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NASA NTRS1992

Atmospheric entry survival of large micrometeorites: Implications for their sources and for the cometary contribution to the zodiacal cloud

Atmospheric entry heating simulations indicate that a large fraction of the micrometeorites larger than 100 microns in diameter which survive atmospheric entry must have entered the Earth's atmosphere with velocities very near the Earth's escape velocity. Thus, these particles must have been captured by Earth from heliocentric orbits with small eccentricities and low inclinations, indicating a main-belt asteroidal source. Space exposure ages measured on these large micrometeorites are also consistent with a main-belt asteroidal source. However, dynamical calculations have previously indicated that particles larger than 100 microns in diameter were likely to be destroyed by catastrophic collisions in the time required for orbital evolution from the main-belt to Earth capture by Poynting-Robertson drag. The absence of a large amount of collisional debris in the less than 50 microns size range indicates these large micrometeorites are not the few, rare survivors of a mostly collisionally disrupted population. The measured space exposure ages, which are about an order of magnitude larger than their calculated catastrophic collision lifetimes, confirm the survival of these large micrometeorites for times much longer than the calculated catastrophic collision lifetimes. Since collisions with cometary dust less than 20 microns in size were expected to be the major contributor to the collisional destruction of these larger particles, the contribution of cometary material to the zodiacal cloud is likely to be much smaller than previously believed.

Flynn, George J.↗
NASA NTRS1997

Aeroelastic Analysis of Counter Rotation Fans

Aeroelastic problems in turbomachinery and propfans can be static or dynamic in nature. The analysis of static aeroelastic problems is involved primarily with determination: (a) of the shape of the blades and the steady aerodynamic loads on the blades (which are inter-dependent), (b) of the resultant steady stresses and (c) of the static instability (divergence) margin, if applicable. In this project, we were concerned exclusively with dynamic aeroelastic behavior. The analysis of dynamic aeroelastic problems is involved with the determination: (a) of the unsteady aerodynamic loads on blades and the dynamic motion of the blades (which are again inter-dependent), (b) of the resultant dynamic stresses and their effect on fatigue life and (c) of the dynamic instability (flutter), if applicable. There are two primary dynamic aeroelastic phenomena of interest to designers of turbomachinery and propfans: flutter and forced response. Flutter generally refers to the occurrence of rapidly growing self-excited oscillations leading to catastrophic failure of the blade. When certain nonlinear phenomena are present, flutter response may lead to a potentially dangerous limit cycle oscillation rather than an immediate catastrophic failure. Forced response generally refers to the steady-state oscillations that occur as a consequence of excitations external to the rotor in question. These excitations typically result from the presence of upstream obstructions, inflow distortions, downstream obstructions, or mechanical sources such as tip-casing contact or shaft and gear meshing. Significant forced response leads to blade fatigue, and at design conditions, generally contributes to a degradation of blade life. At other operating conditions, forced response may lead to catastrophic failure due to severe blade fatigue in a short duration of time.

Keith, Theo G., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Selection and Assessment of Predictions of the Mars Pathfinder Landing Site

