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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2005

Space Shuttle Operations and Infrastructure: A Systems Analysis of Design Root Causes and Effects

This NASA Technical Publication explores and documents the nature of Space Shuttle operations and its supporting infrastructure and addresses fundamental questions often asked of the Space Shuttle program why does it take so long to turnaround the Space Shuttle for flight and why does it cost so much? Further, the report provides an overview of the cause-and effect relationships between generic flight and ground system design characteristics and resulting operations by using actual cumulative maintenance task times as a relative measure of direct work content. In addition, this NASA TP provides an overview of how the Space Shuttle program's operational infrastructure extends and accumulates from these design characteristics. Finally, and most important, the report derives a set of generic needs from which designers can revolutionize space travel from the inside out by developing and maturing more operable and supportable systems.

McCleskey, Carey M.↗
NASA NTRS2005

STS-114: Discovery Launch Readiness Press Conference

This press conference, attended by representatives from the national, Florida, and aerospace media, addresses launch, weather, and safety issues related to Space Shuttle Discovery prior to its launch on the STS-114 Return to Flight mission. The Master of Ceremonies is George Diller from NASA Public Affairs, and the panelists are: Space Shuttle Program Manager Bill Parsons, ISS Program Manager (JSC) Bill Gerstenmaier, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager Wayne Hale, Director of Shuttle Processing Mike Wetmore, ISS Program Manager (JAXA) Dr. Kuniaki Shiraki, and Launch Weather Officer (USAF) Mindy Chavez. Questions included the following topics: predicted weather conditions at launch, contingency rescue plans, countdown procedures, and risk management, as well as implications of the Return to Flight for the International Space Station (ISS).

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1973

The Space Shuttle test program.

Development, qualification, acceptance, horizontal-flight, and vertical-flight tests of the Space Shuttle are described in keeping with the schedule in which they are to be carried out prior to the Orbiter system becoming operational. Test goals, required facilities, and procedures to be employed are outlined, and tables list specific subsystems of the Orbiter, solid rocket motor, and drop tank elements to be checked out in the flight tests.

Frazer, R. R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

STS-121/Discovery Preflight Briefing Program Overview

Wayne Hale (Space Shuttle Program Manager) opens with a short video of the external tank operation and the Shuttle roll out to the launch pad. Kirk Shireman (International Space Station Program Deputy Manager) shows a video of International Space Station activities which included replacement of the remote power switch, unloading of cargo, Earth observation (over 23,000 photos taken), exercises, and replacement of the Camera during a spacewalk.

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NASA NTRS2000

STS-101: Atlantis Orbiter Upgrade Briefing

Live footage shows panelists, Manager of the Space Shuttle Program Development, Elric McHenry, and the Associate Program Manager for Space Shuttle Upgrades, Andy Allen, giving an overview of the new upgrades on the STS-101 Orbiter. McHenry and Allen speaks about the changes and modernization of Atlantis. The panelists' mentions all the new capabilities of the new glass cockpit. They emphasize the redesign of the engine, specifically, the ability to shut down automatically. They also discuss future implementation of a smart cockpit.

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NASA NTRS1992

Shared visions: Partnership of Rockwell International and NASA Cost Effectiveness Enhancements (CEE) for the space shuttle system integration program

