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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2007

Integrated Radial Probe Transition From MMIC to Waveguide

A radial probe transition between a monolithic microwave integrated circuit (MMIC) and a waveguide has been designed for operation at frequency of 340 GHz and to be fabricated as part of a monolithic unit that includes the MMIC. Integrated radial probe transitions like this one are expected to be essential components of future MMIC amplifiers operating at frequencies above 200 GHz. While MMIC amplifiers for this frequency range have not yet been widely used because they have only recently been developed, there are numerous potential applications for them-- especially in scientific instruments, test equipment, radar, and millimeter-wave imaging systems for detecting hidden weapons.

Samoska, Lorene↗
NASA NTRS1986

Pilot vehicle interface on the advanced fighter technology integration F-16

This paper focuses on the work load aspects of the pilot vehicle interface in regard to the new technologies tested during AMAS Phase II. Subjects discussed in this paper include: a wide field-of-view head-up display; automated maneuvering attack system/sensor tracker system; master modes that configure flight controls and mission avionics; a modified helmet mounted sight; improved multifunction display capability; a voice interactive command system; ride qualities during automated weapon delivery; a color moving map; an advanced digital map display; and a g-induced loss-of-consciousness and spatial disorientation autorecovery system.

Dana, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Structural analysis of low-speed composite propfan blades for the LRCSW wind tunnel model

The Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, CA, is currently in the process of evaluating propulsion systems for the Long Range Conventional Standoff Weapons (LRCSW). At present, the Advanced Counter-Rotating Propfan system is being considered. The methodologies are documented which were used to structurally analyze the 0.55 scale CM1 composite propfan blades for the LRCSW with COBSTRAN and MSC/NASTRAN. Significant results are also reported.

Ernst, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Advanced fighter technology integration (AFTI)/F-16 Automated Maneuvering Attack System final flight test results

The AFTI F-16 Automated Maneuvering Attack System has undergone developmental and demonstration flight testing over a total of 347.3 flying hours in 237 sorties. The emphasis of this phase of the flight test program was on the development of automated guidance and control systems for air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons delivery, using a digital flight control system, dual avionics multiplex buses, an advanced FLIR sensor with laser ranger, integrated flight/fire-control software, advanced cockpit display and controls, and modified core Multinational Stage Improvement Program avionics.

Dowden, Donald J.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Confirming the absence of nuclear warheads via passive gamma-ray measurements

Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. Here, we demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
NASA NTRS1993

Measures for simulator evaluation of a helicopter obstacle avoidance system

The U.S. Army Aeroflightdynamics Directorate (AFDD) has developed a high-fidelity, full-mission simulation facility for the demonstration and evaluation of advanced helicopter mission equipment. The Crew Station Research and Development Facility (CSRDF) provides the capability to conduct one- or two-crew full-mission simulations in a state-of-the-art helicopter simulator. The CSRDF provides a realistic, full field-of-regard visual environment with simulation of state-of-the-art weapons, sensors, and flight control systems. We are using the CSRDF to evaluate the ability of an obstacle avoidance system (OASYS) to support low altitude flight in cluttered terrain using night vision goggles (NVG). The OASYS uses a laser radar to locate obstacles to safe flight in the aircraft's flight path. A major concern is the detection of wires, which can be difficult to see with NVG, but other obstacles--such as trees, poles or the ground--are also a concern. The OASYS symbology is presented to the pilot on a head-up display mounted on the NVG (NVG-HUD). The NVG-HUD presents head-stabilized symbology to the pilot while allowing him to view the image intensified, out-the-window scene through the HUD. Since interference with viewing through the display is a major concern, OASYS symbology must be designed to present usable obstacle clearance information with a minimum of clutter.

Demaio, Joe↗
DOE OSTI2021

WNR Facility Flight Path 90L Advanced Collimation Development

In November 2020, an advanced neutron beam transport and collimation system was installed and commissioned at flight path (FP) 90L within the Weapons Neutron Research (WNR) facility. This new collimation system was developed as a replacement for the legacy neutron collimation present at WNR FP90L. The need for this upgrade, design of this collimation system, installation at the experimental flight path, and results of this recent effort will be detailed.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗
NASA NTRS1989

Summary and evaluation of the Strategic Defense Initiative Space Power Architecture Study

The Space Power Architecture Study (SPAS) identified and evaluated power subsystem options for multimegawatt electric (MMWE) space based weapons and surveillance platforms for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) applications. Steady state requirements of less than 1 MMWE are adequately covered by the SP-100 nuclear space power program and hence were not addressed in the SPAS. Four steady state power systems less than 1 MMWE were investigated with little difference between them on a mass basis. The majority of the burst power systems utilized H(2) from the weapons and were either closed (no effluent), open (effluent release) or steady state with storage (no effluent). Closed systems used nuclear or combustion heat source with thermionic, Rankine, turboalternator, fuel cell and battery conversion devices. Open systems included nuclear or combustion heat sources using turboalternator, magnetohydrodynamic, fuel cell or battery power conversion devices. The steady state systems with storage used the SP-100 or Star-M reactors as energy sources and flywheels, fuel cells or batteries to store energy for burst applications. As with other studies the open systems are by far the lightest, most compact and simplist (most reliable) systems. However, unlike other studies the SPAS studied potential platform operational problems caused by effluents or vibration.

