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DOE OSTI2025

Application of Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC) Systems for Powering Safety Monitoring Systems of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations. OESI 2.0 M-1 T-1-P1.1 – Objective 1 Interim Report: Summary of Offshore Oil and Gas Well Monitoring Systems and Process Power Requirements

This report is part of a comprehensive research initiative aimed at evaluating the technoeconomic feasibility of deploying greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions monitoring systems powered by small-scale renewable energy sources on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The study has three primary objectives: summarizing available GHG monitoring systems for the OCS, modeling a renewable marine energy source (specifically ocean thermal energy conversion, or OTEC), and modeling the collocation of OTEC power sources with offshore oil and gas activities to offset power demand.

02 PETROLEUM↗
NASA NTRS2024

Workshop on the Role of Design Assurance in System-Wide Safety’s Safety Demonstrator Series

This report summarizes a three-hour hybrid in-person/online workshop on June 7, 2024 on the topic of design assurance and the Safety Demonstrator Series (SDS), which was held at NASA Ames Research Center. The SDS provides an operational demonstration of, and recommendations for, requirements and standards necessary to monitor, assess, and mitigate risks to assure safety in disaster-oriented operations. Over sixty NASA personnel participated in the workshop. Four main topics were discussed: (1) assurance needs for the Safety Demonstrator Series, (2) assurance and the In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS), (3) in-time assurance: existing efforts and future opportunities, and (4) demonstrating assurance tools in the Safety Demonstrators. Key takeaways are as follows: 1. Design assurance tools can be used to assure an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System, the systems that comprise it, and other systems or missions. Assurance must consider both systems and components and include the interactions between elements in both a systems/aircraft context and a systems-of-systems/airspace context. 2. Design-time assurance activities can support the identification of monitors needed for operational assurance activities (i.e., the “monitor” function in the monitor-assess-mitigate paradigm at the heart of the IASMS concept). 3. A major opportunity for design-time assurance tools to contribute to the IASMS concept is to support rapid re-validation of systems. This will be particularly important for (1) supporting novel operations in the IASMS, where operational data may disprove design-time assumptions (motivating re-analysis of system safety) and (2) adapting technologies (e.g., AI/ML for autonomous operations) to new operational domains, where there may be new or different safety considerations not included in the initial scope of operations. 4. There are several design assurance tools under development in the System-Wide Safety project that can support assurance of Services, Functions, and Capabilities (SFCs) in the Safety Demonstrators. Transitioning these tools from one-off research projects into a functioning part of IASMS assurance will require closer integration between these tools. 5. It is not clear whether the role of design assurance tools is primarily as a part of IASMS architecture or as an external check on IASMS. The workshop consisted of four discussion topics initiated via four lightning talks by System-Wide Safety researchers. Discussions utilized Mural to engage both in-person and online participants in the hybrid format. Polls and surveys were also utilized to gather participant input. The workshop closed with a reflection activity for participants, as well as new ideas for collaboration and coordination of ongoing System-Wide Safety research.

design assurance↗
NASA NTRS2008

Product Engineering Class in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy for Building Safety-Critical Systems

When software safety requirements are imposed on legacy safety-critical systems, retrospective safety cases need to be formulated as part of recertifying the systems for further use and risks must be documented and managed to give confidence for reusing the systems. The SEJ Software Development Risk Taxonomy [4] focuses on general software development issues. It does not, however, cover all the safety risks. The Software Safety Risk Taxonomy [8] was developed which provides a construct for eliciting and categorizing software safety risks in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we present extended work on the taxonomy for safety that incorporates the additional issues inherent in the development and maintenance of safety-critical systems with software. An instrument called a Software Safety Risk Taxonomy Based Questionnaire (TBQ) is generated containing questions addressing each safety attribute in the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. Software safety risks are surfaced using the new TBQ and then analyzed. In this paper we give the definitions for the specialized Product Engineering Class within the Software Safety Risk Taxonomy. At the end of the paper, we present the tool known as the 'Legacy Systems Risk Database Tool' that is used to collect and analyze the data required to show traceability to a particular safety standard