As a result of limited resources and tight fiscal constraints over the past several years, the defense and aerospace industries have experienced a downturn in business activity. The impact of fewer contracts being awarded has placed a greater emphasis for effectiveness and efficiency on industry contractors. It is clear that a reallocation of resources is required for America to continue to lead the world in space and technology. The key to technological and economic survival is the transforming of existing programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program, into more cost efficient programs so as to divert the savings to other NASA programs. The partnership between Rockwell International and NASA and their joint improvement efforts that resulted in significant streamlining and cost reduction measures to Rockwell International Space System Division's work on the Space Shuttle System Integration Contract is described. This work was a result of an established Cost Effectiveness Enhancement (CEE) Team formed initially in Fiscal Year 1991, and more recently expanded to a larger scale CEE Initiative in 1992. By working closely with the customer in agreeing to contract content, obtaining management endorsement and commitment, and involving the employees in total quality management (TQM) and continuous improvement 'teams,' the initial annual cost reduction target was exceeded significantly. The CEE Initiative helped reduce the cost of the Shuttle Systems Integration contract while establishing a stronger program based upon customer needs, teamwork, quality enhancements, and cost effectiveness. This was accomplished by systematically analyzing, challenging, and changing the established processes, practices, and systems. This examination, in nature, was work intensive due to the depth and breadth of the activity. The CEE Initiative has provided opportunities to make a difference in the way Rockwell and NASA work together - to update the methods and processes of the organizations. The future success of NASA space programs and Rockwell hinges upon the ability to adopt new, more efficient and effective work processes. Efficiency, proficiency, cost effectiveness, and teamwork are a necessity for economic survival. Continuous improvement initiatives like the CEE are, and will continue to be, vehicles by which the road can be traveled with a vision to the future.

Bejmuk, Bohdan I.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from Shuttle Payload Verification Loads Analysis

When a system experiences a loading environment characterized by rapidly varying forces, such as a rocket launch, a transient analysis is used to analyze the response of the system. The most common transient analysis methodology is the Coupled Loads Analysis (CLA). CLAs are used by the automotive and aerospace industry to analyze cars, trucks, planes, helicopters, spacecraft, etc. The Space Shuttle program also uses the CLA methodology to assess the compatibility of the payload with the Orbiter and the flight environment. The Space Shuttle Verification Loads Analysis (VLA) was a standardized process that started between ten and thirteen months prior to launch, and included several meetings as well as analysis by both the Shuttle Program and the payload developers. Over the course of the Space Shuttle Program, many improvements were made to the process which helped to reduce cycle time and improve manifest flexibility. There were also several issues which were never properly addressed, but a work-around would be developed to keep the process flowing. The lessons learned included automation of some processes and standardization of others, early assessments, improved documentation and better coordination with all stakeholders in the process. Lessons learned also included the limitations in the current process, and what needs to be planned for in the future to avoid the same issues.

Bruno, Erica↗
NASA NTRS2015

SSME to RS-25: Challenges of Adapting a Heritage Engine to a New Vehicle Architecture

Following the cancellation of the Constellation program and retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA initiated the Space Launch System (SLS) program to provide next-generation heavy lift cargo and crew access to space. A key constituent of the SLS architecture is the RS-25 engine, also known as the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). The RS-25 was selected to serve as the main propulsion system for the SLS core stage in conjunction with the solid rocket boosters. This selection was largely based on the maturity and extensive experience gained through 135 missions, 3000+ ground tests, and over a million seconds total accumulated hot-fire time. In addition, there were also over a dozen functional flight assets remaining from the Space Shuttle program that could be leveraged to support the first four flights. However, while the RS-25 is a highly mature system, simply unbolting it from the Space Shuttle boat-tail and installing it on the new SLS vehicle is not a "plug-and-play" operation. In addition to numerous technical integration details involving changes to significant areas such as the environments, interface conditions, technical performance requirements, operational constraints and so on, there were other challenges to be overcome in the area of replacing the obsolete engine control system (ECS). While the magnitude of accomplishing this effort was less than that needed to develop and field a new clean-sheet engine system, the path to the first flight of SLS has not been without unexpected challenges.

Ballard, Richard O.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Implementation of the Orbital Maneuvering Systems Engine and Thrust Vector Control for the European Service Module

The European Space Agency (ESA) has entered into a partnership with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to develop and provide the Service Module (SM) for the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program. The European Service Module (ESM) will provide main engine thrust by utilizing the Space Shuttle Program Orbital Maneuvering System Engine (OMS-E). Thrust Vector Control (TVC) of the OMS-E will be provided by the Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) TVC, also used during the Space Shuttle Program. NASA will be providing the OMS-E and OMS TVC to ESA as Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to integrate into the ESM. This presentation will describe the OMS-E and OMS TVC and discuss the implementation of the hardware for the ESM.