The successful landing of the Mars Pathfinder spacecraft on Mars allows the review of the process of selecting the landing site and assessing predictions made for the site based on Viking and Earth-based data. Selection of the landing site for Mars Pathfinder was a two-phase process. The first phase took place from October 1993 to June 1994 and involved: initial identification of engineering constraints, definition of environmental conditions at the site for spacecraft design, and evaluation of the scientific potential of different landing sites. This phase culminated with the first "Mars Pathfinder Landing Site Workshop", held at the Lunar and Planetary Institute in Houston, Texas on April 18-19, 1994, in which suggested approaches and landing sites were solicited from the entire scientific community. A preliminary site was selected by the project for design purposes in June 1994. The second phase took place from July 1994 to March 1996 and involved: developing criteria for evaluating site safety using images and remote sensing data, testing of the spacecraft and landing subsystems (with design improvements) to establish quantitative engineering constraints on landing site characteristics, evaluating all potential landing sites on Mars, and certification of the site by the project. This phase included a second open workshop, "Mars Pathfinder Landing Site Workshop II: Characteristics of the Ares Vallis Region and Field Trips in the Channeled Scabland, Washington" held in Spokane and Moses Lake September 24-30, 1995 and formal acceptance of the site by NASA Headquarters. Engineering constraints on Pathfinder landing sites were developed from the initial design of the spacecraft and the entry, descent and landing scenario. The site must be within 5 degrees of the subsolar latitude at the time of landing (15N for maximum solar power and flexible communications with Earth. It also must be below 0 km elevation to enable enough time for the parachute to bring the lander to the proper terminal velocity for landing. The entire landing ellipse, which is 70 km by 200 km due to navigational, ephemeris and atmospheric uncertainties, must be free of steep slopes, scarps and obvious hazards in Viking orbiter images, have acceptable radar reflectivity, moderate rock abundances and have little or no dust. Scientific considerations of the Mars Pathfinder payload and mission indicate that analyses of "grab bag" samples at the mouths of outflow channels can offer a first order assessment of a variety of rock types on Mars. Highland sites offer the advantage of in situ analysis of ancient rocks on Mars that record crustal differentiation and the nature of the early environment. Dark gray sites offer the potential of analyzing unweathered and unoxidized materials. Following a general assessment of the safety of different sites, a preliminary selection of a "grab bag" site was made. This site, Ares Vallis, is near the mouth of an outflow channel that may contain ancient Noachian terrain, Hesperian ridged plains, and reworked channel materials. All potential landing sites on Mars that met basic safety criteria were analyzed in detail. Sites (100 by 200 km target ellipses) were considered safe if they were below 0 km elevation, were free of obvious hazards (high relief surface features) in high-resolution (< 50 m/pixel) Viking orbiter images and had acceptable reflectivity and roughness at radar wavelengths, high thermal inertia, moderate rock abundance, low red to violet ratio, and low albedo. Only 4 sites on Mars met all the above criteria, which included 1995 opposition 3.5 cm delay-Doppler radar data. Complete data were evaluated for 7 sites and the Viking landing sites for comparison for all the above criteria as well as crater abundance, hill and mesa abundance, slopes over meter to kilometer scales, low altitude winds (from global circulation models and slopes), the size-frequency distribution of large rocks, as well as rover trafficability and science potential. Discussion of potential hazards at Ares Vallis using a variety of data sets (including radar) at a second open workshop, indicated this site cannot be shown to be any more hazardous than the Viking landing sites. Field trips to the Channeled Scabland and the Ephrata Fan, analogs for Ares Vallis and the landing site, respectively, provided valuable insight into possible geologic processes and potential surface characteristics. Three sites met all the data requirements and safety criteria for landing Pathfinder. Ares Vallis was selected by the project because it appeared acceptably safe (although it appeared to have greater rock abundances than other sites, its elevation was likely the best known) and offered the prospect of analyzing a variety of rock types expected to be deposited by catastrophic floods, which would enable addressing first-order scientific questions such as differentiation of the crust, the development of weathering products, and the nature of the early martian environment and its subsequent evolution. The selection was reviewed by an external board at a number of meetings and accepted, and the site was approved by NASA Headquarters. Data gathered by the Pathfinder lander' and rover provides the opportunity to test the predictions made for the site in the selection process based on remote observations from Earth, orbit, and the surface. The discussion below is taken from Golombek et al. to which the reader is referred for a more complete discussion and a complete list of references, which are omitted here for brevity. Many characteristics of the landing site are consistent with its being shaped and deposited by the Ares and Tiu catastrophic floods. The rocky surface is consistent a depositional plain comprising semi-rounded pebbles, cobbles and tabular boulders (some of which appear imbricated and/or inclined in the direction of flow) that appear similar to depositional plains in terrestrial catastrophic floods. The Twin Peaks appear to be streamlined hills in lander images, which is consistent with interpretations of larger hills in Viking orbiter images of the region that suggest the lander is on the flank of a broad, gentle ridge trending northeast from Twin Peaks. This ridge, which is the rise to the north of the lander, is aligned in the downstream direction from the Ares and Tiu Valles floods, and may be a debris tail deposited in the wake of the Twin Peaks. Channels visible throughout the scene may be a result of late stage drainage. As predicted by delay-Doppler radar measurements and tracking results, the average elevation of the center of the site was about the same as Viking Lander I relative to the 6.1 mbar geoid. The Doppler tracking and two-way ranging estimate for the elevation of the spacecraft is only 45 in lower than the Viking I Lander and within 100 in of that expected, which is within the uncertainties of the measurements. After landing, surface pressures and winds (5-10 m/s) were found to be similar to expectations based on Viking data, although temperatures were about 10 K warmer. The temperature profile below 50 km was also roughly 20 K warmer. As a result, predicted densities were 5% higher near the surface and up to 40% lower at 50 km but within the entry, descent and landing design margins. The populations of craters and small hills and the slopes of the hills measured in high-resolution (38 m/pixel) Viking orbiter images and the radar derived slopes of the landing site are all consistent with observations of these properties in the lander images. A rocky surface was expected from Viking Infra-Red Thermal Mapper (IRTM) observations and comparisons with the Viking landing sites. The observed cumulative fraction of area covered by rocks with diameters greater than 3 cm and heights greater than 0.5 in (potentially hazardous to landing) at Ares is similar to that predicted by IRTM observations and models of Viking lander and Earth analog rock size-frequency distributions. The IRTM prediction postulated an effective thermal inertia of 30 (10(exp -3) cgs units - cal/cubic cm/s(exp 0.5)/K) for the rock population, but we obtain a slightly different effective thermal inertia for the actual rock population. The validity of interpretations of radar echoes prior to landing are supported by a simple radar echo model, an estimate of the reflectivity of the soil from its bulk density, and the fraction of area covered by rocks. In the calculations, the soil produces the quasi-specular echo and the rocks produce the diffuse echo. The derived quasispecular cross section is comparable to the cross-sections and reflectivities reported for 3.5-cm wavelength observations. The model yields a diffuse echo that is modestly larger than the polarized diffuse echo reported for 3.5-cm wavelength observations. At 12.5-cm wavelength, similar rock populations at Ares and the Viking I site were expected because the diffuse echoes are comparable, but the large normal reflectivities suggests that bulk densities of the soils at depth are greater than those at the surface. We also obtain a fine-component inertia near 8.4 which agrees with the fine-component inertia of 8.7 (in 10(exp -3) cgs units) estimated from thermal observations from orbit by the IRTM; for this estimate, we used a bulk thermal inertia of 10.4 for the landing site, an effective thermal inertia near 40 (10(exp -3) cgs units) for the rock population, and a graphical representation of Kieffer's model. Color and albedo data for Ares suggested surfaces of materials at Ares Vallis would be relatively dust free or unweathered prior to landing compared with the materials at the Viking landing sites. This suggestion is supported by the abundance of relatively dark-gray rocks at Ares and their relative rarity at the Viking landing sites, where rocks are commonly coated with bright red dust. Finally, the 40 km long Ephrata Fan of the Channeled Scabland in Washington state, which was deposited where c

Golombek, M. P.↗
NASA NTRS1998

Proposed Mars Surveyor Landing Sites in Northern Meridiani Sinus, Southern Elysium Planitia, and Argyre Planitia

