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UP2 400 High Activity Oxide Legacy Waste Retrieval Project Scope and Progress-13048

The High Activity Oxide facility (HAO) reprocessed sheared and dissolved 4500 metric tons of light water reactor fuel the fuel of the emerging light water reactor spent fuel between 1976 and 1998. Over the period, approximately 2200 tons of process waste, composed primarily of sheared hulls, was produced and stored in a vast silo in the first place, and in canisters stored in pools in subsequent years. Upon shutdown of the facility, AREVA D and D Division in La Hague launched a thorough investigation and characterization of the silos and pools content, which then served as input data for the definition of a legacy waste retrieval and reconditioning program. Basic design was conducted between 2005 and 2007, and was followed by an optimization phase which lead to the definition of a final scenario and budget, 12% under the initial estimates. The scenario planned for the construction of a retrieval and reconditioning cell to be built on top of the storage silo. The retrieved waste would then be rinsed and sorted, so that hulls could subsequently be sent to La Hague high activity compacting facility, while resins and sludge would be cemented within the retrieval cell. Detailed design was conducted successfully from 2008 until 2011, while a thorough research and development program was conducted in order to qualify each stage of the retrieval and reconditioning process, and assist in the elaboration of the final waste package specification. This R and D program was defined and conducted as a response and mitigation of the major project risks identified during the basic design process. Procurement and site preparatory works were then launched in 2011. By the end of 2012, R and D is nearly completed, the retrieval and reconditioning process have been secured, the final waste package specification is being completed, the first equipment for the retrieval cell is being delivered on site, while preparation works are allowing to free up space above and around the silo, to allow for construction which is scheduled to being during the first semester of 2013. The elaboration of the final waste package is still undergoing and expected to be completed by then end of 2013, following some final elements of R and D required to demonstrate the full compatibility of the package with deep geological repository. The HAO legacy waste retrieval project is so far the largest such project entering operational phase on the site of La Hague. It is on schedule, under budget, and in conformity with the delivery requirements set by the French Safety Authority, as well as other stakeholders. This project paves the way for the successful completion of AREVA La Hague other legacy waste retrieval projects, which are currently being drafted or already in active R and D phase. (authors)

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Analysis of the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14349

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls will ensure that all waste packages are sub-critical, and the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is prevented for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages begin to degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Therefore, the possibility for the evolution of conditions in a GDF to result in criticality requires assessment. RWM established the 'Likelihood of Criticality' research project to develop qualitative and quantitative arguments to demonstrate that criticality after closure of a GDF is unlikely. The project included consideration of the criticality safety of disposal concepts for intermediate and high level waste, spent fuel, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in different generic geological settings. The results are underpinned by the construction of post-closure criticality scenarios that have been evaluated using high-level judgments about scenario credibility as well as modelling of evolving conditions in a GDF. In the latter case, a probabilistic modelling approach has been undertaken to address uncertainty in the calculation of concentrations and masses of fissile material that could occur at potential accumulation sites. The potential for criticality has been judged based on comparisons of the calculated fissile masses with minimum values required for criticality at different locations in the barrier system. This paper explains the novel approach taken to evaluating the likelihood of criticality in a GDF based on the probabilistic modelling of waste package evolution and plutonium and uranium migration. The role of this research in RWM's work to demonstrate the criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper, which also draws on the results of a parallel research project that demonstrates that, even if a criticality were to occur, then its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. (authors)

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The Formation and Modeling of Colloids from the Corrosion of Nuclear Waste Forms

This paper describes a model for determining the stability and associated radionuclide concentrations of colloids that might be present in the nuclear waste package environment from degradation of the nuclear waste forms. The model simplifies radionuclide–colloid behavior by assuming that all colloids can be defined as either smectite clay, a mixed actinide-bearing rare earth-zirconium oxide, iron oxyhydroxide (ferrihydrite {FeOOH}, or uranophane {Ca(UO2)2(SiO3OH)2(H2O)5}. However, for the purposes of predictive stability modeling, the colloids are conceptually represented as montmorillonite, ZrO2, hematite, and meta autunite, respectively. The model uses theoretical calculations and laboratory data to determine the stability of modeled colloids with ionic strength and pH. The true nature of colloid composition and heterogeneity, generation, and flocculation will be extremely complex, involving the formation of numerous types of phases, often depending on the composition of the various waste forms and waste package materials. This model strives to capture the uncertainty of the real system using theoretical models. In this paper, one of the four representative colloids designed to capture the behavior of the spent fuel derived colloids is described in detail.