Hill, Janice↗
NASA NTRS1981

NASA aviation safety reporting system

Aviation safety reports that relate to loss of control in flight, problems that occur as a result of similar sounding alphanumerics, and pilot incapacitation are presented. Problems related to the go around maneuver in air carrier operations, and bulletins (and FAA responses to them) that pertain to air traffic control systems and procedures are included.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1997

Software Design Improvements: Software Quality and the Design and Inspection Process - Part 2

The application of assurance engineering techniques improves the duration of failure-free performance of software. The totality of features and characteristics of a software product are what determine its ability to satisfy customer needs. Software in safety-critical systems is very important to NASA. We follow the System Safety Working Groups definition for system safety software as: 'The optimization of system safety in the design, development, use and maintenance of software and its integration with safety-critical systems in an operational environment. 'If it is not safe, say so' has become our motto. This paper goes over methods that have been used by NASA to make software design improvements by focusing on software quality and the design and inspection process.

Lalli, Vincent R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Model-Based Safety Analysis

System safety analysis techniques are well established and are used extensively during the design of safety-critical systems. Despite this, most of the techniques are highly subjective and dependent on the skill of the practitioner. Since these analyses are usually based on an informal system model, it is unlikely that they will be complete, consistent, and error free. In fact, the lack of precise models of the system architecture and its failure modes often forces the safety analysts to devote much of their effort to gathering architectural details about the system behavior from several sources and embedding this information in the safety artifacts such as the fault trees. This report describes Model-Based Safety Analysis, an approach in which the system and safety engineers share a common system model created using a model-based development process. By extending the system model with a fault model as well as relevant portions of the physical system to be controlled, automated support can be provided for much of the safety analysis. We believe that by using a common model for both system and safety engineering and automating parts of the safety analysis, we can both reduce the cost and improve the quality of the safety analysis. Here we present our vision of model-based safety analysis and discuss the advantages and challenges in making this approach practical.

Joshi, Anjali↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Demonstrator Series for an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System

NASA's Advanced Air Mobility Integration Office has coordinated a meeting with the National Research Council Canada (NRC) to have an interchange of technical area activities to evaluate merit for international partnership. Both NASA and NRC will provide a brief overview of their Advanced Air Mobility activities. Additional aeronautics projects will have an opportunity to present a few slides on current activities and plans. Topics include wildfire, vehicle automation technologies and detect and avoid, and national campaign flight initiatives. NASA's System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project will provide a high-level overview of the the safety demonstrator series. The project has scheduled operational demonstrations of an in-time aviation safety management system across a series of disaster-oriented operations. First up is a wildland fire demonstration scheduled for 2025. Opportunities for synergy will be discussed.

system-wide safety↗
NASA NTRS1984

The aviation safety reporting system

The aviation safety reporting system, an accident reporting system, is presented. The system identifies deficiencies and discrepancies and the data it provides are used for long term identification of problems. Data for planning and policy making are provided. The system offers training in safety education to pilots. Data and information are drawn from the available data bases.

Reynard, W. D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Quantifying Pilot Contribution to Flight Safety during Hydraulic Systems Failure

Accident statistics cite the flight crew as a causal factor in over 60% of large transport aircraft fatal accidents. Yet, a well-trained and well-qualified pilot is acknowledged as the critical center point of aircraft systems safety and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation system. The latter statement, while generally accepted, cannot be verified because little or no quantitative data exists on how and how many accidents/incidents are averted by crew actions. A joint NASA/FAA high-fidelity motion-base human-in-the-loop test was conducted using a Level D certified Boeing 737-800 simulator to evaluate the pilot's contribution to safety-of-flight during routine air carrier flight operations and in response to aircraft system failures. To quantify the human's contribution, crew complement (two-crew, reduced crew, single pilot) was used as the independent variable in a between-subjects design. This paper details the crew's actions, including decision-making, and responses while dealing with a hydraulic systems leak - one of 6 total non-normal events that were simulated in this experiment.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Loosely Coupled GPS-Aided Inertial Navigation System for Range Safety

The Autonomous Flight Safety System (AFSS) aims to replace the human element of range safety operations, as well as reduce reliance on expensive, downrange assets for launches of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs). The system consists of multiple navigation sensors and flight computers that provide a highly reliable platform. It is designed to ensure that single-event failures in a flight computer or sensor will not bring down the whole system. The flight computer uses a rules-based structure derived from range safety requirements to make decisions whether or not to destroy the rocket.