Our objective is to propose two landing sites that the Mars Surveyor 2001 Lander and Athena Rover could go to on Mars that should meet the safety requirements of the spacecraft landing system and optimize surface operations (chiefly driven by power and communications requirements). An additional site within Argyre Planitia, initially proposed by Parker to the Mars Surveyor Landing Site program, is also proposed for potential consideration for post-2001 missions to Mars, as it is well outside the current latitude limits for the Athena Rover. All three sites are designed to be situated as close to a diversity of geologic units within a few kilometers of the landing site so that diversity can be placed in a geologic context. This objective is very different from the Mars Pathfinder requirement to land at a site with a maximum chance for containing a diversity of rocks within a few tens of meters of the lander. That requirement was driven by the Sojourner mobility limit of a few tens of meters. It can be argued that the Athena project, with its much larger mobility capability, might actually want to avoid such a site, because placing collected samples in geologic context would be difficult. While it has been argued, both before and after the Mars Pathfinder landing, that the provenance for local blocks may be determined by orbiter spectra, primarily from the MGS TES instrument, our ability to do so has yet to be demonstrated. Indeed, several months after conclusion of the Pathfinder mission, we have yet to reach a consensus on the composition of local materials. Our primary data set for selecting a landing site within the latitude and elevation constraints of the 2001 mission is the Viking Orbiter image archive. The site must be selected to place the landing ellipse so as to avoid obvious hazards, such as steep slopes, large or numerous craters, or abundant large knobs. For this purpose, we chose a resolution limit of better than 50 m/pixel. This necessarily excludes from the present study images from current and future orbiter spacecraft, until such data does become readily available. Within each proposed region, it may be possible to identify additional sites once these data become available. Second, the fine-component thermal inertia data, should be greater than about 5 or 6 cgs Units (10(exp -3) cal/sq cm s(exp -0.5)/K). Low thermal inertias imply dusty environments, which could pose a mobility hazard. Similarly, the albedo of the site should not be particularly high, which would also suggest dusty surfaces. Low albedos are preferred, as they often coincide with low Viking red:violet ratios and indicate less dusty surfaces. Next, the Modeled Block Abundance should also not be too high or too low. Based on the Viking Lander and Mars Pathfinder experiences, percentages of blocks should be on the order of 5-25%. Too many blocks could pose a hazard to the landing and mobility. Too few blocks could also indicate a dusty surface. Primary Landing Site: Northern Meridiani Sinus (Proposed by T. J. Parker and K., S. Edgett) Vital Statistics: (1) Latitude, Longitude: 0-3 N, 350-2 W. *Elevation (Viking): about0.5-1.5 Ian. (2) Viking Orbiter Image coverage: Excellent coverage by 15 - 25 m/pixel images (orbits 709A and 410B). Possible stereo coverage in region where two orbits overlap (probably small parallax angle, as these orbits are not listed in NASA Contractor Report 3501) (3) Albedo: about .18 -.26 (4) Block Abundance: 5-26% (5)Fine-Component Thermal Inertia: 5-9 cgs units This region consists of bright deposits similar to those described by Edgett et al, that also lie within a prominent dark albedo region. These deposits are flat-lying, to such a degree that they ramp against topography rather than draping over it. This led Edgett and Parker to suggest that they may be subaqueous sediments, possibly lacustrine or marine evaporites, laid down sometime from the late Noachian to middle Hesperian (age determination pending crater counts). A contact between this material and elevated, dissected highlands to the south was identified , and is described by Edgett et al. Our desire in proposing this landing site is to sample the edge of this deposit where it has been exposed through etching, presumably eolian deflation (the deposit, though in the highlands, is itself only lightly to moderately cratered). This should enable access to in situ stratigraphy. The actual landing site will be selected where slopes are not expected to be steep, such that the rover itself should be able to traverse them and sample layered materials on the way, either up or down the slope. Perhaps due to uncertainties at this time as to the friability or meter-scale roughness of the deposit, it might make sense to place the landing ellipse on the exhumed highland surface adjacent to the deflated margin of the deposit and plan on driving to the deposit rather than landing on it and driving downslope. This should also enable imaging the margin for evidence of layering should it prove too difficult to climb. A target ellipse on the highland surface should also allow Athena access to ancient Noachian highland materials, particularly if placed near crater ejecta or an inlier of knobby material. Secondary Landing Site: Southern Elysium Planitia (Proposed by T. J. Parker) Vital Statistics: (1) Latitude, Longitude: 1.5-3.5 S, 195-198 W. (2) Elevation (Viking): -1.0 km. (3) Viking Orbiter Image coverage: Excellent coverage by 15 - 25 m/pixel images (orbit 725). Possible stereo coverage between images from beginning and end of orbit that overlap (probably small parallax angle) (4) Albedo: about .27-.28 (5) Block Abundance: 4-7% (6) Fine-Component Thermal Inertia: about 3 cgs units This region consists of eroded knobby material, probably of Noachian age, though much of the crater population has been destroyed, that is onlapped at a sharp contact by an extensive plains unit in southern Elysium Planitia that is Amazonian in age. The plains materials have been attributed to unusually low-viscosity flood lavas from fissures south of the Elysium volcanic rise, or to lacustrine materials associated with a large, Amazonian lake at the source of Marte Vallis. Parker and Schenk presented evidence in support of the latter interpretation, though they attributed the putative shore morphology to an embayment of a northern plains ocean into the southern Elysium region. Detailed examination of the margin of the deposit, showing erosion, not simply burial, of small crater rims and fluidized ejecta blankets, also points to lacustrine or marine sedimentation rather than volcanic plains burial. The plains surface exhibits a "crusty" appearance that many researchers have attributed to pressure ridges in lava flows. In a lacustrine context, they also resemble pressure ridges in desiccated evaporite deposits and salt-rimmed pools (now dry) similar in scale and morphology to spectacular, hundred meter-scale pool rims in alkaline Lake Natron, East African Rift. The eroded highland margin surface adjacent to these plains appears to be fairly smooth, even at 15 m/pixel. Isolated knob inliers are scattered from a few kilometers to several tens of "kilometers apart. Heights of the knobs have not been measured yet but, based on experience with similar features in the Pathfinder landing ellipse, are probably typically on the order of several tens of meters high and smaller, though some of the largest knobs in the region are probably up to a few hundred meters high. Two craters larger than a kilometer in diameter, with fluidized deposits, lie nearby the proposed landing site. Very high-resolution images from MOC should help to determine whether a landing site navigable by the Athena rover could be placed in this region. The space between knobs and craters is large enough to enable placement of a target landing ellipse between them but still provide access to one or more of them and to the margin of the Elysium plains material. Post-2001 Mars Surveyor Landing Site: Argyre Planitia (Proposed by T. J. Parker) Vital Statistics: (1) Latitude, Longitude: 55-56 S, 41-43 W. (2) Elevation (Viking): 1.0 km. (3) Viking Orbiter Image coverage: Excellent coverage by 40 m/pixel images (orbits 567B, 568B, and 569B). Excellent stereo coverage with large parallax angles over the entire landing site region, and much of central and southern Argyre. (4) Albedo: about .23-.24 (5) Block Abundance: No data (6) Fine-Component Thermal Inertia: No data The floors of both the Argyre and Hellas basins contain etched layered materials that are probably thick accumulations of channel or lacustrine sediments. The deposits in Hellas are much more eroded than those in Argyre, and Hellas lacks a channel outlet. Argyre is unique in that Uzboi Vallis flowed out of the basin, requiring overflow of a standing body of water within Argyre. This makes it the largest impact basin on Mars with channels both draining into it and flowing out from it. Hellas' channels may be catastrophic flood channels, whereas Argyre was fed by modest-scale valley networks, though the outlet at Uzboi Vallis was a catastrophic flood Highland craters and basins of this kind should be high-priority landing targets for missions intended to focus on the search for either prebiotic organic materials or even simple fossil microorganisms. Basins with internally-draining valley networks should be preferred over flood channels, as they could have provided the long-term influx of water favorable to the origin of life. (Catastrophic floods are not conducive to fossil preservation, due to their very short durations and high transportation energies). They also afford an opportunity to study the evolution of the planet's climate and volatiles during the period of time between the late Noachian and early Hesperian, when a drastic change from a proposed early warm, wet climate to one more closely resembling the modern environment is thought to have occurred. Large basin

