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DOE OSTI2023

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Design and Controls for Energy Systems

As the grid of today is evolving into a highly distributed and autonomous cyber-physical system with higher penetration of Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) and autonomous controls that are dependent on the cyber infrastructure, there are novel and increasing challenges to cyber-resilient operation of the grid. While the traditional mechanisms take a "bolt on" approach to cybersecurity and resiliency, this talk presents two novel technologies developed at NREL that "bake in" security and resilience into the design and control of the grid. An Adaptive Resilience Metrics framework is a novel mechanism for system owners and operators to understand the impact of cyber and physical system design and topology on the resilient operation, while also helping determine optimal policies in response to adverse cyber events. Along with that a zero-knowledge proof-based technique helps incorporate security into the controls layer by focusing on computational integrity rather than data integrity. By leveraging design and control properties unique to Operational Technology systems these technologies will not only help enhance cyber-resilience for the grid of today, but a highly distributed and autonomous grid of tomorrow.

cyber resilience↗

DOE OSTI2023

Requirements and Recommendations for a Physical Attack Characterization Framework

This study seeks to identify existing frameworks or develop requirements and recommendations for a new framework that can consistently characterize physical attacks, analogous to MITRE ATT&CK®. MITRE ATT&CK is widely used across government, research organizations, and the cyber security community to characterize cyber attack tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in a consistent and commonly understood manner. While physical attack taxonomies, methodologies, and other tools for evaluating physical security do exist, many are sector and/or facility-type specific—and therefore not able to provide comparable scenarios across sectors—or are more focused on security assessment instead of the characterization of attacks themselves. A MITRE ATT&CK analog for physical attacks on critical infrastructure would provide a common language and structure for analysis of physical attacks. Existing attack characterization methodologies do not robustly address cyber-physical security risks. To fully understand a facility’s security needs, it is important to understand the entire vulnerability landscape from both a physical and a cyber perspective. To underscore this need, organizations such as the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are calling for a coordinated approach to cyber and physical security, which they refer to as cyber and physical security convergence. A physical attack characterization framework that could be used jointly with MITRE ATT&CK would help support a more robust analysis in support of convergence, enabling the consistent characterization of attacks that utilize both cyber and physical tactics and techniques. This could provide analysts and stakeholders with a clearer understanding of how security mitigations deployed in the physical realm impact security risks in the cyber realm, and vice versa. In this study, the project team evaluates existing physical security taxonomies and methodologies to assess whether an existing method can be used to create a “physical half” of MITRE ATT&CK. This study then provides requirements and recommendations for a framework that can leverage aspects of existing methodologies. The goal of the final framework is for it to be widely adopted and referenced, regardless of critical infrastructure sector, facility type, or facility components. This study also identifies applicable use cases for when and how a framework could be applied across the various critical infrastructure sectors for a variety of attack types or motivations. Through a literature review of existing security-focused methodologies and taxonomies, engagement with relative stakeholders, evaluation of potential physical attack framework use cases, and subsequent identification of requirements, this study identified the following key findings and recommendations: There is a need for a new physical attack characterization framework; A physical attack framework should be interoperable with the MITRE ATT&CK framework; A physical attack framework should be broadly applicable, but with detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures that encompass the entire attack path; A physical attack framework should be based on observed or feasible events; A physical attack framework should adapt features from existing methodologies, frameworks, and taxonomies; A physical attack framework should be owned, overseen, and maintained by one organization.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2026

Moving from Information Assurance to Functional Assurance with Engineered Controls

Cyber threats to operational technology demand more than traditional IT defenses—they require full-spectrum mission assurance. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that embeds engineered controls into system design to ensure critical functions remain safe and reliable, even under attack. Unlike conventional cybersecurity tools, engineered controls act directly on physical processes to prevent unacceptable outcomes such as equipment damage or mission failure. This session will outline the CIE framework and share examples of consequence-based design that deliver true resilience, not just fail-safe behaviors. Attendees will learn how to integrate these principles into the engineering lifecycle to support resilient-by-design architectures and inform emerging standards. This talk sets the stage for the panel discussion on advancing CIE across sectors as digital and physical systems converge.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2023

Cyber threat assessment of machine learning driven autonomous control systems of nuclear power plants