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Understanding the consequences of hypothetical post-closure transient criticality in a geological disposal facility - 14439

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher-activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety for the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal all waste packages will be safely sub-critical. Containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will ensure that criticality is not possible for some time after disposal. However, as waste packages degrade, fissile and other materials may be mobilised, which could affect the potential for criticality. Although the likelihood of a critical configuration developing is demonstrably low, it cannot be assumed to be zero over long post-closure timescales. The UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation for a GDF includes a specific requirement to consider the consequences of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. RWM has undertaken a programme of research to model and understand the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events. Initially focused on the scenario of fissile material relocation and accumulation following intermediate level waste (ILW) disposal, two bespoke computer models were developed. The quasi-steady-state (QSS) model considered critical systems maintained by accumulation of fissile materials where the temperature feedback remains negative throughout the transient. The rapid transient model (RTM) considered systems with positive temperature feedback. The QSS model development included a successful comparison with the Oklo natural reactors. With a requirement to consider post-closure criticality for a wider range of potential waste types under different illustrative disposal concepts, the initial transient criticality models had some limitations. For the QSS model this was the assumption of fixed geometry, while the complex functional inputs required in the RTM were not readily available for different materials. For the QSS model this paper describes the model development to allow changing volume; this has enabled its application to 'what-if' scenarios of flooding within a spent fuel waste package and the slumping of a stack of ILW packages. For rapid transient criticality this paper explains how the development of a simpler 'bounding approach' model to complement the RTM has enabled transient criticality analysis for a wider range of host materials. The role of this research in demonstrating post-closure criticality safety of a GDF in the UK is presented in a companion paper which also draws on the results of a parallel research project to demonstrate that the likelihood of post-closure criticality is low. (authors)

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Disposal Concepts for a High-Temperature Repository in Shale.

Disposal of large, heat-generating waste packages containing the equivalent of 21 pressurized water reactor (PWR) assemblies or more is among the disposal concepts under investigation for a future repository for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the United States. Without a long (>200 years) surface storage period, disposal of 21-PWR or larger waste packages (especially if they contain high-burnup fuel) would result in in-drift and near-field temperatures considerably higher than considered in previous generic reference cases that assume either 4-PWR or 12-PWR waste packages (Jové Colón et al. 2014; Mariner et al. 2015; 2017). Sevougian et al. (2019c) identified high-temperature process understanding as a key research and development (R&D) area for the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign. A two-day workshop in February 2020 brought together campaign scientists with expertise in geology, geochemistry, geomechanics, engineered barriers, waste forms, and corrosion processes to begin integrated development of a high-temperature reference case for disposal of SNF in a mined repository in a shale host rock. Building on the progress made in the workshop, the study team further explored the concepts and processes needed to form the basis for a high-temperature shale repository reference case. The results are described in this report and summarized..

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Analysis of Simulated Headspace Gases

The Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) for headspace gases distributes blind audit samples in a gas matrix for analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Participating measurement facilities (i.e., fixed laboratories, mobile analysis systems, and on-line analytical systems) are located across the United States. Each sample distribution is termed a PDP cycle. These evaluation cycles provide an objective measure of the reliability of measurements performed for transuranic (TRU) waste characterization. The primary documents governing the conduct of the PDP are the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (DOE/CBFO-94-1012) and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) contained in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (NM4890139088-TSDF) issued by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). The WAP requires participation in the PDP; the PDP must comply with the QAPD and the WAP. This plan implements the general requirements of the QAPD and the applicable requirements of the WAP for the Headspace Gas (HSG) PDP. Participating measurement facilities analyze blind audit samples of simulated TRU waste package headspace gases according to the criteria set by this PDP Plan. Blind audit samples (hereafter referred to as PDP samples) are used as an independent means to assess each measurement facility’s compliance with the WAP quality assurance objectives (QAOs). To the extent possible, the concentrations of VOC analytes in the PDP samples encompass the range of concentrations anticipated in actual TRU waste package headspace gas samples. Analyses of headspace gases are required by the WIPP to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements. These analyses must be performed by measurement facilities that have demonstrated acceptable performance in this PDP. These analyses are referred to as WIPP analyses and the TRU waste package headspace gas samples on which they are performed are referred to as WIPP samples in this document. Participating measurement facilities must analyze PDP samples using the same procedures used for routine waste characterization analyses of WIPP samples.