Parker, T. J.↗
NASA NTRS1996

NASA Space Missions to Asteroids: Protecting the Earth from NEO Impacts

There is now a general recognition of the hazard of impacts on Earth by comets and asteroids, but there is yet no consensus concerning international actions that should be taken to protect the planet from such impacts. An essential step in the analysis of the situation involves estimating the relative hazard posed by comets and asteroids of different sizes and orbits. All recent studies agree that the larger impacts pose the greater danger, and that our primary concern from the perspective of total risk should be on impacts that are large enough to cause global ecological catastrophe. These global catastrophes are also of special interest, since they (alone among natural disasters) have the potential to destroy civilization. Studies of the sensitivity of the Earth's environment suggest that the energy threshold energy for causing a global catastrophe is at about 1 million megatons, corresponding to impactor diameters of 1.5 to 2 km. This information leads naturally to a strategy of concentrating on the larger NEOs, say those 1 km or more in diameter. This is the rationale for the Spaceguard Survey, which must be the highest priority in mitigation efforts. The second question concerns the value of developing standing defensive systems that could deflect or destroy an incoming NEO. In the case of the asteroids larger than 1 km in diameter, no such system is needed, since there will be ample time (at least several decades) between the discovery of the threatening object by Spaceguard and the requirement to take action against it. In the case of objects smaller than 1 km diameter, development of defensive systems is not cost-effective; there are many greater dangers to persons and property that are much more urgent. Only in the case of large long-period comets is there a rationale for standing defense systems. The question is also raised whether the risks inherent in developing and maintaining a defense system might be greater than the impact risks it is intended to guard against. These and related issues are the focus of much current international debate on defense of the planet against NEO impacts. Meanwhile, the most critical issue remains the expansion of the telescopic search for NEOs.

Morrison, David↗
NASA NTRS1991

A Cretaceous-Tertiary mass extinction? Were most of Earth's species killed off?

For the past decade, the scientific and popular press have carried frequent articles about a catastrophic mass extinction that supposedly destroyed the majority of the earth's species, including the dinosaurs, approximately 65 million years ago. Since 1980, more than 2000 papers and books have dealt with some aspect of a mass extinction at the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K/T) boundary. One authoritative estimate of the severity of the extinctions is that 60-80% of all the living species became extinct at this boundary (Raup 1988). There appears to be a general acceptance of the fact that such a great catastrophe did occur. Most of the argument among scientists now is devoted to the determination of the cause. In this article, I argue that the species changes at the K/T boundary were neither sudden nor catastrophic. They were most likely caused by a regression of sea level that led to a decrease in primary production.