Orbital Maneuvering System↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Final Count Down: A Review of Three Decades of Flight Controller Training Methods for Space Shuttle Mission Operations

Operations of human spaceflight systems is extremely complex, therefore the training and certification of operations personnel is a critical piece of ensuring mission success. Mission Control Center (MCC-H), at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, in Houston, Texas manages mission operations for the Space Shuttle Program, including the training and certification of the astronauts and flight control teams. As the space shuttle program ends in 2011, a review of how training for STS-1 was conducted compared to STS-134 will show multiple changes in training of shuttle flight controller over a thirty year period. This paper will additionally give an overview of a flight control team s makeup and responsibilities during a flight, and details on how those teams have been trained certified over the life span of the space shuttle. The training methods for developing flight controllers have evolved significantly over the last thirty years, while the core goals and competencies have remained the same. In addition, the facilities and tools used in the control center have evolved. These changes have been driven by many factors including lessons learned, technology, shuttle accidents, shifts in risk posture, and generational differences. A primary method used for training Space Shuttle flight control teams is by running mission simulations of the orbit, ascent, and entry phases, to truly "train like you fly." The reader will learn what it is like to perform a simulation as a shuttle flight controller. Finally, the paper will reflect on the lessons learned in training for the shuttle program, and how those could be applied to future human spaceflight endeavors.

Dittemore, Gary D.↗
NASA NTRS2012

An Analysis of Shuttle Crew Scheduling Violations

From the early years of the Space Shuttle program, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Shuttle crews have had a timeline of activities to guide them through their time on-orbit. Planners used scheduling constraints to build timelines that ensured the health and safety of the crews. If a constraint could not be met it resulted in a violation. Other agencies of the federal government also have scheduling constraints to ensure the safety of personnel and the public. This project examined the history of Space Shuttle scheduling constraints, constraints from Federal agencies and branches of the military and how these constraints may be used as a guide for future NASA and private spacecraft. This was conducted by reviewing rules and violations with regard to human aerospace scheduling constraints, environmental, political, social and technological factors, operating environment and relevant human factors. This study includes a statistical analysis of Shuttle Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) related violations to determine if these were a significant producer of constraint violations. It was hypothesized that the number of SCSC violations caused by EVA activities were a significant contributor to the total number of violations for Shuttle/ISS missions. Data was taken from NASA data archives at the Johnson Space Center from Space Shuttle/ISS missions prior to the STS-107 accident. The results of the analysis rejected the null hypothesis and found that EVA violations were a significant contributor to the total number of violations. This analysis could help NASA and commercial space companies understand the main source of constraint violations and allow them to create constraint rules that ensure the safe operation of future human private and exploration missions. Additional studies could be performed to evaluate other variables that could have influenced the scheduling violations that were analyzed.

Bristol, Douglas↗
NASA NTRS2001

Scintillation Effects on Space Shuttle GPS Data

Irregularities in ionospheric electron density result in variation in amplitude and phase of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, or scintillation. GPS receivers tracking scintillated signals may lose carrier phase or frequency lock in the case of phase sc intillation. Amplitude scintillation can cause "enhancement" or "fading" of GPS signals and result in loss of lock. Scintillation can occur over the equatorial and polar regions and is a function of location, time of day, season, and solar and geomagnetic activity. Mid latitude regions are affected only very rarely, resulting from highly disturbed auroral events. In the spring of 1998, due to increasing concern about scintillation of GPS signals during the upcoming solar maximum, the Space Shuttle Program began to assess the impact of scintillation on Collins Miniaturized Airborne GPS Receiver (MAGR) units that are to replace Tactical Air Control and Navigation (TACAN) units on the Space Shuttle orbiters. The Shuttle Program must determine if scintillation effects pose a threat to safety of flight and mission success or require procedural and flight rule changes. Flight controllers in Mission Control must understand scintillation effects on GPS to properly diagnose "off nominal" GPS receiver performance. GPS data from recent Space Shuttle missions indicate that the signals tracked by the Shuttle MAGR manifest scintillation. Scintillation is observed as anomalous noise in velocity measurements lasting for up to 20 minutes on Shuttle orbit passes and are not accounted for in the error budget of the MAGR accuracy parameters. These events are typically coincident with latitude and local time occurrence of previously identified equatorial spread F within about 20 degrees of the magnetic equator. The geographic and seasonal history of these events from ground-based observations and a simple theoretical model, which have potential for predicting events for operational purposes, are reviewed.

