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At least 181 records · Page 10

Quantifying Human Behavior and Decision Errors in Security Screening Operations

The potential for human errors in conducting security related screening operations can lead to inadvertent and adverse decision outcomes. This paper overviews an initial mathematical framework designed to model and quantify the various human factors and decision outcomes that may occur in conducting security screening operations, such as U.S. port of entry radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) security screening. This framework is based on the Human Error Assessment and Reduction (HEART) technique. As applied here, the framework incorporates a set of rules for human engagement, including a prescribed concept of operations (CONOPS) and deviations that may occur from this established CONOPS due to inadvertent personnel decision errors. We also review some of the various factors that may adversely influence such decisions by security screening personnel. Some of these factors include current workload, environmental conditions, training, and various other intangible factors. Using the HEART methodology, we translate each of these factors into error producing conditions, their effects on error, an assessed proportion of effects, and finally the overall probability of human error at each stage of the screening process. We then include a small scale example to demonstrate the methodology and results based on an assumed set of input conditions at a notional port of entry.

Brigantic, Robert T.↗

Reduction of Maintenance Error Through Focused Interventions

It is well known that a significant proportion of aviation accidents and incidents are tied to human error. In flight operations, research of operational errors has shown that so-called "pilot error" often involves a variety of human factors issues and not a simple lack of individual technical skills. In aircraft maintenance operations, there is similar concern that maintenance errors which may lead to incidents and accidents are related to a large variety of human factors issues. Although maintenance error data and research are limited, industry initiatives involving human factors training in maintenance have become increasingly accepted as one type of maintenance error intervention. Conscientious efforts have been made in re-inventing the "team" concept for maintenance operations and in tailoring programs to fit the needs of technical operations. Nevertheless, there remains a dual challenge: to develop human factors interventions which are directly supported by reliable human error data, and to integrate human factors concepts into the procedures and practices of everyday technical tasks. In this paper, we describe several varieties of human factors interventions and focus on two specific alternatives which target problems related to procedures and practices; namely, 1) structured on-the-job training and 2) procedure re-design. We hope to demonstrate that the key to leveraging the impact of these solutions comes from focused interventions; that is, interventions which are derived from a clear understanding of specific maintenance errors, their operational context and human factors components.

Kanki, Barbara G.↗

How Humans Contribute to Safety

We have all heard, and much too often, how human error is the leading cause of accidents. What we haven’t been hearing is how humans produce safety far more often than reduce safety. Before we embark on developing technologies to replace the error-prone human, it behooves us to understand how humans produce safety lest we lose that primary source of resilience in our aviation system.

safety↗

Error-associated behaviors and error rates for robotic geology

This study explores human error as a function of the decision-making process. One of many models for human decision-making is Rasmussen's decision ladder [9]. The decision ladder identifies the multiple tasks and states of knowledge involved in decision-making. The tasks and states of knowledge can be classified by the level of cognitive effort required to make the decision, leading to the skill, rule, and knowledge taxonomy (Rasmussen, 1987). Skill based decisions require the least cognitive effort and knowledge based decisions require the greatest cognitive effort. Errors can occur at any of the cognitive levels.

error rates↗

Accounting for the Speed-Accuracy Trade-Off in Quantifying Human-In-The-Loop Error Probabilities

Human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulations cannot collect enough data from human operators to validate estimates of error probabilities for task components. Error rates for tasks have been estimated by using laboratory data for error rates depending on variables such as the cognitive complexity of the task. The limited channel capacity of human operators compels error rates to be strongly related to the time available for the task, the speed-accuracy trade-off. HITL simulations can provide valuable data on the time available for the operator's tasks. We propose that the response times be used in conjunction with measured speed-accuracy curves to estimate the operator error rates contributing to mission failure. Such analyses should be especially important in the estimation of error rates in off-nominal situations.

probability↗

Challenges in leveraging existing human performance data for quantifying the IDHEAS HRA method

Our article documents an exploratory study for collecting and using human performance data to inform human error probability (HEP) estimates for a new human reliability analysis (HRA) method, the IntegrateD Human Event Analysis System (IDHEAS). The method was based on cognitive models and mechanisms underlying human behaviour and employs a framework of 14 crew failure modes (CFMs) to represent human failures typical for human performance in nuclear power plant (NPP) internal, at-power events [1]. A decision tree (DT) was constructed for each CFM to assess the probability of the CFM occurring in different contexts. Data needs for IDHEAS quantification are discussed. Then, the data collection framework and process is described and how the collected data were used to inform HEP estimation is illustrated with two examples. Next, five major technical challenges are identified for leveraging human performance data for IDHEAS quantification. Furthermore, these challenges reflect the data needs specific to IDHEAS. More importantly, they also represent the general issues with current human performance data and can provide insight for a path forward to support HRA data collection, use, and exchange for HRA method development, implementation, and validation.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Can Resilience Assessments Inform Early Design Human Factors Decision-making?