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Performance Demonstration Program Plan for Analysis of Simulated Headspace Gases

The Performance Demonstration Program (PDP) for headspace gases distributes blind audit samples in a gas matrix for analysis of volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Participating measurement facilities (i.e., fixed laboratories, mobile analysis systems, and on-line analytical systems) are located across the United States. Each sample distribution is termed a PDP cycle. These evaluation cycles provide an objective measure of the reliability of measurements performed for transuranic (TRU) waste characterization. The primary documents governing the conduct of the PDP are the Quality Assurance Program Document (QAPD) (DOE/CBFO-94-1012) and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Waste Analysis Plan (WAP) contained in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (NM4890139088-TSDF) issued by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED). The WAP requires participation in the PDP; the PDP must comply with the QAPD and the WAP. This plan implements the general requirements of the QAPD and the applicable requirements of the WAP for the Headspace Gas (HSG) PDP. Participating measurement facilities analyze blind audit samples of simulated TRU waste package headspace gases according to the criteria set by this PDP Plan. Blind audit samples (hereafter referred to as PDP samples) are used as an independent means to assess each measurement facility’s compliance with the WAP quality assurance objectives (QAOs). To the extent possible, the concentrations of VOC analytes in the PDP samples encompass the range of concentrations anticipated in actual TRU waste package headspace gas samples. Analyses of headspace gases are required by the WIPP to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements. These analyses must be performed by measurement facilities that have demonstrated acceptable performance in this PDP. These analyses are referred to as WIPP analyses and the TRU waste package headspace gas samples on which they are performed are referred to as WIPP samples in this document. Participating measurement facilities must analyze PDP samples using the same procedures used for routine waste characterization analyses of WIPP samples.

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Production of an impermeable composite of irradiated graphite and glass by hot isostatic pressing as a long term leach resistant waste form

Around 250,000 tons of irradiated graphite (i-graphite) exists worldwide and can be considered as a current waste or future waste stream. The largest national i-graphite inventory is located in UK (∼ 100,000 tons) with significant quantities also in Russia and France [5]. Most of the i-graphite remains in the cores of shutdown nuclear reactors including the MAGNOX type in UK and the UNGG in France. Whilst there are still operational power reactors with graphite cores, such as the Russian RBMKs and the AGRs in UK, all of them will reach their end of life during the next two decades. The most common reference waste management option of i-graphite is a wet or dry retrieval of the graphite blocks from the reactor core and the grouting of these blocks in a container without further conditioning. This produces large waste package volumes because the encapsulation capacity of the grout is limited and large cavities in the graphite blocks could reduce the packing densities. Packing densities from 0.5 to 1 tons per cubic meter have been assumed for grouting solutions. Furthermore the grout is permeable. This could over time allow the penetration of aqueous phases into the waste block and a potential dissolution and release of radionuclides. As a result particularly highly soluble radionuclides may not be retained by the grout. Vitrification could present an alternative, however a similar waste package volume increase may be expected since the encapsulation capacity of glass is potentially similar to or worse than that of grout. FNAG has developed a process for the production of a graphite-glass composite material called Impermeable Graphite Matrix (IGM) [3]. This process is also applicable to irradiated graphite which allows the manufacturing of an impermeable material without volume increase. Crushed i-graphite is mixed with 20 vol.% of glass and then pressed under vacuum at an elevated temperature in an axial hot vacuum press (HVP). The obtained product has zero or negligible porosity and a water impermeable structure. Structural analysis shows that the glass in the composite has replaced the pores in the graphite structure. The typical pore volume of a graphite material is in the range of 20 vol.%. Therefore no volume increase will occur in comparison with the former graphite material. This IGM material will allow the encapsulation of graphite with package densities larger than 1.5 ton per cubic meter. Therefore a huge volume saving can be achieved by such an alternative encapsulation method. Disposal performance is also enhanced since little or no leaching of radionuclides is observed due to the impermeability of the material NNL and FNAG have proved that IGM can be produced by hot isostatic pressing (HIP) which has several advantages for radioactive materials over the HVP process. - The sealed HIP container avoids the release of any radionuclides. - The outside of the waste package is not contaminated. - The HIP process time is shorter than the HVP process time. The isostatic press avoids anisotropic density distributions. - Simple filling of the HIP container has advantages over the filling of an axial die. (authors)