Goodman, John L.↗
NASA NTRS2007

An Overview of the Space Shuttle Orbiter's Aging Aircraft Program

The Space Shuttle Orbiter has well exceeded its original design life of 10 years or 100 missions. The Orbiter Project Office (OPO) has sponsored several activities to address aging vehicle concerns, including a Corrosion Control Review Board (CCRB), a mid-life certification program, and most recently the formation of the Aging Orbiter Working Group (AOWG). The AOWG was chartered in 2004 as a proactive group which provides the OPO oversight for aging issues such as corrosion, non-destructive inspection, non-metallics, wiring and subsystems. The core team consists of mainly representatives from the Materials and Processes Problem Resolution Team (M&P PRT) and Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). Subsystem engineers and subject matter experts are called in as required. The AOWG has functioned by forming issues based sub-teams. Examples of completed sub-teams include adhesives, wiring and wing leading edge metallic materials. Current sub-teams include Composite Over-Wrapped Pressure Vessels (COPV), elastomeric materials and mechanisms.

Russell, Richard W.↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA Hypersonic Propulsion: Overview of Progress from 1995 to 2005

Hypersonic propulsion work supported by the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration had a primary focus on Space Transportation during the period from 1995 to 2005. The framework for these advances was established by policy and pursued with substantial funding. Many noteworthy advances were made, highlighted by the pinnacle flights of the X-43. This paper reviews and summarizes the programs and accomplishments of this era. The accomplishments are compared to the goals and objectives to lend an overarching perspective to what was achieved. At least dating back to the early days of the Space Shuttle program, NASA has had the objective of reducing the cost of access to space and concurrently improving safety and reliability. National Space Transportation Policy in 1994 coupled with a base of prior programs such as the National Aerospace Plane and the need to look beyond the Space Shuttle program set the stage for NASA to pursue Space Transportation Advances. Programs defined to pursue the advances represented a broad approach addressing classical rocket propulsion as well as airbreathing propulsion in various combinations and forms. The resulting portfolio of activities included systems analysis and design studies, discipline research and technology, component technology development, propulsion system ground test demonstration and flight demonstration. The types of propulsion systems that were pursued by these programs included classical rocket engines, "aerospike" rocket engines, high performance rocket engines, scram jets, rocket based combined cycles, and turbine based combined cycles. Vehicle architectures included single and two stage vehicles. Either single types of propulsion systems or combinations of the basic propulsion types were applied to both single and two stage vehicle design concepts. Some of the propulsion system design concepts were built and tested at full scale, large scale and small scale. Many flight demonstrators were conceptually defined, fewer designed and some built and one flown to demonstrate several technical advancements including propulsion. The X-43 flights were a culmination of these efforts for airbreathing propulsion. During the course of that period, there was a balance of funding and emphasis toward rocket propulsion but still very substantial airbreathing propulsion effort. The broad objectives of these programs were to both advance and test the state of the art so as to provide a basis for options to be pursued for broad space transportation needs, most importantly focused on crew carrying capability. NASA cooperated with the Department of Defense in planning and implementation of these programs to make efficient use of objectives and capabilities where appropriate. Much of the work was conducted in industry and academia as well as Government laboratories. Many test articles and data-bases now exist as a result of this work. At the conclusion of the period, the body of work made it clear that continued research and technology development was warranted, because although not ready for a NASA system development decision, results continued to support the promise of air-breathing propulsion for access to space.

