Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Safety assurance”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 181 records · Page 10

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - The Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther from Earth, spacecraft designs must optimize mass and volume while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) office develops, implements, and ensures compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability, and quality assurance. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program S&MA integration functions, and provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs.

Helen Vaccaro↗

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like NASA's Exploration Mission - 1 (EM-1) and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are becoming exceedingly complex in terms of software's contribution to achieving mission objectives. The increasing complexity and inherent safety critical nature of the embedded flight software imposes a unique resource challenge to assurance providers responsible for affirming that the mission is going to fly safely. Another challenge NASA and other Government agencies are facing is that more and more software is being developed using an agile development methodology, which is divergent from the typical waterfall, iterative, and incremental development methodologies assurance providers generally observe in the development of safety-critical embedded software. Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) has addressed these challenges by providing focused assurance results of critical mission capabilities prioritized by a dynamic assessment of risk level. Prior to this approach, Orion IV&V evaluated areas of risk in much broader, and more static, terms. Due to the agile software development life cycle that Orion follows, IV&V findings were often reported months out of phase with the developer thereby imposing increased rework costs. As a result of evolving the approach to adding assurance on Orion, IV&V is able to incrementally deliver high-priority assurance conclusions and more impactful issues more in phase with the developer activities, thereby increasing the value of the findings to the project. The agile IV&V approach employed by the Orion IV&V team strives to achieve a cadence of delivery that matches the pace of development. This agile approach provides increased flexibility for the assurance provider to become more efficient in reporting assurance conclusions and issues. This paper and presentation will discuss the principles which drive the design of our approach, results to date, and stimulate thinking for groups looking to add assurance to software being developed using an agile methodology.

Justin Smith↗

Integrating Safety and Mission Assurance into Systems Engineering Modeling Practices

During the early development of products, flight, or experimental hardware, emphasis is often given to the identification of technical requirements, utilizing such tools as use case and activity diagrams. Designers and project teams focus on understanding physical and performance demands and challenges. It is typically only later, during the evaluation of preliminary designs that a first pass, if performed, is made to determine the process, safety, and mission quality assurance requirements. Evaluation early in the life cycle, though, can yield requirements that force a fundamental change in design. This paper discusses an alternate paradigm for using the concepts of use case or activity diagrams to identify safety hazard and mission quality assurance risks and concerns using the same systems engineering modeling tools being used to identify technical requirements. It contains two examples of how this process might be used in the development of a space flight experiment, and the design of a Human Powered Pizza Delivery Vehicle, along with the potential benefits to decrease development time, and provide stronger budget estimates.

Requirements↗

Changing the S and MA [Safety and Mission Assurance] Paradigm

Objectives: 1) Optimize S&MA organization to best facilitate Shuttle transition in 2010, successfully support Ares developmental responsibilities, and minimize the impacts of the gap between last Shuttle flight and start of Ares V Project. 2) Improve leveraging of critical skills and experience between Shuttle and Ares. 3) Split technical and supervisory functions to facilitate technical penetration. 4) Create Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) stand-alone position for successfully implementation of S&MA Technical Authority. 5) Minimize disruption to customers. 6) Provide early involvement of S&MA leadership team and frequent/open communications with S&MA team members and steak-holders.

Malone, Roy W., Jr.↗

Testing of Advanced Capabilities to Enable In-time Safety Management and Assurance for Future Flight Operations