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Enhancement of Thermal Conductivity of Bentonite Buffer Materials with Copper Wires/Meshes for High-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

In high-level radioactive waste disposal, a heat-generating waste canister is generally encased with a layer of bentonite-based buffer material acting as an engineered barrier to limit water percolation and radionuclide release. The low thermal conductivity of bentonite (~0.5 W/m∙K) combined with a high thermal loading waste package may result in a high surface temperature on the package that can potentially impact the structural integrity of the package itself as well as the surrounding buffer material. We show in this paper that the thermal conductivity of bentonite can be effectively enhanced by embedding copper wires/meshes across the buffer layer to form fully connected high heat conduction pathways. A simple calculation based on Rayleigh’s model shows that a required thermal conductivity of 5 W/m∙K for effective heat dissipation can be achieved simply by adding ~1 vol % of copper wires/meshes into bentonite. As a result, the peak surface temperature on a large waste package such as a dual-purpose canister can be reduced by up to 300°C, leading to a significant reduction in the surface storage time for waste cooling and therefore the overall cost for direct disposal of such waste packages. Because of the ensured full thermal percolation across the buffer layer, copper wires/meshes turn out to be much more effective than any other materials currently suggested (such as graphene or graphite) in enhancing the thermal conductivity of buffer material. Furthermore, the embedded copper wires/meshes can help reinforce the mechanical strength of the buffer material, thus preventing the material from a potential erosion by a possible intrusion of dilute groundwater.

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Deep Borehole Disposal Waste Emplacement Mode Cost-Risk Study - 16346

An engineering study has developed alternative concepts for waste packaging and for emplacing/retrieving packages in deep boreholes. The study compared costs and risks associated with emplacement using wire-line vs. drill-string technologies. Selection of a method is needed to proceed with demonstration as part of the Deep Borehole Field Test being conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Used Nuclear Fuel Disposition. Each emplacement method was described as a series of steps, and each step was analyzed for potential to cause any of four off-normal events including drops and getting stuck. Each such event was supported by a fault tree. The hazard analysis identified a number of improvements including: 1) impact limiters; 2) safety systems; 3) instrumentation; and 4) methods to mitigate casing collapse or borehole debris during operations. Off-normal events were related in a top-level event tree with normal and off-normal outcomes. Costs were estimated for each outcome (including recovery and decontamination). A panel of subject matter experts was convened to review the study and provide key inputs. The wire-line method is less costly for normal operations, while the drill-string method has advantages if waste packages become stuck. The wire-line method has a lower aggregate probability of accidents resulting in waste package breach. The integrated probability of off-normal events is on the order of a few percent per borehole, and engineered measures are quite important to prevent and mitigate accidents, limiting radiological consequences. Development of these measures during design will help to further improve system reliability. (authors)

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Deep Borehole Disposal: Options, Issues and Challenges - 16250

Different versions of deep borehole disposal vary in approach and detail and the differences raise issues and create options that need to be considered in the design of any practical implementation. Among the areas for which significant options exist are the size and depth of the disposal zone; container materials and design; the method and strategy for waste package deployment; filling of the annuli around the waste packages and the final sealing of the borehole. The options for these and other areas are discussed with a focus on their advantages and disadvantages and some conclusions reached that could provide guidance for the practical application of the concept. One particularly significant point is that the integrity of the final borehole seal(s) may not be required to survive for as long as is widely believed. (authors)

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Used Fuel Management System Interface Analyses - 13578

Preliminary system-level analyses of the interfaces between at-reactor used fuel management, consolidated storage facilities, and disposal facilities, along with the development of supporting logistics simulation tools, have been initiated to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other stakeholders with information regarding the various alternatives for managing used nuclear fuel (UNF) generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the United States. An important UNF management system interface consideration is the need for ultimate disposal of UNF assemblies contained in waste packages that are sized to be compatible with different geologic media. Thermal analyses indicate that waste package sizes for the geologic media under consideration by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign may be significantly smaller than the canisters being used for on-site dry storage by the nuclear utilities. Therefore, at some point along the UNF disposition pathway, there could be a need to repackage fuel assemblies already loaded and being loaded into the dry storage canisters currently in use. The implications of where and when the packaging or repackaging of commercial UNF will occur are key questions being addressed in this evaluation. The analysis demonstrated that thermal considerations will have a major impact on the operation of the system and that acceptance priority, rates, and facility start dates have significant system implications. (authors)

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DOE-Managed HLW and SNF Research: FY15 EBS and Thermal Analysis Work Package Status.

