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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 181 records · Page 10
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

Adaptive Hierarchical Cyber Attack Detection and Localization in Active Distribution Systems

Development of a cyber security strategy for the active distribution systems is challenging due to the inclusion of distributed renewable energy generations. Here this paper proposes an adaptive hierarchical cyber attack detection and localization framework for distributed active distribution systems via analyzing electrical waveforms. Cyber attack detection is based on a sequential deep learning model, via which even minor cyber attacks can be identified. The two-stage cyber attack localization algorithm first estimates the cyber attack sub-region, and then localize the specified cyber attack within the estimated subregion. We propose a modified spectral clustering-based network partitioning method for the hierarchical cyber attack ‘coarse’ localization. Next, to further narrow down the cyber attack location, a normalized impact score based on waveform statistical metrics is proposed to obtain a ‘fine’ cyber attack location by characterizing different waveform properties. Finally, compared with classical and state-of-art methods, a comprehensive quantitative evaluation with two case studies shows promising estimation results of the proposed framework.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Physical Security and Resiliency Analysis Testbed for Critical Microgrids with IEEE 2030.5: Preprint

IEEE 2030.5, also known as the Common Smart Inverter Standard (CSIP) is a protocol that specifies the interface between the end user and the smart grid. This standard was proposed recently, and provides many functions which if implemented incorrectly might lead to vulnerabilities. This paper proposes a cyber-physical microgrid testbed using OpenDSS and IEEE 2030.5 that can be used to study the performance of the CSIP protocol various scenarios. For critical microgrid installations, it is essential that the critical loads are served in spite of multiple contingencies. A resiliency analysis is performed for a military microgrid to study its performance and the results are analyzed.

CVSS↗
DOE OSTI2025

EUREICA: Efficient UltRa Endpoint IoT-enabled Coordinated Architecture

The electricity grid has evolved from a physical system to a cyber-physical system with digital devices that perform measurement, control, communication, computation, and actuation. The increased penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) that include renewable generation, flexible loads, and storage provides extraordinary opportunities for improvements in efficiency and sustainability. However, they can introduce new vulnerabilities in the form of cyberattacks, which can cause significant challenges in ensuring grid resilience. The purpose of this project was to develop a framework ((Efficient, Ultra-REsilient, IoT-Coordinated Assets, or EUREICA)for achieving grid resilience through suitably coordinated assets including a network of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and a local electricity market (LEM) to identify trustable assets and carry out this coordination. Situational Awareness (SA) of locally available DERs with the ability to inject power or reduce consumption is enabled by the market, together with a monitoring procedure for their trustability and commitment. Experiments conducted during this project demonstrated that, with this SA, a variety of cyberattacks can be mitigated using local trustable resources without stressing the bulk grid. The demonstrations were carried out using a variety of high-fidelity co-simulation platforms, real-time hardware-in-the-loop validation, and a utility-friendly simulator.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber-Resilient Design Methodology for Microgrids

Recent advancement in tools has helped with microgrid design, development, planning and operation. Microgrids offer a unique application based on users with different requirements for tools. The process of designing, constructing, commissioning, and assessing a microgrid is not always straightforward due to these distinct requirements. Additionally, metrics are needed for performance evaluation. This panel will offer an overview and description of tools that helps with microgrid design, construction, planning, operation, cyber security, and metrics-driven performance assessment driven by multiple diverse applications and use cases.

CCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Physics-informed Data-driven Degradation and Prognostic For Hydropower System

The hydropower system is a cyber-physical system, and the industry is experiencing high operation and maintenance (O&M) costs along with increasing unplanned outages, primarily due to aging equipment and new asset loading patterns. Current (O&M) practices in asset management are predominantly reactive rather than predictive and systematic. To address these challenges, a proposed physics-informed data-driven degradation model aims to simulate the health of components in various environments. Its purpose is to accurately characterize wear and fatigue in the pilot components of hydropower systems. Additionally, the model provides informed confidence in prognostic predictions concerning asset degradation and remaining life.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Securing Smart Manufacturing: Detection of Cyber-Physical Attacks in CNC-Based Systems

As Industry 4.0 advances, the integration of computer numerical control (CNC) machines and advanced manufacturing technologies is transforming production into smart manufacturing systems that blend physical and digital processes as cyber-physical systems. However, this increased cyber-physical connectivity exposes manufacturing systems to cyber threats that can cause severe operational and financial disruptions. This paper presents a comparative study on cyber attacks and anomaly detection techniques in manufacturing, focusing on network traffic from CNC machines. The data extracted from network packets includes machine commands and control signals exchanged between the machine's interface and control system, crucial for maintaining operational integrity. We explore two types of cyber attacks, design modification and command injection, which pose substantial risks to CNC machine productivity and system integrity. Our investigation involves experiments on a real CNC system, highlighting the urgent need for effective detection mechanisms. To address these threats, we evaluate three anomaly detection methods: dynamic time warping (DTW), rolling average, and a deep learning, long short-term memory (LSTM) time-series-based autoencoder. Each is assessed for its effectiveness in identifying anomalous behaviors caused by the attacks. Our findings demonstrate the unique strengths and limitations of each detection technique, providing a deeper understanding of their applicability in realworld manufacturing environments. The comparative analysis indicates that while certain methods are highly effective against specific attack types, others offer broader applicability across different attacks. This study contributes to the accurate detection of anomalies in CNC machining processes, thereby enhancing the reliability and security of smart manufacturing systems against diverse cyber threats.

Williams, Bethanie [Tennessee Technological Univer↗
DOE OSTI2025

DRE: Designing for Resilience through Emulation

Threats to cyber- and cyber-physical systems have continued to increase over the past decade. Now more than ever, it is vital that cyber-physical system stakeholders have the tools to deeply understand their systems and the threats they face. High-fidelity modeling capabilities are powerful tools to support system understanding and decision-making, but they currently lack scientifically rigorous experimentation practices and infrastructures. The purpose of the project Designing for Resilience through Emulation (DRE) was to bring together past research and existing tools into a new pipeline to improve our ability to quantitatively evaluate future cyber scenarios. DRE offers new integrated capabilities for large dataset collection, noise studies, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty quantification, and surrogate modeling using a cyber-physical system emulation environment. These new capabilities significantly improve our ability to establish the credibility of the answers derived from emulation environments, ultimately leading to better critical decision support.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Sensor and Actuator Attacks on Hierarchical Control Systems with Domain-Aware Operator Theory

Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) provide opportunities for cyber attacks to have physical impacts. Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are a subclass of cyber threats that act stealthily to avoid detection and enable long-term attacks. Here, we build on our past work in APT modelling to combine deception-based sensor bias attacks and direct actuator manipulations in attacks against a hierarchical control system. That past work used the Koopman operator to develop a data-driven, domain-aware, optimization-based attacker model. Using an expansion of this model, we compute several different attacks, including multiple simultaneous attacks, against a high-fidelity commercial building emulator and compare the impacts of those attacks to each other. One next step of interest is to construct a defender system, built on the same modelling approach, designed to detect and mitigate such attacks.

koopman operator, Cyber-Physical Security, machine↗
DOE OSTI2025

Analysing a multi‐stage cyber threat and its impact on the power system

Abstract Electric power systems are composed of physical and cyber sub‐systems. The sub‐systems depend on each other. If the cyber sub‐system is compromised by a cyber threat, what is the impact on the physical system? This paper presents a case study that shows the steps of a multi‐stage cyber threat involving a database injection attack, and what happens to the power system if this threat is not detected in its early stages. The threat first affects one utility but it can spread to the balancing authority, which is responsible for keeping the voltage and frequency stable in the power grid. During the cyber threat, the authors also show defence tools, such as a cyber‐physical data fusion tool that displays and analyses power and cyber telemetry.