NASA Discipline Exobiology↗
NASA NTRS1995

Gear Crack Propagation Investigation

Reduced weight is a major design goal in aircraft power transmissions. Some gear designs incorporate thin rims to help meet this goal. Thin rims, however, may lead to bending fatigue cracks. These cracks may propagate through a gear tooth or into the gear rim. A crack that propagates through a tooth would probably not be catastrophic, and ample warning of a failure could be possible. On the other hand, a crack that propagates through the rim would be catastrophic. Such cracks could lead to disengagement of a rotor or propeller from an engine, loss of an aircraft, and fatalities. To help create and validate tools for the gear designer, the NASA Lewis Research Center performed in-house analytical and experimental studies to investigate the effect of rim thickness on gear-tooth crack propagation. Our goal was to determine whether cracks grew through gear teeth (benign failure mode) or through gear rims (catastrophic failure mode) for various rim thicknesses. In addition, we investigated the effect of rim thickness on crack propagation life. A finite-element-based computer program simulated gear-tooth crack propagation. The analysis used principles of linear elastic fracture mechanics, and quarter-point, triangular elements were used at the crack tip to represent the stress singularity. The program had an automated crack propagation option in which cracks were grown numerically via an automated remeshing scheme. Crack-tip stress-intensity factors were estimated to determine crack-propagation direction. Also, various fatigue crack growth models were used to estimate crack-propagation life. Experiments were performed in Lewis' Spur Gear Fatigue Rig to validate predicted crack propagation results. Gears with various backup ratios were tested to validate crack-path predictions. Also, test gears were installed with special crack-propagation gages in the tooth fillet region to measure bending-fatigue crack growth. From both predictions and tests, gears with backup ratios (rim thickness divided by tooth height) of 3.3 and 1.0 produced tooth fractures, whereas a backup ratio of 0.3 produced rim fractures. For a backup ratio of 0.5, the experiments produced rim fractures and the predictions produced both rim and tooth fractures, depending on the initial geometry of the crack. Good correlation between predicted and measured crack growth was achieved when the fatigue crack-closure concept was introduced into the analysis. As the gear rim thickness decreased, the compressive cyclic stress in the gear-tooth fillet region increased. This retarded crack growth and increased the number of crack-propagation cycles to failure.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2002

Gear Crack Propagation Path Studies-- Guidelines Developed for Ultrasafe Design

Effective gear designs balance strength, durability, reliability, size, weight, and cost. However, unexpected gear failures may occur even with adequate gear tooth design. To design an extremely safe system, the designer must ask and address the question "What happens when a failure occurs?" With regard to gear-tooth bending fatigue, tooth or rim fractures may occur. For aircraft, a crack that propagated through a rim would be catastrophic, leading to the disengagement of a rotor or propeller, the loss of an aircraft, and possible fatalities. This failure mode should be avoided. However, a crack that propagated through a tooth might or might not be catastrophic, depending on the design and operating conditions. Also, early warning of this failure mode might be possible because of advances in modern diagnostic systems. An analysis was performed at the NASA Glenn Research Center to develop design guidelines to prevent catastrophic rim fracture failure modes in the event of gear-tooth bending fatigue. The finite element method was used with principles of linear elastic fracture mechanics. Crack propagation paths were predicted for a variety of gear tooth and rim configurations. The effects of rim and web thicknesses, initial crack locations, and gear-tooth geometry factors such as diametral pitch, number of teeth, pitch radius, and tooth pressure angle were considered. Design maps of tooth and rim fracture modes, including the effects of gear geometry, applied load, crack size, and material properties were developed. The occurrence of rim fractures significantly increased as the backup ratio (rim thickness divided by tooth height) decreased. The occurrence of rim fractures also increased as the initial crack location was moved down the root of the tooth. Increased rim and web compliance increased the occurrence of rim fractures. For gears with constant-pitch radii, coarser-pitch teeth increased the occurrence of tooth fractures over rim fractures. Also, 25 degree pressure angle teeth increased the occurrence of tooth fractures over rim fractures in comparison to 20 pressure angle teeth. For gears with a constant number of teeth or for gears with constant diametral pitch, varying size had little or no effect on crack propagation paths.

Lewicki, David G.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Reliability Effects of Surge Current Testing of Solid Tantalum Capacitors

Solid tantalum capacitors are widely used in space applications to filter low-frequency ripple currents in power supply circuits and stabilize DC voltages in the system. Tantalum capacitors manufactured per military specifications (MIL-PRF-55365) are established reliability components and have less than 0.001% of failures per 1000 hours (the failure rate is less than 10 FIT) for grades D or S, thus positioning these parts among electronic components with the highest reliability characteristics. Still, failures of tantalum capacitors do happen and when it occurs it might have catastrophic consequences for the system. This is due to a short-circuit failure mode, which might be damaging to a power supply, and also to the capability of tantalum capacitors with manganese cathodes to self-ignite when a failure occurs in low-impedance applications. During such a failure, a substantial amount of energy is released by exothermic reaction of the tantalum pellet with oxygen generated by the overheated manganese oxide cathode, resulting not only in destruction of the part, but also in damage of the board and surrounding components. A specific feature of tantalum capacitors, compared to ceramic parts, is a relatively large value of capacitance, which in contemporary low-size chip capacitors reaches dozens and hundreds of microfarads. This might result in so-called surge current or turn-on failures in the parts when the board is first powered up. Such a failure, which is considered as the most prevalent type of failures in tantalum capacitors [I], is due to fast changes of the voltage in the circuit, dV/dt, producing high surge current spikes, I(sub sp) = Cx(dV/dt), when current in the circuit is unrestricted. These spikes can reach hundreds of amperes and cause catastrophic failures in the system. The mechanism of surge current failures has not been understood completely yet, and different hypotheses were discussed in relevant literature. These include a sustained scintillation breakdown model [1-3]; electrical oscillations in circuits with a relatively high inductance [4-6]; local overheating of the cathode [5,7, 8]; mechanical damage to tantalum pentoxide dielectric caused by the impact of MnO2 crystals [2,9, 10]; or stress-induced-generation of electron traps caused by electromagnetic forces developed during current spikes [11]. A commonly accepted explanation of the surge current failures is that at unlimited current supply during surge current conditions, the self-healing mechanism in tantalum capacitors does not work, and what would be a minor scintillation spike if the current were limited, becomes a catastrophic failure of the part [l, 12]. However, our data show that the scintillation breakdown voltages are significantly greater that the surge current breakdown voltages, so it is still not clear why the part, which has no scintillations, would fail at the same voltage during surge current testing (SCT).