Cikanek, Harry A., III↗
NASA NTRS2011

Which Way is Up? Lessons Learned from Space Shuttle Sensorimotor Research

The Space Shuttle Program provided the opportunity to examine sensorimotor adaptation to space flight in unprecedented numbers of astronauts, including many over multiple missions. Space motion sickness (SMS) severity was highly variable across crewmembers. SMS generally lasted 2-3 days in-flight with approximately 1/3 of crewmembers experiencing moderate to severe symptoms, and decreased incidence in repeat flyers. While SMS has proven difficult to predict from susceptibility to terrestrial analogs, symptoms were alleviated by medications, restriction of early activities, maintaining familiar orientation with respect to the visual environment and maintaining contact cues. Adaptive changes were also reflected by the oculomotor and perceptual disturbances experienced early inflight and by the perceptual and motor coordination problems experienced during re-entry and landing. According to crew self-reports, systematic head movements performed during reentry, as long as paced within one's threshold for motion tolerance, facilitated the early readaptation process. The Shuttle provided early postflight crew access to document the initial performance decrements and time course of recovery. These early postflight measurements were critical to inform the program of risks associated with extending the duration of Shuttle missions. Neurological postflight deficits were documented using a standardized subjective rating by flight surgeons. Computerized dynamic posturography was also implemented as a quantitative means of assessing sensorimotor function to support crew return-to-duty assessments. Towards the end of the Shuttle Program, more emphasis has been placed on mapping physiological changes to functional performance. Future commercial flights will benefit from pre-mission training including exposures to launch and entry G transitions and sensorimotor adaptability assessments. While SMS medication usage will continue to be refined, non-pharmacological countermeasures (e.g., sensory aids) will have both space and Earth-based applications. Early postflight field tests are recommended to provide the evidence base for best practices for future commercial flight programs. Learning Objective: Overview of the Space Shuttle Program regarding adaptive changes in sensorimotor function, including what was learned from research, what was implemented for medical operations, and what is recommended for commercial flights.

Wood, S. J.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Thermal Protection Systems Technology Transfer from Apollo and Space Shuttle to the Orion Program

This paper describes how the Orion program is utilizing the Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience from the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs to reduce program risk and improve affordability to meet NASA's future manned exploration missions. The Orion program successfully completed the Exploration Flight Test (EFT-1) mission in 2014 and is currently assembling, integrating, and testing the next spacecraft for the Exploration Mission (EM-1) to meet the flight test objectives of an unmanned orbital mission to the moon and return to earth in 2019. The Orion spacecraft production operations are located in the Neil Armstrong Operations and Checkout (O&C) facility at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) providing an affordable and seamless delivery approach of vehicles directly to the launch site eliminating spacecraft transportation and additional checkout testing. Innovative vehicle design, manufacturing and test operations approaches are maturing and evolving with each Orion vehicle build to support the challenging NASA exploration mission requirements beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO) while reducing program cost and schedule impacts. An example of Orion's evolution is the incorporation of an improved heat shield design, assembly and testing approach to meet the higher re-entry velocities for a lunar return for the EM-1 mission. The EFT- 1 heat shield was based on the Apollo heat shield manufacturing processes and was assembled at a supplier location and then transported to KSC for final integration. The EM-1 heat shield is now manufactured, assembled, tested, and installed into the spacecraft at the O&C facility reducing program cost and production schedules. The transition of the Space Shuttle TPS capabilities has enabled Orion to provide a human rated capsule design using proven materials and processes established over years of orbiter re-entry missions. The Orion Crew Module (CM) TPS configuration is derived from the Apollo CM approach utilizing improved materials and processes developed from the Space Shuttle program. The Orion EFT-1 heat shield utilized the Avcoat ablative material from Apollo which was injected into a honeycomb substrate and has been updated for EM-1 incorporating a block configuration bonded to a composite shell structure. This approach utilizes the proven Avcoat material for the heat shield ablator and is utilizing derived bonding and inspection methods and techniques from the Space Shuttle tile experience. The Orion back shell TPS configuration is based on Space Shuttle tile designs using proven tile materials and coatings. The Orion forward bay cover utilizes the high temperature tiles similar to the back shell tiles and low temperature blankets derived from the Space Shuttle program reducing weight impacts. Space Shuttle Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) is installed in the Orion capsule to control the interior temperature environment providing a light weight design. These TPS design approaches have performed successfully on the Orion first flight test on EFT-1 and are incorporated in the configuration for the next flight test for EM-1. Completion of these two flight tests will certify the TPS for the Orion program for human rated exploration missions and has reduced the development cost to the Orion program. In addition to transitioning the Space Shuttle TPS design configurations to Orion, the supporting manufacturing infrastructure, manufacturing processes, and inspection methods are also incorporated into the Orion assembly operations at KSC. This has avoided significant startup schedule and costs impacts of new capabilities and development of support operations necessary to fabricate, install, inspect, and validate the TPS installations for the Orion spacecraft. The Thermal Protection System Facility (TPSF) which supported the Space Shuttle program provides the heat shield Avcoat blocks and the back shell AETB-8 tiles for Orion program. Extending the existing Space Shuttle TPS operations at KSC provides onsite support to the Orion spacecraft assembly operations. A significant benefit to the Orion program is the transition of the Space Shuttle technician work force at KSC. This highly skilled workforce was able to transition to the Orion program and immediately support the TPS installation operations. They brought with them the human rated manufacturing and assembly operations culture that was critical to the Space Shuttle success avoiding the retraining cost and schedule impacts of a new workforce to Orion. The technician skills certification program from the Space Shuttle was found to be compatible with the Lockheed Martin technician certification programs enabling a seamless training process utilizing process similarity avoiding the cost of retraining the work force to Orion standards. The existing workforce is certificated for multiple processes enabling reassignment of technicians to other tasks in the Orion AI&P operations reducing the overall touch labor manpower requirements. Additional benefits of using the Space Shuttle workforce is the incorporation of the lessons learned from Space Shuttle processes to improve the Orion TPS processes. This has resulted in a continuous evolution of TPS processes to improve the producibility and reduce the program cost for the TPS for the Orion program. Transitioning the Apollo and Space Shuttle TPS designs, processes, and technician workforce has been instrumental in enabling Orion to successfully meet the program challenges for NASA's exploration missions of the future.