Heatwole, Scott↗
NASA NTRS2014

Dangers on the Ramp: Aviation Safety Reporting System

The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) in a partnership between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), participating carriers, and labor organizations. It is designed to improve the National Airspace System by collecting and studying reports detailing unsafe conditions and events in the aviation industry. Employees are able to report safety issues or concerns with confidentiality and without fear of discipline.

confidential reporting↗
NASA NTRS2007

Software Safety Risk in Legacy Safety-Critical Computer Systems

Safety-critical computer systems must be engineered to meet system and software safety requirements. For legacy safety-critical computer systems, software safety requirements may not have been formally specified during development. When process-oriented software safety requirements are levied on a legacy system after the fact, where software development artifacts don't exist or are incomplete, the question becomes 'how can this be done?' The risks associated with only meeting certain software safety requirements in a legacy safety-critical computer system must be addressed should such systems be selected as candidates for reuse. This paper proposes a method for ascertaining formally, a software safety risk assessment, that provides measurements for software safety for legacy systems which may or may not have a suite of software engineering documentation that is now normally required. It relies upon the NASA Software Safety Standard, risk assessment methods based upon the Taxonomy-Based Questionnaire, and the application of reverse engineering CASE tools to produce original design documents for legacy systems.

Hill, Janice↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Designing for Advanced Aerial Mobility: Human-Autonomy Teaming and In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance

The continued growth of aviation shall require new innovative technologies and operational concepts to meet the ever-increasing demands on air transportation. The NASA Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) project focuses on emerging aviation markets, such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is defined as “...a safe and efficient system for air passenger and cargo transportation within an urban area. It is inclusive of small package delivery and other urban unmanned aerial system services and supports a mix of onboard/ground-piloted and increasingly autonomous operations” ([1]). The AAM project emphasizes technology development and validating system-level concepts and solutions in coordination with other NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) projects to enable UAM metro- and micro-plex vertiport and airspace concepts of operations. The NASA AAM research portfolio includes the concepts of Remote Supervisor-in-Command (RSC) and Fleet and Airspace Manager (FAM) as possible human roles for consumer fleet providers. NASA research in RSC is focused on development of guidelines and standards for remote pilots/operators passively and actively controlling a large fleet of autonomous aircraft. For FAM, flight and ground system concepts and technologies to enable high density homogeneous operations at increased scale from vertiport(s), and coordination with other humans in the systems (e.g., UAM urban airspace manager, Air Traffic Control) are key research areas. The envisioned UAM operations are posited to require autonomous systems to enable functions ranging from fleet and resource management to vehicle control. Although automation has become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous in civil aviation, autonomy represents a significant evolution in automation, which has generally been limited in functional scope and capability. As autonomy takes on increasing responsibilities, humans and machines will be required to work together in new and different ways [2], rather than traditional design approaches focused on how machines (i.e., autonomy) can do the work of people. The emerging field of human-autonomy teaming (HAT) represents a comprehensive and prioritized research-driven approach to enable the success of future emerging aviation market applications through capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machine working and thinking better together. The NASA Transformational Tools and Technologies (TTT) Autonomous System (AS) Sub-project was created to assist with the transition into higher levels of autonomy to enable new modes of air transportation, such as UAM. TTT-AS has identified HAT as a key research need to enable UAM while maintaining today’s ultra-safe aviation system safety levels. The latter challenge has been taken up by the NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project, which recognizes that aviation safety, as it evolves, shall require new ways of thinking about safety to include integration of a wide-range of existing and new safety systems and practices, enhanced tools and technologies, increased access to data and data fusion, improved data analysis capabilities, enhanced in-time risk monitoring and detection, hazard prioritization and mitigation, safety assurance decision-support, and in-time integrated system analytics [3].The operational concept of UAM represents a variety of work that has been termed, “work-as-imagined” to characterize the idea that how people think that work is done and how work is actually done are often not the same [4]. To ensure design success and system safety, looking at “work-as-done” provides a comparative approach toward UAM concept and technology design through examination of corresponding analogs found today in aviation (e.g., on-demand operations) and other transportation domains (e.g., port operations). The paper shall discuss various alternative applications with specific focus on airline operation center (AOC) operations, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) command-and-control to inform scaled-versions of FAM and RSC, respectively, and with consideration of the national airspace system contextual environment. The tenets and principles of the HAT field and current NASA research efforts under the TTT-AS sub-project shall also be described. Finally, the SWS sub-project efforts to develop In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-Time Safety Management Systems (IASMS) are discussed in terms of how “in-time” safety assurance may be conceptualized for the on-demand mobility air taxi “work-as-imagined” operational concept [5]. As part of this effort, concepts from the emerging field of resilience engineering, are being studied. Traditional approaches to aviation safety have focused on what can go wrong and how to prevent it. Another approach to thinking about system safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” (protective safety) but also “ensuring that things go right” (productive safety), that enables a system to exhibit the resilient performance [6] necessary for the success of the future aviation system emerging concepts of operations. The paper shall describe efforts focused on how productive safety and resilience may enable a more complete approach to system safety thinking and design of ISSA and IASMS for UAM. Future directions and research needs shall also be discussed.