Teverovsky, Alexander↗
NASA NTRS2010

What if Things Get Worse? Really Grand Challenges for Modeling and Simulation in a Risky and Complex World or Modeling and Simulation for the "Greater Good"?

Today Modeling and Simulation-- ---as an important practice or industry or area of expertise ----- is at a complex crossroad - a sort of cyber-highway--where these complexities meet-technical, economic, environmental, geopolitical and cultural. They may converge or collide. Let's not kid ourselves. It is all too much for anyone person or organization Malcolm Gladwell said it. "We have constructed a world in which the potential for high tech catastrophe is embedded in the fabric of everyday life." We are surrounded by problems that scream at us from our television, Internet and social networks along with billboards and protest signs. We face not just high tech catastrophes but, also, landslides, earthquakes, tornados, floods and hurricanes and large-scale criminality. Evil, war, famine and pestilence have not gone away. It is all too much to think about. My friend, George Peabody, who taught me everything I know about power said that addressing such issues requires that we constantly build our network, information resources and the credibility and visibility of our work. That is how we will build the power of simulation so it can change the world --even maybe, save it. We need all the help we can get and give one another because our human early warning systems appear to be out of kilter. We seem to have trouble imagining how small failings can continue to lead to catastrophic disaster. Think about O-rings and blowout preventers. One is reminded of the old nursery rhyme, "For want of a nail, a shoe was lost! for want of a shoe the horse was lost! for want of a rider the battle was lost and so the kingdom fell." Although the investigation will take more time for real answers, it is worrisome that a rig worker reported to the BBC that-- weeks before the explosion of Deep Ocean Horizon. -he identified a leak in the oil rig's safety equipment -the Control Pod of the blowout preventer which has giant shears designed to cut and seal off the well's main pipe. With both electronics and hydraulics, these are effectively the brains of the blowout preventer. No one fixed it, he alleges, they just shut it down and relied on the other control pod -an act deemed unacceptable by petroleum expert, Tad Patzek, at the University of Texas. The US Congress has identified numerous other problems with the blowout preventer, including design problems and unexpected modifications.

Fifrey, Priscilla↗
NASA NTRS2011

Independent Review of U.S. and Russian Probabilistic Risk Assessments for the International Space Station Mini Research Module #2 Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

The Mini-Research Module-2 (MRM-2), a Russian module on the International Space Station, does not meet its requirements for micrometeoroid and orbital debris probability of no penetration (PNP). To document this condition, the primary Russian Federal Space Agency ISS contractor, S.P. Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation-Energia (RSC-E), submitted an ISS non-compliance report (NCR) which was presented at the 5R Stage Operations Readiness Review (SORR) in October 2009. In the NCR, RSC-E argued for waiving the PNP requirement based on several factors, one of which was the risk of catastrophic failure was acceptably low at 1 in 11,100. However, NASA independently performed an assessment of the catastrophic risk resulting in a value of 1 in 1380 and believed that the risk at that level was unacceptable. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center was requested to evaluate the two competing catastrophic risk values and determine which was more accurate. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Squire, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2013

What Reliability Engineers Should Know about Space Radiation Effects

Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.

DiBari, Rebecca↗
NASA NTRS2013

Design Safety Used in NASA's Human-rated Primary Lithium Batteries

Single cell tests were benign for external short, inadvertent charge and overdischarge into reversal up to 4.5 A. At lower current loads cells die (may be due to excessive dendrite formation) benignly. String level external short circuits lead to an unbalanced overdischarge, with one cell going into reversal. The result is catastrophic violent venting. Unbalanced string overdischarges at different currents causes catastrophic violent venting also. Heat-to-vent is very dramatic displaying violent venting Simulated internal short is also catastrophic and displays violent venting. Battery is not UL-rated; hence does not have dual-fault tolerance or tolerance to inherent cell tolerance to failures Battery Design for NASA JSC's human-rated application for use on ISS was changed to include two bypass diodes per cell to provide for two-failure tolerance to overdischarge into reversal (and external short) hazards.

Jeevarajan, J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Reliability Model for Ni-BaTiO3-Based (BME) Ceramic Capacitors

The evaluation of multilayer ceramic capacitors (MLCCs) with base-metal electrodes (BMEs) for potential NASA space project applications requires an in-depth understanding of their reliability. The reliability of an MLCC is defined as the ability of the dielectric material to retain its insulating properties under stated environmental and operational conditions for a specified period of time t. In this presentation, a general mathematic expression of a reliability model for a BME MLCC is developed and discussed. The reliability model consists of three parts: (1) a statistical distribution that describes the individual variation of properties in a test group of samples (Weibull, log normal, normal, etc.), (2) an acceleration function that describes how a capacitors reliability responds to external stresses such as applied voltage and temperature (All units in the test group should follow the same acceleration function if they share the same failure mode, independent of individual units), and (3) the effect and contribution of the structural and constructional characteristics of a multilayer capacitor device, such as the number of dielectric layers N, dielectric thickness d, average grain size r, and capacitor chip size S. In general, a two-parameter Weibull statistical distribution model is used in the description of a BME capacitors reliability as a function of time. The acceleration function that relates a capacitors reliability to external stresses is dependent on the failure mode. Two failure modes have been identified in BME MLCCs: catastrophic and slow degradation. A catastrophic failure is characterized by a time-accelerating increase in leakage current that is mainly due to existing processing defects (voids, cracks, delamination, etc.), or the extrinsic defects. A slow degradation failure is characterized by a near-linear increase in leakage current against the stress time; this is caused by the electromigration of oxygen vacancies (intrinsic defects). The two identified failure modes follow different acceleration functions. Catastrophic failures follow the traditional power-law relationship to the applied voltage. Slow degradation failures fit well to an exponential law relationship to the applied electrical field. Finally, the impact of capacitor structure on the reliability of BME capacitors is discussed with respect to the number of dielectric layers in an MLCC unit, the number of BaTiO3 grains per dielectric layer, and the chip size of the capacitor device.