Al Homoud, Leen [Texas A&amp,M University College ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Cooperative Research and Development Agreement among National Energy Technology Laboratory, The Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia by and on behalf of Georgia Institute of Technology, and University of Texas at El Paso [Abstract]

Georgia Institute of Technology (GIT), University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), and the National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) will collaborate and develop cyber-physical systems for advanced power systems. GIT will test virtual models on hybrid power system hardware and cyber physical components. UTEP will test novel actuators on hybrid power system hardware. NETL will access GIT’s expertise in the engineering and real time simulation of power system processes for cyber-physical systems and simulations to control hardware. NETL will establish a relationship to promote UTEP’s capabilities in additive manufacturing and high-temperature piezo-electric devices with the potential for controlling high-temperature flows with a light and inexpensive device at high response rates. This project is the result of an EERE Advanced Manufacturing Office open Multi-Topic awarded proposal led by GIT titled, “Robust Combined Heat and Hybrid Power (CHHP) for High Electrical Efficiency Cogeneration”.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Review of Cyber-Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

In this paper, the challenges and a future vision of the cyber-physical security of photovoltaic (PV) systems are discussed from a firmware, network, PV converter controls, and grid security perspective. The vulnerabilities of PV systems are investigated under a variety of cyber-attacks, ranging from data integrity attacks to software-based attacks. A success rate metric is designed to evaluate the impact and facilitate decision making. Model-based and data-driven methods for threat detection and mitigation are summarized. In addition, the blockchain technology that addresses cyber-attacks in software and cyber networks is described. Simulation and experimental results that show the impact of cyber-attacks at the converter (device) and grid (system) levels are presented. Finally, potential research opportunities are discussed for next-generation, cyber-secure power electronics systems. These opportunities include multi-scale controllability, self-/event-triggering control, artificial intelligence/machine learning, hot patching, and online security. As of today, this study will be one of the few comprehensive studies in this emerging and fast-growing area.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems

The Cyber Resilient Energy Delivery Consortium (CREDC) started operations on October 1, 2015. The original period of performance ended September 30, 2020. During this span, CREDC developed projects with significant and measurable sector impact, achieved by involving industry partners (asset owners, equipment vendors, and technology providers) early and often, from helping us to identify critical sector needs, to performing pilot deployment and technology adoption. The central project goal was to create a research and development ecosystem where research results lead directly to development of applications and methodologies which are then validated in realistic contexts.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Filling the Gaps: A Bayesian Mixture Model for Imputing Missing Soil Water Content Data

ABSTRACT Soil water content (SWC) data are central to evaluating how soil moisture varies over time and space and influences critical plant and ecosystem functions, especially in water‐limited drylands. However, sensors that record SWC at high frequencies often malfunction, leading to incomplete timeseries and limiting our understanding of dryland ecosystem dynamics. We developed an analytical approach to impute missing SWC data, which we tested at six eddy flux tower sites along an elevation gradient in the southwestern United States. We impute missing data as a mixture of linearly interpolated SWC between the observed endpoints of a missing data gap and SWC simulated by an ecosystem water balance model (SOILWAT2). Within a Bayesian framework, we allowed the relative utility (mixture weight) of each component (linearly interpolated vs. SOILWAT2) to vary by depth, site and gap characteristics. We explored “fixed” weights versus “dynamic” weights that vary as a function of cumulative precipitation, average temperature, and time since the start of the gap. Both models estimated missing SWC data well ( R 2 = 0.70–0.88 vs. 0.75–0.91 for fixed vs. dynamic weights, respectively), but the utility of linearly interpolated versus SOILWAT2 values depended on site and depth. SOILWAT2 was more useful for more arid sites, shallower depths, longer and warmer gaps and gaps that received greater precipitation. Overall, the mixture model reliably gap‐fills SWC, while lending insight into processes governing SWC dynamics. This approach to impute missing data could be adapted to accommodate more than two mixture components and other types of environmental timeseries.