resilience↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) collects, analyzes, and distributes de-identified safety information provided through confidentially submitted reports from frontline aviation personnel. Since its inception in 1976, the ASRS has collected over 900,000 reports and has never breached the identity of the people sharing their information about events or safety issues. From this volume of data, the ASRS has released over 5,500 aviation safety alerts concerning potential hazards and safety concerns. The ASRS processes these reports, evaluates the information, and provides de-identified report information through the online ASRS Database at http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov. The NASA ASRS is also a founding member of the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) group which is a collection of other national aviation reporting systems throughout the world. The ASRS model has also been replicated for application to improving safety in railroad, medical, fire fighting, and other domains. This presentation \vill discuss confidential, voluntary, and non-punitive reporting systems and their advantages in providing information for safety improvements.

Connell, Linda↗
NASA NTRS2017

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) collects, analyzes, and distributes de-identified safety information provided through confidentially submitted reports from frontline aviation personnel. Since its inception in 1976, the ASRS has collected over 1.4 million reports and has never breached the identity of the people sharing their information about events or safety issues. From this volume of data, the ASRS has released over 6,000 aviation safety alerts concerning potential hazards and safety concerns. The ASRS processes these reports, evaluates the information, and provides selected de-identified report information through the online ASRS Database at http:asrs.arc.nasa.gov. The NASA ASRS is also a founding member of the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) group which is a collection of other national aviation reporting systems throughout the world. The ASRS model has also been replicated for application to improving safety in railroad, medical, fire fighting, and other domains. This presentation will discuss confidential, voluntary, and non-punitive reporting systems and their advantages in providing information for safety improvements.

Connell, Linda J.↗
NASA NTRS2016

NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS)

The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) collects, analyzes, and distributes de-identified safety information provided through confidentially submitted reports from frontline aviation personnel. Since its inception in 1976, the ASRS has collected over 1.4 M reports and has never breached the identity of the people sharing their information about events or safety issues. From this volume of data, the ASRS has released over 6,000 aviation safety alerts concerning potential hazards and safety concerns. The ASRS processes these reports, evaluates the information, and provides selected de-identified report information through the online ASRS Database at http:asrs.arc.nasa.gov. The NASA ASRS is also a founding member of the International Confidential Aviation Safety Systems (ICASS) group which is a collection of other national aviation reporting systems throughout the world. The ASRS model has also been replicated for application to improving safety in railroad, medical, fire fighting, and other domains. This presentation will discuss confidential, voluntary, and non-punitive reporting systems and their advantages in providing information for safety improvements.

Connell, Linda↗