reliability↗
NASA NTRS2017

Development of a Numerical Model of Hypervelocity Impact into a Pressurized Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

As the outlook for space exploration becomes more ambitious and spacecraft travel deeper into space than ever before, it is increasingly important that propulsion systems perform reliably within the space environment. The increased reliability compels designers to increase design margin at the expense of system mass, which contrasts with the need to limit vehicle mass to maximize payload. Such are the factors that motivate the integration of high specific strength composite materials in the construction of pressure vessels commonly referred to as composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPV). The COPV consists of a metallic liner for the inner shell of the COPV that is stiff, negates fluid permeation and serves as the anchor for composite laminates or filaments, but the liner itself cannot contain the stresses from the pressurant it contains. The compo-site-fiber reinforced polymer (CFRP) is wound around the liner using a combination of hoop (circumferential) and helical orientations. Careful consideration of wrap orientation allows the composite to evenly bear structural loading and creates the COPV's characteristic high strength to weight ratio. As the CFRP overwrap carries most of the stresses induced by pressurization, damage to the overwrap can affect mission duration, mission success and potentially cause loss-of-vehicle/loss-of-crew. For this reason, it is critical to establish a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms involved in the failure of a stressed composite such as that of the COPV. One of the greatest external threats to the integrity of a spacecraft's COPV is an impact from the meteoroid and orbital debris environments (MMOD). These impacts, even from submillimeter particles, generate extremely high stress states in the CFRP that can damage numerous fibers. As a result of this possibility, initial assumptions in survivability analysis for some human-rated NASA space-craft have assumed that any alteration of the vessel due to impact is considered a catastrophic failure. This assumption is conservative and made due to lack of knowledge on the level of allow-able damage to the composite overwrap that can be sustained and still allow successful completion of the mission. To quantify the allowable damage level to the composite overwrap involves assessing stress redistribution following damage as well as evaluating possible time-dependent mechanisms involved in the COPV response to an impact event. Limited published work in this subject has shown that COPV can withstand at least some level of damage due to high energy impacts. These observations have been confirmed and expanded upon in recent experimental research performed by NASA. This research has demonstrated that there is not only robustness in a COPV to compensate for CFRP damage, but has also identified two significant failure modes for pressurized COPV. The lowest threshold failure mode involves the perforation of the vessel, and the highest threshold failure mode is the catastrophic rupture. While both of these failure modes mean a loss of the COPV, system robustness affords some tolerance to the venting as opposed to the more catastrophic rupture. As a consequence, it is necessary to understand the conditions that result in the transition between these failure modes. The aforementioned experimental research has been performed in both the unpressurized and pressurized condition to identify the damage level that triggered the failure thresh-old. This COPV test program was sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC), and tests were performed at NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Planning and coordination were provided by NASA JSC Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group, and the COPVs were provided by the ISS Program. Unpressurized testing has been conducted at the pressure of the vacuum test chamber, while, the pressurized testing has been conducted at 290 +/- 10 bar (4,200  100 psi) using nitrogen as the pressurizing gas, which corresponds to the design pressure for the target COPV. In this research, spherical aluminum projectiles with varying diameter has been chosen as the impactor. For the unpressurized COPV, the dependence of penetration up to the dependence of hole size in the liner has been obtained as a function of impact conditions. For the pressurized research, the dependence of penetration up to rupture has been obtained as a function of im-pact conditions. Two representative post-test photographs of the failed COPV's from a nor-mal impact into the COPV surface are shown in Fig. 1. These images display the dramatic difference between failure modes, venting (Fig. 1a) and rupture (Fig. 1b). For venting, liner perforation, severed composite fibers/tows and ply delamination are commonly observed damage characteristics of this COPV failure mode. In the case of rupture, the COPV typically experienced a separation of its domed regions and severe break-up of the cylindrical region. Fully understanding the transition from venting to rupture experimentally is costly and potentially unachievable for conditions that cannot be generated in the laboratory. These shortcomings have motivated the performance of three-dimensional numerical simulations to expand the existing experimental database. These simulations have been carried out with the nonlinear-structural-dynamics, analysis-tool, CTH. A typical pressure contour plot from an impact simulation of an entire COPV is shown in Fig. 2. To generate the COPV stress state without initiating a shock wave, the pressure in the simulated COPV is ramped up to the final pressure over a millisecond prior to impact of the projectile with nitrogen gas. Figure 2a shows the system in this initial condition. After one millisecond, a projectile is initiated into the simulation and impacts the COPV. Figure 2b shows the system after this impact. In the figure, the onset of venting is represented as the change in pressure (μbar), red to green, at the perforation site. Also seen in the figure is the eroded projectile that had passed into the COPV vessel with the generated shock wave in the pressurant propagating just ahead of the material. In this paper, pertinent experimental details and the development of the material constitutive models necessary for this work along with the efforts to validate their use are dis-cussed. The simulation results are presented and compared with the NASA experimental observations. While work is on-going from this effort, early observations pertinent to the failure threshold are presented.