In order to refine an initial Concept of Operations, explore Concepts of Use, and expose/validate requirements for future In-Time Aviation Safety Management Systems (IASMS), testing architectures were created, along with a set of capabilities and underlying information exchange protocols. These systems were conceived and developed based on hazards associated with two envisioned urban area flight domains: (1) highly autonomous small uncrewed aerial systems (sUAS) operating at low altitudes, and (2) highly autonomous air taxis. The initial scope of this development is described in [1]; this report provides an update, focusing on the subsequent developments and test activities. As stated in [1], it is important to note that there are many capabilities already in use by the industry (or soon to be in use) that will play critical roles in future IASMS designs. Those reported here were developed to address a gap in the current state-of-the-art regarding specific hazards/risks, and/or to allow for investigation of the interplay between and across hazard types — particularly regarding how overall safety risk can be reduced or managed effectively. Results of testing and development activities are organized by the operational phase wherein a particular capability would be employed (i.e., preflight, in-flight, and post-flight/off-line). Pre-flight: A set of capabilities were developed to help mitigate safety risk prior to flight (e.g., during flight and mission planning). Results of testing summarize (1) validation activities to raise the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and (2) evaluation activities where the capabilities were applied to flight/mission planning procedures and used by operators/pilots. For the latter, flight plans were automatically assessed, and operators/pilots were notified of hazardous flight segments so as to enable adjustment of the flight plan and re-evaluation, and/or to better inform go/no-go decisions. Capabilities addressed hazards associated with power consumption, third-party risk, wind, navigation system performance, radiofrequency interference, and proximity to geo-spatial threats (e.g., buildings, trees, and no-fly zones). In-flight: Flight experiments tested capabilities that detect and respond to hazards encountered during flight. In the first series, safety hazards were monitored and assessed onboard, and system-generated mitigation maneuvers were recorded (but not acted upon by the vehicle). In the second series, mitigation maneuver commands directed the aircraft in response to safety hazards (i.e., auto-mitigation). The sUAS used for testing is described in full, as is the test architecture, which included commercial avionics, research avionics, and onboard software designed to detect, assess, and respond to hazards. The onboard system was designed as a run-time assurance framework, consistent with [2] and supportive of both supervisory and automated modes. The primary functions included: real-time risk assessment (RTRA), auto-pilot monitoring, constraint monitoring, and contingency select/triggering. RTRA performs integrated risk assessment considering data from several hazard-related monitors (e.g., battery, motors, navigation, communications, population density, and loss-of-control). Post-flight/off-line: Data monitored and recorded during flights can enable IASMS capabilities that execute after flights have completed (or “off-line”). These include: (1) the ability to identify anomalies and trends that may only be observable when comparing data spanning a number of similar flights; (2) the ability to update and validate pre-flight and in-flight capabilities and any underlying models to improve their performance; (3) the ability to report anomalies/off-nominals that may indicate design changes or maintenance actions are needed; and (4) the ability for humans involved in operations to report safety-relevant observations to help in understanding the flight data and/or the operational context of a flight. Progress on three such capabilities is summarized; the first investigates anomaly detection given a limited set of flight logs and applies an approach previously used for space operations. The second explores what could be identified using a larger set of flight logs, including from web-based forums where flight logs are posted by sUAS autopilot users. The third creates a new means of collecting information on UAS incidents and accidents via the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).

sUAS↗

NASA Nuclear Flight Safety – New Protocols for Safety and Mission Assurance

Over the past 4 years, the United States (U.S.) Government has issued several new National policies that fundamentally change the approach to nuclear flight safety for aerospace applications, including the complete revision of the Federal policy for handling launch of spacecraft containing space nuclear systems. In response, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is updating its nuclear flight safety program while still maintaining consistency with other Federal policies, international conventions, and NASA’s own policies. The recently-completed revision of the NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) document for nuclear flight safety is a key step in the evolution of NASA policy and practice in this area. This paper will briefly describe the more significant changes in the new NASA NPR.

Donald Helton↗

The NASA Commercial Crew Program (CCP) Shared Assurance Model for Safety

NASA established the Commercial Crew Program in order to provide human access to the International Space Station and low earth orbit via the commercial (nongovernmental) sector. A particular challenge to NASA is how to determine the commercial provider's transportation system complies with Programmatic safety requirements while at the same time allowing the provider the flexibility to demonstrate compliance. This will be accomplished through the use of Shared Assurance and Risk Based Assessment by NASA thus shifting more responsibility to the Provider. This model will be the focus of this presentation.

Programmatic safety requirements↗

Safety and Mission Assurance for In-House Design Lessons Learned from Ares I Upper Stage

This viewgraph presentation identifies lessons learned in the course of the Ares I Upper Stage design and in-house development effort. The contents include: 1) Constellation Organization; 2) Upper Stage Organization; 3) Presentation Structure; 4) Lesson-Importance of Systems Engineering/Integration; 5) Lesson-Importance of Early S&MA Involvement; 6) Lesson-Importance of Appropriate Staffing Levels; 7) Lesson-Importance S&MA Team Deployment; 8) Lesson-Understanding of S&MA In-Line Engineering versus Assurance; 9) Lesson-Importance of Close Coordination between Supportability and Reliability/Maintainability; 10) Lesson-Importance of Engineering Data Systems; 11) Lesson-Importance of Early Development of Supporting Databases; 12) Lesson-Importance of Coordination with Safety Assessment/Review Panels; 13) Lesson-Implementation of Software Reliability; 14) Lesson-Implementation of S&MA Technical Authority/Chief S&MA Officer; 15) Lesson-Importance of S&MA Evaluation of Project Risks; 16) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List and Government Mandatory Inspections; 17) Lesson-Implementation of Critical Items List Mandatory Inspections; 18) Lesson-Implementation of Test Article Safety Analysis; and 19) Lesson-Importance of Procurement Quality.

Anderson, Joel M.↗

Assuring NASA's Safety and Mission Critical Software

What is IV&V? Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) is an objective examination of safety and mission critical software processes and products. Independence: 3 Key parameters: Technical Independence; Managerial Independence; Financial Independence. NASA IV&V perspectives: Will the system's software: Do what it is supposed to do?; Not do what it is not supposed to do?; Respond as expected under adverse conditions?. Systems Engineering: Determines if the right system has been built and that it has been built correctly. IV&V Technical Approaches: Aligned with IEEE 1012; Captured in a Catalog of Methods; Spans the full project lifecycle. IV&V Assurance Strategy: The IV&V Project's strategy for providing mission assurance; Assurance Strategy is driven by the specific needs of an individual project; Implemented via an Assurance Design; Communicated via Assurance Statements.

