m resolution data from publicly available Sentinel-2 satellite data over the Crescent Dunes plant.

Mullin, Matthew↗

Integrated Solutions for Interim Used Fuel Management: From Pool Unloading to Safe Delivery to Recycling or Repository Facilities - 17235

Safe management of used nuclear fuel (UNF) is key to the survival of the nuclear industry. That is why it is more important than ever to have a consent-based, practical, credible, and sustainable roadmap for managing the back-end of the nuclear cycle. Worldwide UNF Light Water Reactors (LWR) inventories are currently around 200,000 tons and are estimated to grow to more than 350,000 tons by 2030, and operating nuclear reactors in the U.S. continue to discharge UNF every 18 to 24 months. International experience has demonstrated that the development of a permanent geological repository can be a multi-decade process, especially in the face of public acceptance challenges. Meanwhile, the solution for permanent disposal of UNF in the U.S. is moving at a glacial pace. As a result, industrial stakeholders have been forced to find practical interim UNF storage solutions in order to continue safely operating their reactors. Among those interim solutions are the cask- or canister-based dry storage systems that have dramatically increased in the last 10 years as they provide flexibility for expansion with a low up-front investment. With interim dry storage in place for more than 30 years, our industry is entering a new phase as we are forced to prepare for a few more decades before geological repositories begin operating. Consequently, interim dry storage has to be extended for 80 years or more. Thus, new considerations have to be taken into account to ensure the safety of this stored used fuel: - Interim storage systems are aging; - High burn-up fuel behavior overtime is uncertain; - Used fuel is losing its self-protection; - The number of shutdown sites without a fuel transfer facility, such as a pool, is increasing; - Some owners of Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation (ISFSI) at shutdown sites are not nuclear operators anymore. With increasing uncertainties, AREVA TN -- based on its long expertise with used fuel transportation and interim storage systems -- is adapting its portfolio to develop integrated and flexible solutions that will remove the burden of interim used fuel management from nuclear operators. AREVA TN is developing comprehensive solutions to reduce risks including the continued supply of proven safe high-performance dry storage systems; on-site services to safely transfer used fuel from pool to pad; the optimization of fuel heat load in the storage pool and pad; innovative aging management services including inspection, monitoring and repair; a realistic solution for consolidated interim storage with a priority to remove Used Nuclear Fuel stored in dry storage systems from shutdown sites; world-class transport and logistics services to safely move the used fuel from nuclear reactor sites to consolidated storage and repository or recycling as applicable, and turnkey management of shutdown ISFSIs. Due to the lack of an available path for transporting used fuel away from reactors, nuclear operators are faced with many challenges and growing uncertainties. Our presentation will describe the practical solutions developed and being developed in order to manage used fuel on behalf of nuclear operators and allows them to continue focusing on the important job of producing carbon-free clean energy. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A New Consolidated Storage Facility for Used Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County, Texas - 16418

On February 6, 2015, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) announced its plan to file a license application with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF). Upon issuance of the license, WCS would be authorized to receive Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) and reactor related Greater Than Class C Low Level Radioactive Waste (referred hence forth as UNF) at the CISF in late 2020. WCS based its decision to license a CISF based on strong support from the State of Texas and the local community's willingness to host such a facility in Andrews County, Texas. WCS' decision to license a CISF in a supportive community is consistent with the consent-based licensing approach recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. WCS intends to use existing technology developed by AREVA and NAC International that have already been approved by the NRC to transport UNF from existing commercial nuclear reactors across the nation for interim storage at its 14,000 acre site in Andrew County, Texas. In the pre-application licensing meetings held with the NRC, WCS underscored that UNF would be removed first from the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites and transported to the CISF. Approximately eighty percent of the UNF currently residing at the shutdown decommissioned reactor sites can be safely placed into the storage systems developed by AREVA and NAC International that are currently licensed by the NRC. WCS plans to store up to 40,000 Metric Tons of Heavy Metal (MTHM) at the CISF that would be constructed in eight phases over the next 20 years. WCS intends to submit its license application for the CISF to the NRC by April 2016. The license application will request authorization to possess up to 5,000 MTHM of UNF for Phase One which can accommodate storing the fuel located at over ten shutdown decommissioned reactor sites. As discussed with the NRC, the license application will be developed following NRC regulatory guidance to comply with the technical requirements specified in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste. In addition, to filing the license application, WCS is also seeking legislative changes to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requiring the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to take title of the UNF at the commercial nuclear reactor sites. Under such legislative changes, the DOE would also be responsible for the transport of UNF to the CISF. In addition to preparing the CISF License Application, WCS and its partners AREVA and NAC International are prepared to work with DOE to facilitate the development of the UNF transportation infrastructure in the timeframe needed to support CISF operations. The WCS site and technical approach give it several advantages which uniquely position it to become the first successful commercial CISF in the U.S. These advantages include: broad consent-based support at the local, state, and Congressional level; an operating waste disposal site with an existing transportation infrastructure; and the use of already licensed systems to address 80% of the UNF currently in dry storage at shutdown sites in the U.S. WCS firmly believes this initiative will provide an economically viable option for consolidated interim storage of UNF until a permanent geologic repository becomes available. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

RBMK Neutron-Physical Characteristics and Nuclear Safety

The neutron-physical characteristics of RBMK at the Kursk, Leningradskaya, and Smolensk NPPs for 2015–2017, as determined from calculations of more than 6000 actual states at nominal power, are presented. The results of computational modeling of shutdown regimes upon actuation of the shutdown systems of the emergency protection and fast power reduction are presented. It is shown that the physical characteristics, efficiency, and fast response of the shutdown systems of the emergency protection and fast power reduction ensure the nuclear safety of RBMK. The effect of repair of the graphite stack with a sharp graphite blocks on the neutron-physical characteristics of the reactor is determined. It is shown that the removal of some of the graphite during the repair of 500–600 graphite columns results in a reduction of the steam coefficient of reactivity and partial or complete removal of additional absorbers from the core while maintaining the neutronic characteristics and nuclear safety of RBMK.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Preliminary analysis of loss-of-coolant accident in Fukushima nuclear accident

Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) in Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) especially on Fukushima Nuclear Accident will be discussed in this paper. The Tohoku earthquake triggered the shutdown of nuclear power reactors at Fukushima Nuclear Power station. Though shutdown process has been completely performed, cooling process, at much smaller level than in normal operation, is needed to remove decay heat from the reactor core until the reactor reach cold-shutdown condition. If LOCA happen at this condition, it will cause the increase of reactor fuel and other core temperatures and can lead to reactor core meltdown and exposure of radioactive material to the environment such as in the Fukushima Dai Ichi nuclear accident case. In this study numerical simulation has been performed to calculate pressure composition, water level and temperature distribution on reactor during this accident. There are two coolant regulating system that operational on reactor unit 1 at this accident, Isolation Condensers (IC) system and Safety Relief Valves (SRV) system. Average mass flow of steam to the IC system in this event is 10 kg/s and could keep reactor core from uncovered about 3,2 hours and fully uncovered in 4,7 hours later. There are two coolant regulating system at operational on reactor unit 2, Reactor Core Isolation Condenser (RCIC) System and Safety Relief Valves (SRV). Average mass flow of coolant that correspond this event is 20 kg/s and could keep reactor core from uncovered about 73 hours and fully uncovered in 75 hours later. There are three coolant regulating system at operational on reactor unit 3, Reactor Core Isolation Condenser (RCIC) system, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and Safety Relief Valves (SRV). Average mass flow of water that correspond this event is 15 kg/s and could keep reactor core from uncovered about 37 hours and fully uncovered in 40 hours later.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