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DOE OSTI2025

Critical minerals lists for low-carbon transitions: Reviewing their structure, objectives, and limitations

Critical minerals lists have flourished in the past decade, in particular linked to the importance of critical minerals for low-carbon transitions. We identified 27 critical minerals or materials lists across 15 countries and the European Union (EU). These lists are designed to attract public and private attention and investments to secure both domestic and foreign supplies. This review article fills a gap in the existing literature by analyzing the ways in which these lists are defined and utilized by countries engaged in a mineral rush. We focus our attention on three categories of minerals – battery minerals, platinum-group metals (PGMs), and rare earth elements (REEs) that are particularly important to energy transitions. We situate this research in the broader legal and administrative developments that have driven critical minerals policies in the past decade. We provide an in-depth analysis of the commonalities and variations in the raw materials included in these lists, and identify six core limitations of critical minerals lists: (1) unclear links between criticality assessments and mineral prioritization (2) failure to account for the full mineral value-chain; (3) limited strategic alignment between allied nations; (4) limited flexibility in dynamic environments (5) limited consideration for recycling and by-product sourcing; and (6) reliance on incomplete reserve and resource data.

Battery minerals↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Comparing Pre-Launch Assumptions to In-Flight Navigation Performance of OSIRIS-REx

The Sample Return Capsule (SRC) onboard the NASA Origins, Spectral Inter-pretation, Resource Identification, and Security–Regolith Explorer (OSIRIS-REx)spacecraft is currently carrying samples of the B-type asteroid Bennu for safe re-turn to Earth at the Utah Test and Training Range on September 24, 2023. These samples were collected during the Touch And Go (TAG) sampling event on October 20, 2020, when the spacecraft contacted the surface for a few seconds at a location less than 1 meter from the target. The unprecedented navigation performance achieved during that event was the culmination of experience gained during two years of cruise and two years of increasingly challenging operation sat Bennu. As we had hoped, the proximity navigation performance at Bennu exceeded pre-launch analysis. This paper will compare the navigation performance through the proximity operation phases to our pre-launch analysis and will quantify how refinements of the small force models governing the spacecraft motion near Bennu considerably improved the down-track state predictions leading up to the successful TAG event. It was evident to the team and to expert peer reviewers during the design phase that exquisite model fidelity and aggressive operational concepts, which challenged and advanced the state of the art for deep space proximity operations, would be required to meet the mission’s objectives. This paper summarizes the superlative achievements of the team in rising to and overcoming these challenges.

Peter G Antresian↗

NASA NTRS2010

Materials Development: Pitfalls, Successes, and Lessons

The incorporation of new or improved materials in aerospace systems, or indeed any systems, can yield tremendous payoffs in the system performance or cost, and in many cases can be enabling for a mission or concept. However, the availability of new materials requires advance development, and too often this is neglected or postponed, leaving a project or mission with little choice. In too many cases, the immediate reaction is to use what was used before; this usually turns out not to be possible and results in large sums of money, and amounts of time, being expended on reinvention rather than development of a material with extended capabilities. Material innovation and development is time consuming, with some common wisdom claiming that the timeline is at least 20 years. This time expands considerably when development is stopped and restarted, or knowledge is lost. Down selection of materials is necessary, especially as the Technical Readiness Level (TRL) increases. However, the costs must be considered and approaches should be taken to retain knowledge and allow for restarting the development process. Regardless of the exact time required, it is clear that it is necessary to have materials, at all stages of development, in a research and development pipeline and available for maturation as required. This talk will discuss some of theses issues, including some of the elements for a development path for materials. Some history of materials developments will be included. The usefulness of computational materials science, as a route to decreasing material development time, will be an important element of this discussion. Collaboration with outside institutions and nations is also critical for innovation, but raises the issues of intellectual property and protections, and national security (ITAR rules, for example).

Johnson, Sylvia M.↗

DOE OSTI2026

Uinta Basin CarbonSAFE II: Storage Complex Feasibility (Final Report)