We report advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber–physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Dynamic Role-Based Access Control Policy for Smart Grid Applications: An Offline Deep Reinforcement Learning Approach

Role-based access control (RBAC) is adopted in the information and communication technology domain for authentication purposes. However, due to a very large number of entities within organizational access control (AC) systems, static RBAC management can be inefficient, costly, and can lead to cybersecurity threats. In this paper, a novel hybrid RBAC model is proposed, based on the principles of offline deep reinforcement learning (RL) and Bayesian belief networks. The considered framework utilizes a fully offline RL agent, which models the behavioral history of users as a Bayesian belief-based trust indicator. Thus, the initial static RBAC policy is improved in a dynamic manner through off-policy learning while guaranteeing compliance of the internal users with the security rules of the system. By deploying our implementation within the smart grid domain and specifically within a Distributed Energy Resources (DER) ecosystem, we provide an end-to-end proof of concept of our model. Finally, detailed analysis and evaluation regarding the offline training phase of the RL agent are provided, while the online deployment of the hybrid RL-based RBAC model into the DER ecosystem highlights its key operation features and salient benefits over traditional RBAC models.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE OSTI2021

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗

DOE OSTI2022

WPTO Navigator

Protecting hydroelectric plants from incidents that adversely impact their cyber-physical systems presents unique challenges due to the plants’ widely dispersed geographic locations and varied configurations as well as the relative nascent nature of the cyberattacks targeting these facilities. To help hydroelectric plants better respond to and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, this Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office Navigator aligns the processes within the National Institute of Standards 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide with the emergency actions within the FEMA 64 Emergency Action Plan Framework. This work is to be used at a hydroelectric plant to quickly understand how the plant responds to a cyber incident in relationship to the actions involved in an emergency action plan involving a hydroelectric plant. In addition to this product, there are three other products meant to be distributed to a hydroelectric plant to assist in their cyber incident response and recovery. The first, a report on the processes of building a R&R flip book based on a large set of existing guidance. The second, a handy flip book meant to be distributed to hydroelectric plants to assist them during a cybersecurity incident occurring on a hydroelectic plant. And the third is a comprehensive set of resources to assist an operator in locating appropriate guidance during the recovery process.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One - Abridged

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation and Demonstration of Blockchain Applicability Framework

Blockchain technology has been gaining great interest from a variety of industry sectors, including financial, food processing, and power and energy markets. Realizing the strength of blockchain technology beyond the successful application in the cryptocurrency arena, researchers have been evaluating and using blockchain for applications such as supply chain management, transactive industry (both financial and energy), system integrity, device cybersecurity, identity management, and much more. One of the unique elements of the blockchain technology that made it such a captivating technology to researchers is its plethora of features. Some of the features include smart contracts, cryptocurrency and tokenizing, immutable distributed ledger, cryptographic hashing, and digital signature. In addition, there are multiple types of blockchains, such as permissioned/private and permissionless/public, and various consensus models, such as proof-of-work, proof-of-authority, proof-of-burn, and proof-of-stake. Therefore, it is often non-trivial to determine if an application requires a blockchain. If so, what kind of blockchain and consensus is most appropriate? This paper discusses the blockchain applicability framework (BAF), which was specifically designed with the purpose to answer those questions. BAF is divided into five domains, 18 subdomains, and about 100 controls. It is designed to ingest detailed user requirements to perform a weighted evaluation that is built on mathematical constructs to determine the ideal combination of blockchain that is appropriate for an application. Along with the core logical formulation of BAF, this paper depicts the efficacy of BAF through two use cases

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Neuromorphic Graph Algorithms

Graph algorithms enable myriad large-scale applications including cybersecurity, social network analysis, resource allocation, and routing. The scalability of current graph algorithm implementations on conventional computing architectures are hampered by the demise of Moore’s law. We present a theoretical framework for designing and assessing the performance of graph algorithms executing in networks of spiking artificial neurons. Although spiking neural networks (SNNs) are capable of general-purpose computation, few algorithmic results with rigorous asymptotic performance analysis are known. SNNs are exceptionally well-motivated practically, as neuromorphic computing systems with 100 million spiking neurons are available, and systems with a billion neurons are anticipated in the next few years. Beyond massive parallelism and scalability, neuromorphic computing systems offer energy consumption orders of magnitude lower than conventional high-performance computing systems. We employ our framework to design and analyze new spiking algorithms for shortest path and dynamic programming problems. Our neuromorphic algorithms are message-passing algorithms relying critically on data movement for computation. For fair and rigorous comparison with conventional algorithms and architectures, which is challenging but paramount, we develop new models of data-movement in conventional computing architectures. This allows us to prove polynomial-factor advantages, even when we assume a SNN consisting of a simple grid-like network of neurons. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first examples of a rigorous asymptotic computational advantage for neuromorphic computing.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