Edenburn, M.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Computational Optimization of 133m Xe Production via Neutron Irradiation in a TRIGA Reactor

Here, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear tests worldwide. As part of treaty compliance, the concentration of radioactive nuclides in the atmosphere is monitored to detect nuclear weapons tests. Radioactive noble gas fission products, specifically radioxenon, can vent into the atmosphere after a nuclear weapons test, even if the test is well contained underground or underwater. Radioxenon thus serves as a signal for nuclear weapons tests. All atmospheric monitoring systems require samples of radioxenon isotopes for detector calibration, quality control, and certification. Here, we present a novel, improved method for creating samples of 133m Xe via neutron irradiation of 132 Xe in the Washington State University TRIGA reactor. 132 Xe neutron absorption results in either 133 Xe or 133m Xe—thermal neutron absorption results in 133m Xe 12% of the time, while fast neutron absorption (above ~1 MeV) results in 133m Xe ~50% of the time. To optimize the production of 133m Xe via neutron absorption in 132 Xe in the thermal TRIGA reactor, spectral tuning using an irradiation chamber is required to maximize the fraction of fast neutrons being absorbed and minimize the number of thermal neutrons interacting with the 132 Xe. We used MCNP to tally 132 Xe absorptions with the isotopic tally function, flux tallies and neutron attenuation to estimate the number of neutrons reaching the 132 Xe through the irradiation chamber, and the adjoint importance function to improve the source strength estimate. Additionally, we performed a heat transfer analysis for safety considerations. It was determined that the use of a 96% enriched 10 B boron carbide chamber, placed next to the fuel elements in reactor position D8, increases the 133m Xe/ 133 Xe activity ratio from a baseline value of 0.3 to 1.0, a 233% increase. Additionally, it was determined that the alpha heating produced in the boron does not become an unmanageable problem in the Washington State University reactor.

37 - INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL AND ANALYTICAL C↗
NASA NTRS1971

Systems management techniques and problems

Report is reviewed which discusses history and trends of systems management, its basic principles, and nature of problems that lend themselves to systems approach. Report discusses systems engineering as applied to weapons acquisition, ecology, patient monitoring, and retail merchandise operations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1992

History of on-orbit satellite fragmentations

Since the first serious satellite fragmentation occurred in Jun. 1961, and instantaneously increased the total Earth satellite population by more than 400 percent, the issue of space operations within the finite region of space around the Earth has been the subject of increasing interest and concern. The prolific satellite fragmentations of the 1970's and the marked increase in the number of fragmentations in the 1980's served to widen international research into the characteristics and consequences of such events. Plans for large, manned space stations in the next decade and beyond demand a better understanding of the hazards of the dynamic Earth satellite population. The contribution of satellite fragmentations to the growth of the Earth satellite population is complex and varied. The majority of detectable fragmentation debris have already fallen out of orbit, and the effects of 40 percent of all fragmentations have completely disappeared. In this volume, satellite fragmentations are categorized by their assessed nature and to a lesser degree by their effect on the near-Earth space environment. A satellite breakup is the usually destructive disassociation of an orbital payload, rocket body, or structure, often with a wide range of ejecta velocities. A satellite breakup may be accidental or the result of intentional actions, e.g., due to a propulsion system malfunction or a space weapons test, respectively. An anomalous event is the unplanned separation, usually at low velocity, of one or more detectable objects from a satellite which remains essentially intact. Anomalous events can be caused by material deterioration of items such as thermal blankets, protective shields, or solar panels. As a general rule, a satellite breakup will produce considerably more debris, both trackable and non-trackable, than an anomalous event. From one perspective, satellite breakups may be viewed as a measure of the effects of man's activity on the environment, while anomalous events may be a measure of the environment on man-made objects.