The primary objective of this CarbonSAFE Phase II project was to establish the technical and commercial feasibility of a commercial-scale CO 2 geological storage complex for Deseret Power Electric Cooperative Bonanza Power Plant and other CO 2 sources in the northeast Uinta Basin, Utah, with the goal to securely store at least 50 million metric tons of captured CO 2 and accelerate CO 2 capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) deployment. The project team established high-potential technical and commercial feasibility for a storage site within the east Uinta Basin (Utah), in the Cretaceous sandstones (Frontier, Dakota, and Buckhorn), Entrada Sandstone, Nugget Sandstone, and/or Weber Sandstone southwest of the Bonanza coal-fired power plant. This project collected and analyzed state-of-the-art data to characterize the storage complex consistent with Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) permitting standards. The team conducted extensive analog studies, outcrop mapping, and data sampling, which largely contributed to understanding the subsurface lithology and facies. Existing data were obtained and assessed from Utah Division of Oil, Gas, and Mining (DOGM), Utah Geological Survey (UGS), Colorado Geological Survey (CGS), U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), and EPA. These data were analyzed using state-of-the-art CCUS technologies for Societal Considerations, Site Characterization, Modeling and Simulations, Risk Assessment, Management and Monitoring, potential Underground Injection Control (UIC) Class VI Well Permitting, and Technical/Economic Feasibility. Through these high-resolution data collection and feasibility studies, this project was expected to provide a reference for initiating Underground Injection Control (UIC) and other commercial-scale geological storage permitting processes in the Western United States, ultimately contributing to the nation's decarbonization goals through low-risk, cost-effective commercial-scale carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) projects.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

International Coordination and Cooperation on LunaNet Spectrum

LunaNet is planned to be the network of networks operated by a set of cooperating organizations to provide interoperable Communications, networking, Position, Navigation, and Timing (CPNT) services to users on and around the Moon based on a framework of mutually agreed-upon standards, protocols, frequency bands and interface requirements. LunaNet follows a service-oriented architecture that is agnostic about the types of organizations that provide services, e.g., government, industry, or academia. LunaNet is open, scalable, resilient, secure, and extensible. To achieve these goals, LunaNet Service Providers (LNSP) must coordinate with each other to define and develop the architecture, to plan initial and evolved capabilities, and to operate their networks. One of the central LunaNet tenets is the use of shared spectrum. For example, the Lunar Augmented Navigation Service (LANS) acts like a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) such as the US Global Positioning System (GPS) or European Galileo but the LNSPs’ contributions to LunaNet must use the same frequency band (2483.5 MHz-2500.0 MHz) and transmit the same waveform synchronized by highly accurate clocks so that Users ‘see’ one virtual network and use the same multilateration algorithm to determine their positions. This necessitates a high degree of spectrum coordination. NASA’s Lunar and Human Spaceflight Spectrum Management Team has been actively supporting development of the LunaNet Interoperability Specification (LNIS), soliciting inputs from spectrum policy and planning experts across NASA, ESA and JAXA. Cislunar spectrum use considerations have been studied and adjudicated within the Space Frequency Coordination Group (SFCG) and inform the ongoing discussion of a lunar communication and navigation architecture within the existing radio regulatory framework of the International Telecommunication Union, leading to the 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-27). The frequency plan contained in the publicly released draft of the LunaNet Interoperability Specification reflects the initial phase of exploration (roughly to 2030) defining an optimal set of radio frequencies in appropriately allocated services consistent with WRC-23 decisions for use by known or planned CPNT applications, while striving to maximize coexistence and compatibility amongst cislunar systems and other systems within the near-Earth regime (< 2 million km from Earth). Important considerations include: protection of extremely sensitive receive-only radio astronomy systems on the lunar far side, known as the Shielded Zone of the Moon (SZM); compatibility between Direct with Earth (DWE) communications links and links needed to support relay satellites in lunar orbit with their customer systems on orbit or on the lunar surface; compatibility between multiple lunar surface communications systems and capabilities over varied and challenging terrain and distances; as well as ensuring compatibility and interoperability between navigation systems which either leverage Earth-based or in-situ lunar systems. In addition, the lunar CPNT architecture is envisioned to be the basis – with adjustments – of the future Mars CPNT architecture as we expand into the solar system using Interplanetary Networking (IPN). The second phase of lunar spectrum definition will address planned international capabilities for the next decade that will require action at WRC-27 and beyond. This paper will discuss each of these considerations in more depth and how the current LunaNet frequency plan addresses them.