NARUC grid data sharing playbook

In 2022, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) launched an initiative to support its members in addressing issues related to grid data sharing. The Grid Data Sharing Collaborative was funded by the DOE’s Office of Electricity and Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER). NARUC invited programmatic, policy, technical, and cybersecurity subject matter experts from public utility commissions, utilities, non-governmental organizations, energy service companies, and DOE to join the two-year Grid Data Sharing Collaborative to help develop a flexible framework for states to use as a starting point when navigating complex decision-making inherent in grid data sharing. The framework took shape through a series of intensive workshops during which Collaborative participants explored illustrative use cases to identify data needs, articulate the benefits and risks of sharing such data, and assess the trade-offs. Along the way, participants offered suggestions for how the framework could be used in practice. The purpose of this playbook is to describe the elements of the Grid Data Sharing Framework and to begin supporting its implementation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

DOE OSTI2026

Mapping the Gap: Analysis of Nuclear Cybersecurity Education in U.S. Universities

The U.S. nuclear sector is undergoing rapid transformation, driven by the expansion of advanced reactors, digital modernization of legacy systems, and increasing interest in nuclear energy to meet AI-fueled energy demands. However, the cybersecurity talent pipeline is not keeping pace with this growth. This paper investigates the significant gap in nuclear cybersecurity education and proposes scalable strategies for colleges to address this critical need by promoting it as a viable and essential career path. Through a multi-institutional landscape analysis of 16 cybersecurity and 12 nuclear engineering programs, we found that nuclear cybersecurity is largely absent from university curricula. Most students are unaware of the field’s existence, and few institutions offer hands-on training or interdisciplinary exposure. This lack of awareness leads to a shortage of specialized talent, forcing nuclear facilities to retrain generalist hires or rely on costly external consultants. We present a framework for early pipeline cultivation grounded in Social Cognitive Career Theory and workforce development principles. Proposed solutions include student-led clubs, guest lectures, modular classroom kits, and summer boot camps. By increasing visibility and access to nuclear cyber content, we aim to break the self-reinforcing cycle of low awareness and limited specialization. This work underscores the critical role of education and advocacy in cultivating early interest and guiding students toward this emerging field. We call on academic institutions, national laboratories, and industry stakeholders to collaborate in establishing nuclear cybersecurity as a distinct and accessible career path within the broader cybersecurity and nuclear engineering ecosystems.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Utility-Scale Operational Consequences for Solar Grid Services

This report delves into the critical aspects of grid services provided by solar inverter-based resources (IBRs), with an emphasis on the evolving landscape of microgrids, virtual power plants (VPPs), aggregators, and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS). As the energy sector undergoes a transformative shift towards more decentralized and resilient grid architectures, understanding the multifaceted risks associated with these technologies becomes paramount. The report categorizes these risks into organizational, technical, and procedural domains, providing a thorough risk assessment framework that stakeholders can utilize to anticipate and mitigate potential issues. In addressing the increasing complexity of grid interconnections, the report highlights the importance of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). By embedding engineering controls and cybersecurity measures into the early stages of system design, this approach aims to fortify grid infrastructure against emerging cyber threats. The analysis includes an exploration of best practices and strategies for integrating CIE principles to enhance grid security and resilience. To provide practical insights, the report conducts a detailed consequence analysis of various grid services and cyber mitigations that can be applied through the interconnection process. This analysis evaluates the potential impacts of different failure modes and vulnerabilities, offering a clear understanding of the consequences that could arise from disruptions within the energy grid. The findings are further enriched by a series of case studies that illustrate real-world scenarios and lessons learned from past incidents. Through this comprehensive examination of grid services and their criticality, the report aims to prepare industry professionals with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate the complexities of modern energy systems. By providing a comprehensive approach that includes risk assessment, cybersecurity, and consequence analysis, solar stakeholders can more effectively guarantee the reliability, efficiency, and security of the energy grid.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