Garcia, M. A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Hail Storm Risk Assessment Using Space-Borne Remote Sensing Observations and Reanalyses

Much of the world is impacted by severe thunderstorms, but whether they become disasters depends upon resilience--our capacity to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover. Hail is the costliest severe weather hazard for the insurance industry, generating ~70% of severe convective storm losses due to damage to assets such as homes, businesses, agriculture, and infrastructure. Most insurance companies do not reserve enough capital to cover catastrophes, so they acquire reinsurance. The reinsurance industry uses catastrophe models (CatModels) to statistically estimate risk to an insurer’s portfolio. Hail CatModels are developed with climatologies that define hailstorm frequency and severity. Hail-prone areas can be defined using hail reports from trained spotters, the media, and the general public. Extremely severe hail (2+ inch diameter) occurs nearly every day across the world. Weather radars can detect hail because hailstones strongly reflect microwave signals that they emit. However, hail climatologies are difficult to derive because hail covers small areas and there are neither hail reporting mechanisms (e.g. website or mobile app) nor radar networks in most places outside the US and Europe. This lack of ground truth on severe hail puts society and economies at risk. Hail is generated within storms by strong updrafts. These updrafts exhibit unique signatures in NASA and other agency satellite observations, offering new opportunities for hailstorm analysis. Geostationary (GEO) visible and infrared imagery has been collected for ~15-25 years across the world (region dependent) and methods have been developed at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) to detect hailstorm updrafts using GEO imagery. Climatological GEO updraft data has been used by Willis Towers Watson (WTW), a leader in catastrophe risk assessment for the insurance industry, and Karlsruhe Institute of Technology to develop CatModels over Europe and Australia. Hail can also be inferred with passive microwave imagery collected by low-Earth-orbiting sensors such as the GPM GMI, TRMM TMI, AMSR-E, AMSR-2, SSM/I, and SSMIS over the last 20+ years using methods developed at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). Hailstorms generate enhanced lightning flash rates that can be tracked using new GOES-R series GEO Lightning Mapping (GLM) imagery. Atmospheric reanalyses can be used to define favorable hailstorm environments for combination with the satellite-based storm detections. This presentation will describe a framework for developing continental to global hail climatologies and CatModels based on NASA satellite data and capabilities. This is a collaboration between LaRC and MSFC, WTW, and partners in Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. This project seeks to mitigate hail disasters by aiding development of new satellite-based severe storm nowcasting tools by regional partners and developing climatologies to improve societal understanding of hail frequency. GEOO visible and infrared metrics of storm intensity, environmental conditions based on reanalyses, spotter hail reports and radar MESH observations are intercompared to quantify the detectability of hailstorms, and our ability to discriminate hailstorms from other severe storms. We are also maturing methods using land surface imaging satellite data (e.g. MODIS, Landsat, Sentinel 1 and 2) to identify hail damage to agriculture. Work with WTW will improve socioeconomic resilience through development of new CatModels. Southern Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Argentina feature some of the most intense thunderstorms on Earth. South America and South Africa are developing insurance markets of interest to WTW clients, and is similar to other regions routinely impacted by hail that do not have comprehensive hail reporting or radars to assess hailstorm frequency. Project datasets will be made available via online GIS-enabled tools developed at the LaRC Atmospheric Science Data Center (ASDC) which will visualize data and provide it in multiple formats for use in a wide range of open source and commercial tools.

Kristopher Michael Bedka↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effect of Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Impact on Modal Response of Persistent Assets

Protecting the infrastructure and payload components of persistent assets (PAs) from damage caused by MicroMeteoroid and/or Orbital Debris (MMOD) impacts is a significant design consideration. The impact resistance to MMOD will need to be provided by the robustness of the structural configuration such that the asset does not suffer loss of function or catastrophic failure. Finite element modelling (FEM) can be used to investigate the effects of MMOD impact on the overall structural behavior of the PA. The models are being used here to investigate the structural response to ‘missing’ truss members, and parametric studies are being performed to identify the worst-case scenario of an impact catastrophically damaging a truss element. These models will be used to determine which truss members are the most critical to the structural performance, and thus, which may require a higher degree of protection or robustness to ensure they can withstand an MMOD impact without causing catastrophic effects on the entire structure. Initial results have been generated indicating a reduction in the global frequency due to missing truss members as a result of MMOD impact.

in-space assembly (ISA)↗
NASA NTRS2021

Reliability and Safety Assessment of Urban Air Mobility Concept Vehicles

The following work was commissioned by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to guide industry and future regulation related to urban air mobility (UAM). Prior studies compared the relative safety of NASA concept vehicles, Figure ES1, designed for UAM and provided recommendations for industry research, aircraft architectural improvements, and regulatory updates. After the prior study completed, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) released regulatory guidance in the form of a special condition (SC), SC-VTOL-01, for multirotors with distributed propulsion and flight controls (DPFC). The objective of the current work was to develop DPFC architectures that will comply with SC-VTOL-01. Vehicle designs, DPFC architectures, and stability & control (S&C) models were developed to find limitations and trends to guide industry. To guide this task, NASA developed quad, hex, and an octorotor to better define vehicle attributes and trade space. Aircraft for study included electric, hybrid-electric, and turboshaft powerplants and collective and RPM control schemes. Assessments are in terms of the safety level achieved, and/or aircraft component/features needed to meet SC-VTOL-01. The most challenging criteria being the catastrophic failure rate, ≤10-9 catastrophic failures per flight hour, and that no single failures may result in a catastrophic event. A disciplined process was followed, similar to that in Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 4761. A preliminary system safety assessment (PSSA) leveraged prior work as a basis of creating failure rate budgets for system design teams. System designs were updated and iterated upon, working with reliability and safety subject matter experts to develop SC-VTOL-01 compliant designs. Design changes were reflected in updated PSSAs for initial verification of compliance. The DPFC architecture was broken into four system design teams, the (1) flight control system (FCS), (2) drive and power system, (3) thermal management system (TMS), and (4) electrical power and distribution system. The FCS including elements necessary to control the aircraft, drive and power including elements necessary to generate and transmit shaft power, the TMS including elements necessary to maintain temperature limits in all operating environments, and electrical pow-er and distribution including equipment necessary to store and transmit electrical energy. Results found that all aircraft evaluated may have paths to comply with SC-VTOL-01, Figure ES2. However, S&C models showed large power transients that must be addressed and PSSA results show that future work is needed in single load path structures, high voltage power storage and distribution, and in motor/rotor overspeed protection.

Boeing↗