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NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Safety analysis for complex systems

Operational risk assessment considers hardware, environment, and human factors. Technique starts with division of postulated mission into segments which are further subdivided into separate operational steps. Consequences of steps, nonoccurrence, premature operation, out-of-sequence operation, and inadvertent execution are examined at subevent, event, and phase levels. Hazards are identified and treated individually. Analysis is well suited to application in energy and transportation fields.

Onesty, J. P.↗

NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗

NASA NTRS2023

The Hazard Components of Representative Key Risks. The Physical Climate Perspective

The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II (WGII) to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks from climate change. These are risks expected to become severe due to the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions with the exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs holistically by assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, in these papers, such assessment cannot always be organized according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes. Often the big-picture evolution of risk has to be extrapolated from either qualitative effects of “low”, “medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C), together with consideration of the socio-economic context and possible adaptation choices. In this study we offer a representation – as systematic as possible given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels (GWLs) to the extent possible. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group I supplemented when needed by more recent literature. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with increasing GWLs has been identified. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - that link can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different GWLs remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems, in the absence of compensating changes in these systems’ exposure and vulnerability, and in the absence of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in their often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future potential evolution, an important component – if never the only one – of the future evolution of risk severity.

Representative Key Risks↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Overview of Plume-Surface Interaction Testing and Research

NASA has studied rocket plume-surface interactions caused by spacecraft since the Apollo era to reduce risk to landing vehicles. The study of plume-surface interactions is a multi-discipline effort, spanning aerospace engineering to planetary science. Historical testing for Apollo and Viking produced methods, terms, and datasets that influence the field today. Research conducted over the past two decades has expanded our understanding of plume-surface interaction phenomena, but the problem remains resistant to a robust predictive capability. Contemporary experimental and modeling efforts to understand and retire strategic knowledge gaps will be discussed, with a focus on work conducted under NASA’s Plume-Surface Interaction Project and the upcoming Human Landing System Plume-Surface Interaction Risk Reduction Ground Test.

Wesley A Chambers↗

NASA NTRS2006

Human Immune Function and Microbial Pathogenesis in Human Spaceflight

This oral presentation was requested by Conference conveners. The requested subject is microbial risk assessment considering changes in the human immune system during flight and microbial diversity of environmental samples aboard the International Space Station (ISS). The presentation will begin with an introduction discussing the goals and limitations of microbial risk assessment during flight. The main portion of the presentation will include changes in the immune system that have been published, historical data from microbial analyses, and initial modeling of the environmental flora aboard ISS. The presentation will conclude with future goals and techniques to enhance our ability to perform microbial risk assessment on long duration missions.

Pierson, Duane J.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2001

A Synthetic Vision Preliminary Integrated Safety Analysis

This report documents efforts to analyze a sample of aviation safety programs, using the LMI-developed integrated safety analysis tool to determine the change in system risk resulting from Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) technology implementation. Specifically, we have worked to modify existing system safety tools to address the safety impact of synthetic vision (SV) technology. Safety metrics include reliability, availability, and resultant hazard. This analysis of SV technology is intended to be part of a larger effort to develop a model that is capable of "providing further support to the product design and development team as additional information becomes available". The reliability analysis portion of the effort is complete and is fully documented in this report. The simulation analysis is still underway; it will be documented in a subsequent report. The specific goal of this effort is to apply the integrated safety analysis to SV technology. This report also contains a brief discussion of data necessary to expand the human performance capability of the model, as well as a discussion of human behavior and its implications for system risk assessment in this modeling environment.

Hemm, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2014

Conceptual Launch Vehicle and Spacecraft Design for Risk Assessment

One of the most challenging aspects of developing human space launch and exploration systems is minimizing and mitigating the many potential risk factors to ensure the safest possible design while also meeting the required cost, weight, and performance criteria. In order to accomplish this, effective risk analyses and trade studies are needed to identify key risk drivers, dependencies, and sensitivities as the design evolves. The Engineering Risk Assessment (ERA) team at NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) develops advanced risk analysis approaches, models, and tools to provide such meaningful risk and reliability data throughout vehicle development. The goal of the project presented in this memorandum is to design a generic launch 7 vehicle and spacecraft architecture that can be used to develop and demonstrate these new risk analysis techniques without relying on other proprietary or sensitive vehicle designs. To accomplish this, initial spacecraft and launch vehicle (LV) designs were established using historical sizing relationships for a mission delivering four crewmembers and equipment to the International Space Station (ISS). Mass-estimating relationships (MERs) were used to size the crew capsule and launch vehicle, and a combination of optimization techniques and iterative design processes were employed to determine a possible two-stage-to-orbit (TSTO) launch trajectory into a 350-kilometer orbit. Primary subsystems were also designed for the crewed capsule architecture, based on a 24-hour on-orbit mission with a 7-day contingency. Safety analysis was also performed to identify major risks to crew survivability and assess the system's overall reliability. These procedures and analyses validate that the architecture's basic design and performance are reasonable to be used for risk trade studies. While the vehicle designs presented are not intended to represent a viable architecture, they will provide a valuable initial platform for developing and demonstrating innovative risk assessment capabilities.