LunaNet↗

NASA NTRS2002

SHEEP: The Search for the High Energy Extragalactic Population

We present the SHEEP survey for serendipitously-detected hard X-ray sources in ASCA GIS images. In a survey area of approx. 40 sq deg, 69 sources were detected in the 5-10 keV band to a limiting flux of approx. 10(exp -13) erg/sq cm/s. The number counts agree with those obtained by the similar BeppoSAX HELLAS survey, and both are in close agreement with ASCA and BeppoSAX 2-10 keV surveys. Spectral analysis of the SHEEP sample reveals that the 2-10 and 5-10 keV surveys do not sample the same populations, however, as we find considerably harder spectra, with an average Gamma approx. 1.0 assuming no absorption. The implication is that the agreement in the number counts is coincidental, with the 5-10 keV surveys gaining approximately as many hard sources as they lose soft ones, when compared to the 2-10 keV surveys. This is hard to reconcile with standard AGN "population synthesis" models for the X-ray background, which posit the existence of a large population of absorbed sources. We find no evidence of the population hardening at faint fluxes, with the exception that the few very brightest objects are anomalously soft. 53 of the SHEEP sources have been covered by ROSAT in the pointed phase. Of these 32 were detected. An additional 3 were detected in the RASS. As expected the sources detected with ROSAT are systematically softer than those detected with ASCA alone, and of the sample as a whole. Although they represent a biased subsample, the ROSAT positions allow relatively secure catalog identifications to be made. We find associations with a wide variety of AGN and a few clusters and groups. At least two X-ray sources identified with high-z QSOs present very hard X-ray spectra indicative of absorption, despite the presence of broad optical lines. A possible explanation for this is that we are seeing relatively dust-free "warm absorbers" in high luminosity/redshift objects. Our analysis defines a new, hard X-ray selected sample of objects - mostly active galactic nuclei - which is less prone to bias due to obscuration than previous optical or soft X-ray samples. They are therefore more representative of the population of AGN in the universe in general, and the SHEEP survey should produce bright examples of the sources that make up the hard X-ray background, the majority of which has recently been resolved by Chandra. This should help elucidate the nature of the new populations.

Nandra, K.↗

NASA NTRS2003

Case for Deploying Complex Systems Utilizing Commodity Components

When the International Space Station (ISS) finally reached an operational state, many of the Payload Operations and Integration Facility (POIF) hardware components were reaching end of life, COTS product costs were soaring, and the ISS budget was becoming severely constrained. However, most requirement development was complete. In addition, the ISS program is a fully functioning program with at least fifteen years of operational life remaining. Therefore it is critical that any upgrades, refurbishments, or enhancements be accomplished in realtime with minimal disruptions to service. For these and other reasons, it was necessary to ensure the viability of the POIF. Due to the to the breadth of capability of the POIF (a NASA ground station), it is believed that the lessons to be learned by other complex systems are applicable and any solutions garnered by the POIF are applicable to other complex systems as well. With that in mind, a number of new approaches have been investigated to increase the portability of the POIF and reduce the cost of refurbishment, operations, and maintenance. These new approaches were directed at the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO); not only the refurbishment but also current operational difficulties, licensing, and anticipation of the next refurbishment. Our basic premise is that technology had evolved dramatically since the concept of the POIF ground system and we should leverage our experience on this new technological landscape. Fortunately, Moore's law and market forces have changed the landscape considerably. These changes are manifest in five (5) ways that are particularly relevant to POIF: 1. Complex Instruction Set Computing (CISC) processors have advanced to unprecedented levels of compute capacity with a dramatic cost break, 2. Linux has become a major operating system supported by most vendors on a broad range of platforms, 3. Windows(TradeMark) based desktops are pervasive in the office environment, 4. Stable and affordable WindowsTM development environments and tools are available and offer a rich set of capabilities, 5. The WindowsTM 2000 provides a stable client platform, Therefore, five studies were proposed, developed, and are in the current process of deployment which dramatically reduces the cost of operations, maintenance, refurbishment, and deployment of a ground system. Restating and refining the basic premise stated earlier, it is possible to enhance operations through the replacement of hardware and software components with commodity based items wherever applicable. This will dramatically reduce the overall lifecycle cost of the project. The first study leveraged the POIF S secure, three-tier, web architecture to replace the client workstations with lower cost PC platforms. A second study initiated a review of COTS products to examine the level of added value of each product. This study included replacement of some COTS products with custom code, deletions, substitutions, and consolidation of COTS products. Studies three and four reviewed the server architectures of the data distribution systems and Enhanced HOSC System (EHS) command and telemetry system to propose migration to new platforms, both software and hardware. The final study reviewed current IP communication technologies, developed an operational model for flight operations, and demonstrated that voice over IP was practical and could be integrated into operations.