Ogle, Kiona [School of Informatics, Computing, and↗
DOE OSTI2020

Supporting Cyber Security of Power Distribution Systems by Detecting Differences Between Real-time Micro-Synchrophasor Measurements and Cyber-Reported SCADA (Final Report)

As modern power grids tend towards greater levels of automation and communication, the challenges of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are ones that are increasingly demanding attention. Today’s power system has evolved to form the foundational bedrock of modern society, and an attack on this infrastructure could prove disastrous. In this project we were tasked to investigate the use of distribution synchrophasors as an independent isolated sensor network with which we can corroborate, or flag potentially spoofed,Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) data. We adapted an approach to marry the underlying physical properties of power systems with the network communications used by power systems in order to offer insights unattainable by either data stream isolation. While the concept of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is well understood for monitoring network traffic and traditional IT computing systems, the approach discussed in this report is motivated by several key notions: first, current SCADA communications alone presents an incomplete view of the grid. Second, the power grid, and the equipment controlling it, is grounded by laws of physics. Given this, we leverage high-frequency physical grid measurements to understand the physical condition of the grid, and combine this with SCADA. While high-frequency physical grid measurements and SCADA communication over Internet Protocol (IP) networks are fundamentally disparate information sources, when collectively examined through appropriate lenses, they offer a much more nuanced depiction of the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Edge Deployed Cyber Security Hardware Architecture for Energy Delivery Systems

At a time of accelerated cyber conflict, an “edge deployed” system will supply sensor based cyber ground truth to live grid models, and under secure command, take complete control of suspected rogue programmable logic controllers (PLCs) to maintain bulk power delivery to chosen critical sites. This hardware solution is purpose built to be agnostic to PLC vendor or protocol with the realization that a widely deployed solution must function with existing devices for rapid adoption by industry. An overview of the situation and how this developed system functions is provided.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Grid Cyber-Security Strategy in an Attacker-Defender Model

The progression of cyber-attacks on the cyber-physical system is analyzed by the Probabilistic, Learning Attacker, and Dynamic Defender (PLADD) model. Although our research does apply to all cyber-physical systems, we focus on power grid infrastructure. The PLADD model evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques. We consider the power grid attack scenarios in the AND configurations and OR configurations. In addition, we consider, for the first time ever, power grid attack scenarios involving both AND configurations and OR configurations simultaneously. Cyber-security managers can use the strategy introduced in this manuscript to optimize their defense strategies. Specifically, our research provides insight into when to reset access controls (such as passwords, internet protocol addresses, and session keys), to minimize the probability of a successful attack. Our mathematical proof for the OR configuration of multiple PLADD games shows that it is best if all access controls are reset simultaneously. For the AND configuration, our mathematical proof shows that it is best (in terms of minimizing the attacker's average probability of success) that the resets are equally spaced apart. We introduce a novel concept called hierarchical parallel PLADD system to cover additional attack scenarios that require combinations of AND and OR configurations.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cyber-Secure and Safe Operation of Solar Photovoltaic Power Distribution Systems

Solar photovoltaic (PV)-rich power distribution systems are networked Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). These are control systems where multiple computing nodes and diverse intelligent agents interact with the physical world in real-time. However, the presence of networked components renders them vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks, cyber-intrusions, and other malicious events. This is because these systems depend on the measurements reported from their heterogeneous sensors. This makes them vulnerable to potential cyber-attacks where malicious agents can compromise the sensors or the communication networks carrying the sensor measurements. This paper proposes a novel methodology for enhancing the cyber-security and cyber-resilient post-attack safe operation of solar PV-rich power distribution systems against potential cyber-attacks through the Dynamic Watermarking (DW), using online system identification. The resiliency of the proposed technique is tested and validated with several attack scenarios on both a lab-scale 3kW grid-connected PV inverter and a Hardware-in-the-Loop (HiL) system. The proposed approach can be applied to other types of power distribution systems to enhance their cyber-secure and cyber-resilient safe operation. This paper thereby contributes to the field of cyber-security of Cyber-Physical Energy Systems (CPES).

Kim, Jaewon↗