There is a growing call among researchers for tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments. In this research, we explore if early design stage resilience assessments can help bridge some of the gaps between human factors and human reliability assessments. Resilience in systems is their ability to recover reasonably and operate within acceptable bounds during failures and unexpected events. The fmdtools toolkit allows designers to assess the resilience of a system by modeling the human error and machine-related failure propagation in both nominal and faulty scenarios during the early design stages. As a result, the fmdtools toolkit has a low-fidelity dynamic human reliability assessment component built into it. In this paper, we study if the results from the fmdtools simulations can help inform and prioritize human factors design decision-making, resulting in tighter coupling between human factors and human reliability assessments during the design process. Specifically, we explore the results from a rover design example to understand the types of information that can help guide human factor-related decision-making.

Resilience-based Design↗

HRA Aerospace Challenges

Compared to equipment designed to perform the same function over and over, humans are just not as reliable. Computers and machines perform the same action in the same way repeatedly getting the same result, unless equipment fails or a human interferes. Humans who are supposed to perform the same actions repeatedly often perform them incorrectly due to a variety of issues including: stress, fatigue, illness, lack of training, distraction, acting at the wrong time, not acting when they should, not following procedures, misinterpreting information or inattention to detail. Why not use robots and automatic controls exclusively if human error is so common? In an emergency or off normal situation that the computer, robotic element, or automatic control system is not designed to respond to, the result is failure unless a human can intervene. The human in the loop may be more likely to cause an error, but is also more likely to catch the error and correct it. When it comes to unexpected situations, or performing multiple tasks outside the defined mission parameters, humans are the only viable alternative. Human Reliability Assessments (HRA) identifies ways to improve human performance and reliability and can lead to improvements in systems designed to interact with humans. Understanding the context of the situation that can lead to human errors, which include taking the wrong action, no action or making bad decisions provides additional information to mitigate risks. With improved human reliability comes reduced risk for the overall operation or project.

DeMott, Diana↗

Why Do People Make Mistakes?

Multitasking is endemic in modern life and work: drivers talk on cell phones, office workers type while answering phone calls, students do homework while text messaging, nurses prepare injections while responding to doctors calls, and air traffic controllers direct aircraft in one sector while handling additional traffic in another. Whether in daily life or at work, we are constantly bombarded with multiple, concurrent interruptions and demands and we have all somehow come to believe in the myth that we can, and in fact are expected to, easily address them all - without any repercussions. However, accumulating scientific evidence is now suggesting that multitasking increases the probability of human error. This talk presents a set of NASA studies that characterize concurrent demands in one work domain, routine airline cockpit operations, in order to illustrate the ways operational task demands together with the proclivity to manage them all concurrently make human performance in this and in any domain vulnerable to potentially serious errors and to accidents.

multitasking↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗

Advanced automated glass cockpit certification: Being wary of human factors

This paper presents some facets of the French experience with human factors in the process of certification of advanced automated cockpits. Three types of difficulties are described: first, the difficulties concerning the hotly debated concept of human error and its non-linear relationship to risk of accident; a typology of errors to be taken into account in the certification process is put forward to respond to this issue. Next, the difficulties connected to the basically gradual and evolving nature of pilot expertise on a given type of aircraft, which contrasts with the immediate and definitive style of certifying systems. The last difficulties to be considered are those related to the goals of certification itself on these new aircraft and the status of findings from human factor analyses (in particular, what should be done with disappointing results, how much can the changes induced by human factors investigation economically affect aircraft design, how many errors do we need to accumulate before we revise the system, what should be remedied when human factor problems are discovered at the certification stage: the machine? pilot training? the rules? or everything?). The growth of advanced-automated glass cockpits has forced the international aeronautical community to pay more attention to human factors during the design phase, the certification phase and pilot training. The recent creation of a human factor desk at the DGAC-SFACT (Official French services) is a direct consequence of this. The paper is divided into three parts. Part one debates human error and its relationship with system design and accident risk. Part two describes difficulties connected to the basically gradual and evolving nature of pilot expertise on a given type of aircraft, which contrasts with the immediate and definitive style of certifying systems. Part three focuses on concrete outcomes of human factors for certification purposes.