Bryant, Barry S.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Regulatory Considerations for Future Regional Air Mobility Aircraft

Regional Air Mobility (RAM) is a term that is used to describe equitable, economical, and environmentally friendly access to air commerce at local airports. The term “regional” can imply a wide range of aircraft payload and/or number of passengers carried, types of airports served, distances between aircraft origin/destination pairs, crew requirements, runways lengths, required energy reserves, and much more. This paper describes the regulations and other considerations that apply to RAM operations in the conterminous United States and defines a notional set of requirements to apply to a planned NASA study on RAM aircraft sizing. These notional requirements include: (1) a payload sufficient to carry up to nine passengers or equivalent cargo, (2) nominal distances between the origin and destination of at least 100 miles, with 300 miles desired, (3) ability to operate from a runway that is no more than 3,364 ft in length at a density altitude of 3,100 ft, with a desire for a 2,665 ft runway at 4,100 ft density altitude, and (4) energy reserves at least sufficient for 45 minutes of operation at normal cruise power, with a desire for energy reserves that also include diversion to an alternate airport at least 50 nautical miles away. Aircraft that meet these desired capabilities will be able to provide commercial access to at least 2,507 airports in the conterminous United States without revision to airworthiness, operating, or security regulations.

Nicholas K Borer↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Regulatory Considerations for Future Regional Air Mobility Aircraft

Nicholas K Borer↗

DOE OSTI2026

An Overview of Potential Future Aviation Energy Carriers

Global jet fuel demand is projected to grow to 165 billion gallons by 2050 and there is growing interest in the aviation industry to understand the capabilities of alternative energy carriers. This report considers several potential energy carriers, reviewing their production potential, operational considerations, and economic implications to inform potential next steps in aeronautics research. The following energy carriers (i.e., fuels) were evaluated in this study for future use in aviation: sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) - both biomass-based and power-to-liquids (PtL) - based SAF - cryogenic hydrogen (LH 2 ) - also known as liquid hydrogen - liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied ethane (LE), and Jet X. The barriers and opportunities for the evaluated energy carriers vary. SAF is a commercially available drop-in fuel compatible with existing aircraft and infrastructure. SAF is limited by both higher prices and slow commercialization of multiple pathways using different feedstocks necessary to significantly grow supply. Cryogenic fuels, in contrast, have very different thermal, physical, and chemical properties than SAF and Jet A, requiring the construction of new airport storage and dispensing infrastructure and the design of new aircraft energy systems capable of mitigating heat transfer and boil-off. Cryogenic fuels offer an opportunity to diversify aviation fuel carriers from domestic energy relevant for both energy security and resilience. This means cryogenic fuels are more of a longer-term solution for aircraft but are worth exploring for potential future cost savings and emissions benefits. Jet X refers to non-drop-in liquid hydrocarbon fuels in the early stages of investigation seeking favorable properties. There are substantial barriers to non-drop-in liquid aviation fuels that are not compatible with existing aircraft and fuel infrastructure.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

NASA NTRS1966

Histopathology of the Chimpanzee Ear

Four female and two male chimpanzees were secured in various positions on a Daisy Decelerator and subjected to forces ranging from 54 to 180 G. It was found that forces in excess of 54 G may rupture the tympanic membranes and cause subepithelial hemorrhages in the middle ear. The majority of cases showed proteinaceous material, with or without cells in the petrous air spaces. When exposed to forces above 119 G, there was engorgement and often rupture of the pericarotid venous plexus. When supine, distortion of both superior and posterior semicircular canals was found. With forces in excess of 54 G, the cupulae of the cristae ampullaris were either elevated or destroyed. The hair processes were also often broken off. The otolithic membranes, especially of the maculae utriculi were also elevated or otherwise distorted and the saccule was often partially collapsed. In several instances, there was an overabundance of a proteinaceous substance in the lumina of the vestibular apparatus and in the cochlear ducts with their associated scalae. In half the cases, the cochlear duct was narrowed by the depression of the vestibular membrane. Although there seems to be considerable individual variation in ability to withstand these forces, neither age, sex nor weight appear to directly influence the results. The possible sources for the materials found both in the air cells and labyrinth are discussed.

ACCELERATION TOLERANCE↗

NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification Validation (IVV) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety and Mission Assurance defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domaincomponent, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IVV enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

Fault management↗

NASA NTRS2017

Risk-Significant Adverse Condition Awareness Strengthens Assurance of Fault Management Systems