Nauer, David J.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Titan on the Red (advanced AI / ML system) [Slides]

Born out of a need to make LANL Weapons Program archival material available to scientists and engineers. Material is the end result of decades of consolidation of mini-libraries and mini archives at LANL. Latest consolidation brought together LANL’s digital archives and physical archives. This houses over 75 years of nuclear weapons research, designs, procedures, videos, photos, and other reports. For the Titan on the Red machine learning project, the system must be able to automatically extract metadata from digitized documents, perform natural-language search, enforce security classification and NTK protocols, be expandable to ingest various data stores (Online Vault, PDMLink, shared drives, SharePoint, etc.), and utilize commercial, public domain, and LANL ontologies.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

National Ignition Facility. Facility and Infrastructure Systems Maintenance Plan

Ensuring the reliability of the NIF, including its support systems, laser systems, target diagnostic systems, and utilities, is essential to the availability of the NIF in its support of NNSA missions. NIF is a key capability in the DOE Stockpile Stewardship Program and supports high energy physics experiments for nuclear weapons, energy, and astrophysics applications. High system reliability provides opportunities for shots and scientific discoveries with opportunities to enhance and upgrade capabilities. This Maintenance Plan (MP) identifies the policies and procedures used to perform and support asset management of the NIF Facility and Infrastructure Systems (FInS), NIF Lasers & Alignment (LASE), NIF Target Experimental Operations (TOPS), NIF Target Area Science and Engineering (TASE), and NIF&PS Control Systems (NCS). The FInS systems include the facility, HVAC, contamination control, beampath, and Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) as well as utilities which create the beampath environments, such as vacuum, argon, or clean dry air. The LASE systems are Programmatic systems which include laser diagnostics, alignment, power conditioning, pulsed power, and input laser systems. The TOPS and TASE systems are also Programmatic systems which include target and diagnostic delivery systems and positioners, many different insertable and fixed target diagnostics, and cryogenic and target gas fill systems. Finally, the NCS systems include both software and hardware for industrial and shot operation control systems. Policies governing administrative and operational practices related to maintenance of FInS, LASE, TOPS, TASE, and NCS systems are described in this plan. In addition, the plan provides processes and procedures for managing, tracking, and documenting the work. This document, the NIF Operations Management Plan, NIF-5020544 (Ref. 1), and NIF Shot Operations Plan, NIF-5018506 (Ref. 2), together satisfy the requirements of the Conduct of Operations. Duties, responsibilities, and reporting requirements of the various positions associated with FInS, LASE, and TOPS maintenance are detailed in this plan. The FInS systems include both Real Property systems with asset management requirements specified in DOE Order 430.1C (Ref. 3) and Programmatic systems. In addition, for FInS, there is a list of the System Level Maintenance Plans (SLMPs) in NIF-1007419198 (Ref. 4) which provide the system descriptions and maintenance plan and schedule. In addition, the list includes the Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and Experience Centered Maintenance (ECM) evaluations that have been performed for applicable FInS systems as well as reliability criticality per Section 3.5. The -AM version of the NIF Maintenance Plan focuses on the reliability program for FInS, LASE, TOPS, TASE, and NCS within the context of the overall NIF Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) program and incorporates changes since the -AL version from August 2011 and has been updated to be fully consistent with the updates to Ref. 1. It also includes asset management considerations, updates to the Work Order (WO) process within the NIF Computerized Maintenance Management System (CMMS) which is EAM infor® System Maintenance and Reliability Tracking (SMaRT) (Ref. 5), and updates to metrics and key performance indicators (KPIs).