This report examines the technical elements necessary to evaluate EBS concepts and perform thermal analysis of DOE-Managed SNF and HLW in the disposal settings of primary interest – argillite, crystalline, salt, and deep borehole. As the disposal design concept is composed of waste inventory, geologic setting, and engineered concept of operation, the engineered barrier system (EBS) falls into the last component of engineered concept of operation. The waste inventory for DOE-Managed HLW and SNF is closely examined, with specific attention to the number of waste packages, the size of waste packages, and the thermal output per package. As expected, the DOE-Managed HLW and SNF inventory has a much smaller volume, and hence smaller number of canisters, as well a lower thermal output, relative to a waste inventory that would include commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF). A survey of available data and methods from previous studies of thermal analysis indicates that, in some cases, thermo-hydrologic modeling will be necessary to appropriately address the problem. This report also outlines scope for FY16 work -- a key challenge identified is developing a methodology to effectively and efficiently evaluate EBS performance in each disposal setting on the basis of thermal analyses results.

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Hot-Isostatic Pressing of Sellafield SIXEP Sand/Clinoptilolite Wastes - 18281

Clinoptilolite is an ion-exchange material currently in use at the SIXEP plant (Sellafield, UK) to remove radioactive Cs and Sr from aqueous solution. Clinoptilolite material exists in a granular form that requires consolidation prior to disposal in a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). The existing baseline treatment technology is to produce cementitious waste packages, which is not ideal due to the large increase in waste volume and poor quality of the wasteform produced. Hot-Isostatic Pressing (HIPing) has been investigated as an alternative treatment method to immobilise this material. This paper presents the results of an investigation that illustrates the capability to process clinoptilolite into a durable, monolithic glass-ceramic wasteform, which should be considered suitable for GDF disposal. The product of HIPing SIXEP sand /clinoptilolite materials is a dense vitreous wasteform with a small quantity of crystalline inclusions, primarily in the form of quartz/cristobalite. Under PCT testing the wasteform produced was shown to be at least an order of magnitude more durable than glasses currently used for the immobilisation of High-Level Wastes (HLW). It was calculated that the treatment of SIXEP sand/clinoptilolite wastes using HIP technology will provide at least a 6.3-fold reduction in the number of waste packages which require management and disposal. (authors)

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Review of Underground Construction Methods and Opening Stability for Repositories in Clay/Shale Media

This report reviews the art and practice of excavating and constructing underground facilities in clay/shale media, as part of a multi-year evaluation of the technical feasibility of direct disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs). The purpose is to review worldwide examples of large-scale excavations in clay/shale media, the methods used for excavation and constructi on, and the costs. It is anticipated that this information will help to show the feasibility of construction for a deep geologic respository for (on the order of) 10,000 large, heavy, heat-generating waste packages. This report will refine the clay/shale disposal concept for DPC -based waste packages, in support of future studies that include cost estimation.

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Backfilling of Geological Disposal Facilities - Development of Optimized Backfill Material - 18146

In Belgium, low- and intermediate-level waste (B-waste) will be conditioned in concrete monoliths and high-level waste (C-waste) in so-called Super-containers (SCs). The Belgian radioactive waste management program has focused on the disposal of these waste types in two emplacement fields of a geological disposal facility (GDF). When the disposal waste packages (DWP) have been emplaced, backfilling of the galleries is supposed to be carried out in order to stabilize the galleries, to reduce voids, to guarantee a favourable chemical milieu with regard to the retention of the radionuclides, to minimize a possible gas pressure build-up, to dissipate radioactive decay heat and to enable good conditions for a potential retrieval of the DWP. The current reference solution is to mix the backfill at the surface and then to pump the mixture through pipeline distribution systems into the underground structures. The catalogue of backfill material requirements comprises common, but also different requirements due to the characteristics of the B and C waste packages and differences in the backfilling systems. It was found that two backfill material recipes have to be developed. Different requirements, such as high porosity (low strength and low gas threshold pressure) and high thermal conductivity have contrary consequences for the material. In addition, during backfill production quality variations of the raw materials that influence the backfill material properties can occur. Different lengths of the delivery pipeline may require adjustments of the material composition. In order to consider the practical experiences of backfill material production, one focus of the development programs was to identify compositional ranges that guarantee the respective material property. A combination of the individual 'conformity fields' results in optimal solutions for the standard operating conditions as well as a compositional range that guarantees compliance with the required material specifications. (authors)