Launch Vehicle↗

NASA NTRS2025

Human Spaceflight Applications of Novel Miniature X-Ray Technologies

INTRODUCTION: Radiography (XR) has long been a cornerstone of terrestrial medical imaging, though it has not yet been used in the spaceflight environment. Medical systems for human spaceflight missions are constrained by mass, volume, and power, and until recently, XR systems have been considered too large and power-consuming for spaceflight diagnostic and therapeutic applications. However, the rise of commercial spaceflight and NASA’s refocused efforts on returning crews to the Moon for long-duration missions have introduced a higher degree of medical risk to human spaceflight and require a re-evaluation when optimizing medical system design. Over the last decade, XR devices have miniaturized while maintaining good diagnostic and therapeutic sensitivity and specificity, making new in-flight medical and non-medical XR applications a possibility. Initial research identified several medical conditions where miniature XR would be beneficial for the diagnosis and/or management of medical conditions arising in space, though a more in-depth analysis is required to identify whether XR may add value to the management of such conditions. With this presentation, we aim to introduce the potential utility of miniature XR, review prior work highlighting where XR may be beneficial, and evaluate how miniature XR may reduce medical risk in human spaceflight missions. METHODS: IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a risk assessment tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design by quantitatively estimating mission medical risk. IMPACT v1.0 includes a novel evidence library baselined to exploration environments, an expanded list of 119 medical conditions, medical capabilities and resources critical for management of these medical conditions, and the ability for rapid and iterative analysis in the setting of modifiable design reference missions (DRMs). Our first analysis identified which of the 119 medical conditions XR had diagnostic or therapeutic utility for. Subject matter experts (SMEs) recorded which XR views would be performed under ideal terrestrial circumstances for diagnosis/management of each condition, as well as which views are pragmatic for spaceflight limitations. A second analysis utilized IMPACT to identify significant conditions that contribute greatest to medical risk during a notional long-duration Lunar orbit and Lunar surface DRM. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life (LOCL), need for return to definitive care (RTDC; medical evacuation), and an estimate of crew task time affected (TTA). Using a standardized semi-quantitative scoring methodology, a deeper evaluation of each of the most significant medical conditions was performed. Data from both of these separate analyses were used to hypothesize what ideal and pragmatic XR studies may impact clinical management of the most significant conditions predicted to lead to medical risk. RESULTS: Approximately 1/3 of the IMPACT conditions were identified as being more effectively or comprehensively assessed or treated with the addition of miniature XR technology. The resulting conditions benefitting diagnostically and therapeutically from XR are revealed, as well as the ideal and pragmatic XR views and medical procedures benefitting from XR. The conditions of clinical significance and those most contributing to risk are also displayed. Among the conditions that contribute greatest to LOCL, four conditions for which XR may improve the diagnosis and management of include: decompression sickness, traumatic shock, dental abscess, and respiratory failure. Among conditions that contributed to RTDC, the evaluation and management of wrist fracture is likely improved by XR. For conditions leading to crew TTA, evaluation and management of EVA shoulder injuries, upper and lower extremity strains, back strains, and EVA hand injuries are likely improved by XR. DISCUSSION: Miniature XR in spaceflight has the potential to improve the evaluation and management of a substantial portion of conditions that most contribute to medical risk. This presentation is an introduction to the possibilities miniature XR provides for future human spaceflight missions and subsequent presenters will expand on potential applications in more detail. LEARNING OBJECTIVES: 1) Understand the previous limitations of using radiography in the management of spaceflight medical conditions; 2) Evaluate the findings from the IMPACT tool analysis, which allows quantification of the benefit miniature XR could provide for managing high-risk medical conditions in long-duration lunar orbit and surface missions, focusing on improvements in crew health outcomes; 3) Analyze case studies where miniature XR technology could reduce the medical risks associated with spaceflight missions, specifically in diagnosing and managing conditions such as decompression sickness, traumatic shock, and EVA-related injuries.

A Anderson↗

NASA NTRS2005

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗

NASA NTRS1985

Remotely Piloted Aircraft for Research

NASA Technical Memorandum presents overview of remotely-piloted research vehicle (RPRV) activities. Controlled from ground, vehicles allow new concepts tried without subjecting pilots to danger. Critical role of pilot in flight testing with RPRV's demonstrated repeatedly, and many system anomalies uncovered with no risk to human life.