Stewart, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2002

Operations Analysis of Space Shuttle System

The space science program at NASA since 1950's has gone through stages of development and implementation in rocketry and scientific advancement. It has become the nation's largest scientific institution of research and innovation for space exploration and military research, and overall a pride of the nation at an exorbitant cost. After placing man on moon, space shuttle program at NASA is an on-going project with a high success rate at an average cost of about $450m per flight. A future endeavor from both government and private sectors needs to be undertaken for commercialization of this expensive mission. In order to attract private enterprises, it needs to boost up its operations with better technology at lower cost to cope with rapid changes in scientific advancement and economic competition. Thus, a second-generation reusable launch vehicle (2GRLV) will play a major role in future operation of NASA centers. Envisioning this potential way of saving the program by reducing the cost, NASA is currently managing an innovative program called the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) to develop key technologies that will support the development of second-generation reusable launch vehicles (RLV) which will be more economical and safer and reliable than the existing space shuttle system. The selection of which technologies to fund for further development is being based on their likelihood to contribute to providing cost reduction or safety improvements. It is envisioned that in the 2006 timeframe, NASA will make a decision as to whether or not to commit to the replacement of the current space shuttle system with a new RLV. The decision to proceed with a new RLV will be partly based on the likelihood that the new system will be better than the existing space shuttle. Government and private entrepreneurs are currently considering four different types of RLV projects: commercial programs, government programs, international concepts, and X Prize competitors. NASA has already commissioned a series of X-programs to study the future RLV program. Today, NASA decision makers need analytical tools to help determine which technologies to fund the development of this technology. In the 2006 timeframe, these same decision makers will need analytical tools to evaluate and compare various RLV architectures, including the existing space shuttle so as to make the best decision for whether or not to proceed with the development of a new RLV, and if so, then which one. A study is conducted here to establish ground level knowledge from the historical data and expertise experiences of the field personnel. Such information is compiled in the form of mission statement, goals, space shuttle operations, payloads and cargo constraints, resource constraints, and bottlenecks to the enhancement vector.

Bhaba R. Sarker↗