Validation↗

Risk Classification and Risk-based Safety and Mission Assurance

Recent activities to revamp and emphasize the need to streamline processes and activities for Class D missions across the agency have led to various interpretations of Class D, including the lumping of a variety of low-cost projects into Class D. Sometimes terms such as Class D minus are used. In this presentation, mission risk classifications will be traced to official requirements and definitions as a measure to ensure that projects and programs align with the guidance and requirements that are commensurate for their defined risk posture. As part of this, the full suite of risk classifications, formal and informal will be defined, followed by an introduction to the new GPR 8705.4 that is currently under review.GPR 8705.4 lays out guidance for the mission success activities performed at the Classes A-D for NPR 7120.5 projects as well as for projects not under NPR 7120.5. Furthermore, the trends in stepping from Class A into higher risk posture classifications will be discussed. The talk will conclude with a discussion about risk-based safety and mission assuranceat GSFC.

Risk Management↗

Integrated Systems Health Management for Space Exploration

Integrated Systems Health Management (ISHM) is a system engineering discipline that addresses the design, development, operation, and lifecycle management of components, subsystems, vehicles, and other operational systems with the purpose of maintaining nominal system behavior and function and assuring mission safety and effectiveness under off-nominal conditions. NASA missions are often conducted in extreme, unfamiliar environments of space, using unique experimental spacecraft. In these environments, off-nominal conditions can develop with the potential to rapidly escalate into mission- or life-threatening situations. Further, the high visibility of NASA missions means they are always characterized by extraordinary attention to safety. ISHM is a critical element of risk mitigation, mission safety, and mission assurance for exploration. ISHM enables: In-space maintenance and repair; a) Autonomous (and automated) launch abort and crew escape capability; b) Efficient testing and checkout of ground and flight systems; c) Monitoring and trending of ground and flight system operations and performance; d) Enhanced situational awareness and control for ground personnel and crew; e) Vehicle autonomy (self-sufficiency) in responding to off-nominal conditions during long-duration and distant exploration missions; f) In-space maintenance and repair; and g) Efficient ground processing of reusable systems. ISHM concepts and technologies may be applied to any complex engineered system such as transportation systems, orbital or planetary habitats, observatories, command and control systems, life support systems, safety-critical software, and even the health of flight crews. As an overarching design and operational principle implemented at the system-of-systems level, ISHM holds substantial promise in terms of affordability, safety, reliability, and effectiveness of space exploration missions.

Uckun, Serdar↗

Crew safety

Crew safety in the manned spaceflight is usually associated with a small group for safety and quality assurance. Crew safety is actually an integral part of all program phases from conception through final implementation. Factors associated with improving safety at each phase of development are discussed. Topics discussed include design, manufacture, hardware/software checkout, management reviews, training and simulation, and data retrieval and analysis. Crew safety is best accomplished by flying a successful mission.

Slayton, D. K.↗

SiC vs. Si for High Radiation Environments: NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Commercial silicon carbide and silicon Schottky barrier power diodes have been subjected to 203 MeV proton irradiation and the effects of the resultant displacement damage on the I-V characteristics have been observed. Changes in forward bias I-V characteristics are reported for fluences up to 4 x 10(exp 14) p/cm2. For devices of both material types, the series resistance is observed to increase as the fluence increases. The changes in series resistance result from changes in the free carrier concentration due to carrier removal by the defects produced. A simple model is presented that allows calculation of the series resistance of the device and then relates the carrier removal rate to the changes in series resistance. Using this model to calculate the carrier removal rate in both materials reveals that the carrier removal rate in silicon is less than that in silicon carbide, indicating that silicon is the more radiation tolerant material.

Schottky barrier power diodes↗

JSC Safety and Mission Assurance Data Analysis Overview

These slides describe the data analysis methods that are used to determine inputs for probabilistic risk models supporting the Space Shuttle Program. Other applications can follow a similar path probably using different data sources. Statistical approaches are different and not addressed here. Topics included here: 1) Prior Distribution; 2) Likelihood Data; 3) Bayesian Updating; and 4) Uncertainty and Error. Note: This is a high-level discussion and is not intended to be a tutorial.

Roelant, Henk↗

Investigation of the Semicoa SCF9550 and the International Rectifier IRHM57260SE for Single-Event Gate Rapture and Single-Event Burnout : NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Office of Safety and Mission Assurance

Single-event-effect test results for hi-rel total-dose-hardened power MOSFETs are presented in this report. TheSCF9550 from Semicoa and the IRHM57260SE from International Rectifier were tested to NASA test condition/standards and requirements.The IRHM57260SE performed much better when compared to previous testing. These initial results confirm that parts from the Temecula line are marginally comparable to the El Segundo line. The SCF9550 from Semicoa was also tested and represents the initial parts offering from this vendor. Both parts experienced single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB). All of the SEGR was from gate to drain.

Single Event Gate Rupture↗