Risk Analysis of Various Design Architectures for High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems of Nuclear Power Plants during Accident Scenarios

This report documents the plus-up activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) risk assessment project. In FY 2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate, risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the high safety-significant safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) support and supplement existing advanced risk-informed DI&C design guides by providing quantitative risk information and evidence, (3) offer a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions and diversity and redundancy applications, (4) assure the long-term safety and reliability of HSSSR DI&C systems, and (5) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the LWRS-developed framework instructs nuclear vendors and utilities on how to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify corresponding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the component level, system level, and plant level, and (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks, thus to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). Adding diversity within system or components is the main means to eliminate and mitigate CCFs, but diversity also increases plant complexity and errors and may not address all sources of systematic failures. How to optimize the diversity and redundancy applications for the safety-critical DI&C systems remains a challenge. To deal with the technical issues in addressing potential software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs and supporting relevant design optimization, the framework provides: ? An integrated best-estimate, risk-informed capability to address new technical digital issues quantitatively, accurately, and efficiently in plan modernization progress, such as software CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? A common and a modularized platform for DI&C designers, software developers, cybersecurity analysts, and plant engineers to efficiently predict and prevent risk in the early design stage of DI&C systems ? Technical bases and risk-informed insights to assist U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and industry to address and fulfill the risk-informed alternatives for evaluation of CCFs in HSSSR DI&C systems of NPPs ? An integrated risk-informed tool that offers a capability of design architecture evaluation of various DI&C systems to support system design decisions in diversity and redundancy applications. The plus-up research and development efforts of this project in FY 2022 are focused on methodology improvement of software CCF modeling and estimation, prevention analysis, importance analysis and risk analysis of various design architectures of HSSSR DI&C systems. This work greatly enhances the capability of the LWRS-developed framework for the risk assessment and design optimization of safety-critical DI&C systems. It should be noted that all the analyses are performed for the demonstration of the LWRS-developed framework, not for the evaluation of relevant systems. Results are obtained based on very limited design information and testing data.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

CIE Curriculum Guide (V.2.0)

The Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) Curriculum Guide offers a comprehensive framework, guidance, and resources for integrating CIE into university-level engineering programs and related educational activities. The primary goal is to help educators adopt CIE principles into their teaching to produce future engineers and technicians who understand digital risks in modern engineered systems, thereby addressing the nation’s infrastructure resilience needs. This guide outlines practical integration examples, links to resources to accelerate CIE adoption, and shares insights from partner academic institutions on various implementation strategies. CIE is a framework for embedding engineered controls that mitigate the impact of cyber-attacks in any cyber-physical system used in critical energy infrastructure and other sectors. Developed by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), the National Cyber-Informed Engineering Strategy emphasizes embedding CIE into formal education, training, and credentialing. This guide supports this strategic objective by providing examples of integrating CIE concepts into engineering curricula, from class activities to new courses and certificate programs. The importance of educating cyber-informed engineers is underscored by the evolving cybersecurity threats facing engineered systems. As industrial control systems (ICS) increasingly incorporate digital technologies, the responsibility for security extends to both cyber professionals and engineers. CIE addresses critical gaps in designing and protecting physical systems with digital components against cyber risks, ensuring engineers consider digital risk throughout the engineering design lifecycle. Currently, engineering education does not routinely include cyber-informed principles, highlighting a gap in addressing modern engineering system risks. This guide advocates for updating engineering curricula to include digital risk management as a fundamental element. By doing so, future engineers will be equipped to design resilient systems that mitigate digital risks from the outset. Through this guide, engineering faculty can integrate CIE into their curricula, bridging the gap between digital risk and engineering. This approach prepares a cyber-informed workforce capable of safeguarding the cyber-physical systems crucial to national security and public welfare. By embedding CIE into education and training, institutions can produce engineers and technicians who can effectively mitigate cyber impacts throughout the engineering design lifecycle, resulting in more secure critical infrastructures.

42 - ENGINEERING↗