Amalberti, Rene↗

National plan to enhance aviation safety through human factors improvements

The purpose of this section of the plan is to establish a development and implementation strategy plan for improving safety and efficiency in the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. These improvements will be achieved through the proper applications of human factors considerations to the present and future systems. The program will have four basic goals: (1) prepare for the future system through proper hiring and training; (2) develop a controller work station team concept (managing human errors); (3) understand and address the human factors implications of negative system results; and (4) define the proper division of responsibilities and interactions between the human and the machine in ATC systems. This plan addresses six program elements which together address the overall purpose. The six program elements are: (1) determine principles of human-centered automation that will enhance aviation safety and the efficiency of the air traffic controller; (2) provide new and/or enhanced methods and techniques to measure, assess, and improve human performance in the ATC environment; (3) determine system needs and methods for information transfer between and within controller teams and between controller teams and the cockpit; (4) determine how new controller work station technology can optimally be applied and integrated to enhance safety and efficiency; (5) assess training needs and develop improved techniques and strategies for selection, training, and evaluation of controllers; and (6) develop standards, methods, and procedures for the certification and validation of human engineering in the design, testing, and implementation of any hardware or software system element which affects information flow to or from the human.

Foushee, Clay↗

Artemis Flight Plan Evolution

Current capabilities and processes are insufficient to confidently meet mission objectives given the complexity of humans on the ground and on-orbit working with different automated vehicles. This research aims to reduce risk of human error by providing a consolidated, human-digestible, source of information that can be used in pre-mission through mission execution by all team members involved in spaceflight.

Mission Control↗

Psychophysiological Methods to Assess Pilot Productive Safety Behaviors

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project is focused on developing new technologies and operational concepts for the aviation industry to meet the increasing global demand while maintaining the current ultra-safe system safety levels. To achieve this, the SWS Project is developing research priorities, including In-time System-wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS; Ellis et al., 2019). A critical component of the IASMS is the human as pilot and in other roles in aviation operations as demonstrated by SWS human factors research on rare occurrences of human error and the far more prevalent human safety producing behaviors (e.g., Hollnagel, 2016). The talk presented by Chad Stephens of NASA Langley Research Center and NASA SWS Project will describe the history of human factors research involving psychophysiological and biocybernetics methods supporting aviation safety conducted at NASA. Specific examples of recent NASA crew state monitoring research focused on a psychophysiological assessment method and system to enable Training for Attention Management will be demonstrated. Current SWS research including the SWS Operations and Technologies for Enabling Resilient In-Time Assurance (SOTERIA) flight simulation study and a data testbed created to enable study of Human Contributions to Safety (HC2S) will be presented. Ongoing collaborative research efforts with Boeing researchers will be highlighted and opportunities for further collaboration will be discussed.

psychophysiology↗

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations: A Survey Approach

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗

The Contribution of Pilots to Resilience in Normal Operations. Part II: A closer look at briefings: Anticipation and Monitoring Also Known as Planning and Coordination

Much of our knowledge about human performance in flight safety has come from the analysis of undesired events, whether accidents, incidents, or crew behaviors identified via flight exceedance monitoring or observational techniques. In recent years, there has been an acknowledgement that operational personnel are not merely sources of “human error”, but also make a unique human contribution to safe outcomes. In a few celebrated cases, this takes the form of “heroic saves”, but on many more occasions, operational personnel contribute to safety through everyday, often-unnoticed actions that turn potentially hazardous situations into non-events. An emerging approach to safety, frequently referred to as “Safety II,” proposes that the positive human contribution is an important and largely untapped source of safety information. Some airlines have successfully trained observers to identify and record the positive behaviors exhibited by the crew over the course of a flight. In other cases, flight crew are interviewed about good practices or positive behaviors. However, each of these methods are relatively limited in scale and resource intensive. A survey could provide a relatively low-cost approach to systematically gather this information on a larger scale. The primary purpose of the research was to develop and assess a surveys methodology for assessing crews' activities in normal flights and the operational perturbations encountered during normal operations. We hope that such a survey could be both a research tool as well as a safety management aid for the aviation industry. We collected responses concerning revenue flights from two groups of airline pilots (N = 25 & N= 65). The results indicated that relatively few flights proceeded exactly as in the original flight plan. Pilots routinely anticipated and adapted to changing circumstances. We will review the challenges encountered in developing the survey and summarize preliminary findings from two administrations of the survey to airline pilots.

human contribution safety↗

Scientific Literature Mining for Experiment Information in Materials Design

Scientific literature is a plethora of documents written in natural language, where the agglomeration of well-cogitated knowledge is inextricably intertwined. The large-scale knowledge source might have the great potential to derive valuable information when text mined and untangled. Typically, scientists obtain preliminary knowledge from research papers prior to beginning a new experiment. Researchers manually harvest experimental information, which is labor-intensive and error prone. To reduce manual effort and human errors, this project aims to build a system for data collection from literature that supplements other data sources so users can look up needed information while preparing experiments or analyzing results.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