As spaceflight systems increase in complexity, Fault Management (FM) systems are ranked high in risk-based assessment of software criticality, emphasizing the importance of establishing highly competent domain expertise to provide assurance. Adverse conditions (ACs) and specific vulnerabilities encountered by safety- and mission-critical software systems have been identified through efforts to reduce the risk posture of software-intensive NASA missions. Acknowledgement of potential off-nominal conditions and analysis to determine software system resiliency are important aspects of hazard analysis and FM. A key component of assuring FM is an assessment of how well software addresses susceptibility to failure through consideration of ACs. Focus on significant risk predicted through experienced analysis conducted at the NASA Independent Verification & Validation (IV&V) Program enables the scoping of effective assurance strategies with regard to overall asset protection of complex spaceflight as well as ground systems. Research efforts sponsored by NASAs Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA) defined terminology, categorized data fields, and designed a baseline repository that centralizes and compiles a comprehensive listing of ACs and correlated data relevant across many NASA missions. This prototype tool helps projects improve analysis by tracking ACs and allowing queries based on project, mission type, domain/component, causal fault, and other key characteristics. Vulnerability in off-nominal situations, architectural design weaknesses, and unexpected or undesirable system behaviors in reaction to faults are curtailed with the awareness of ACs and risk-significant scenarios modeled for analysts through this database. Integration within the Enterprise Architecture at NASA IV&V enables interfacing with other tools and datasets, technical support, and accessibility across the Agency. This paper discusses the development of an improved workflow process utilizing this database for adaptive, risk-informed FM assurance that critical software systems will safely and securely protect against faults and respond to ACs in order to achieve successful missions.

IV&V↗

NASA NTRS2014

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

NASA NTRS2019

Advancing the Standards for Unmanned Air System Communications, Navigation and Surveillance

Under NASA program NNA16BD84C, new architectures were identified and developed for supporting reliable and secure Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) needs for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) operating in both controlled and uncontrolled airspace. An analysis of architectures for the two categories of airspace and an implementation technology readiness analysis were performed. These studies produced NASA reports that have been made available in the public domain and have been briefed in previous conferences. We now consider how the products of the study are influencing emerging directions in the aviation standards communities. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Communications Panel (CP), Working Group I (WG-I) is currently developing a communications network architecture known as the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network with Internet Protocol Services (ATN/IPS). The target use case for this service is secure and reliable Air Traffic Management (ATM) for manned aircraft operating in controlled airspace. However, the work is more and more also considering the emerging class of airspace users known as Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), which refers to certain UAS classes. In addition, two Special Committees (SCs) in the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) are developing Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) and Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for UAS. RTCA SC-223 is investigating an Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) and AeroMACS aviation data link for interoperable (INTEROP) UAS communications. Meanwhile, RTCA SC-228 is working to develop Detect And Avoid (DAA) equipment and a Command and Control (C2) Data Link MOPS establishing LBand and C-Band solutions. These RTCA Special Committees along with ICAO CP WG/I are therefore overlapping in terms of the Communication, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) alternatives they are seeking to provide for an integrated manned- and unmanned air traffic management service as well as remote pilot command and control. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts developed under the NASA program that apply to all three of the aforementioned committees. It discusses the similarities and differences in the problem spaces under consideration in each committee, and considers the application of a common set of CNS alternatives that can be widely applied. As the works of these committees progress, it is clear that the overlap will need to be addressed to ensure a consistent and safe framework for worldwide aviation. In this study, we discuss similarities and differences in the various operational models and show how the CNS architectures developed under the NASA program apply.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗

NASA NTRS2015

The OSIRIS-REx Asteroid Sample Return Mission Operations Design

OSIRIS-REx is an acronym that captures the scientific objectives: Origins, Spectral Interpretation, Resource Identification, and Security-Regolith Explorer. OSIRIS-REx will thoroughly characterize near-Earth asteroid Bennu (Previously known as 1019551999 RQ36). The OSIRIS-REx Asteroid Sample Return Mission delivers its science using five instruments and radio science along with the Touch-And-Go Sample Acquisition Mechanism (TAGSAM). All of the instruments and data analysis techniques have direct heritage from flown planetary missions. The OSIRIS-REx mission employs a methodical, phased approach to ensure success in meeting the mission's science requirements. OSIRIS-REx launches in September 2016, with a backup launch period occurring one year later. Sampling occurs in 2019. The departure burn from Bennu occurs in March 2021. On September 24, 2023, the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) lands at the Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR). Stardust heritage procedures are followed to transport the SRC to Johnson Space Center, where the samples are removed and delivered to the OSIRIS-REx curation facility. After a six-month preliminary examination period the mission will produce a catalog of the returned sample, allowing the worldwide community to request samples for detailed analysis. Traveling and returning a sample from an Asteroid that has not been explored before requires unique operations consideration. The Design Reference Mission (DRM) ties together spacecraft, instrument and operations scenarios. Asteroid Touch and Go (TAG) has various options varying from ground only to fully automated (natural feature tracking). Spacecraft constraints such as thermo and high gain antenna pointing impact the timeline. The mission is sensitive to navigation errors, so a late command update has been implemented. The project implemented lessons learned from other "small body" missions. The key lesson learned was 'expect the unexpected' and implement planning tools early in the lifecycle. This paper summarizes the ground and spacecraft design as presented at OSIRIS-REx Critical Design Review(CDR) held April 2014.

mission operations↗