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Defending the Homeland: Growing Foreign Challenges to the U.S. Missile Defense Posture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for Policy requested that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory conduct a Congressionally directed study on homeland missile defense, pursuant to Section 1692 of the fiscal year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act. In accordance with the statutory language, this study considers whether the security benefits obtained by deployment of homeland missile defenses of the United States are undermined or counterbalanced by adverse reactions of potential adversaries, and considers the effectiveness of homeland missile defense efforts of the United States to deter the development of ballistic missiles. Almost a half-century has elapsed since the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and almost two decades since the former withdrew. Since withdrawing, the United States has sought to develop and deploy a layered missile defense system to defend against regional threats to U.S. and allied interests abroad and to counter limited threats to the U.S. homeland. As such, missile defense supports key national defense policy objectives. Protecting the U.S. homeland, forces abroad, allies, and partners. Deterring attacks against the United States, its allies, and partners. Assuring allies an strengthening U.S. diplomatic activities in peacetime and crisis. We offer five key findings: 1. The primary benefit of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the protection it provides the U.S. homeland against a limited but evolving rogue-state missile threat. While this system has never been tested in combat, it appears thus far to have effectively paced North Korea’s development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In the absence of such a defensive capability, the United States would likely have been more heavily exposed to North Korean actions, would have operated at a much higher-risk posture, and would have had less negotiating room with which to navigate coercive tactics and crises. Its allies would have been more concerned about U.S. willingness in time of crisis and war to run the risks of protecting them. The GMD system also serves as a hedge against Iranian breakout. 2. Potential adversaries continue to develop long-range ballistic missiles despite deployment of a U.S. homeland missile defense system. This includes both rogue states and major power rivals whose long-range missile programs predated the deployment of U.S. missile defenses. While North Korea has continued its long-range missile developments and achieved an intercontinental capability, Iran has not yet reached this threshold. The broader proliferation of long-range missiles anticipated in the late 1990s has not materialized. 3. While Russia has used the existence of a U.S. homeland missile defense system as a justification for its substantial and continuing weapon modernization program, neither Russian force modernization nor the limited U.S. homeland missile defense system has altered the strategic balance. Russia has long considered U.S. missile defenses—both theater and homeland—as directed against its strategic forces and as a capability that could rapidly advance, thereby eroding Russian confidence in its nuclear deterrent. Russia’s political and military actions appear excessive and negatively impact areas such as arms control, but they do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 4. China’s expansion and diversification of nuclear and missile forces has been influenced by its concerns about U.S. homeland missile defense, but those concerns are only one of many factors in China’s force planning. Although China’s actions to preserve and expand its assured retaliation prospects have not fundamentally altered the strategic balance, its buildup and lack of transparency about its force modernization goals are troubling. Taken together, the aggregate pattern of China’s modernization activities over the past two decades strongly suggests a concerted effort to develop a modern military force commensurate with its intended geopolitical status. Whatever China’s legacy concerns over the survivability of its strategic nuclear forces, its ability to overwhelm the GMD system appears intact today and will be further strengthened in the years ahead as it continues its long-term modernization program. China’s political and military actions negatively affect U.S. security interests but do not undermine the primary benefit of the U.S. system cited in Key Finding 1. 5. The basic finding that benefits have not so far been undermined by adverse reactions is a function of circumstances that are increasingly in flux. The existing GMD-centered system is under increasing pressure from the pace and scope of North Korean missile deployments. The proposed “layered” system seeks to mitigate this impending capability gap in the near term and to complement future capabilities, such as the Next Generation Interceptor, when they come online. Given the pace of U.S. missile defense developments since 2000, it is possible that adversary advances in capability will outpace the U.S. system’s ability to adapt. Additionally, because this layered system is in principle more readily scaled, it will almost certainly be viewed skeptically by China and Russia. In a context of growing great-power security competition, the Department of Defense (DoD) should consider undertaking a broader net assessment of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese force balance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Co-op at Sandia National Laboratories (July - December 2019, Final Report)

This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2019

Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) Overload Testing Approach and Results

The qualification of the Orion Capsule Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) system includes exposure to loads and dynamic pressures above the required values as validation of the parachutes' structural integrity. As outlined in the certification plan, each of the four parachutes of the system are to be subjected to 110% of their respective maximum dynamic pressure requirements. The Main and Drogue parachutes have satisfied this overload condition in drop testing and due to cost and schedule constraints, the Forward Bay Cover Parachute (FBCP) and Pilot parachute were subjected to the overload condition in the ground testing described in this document. The test objectives and pass/fail criteria were established and require the parachutes to achieve and maintain a target riser load (associated with a minimum of 110% dynamic pressure overload) for a minimum of three seconds while sustaining no failures of any structural members (vent hoop, radials, suspension line) or any damage which propagates into catastrophic failure of the canopy. Considering the assumptions and limitations associated with the ground testing (primarily non-uniform flow field of the ground test system and variations in parachute manufacturing), a method of establishing the desired overload condition was determined by the technical community and covers the 2-sigma bounds of the drag area distribution derived from drop testing. On June 27, 2017 the testing was executed at the High Velocity Airflow System (HiVAS) facility located at the Weapon Survivability Laboratory (WSL) at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division (NAWCWD) China Lake. Engineering Development Unit (EDU) parachutes were used as pathfinders to gain experience with achieving the test conditions. Additional runs were executed to measure the airflow at the same location as the canopy skirt, although this data is not required to satisfy the test objectives and parachute pass/fail criteria. The qualification parachutes were successfully exposed to the target conditions and sustained only minor damage.

Daum, Jared S.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Prototype for Unclassified Algorithm

Continuing previous efforts to investigate and develop the Unclassified Radioisotope Algorithm, the goal of the FY19-FY20 effort was to develop a prototype detector system which uses the algorithm to confirm warhead attributes related to the presence of either weapons grade plutonium (WGPu) or highly enriched uranium (HEU). The final deliverable is a prototype attribute measurement system built with common, commercially available gamma radiation detector components, capable of confirming the presence of specific, complex radioactive sources of interest, without the collection and storage of gamma energy spectra. This is accomplished by processing each gamma pulse as it is received, applying weight values based on the energy and incrementing or decrementing scalar counters which can be compared with expected values to determine if the measured source is consistent with WGPu or HEU. This report documents the design of the prototype system as well as the development of the algorithm and performance testing results. While the previously conceptualized, simple algorithm resulted in a prohibitive amount of false positives, the goal for a simple attribute measurement system capable of verifying Ba-133 and Ra-226 (weapons grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium surrogate testing sources) at over 95% accuracy with sub 5% false positive rate was demonstrated.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