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Evaluation and Parameter Analysis of Burn up Calculations for the Assessment of Radioactive Waste - 13187

Burn up calculations facilitate a determination of the composition and nuclear inventory of spent nuclear fuel, if operational history is known. In case this information is not available, the total nuclear inventory can be determined by means of destructive or, even on industrial scale, nondestructive measurement methods. For non-destructive measurements however only a few easy-to-measure, so-called key nuclides, are determined due to their characteristic gamma lines or neutron emission. From these measured activities the fuel burn up and cooling time are derived to facilitate the numerical inventory determination of spent fuel elements. Most regulatory bodies require an independent assessment of nuclear waste properties and their documentation. Prominent part of this assessment is a consistency check of inventory declaration. The waste packages often contain wastes from different types of spent fuels of different history and information about the secondary reactor parameters may not be available. In this case the so-called characteristic fuel burn up and cooling time are determined. These values are obtained from a correlations involving key-nuclides with a certain bandwidth, thus with upper and lower limits. The bandwidth is strongly dependent on secondary reactor parameter such as initial enrichment, temperature and density of the fuel and moderator, hence the reactor type, fuel element geometry and plant operation history. The purpose of our investigation is to look into the scaling and correlation limitations, to define and verify the range of validity and to scrutinize the dependencies and propagation of uncertainties that affect the waste inventory declarations and their independent verification. This is accomplished by numerical assessment and simulation of waste production using well accepted codes SCALE 6.0 and 6.1 to simulate the cooling time and burn up of a spent fuel element. The simulations are benchmarked against spent fuel from the real reactor Obrigheim in Germany for which sufficiently precise experimental reference data are available. (authors)

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Handling Radioactive Waste from the Proton Accelerator Facility at the Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI) - Always Surprising? - 13320

The Paul Scherrer Institut (PSI) is the largest national research centre in Switzerland. Its multidisciplinary research is dedicated to a wide field in natural science and technology as well as particle physics. In this context, PSI is operating, amongst others, a large proton accelerator facility since more than 30 years. In two cyclotrons, protons are accelerated to high speeds and then guided along roughly 100 m of beam line to three different target stations to produce secondary particles like mesons and neutrons for experiments and a separately beam line for UCN. The protons induce spallation processes in the target materials, and also at other beam loss points along the way, with emission of protons, neutrons, hydrogen, tritium, helium, heavier fragments and fission processes. In particular the produced neutrons, due to their large penetration depth, will then interact also with the surrounding materials. These interactions of radiation with matter lead to activation and partly to contamination of machine components and the surrounding infrastructures. Maintenance, operation and decommissioning of installations generate inevitably substantial amounts of radioactive operational and dismantling waste like targets, magnets, collimators, shielding (concrete, steel) and of course secondary waste. To achieve an optimal waste management strategy for interim storage or final disposal, radioactive waste has to be characterized, sorted and treated. This strategy is based on radiation protection demands, raw waste properties (size, material, etc.), and requirements to reduce the volume of waste, mainly for legal and economical reasons. In addition, the radiological limitations for transportation of the waste packages to a future disposal site have to be taken into account, as well as special regulatory demands. The characterization is a task of the waste producer. The conditioning processes and quality checks for radioactive waste packages are part of an accredited waste management process of PSI, especially of the Section Dismantling and Waste Management. Strictly proven and accepted methods needed to be developed and enhanced for safe treatment, transport, conditioning and storage. But in the field of waste from research activities, individual and new solutions have to be found in an increasingly growing administrative environment. Furthermore, a wide variety of components, with a really large inventory of radioactive nuclides, has to be handled. And there are always surprising challenges concerning the unusual materials or the nuclide inventory. In case of the operational and dismantling radioactive accelerator waste, the existing conditioning methods are in the process of a continuous enhancement - technically and administratively. The existing authorized specifications of conditioning processes have to be extended to optimize and fully describe the treatment of the inevitably occurring radioactive waste from the accelerator facility. Additional challenges are the changes with time concerning the legal and regulatory requirements - or do we have to consider it as business as usual? This paper gives an overview of the current practices in radioactive waste management and decommissioning of the existing operational accelerator waste. (authors)

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