Rezek, T. W.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Remote Sensing Contributions to Prediction and Risk Assessment of Natural Disasters Caused by Large Scale Rift Valley Fever Outbreaks

Remotely sensed vegetation measurements for the last 30 years combined with other climate data sets such as rainfall and sea surface temperatures have come to play an important role in the study of the ecology of arthropod-borne diseases. We show that epidemics and epizootics of previously unpredictable Rift Valley fever are directly influenced by large scale flooding associated with the El Ni o/Southern Oscillation. This flooding affects the ecology of disease transmitting arthropod vectors through vegetation development and other bioclimatic factors. This information is now utilized to monitor, model, and map areas of potential Rift Valley fever outbreaks and is used as an early warning system for risk reduction of outbreaks to human and animal health, trade, and associated economic impacts. The continuation of such satellite measurements is critical to anticipating, preventing, and managing disease epidemics and epizootics and other climate-related disasters.

Anyamba, Assaf↗

NASA NTRS2015

Bayesian Safety Risk Modeling of Human-Flightdeck Automation Interaction

Usage of automatic systems in airliners has increased fuel efficiency, added extra capabilities, enhanced safety and reliability, as well as provide improved passenger comfort since its introduction in the late 80's. However, original automation benefits, including reduced flight crew workload, human errors or training requirements, were not achieved as originally expected. Instead, automation introduced new failure modes, redistributed, and sometimes increased workload, brought in new cognitive and attention demands, and increased training requirements. Modern airliners have numerous flight modes, providing more flexibility (and inherently more complexity) to the flight crew. However, the price to pay for the increased flexibility is the need for increased mode awareness, as well as the need to supervise, understand, and predict automated system behavior. Also, over-reliance on automation is linked to manual flight skill degradation and complacency in commercial pilots. As a result, recent accidents involving human errors are often caused by the interactions between humans and the automated systems (e.g., the breakdown in man-machine coordination), deteriorated manual flying skills, and/or loss of situational awareness due to heavy dependence on automated systems. This paper describes the development of the increased complexity and reliance on automation baseline model, named FLAP for FLightdeck Automation Problems. The model development process starts with a comprehensive literature review followed by the construction of a framework comprised of high-level causal factors leading to an automation-related flight anomaly. The framework was then converted into a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) using the Hugin Software v7.8. The effects of automation on flight crew are incorporated into the model, including flight skill degradation, increased cognitive demand and training requirements along with their interactions. Besides flight crew deficiencies, automation system failures and anomalies of avionic systems are also incorporated. The resultant model helps simulate the emergence of automation-related issues in today's modern airliners from a top-down, generalized approach, which serves as a platform to evaluate NASA developed technologies

Ancel, Ersin↗

NASA NTRS2020

Lunar Transient Accelerations White Paper

Recently, the United States announced a plan to return astronauts to the moon by 2024 [8]. Lunar landing (and subsequent Mars landing) architecture was not considered when the current NASA standards and vehicle design requirements for crew injury risk were developed. Therefore a gap exists in protecting the crew in planetary landing scenarios. One of the interesting aspects of this design reference mission (DRM)is the consideration of having the crew stand during dynamic phases of flight. Although this approach was contemplated for the Apollo Lunar Module, current NASA standards do not address design solutions that allow the crew to stand. Currently, NASA uses several tools and associated limits to mitigate crew injury because of dynamic loads. Some of these tools are the Brinkley Dynamic Response Criterion (BDRC) model and Hybrid III Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs) [10]; and these have several limitations for assessing spaceflight loading environments, as well as specific underlying assumptions that may not be applicable in planetary landing vehicles. The BDRC is a simple lumped mass parameter model developed by the U.S. military, and has been used primarily to evaluate injury risk associated with aircraft ejection systems. The model evaluates seat accelerations in each axis to determine injury risk. Because the model treats the human-seat-restraint system as a single system, it is contingent on a restraint system and seat with similar characteristics of the original test data underlying the model. In particular, the model requires a rigid seat with a minimum natural frequency of 15Hz, minimal seat pan padding, side supports, and multipoint harness. The BDRC model uses undamped natural frequency and damping coefficients based on these requirements and any deviations may render the model injury predictions void. In lunar landing, one expects that a minimal or even no seat with minimal restraints will be employed. In this case, the original model parameters are likely to not be applicable. For capsule-based spacecraft returning crew to Earth, the Hybrid III ATD in various sizes also is used to supplement the BDRC. This analytical tool was added to address limitations in the BDRC related to spacecraft landings while wearing a pressure garment and helmet. Although the Hybrid III ATD has additional measurement capability; head, neck,and lumbar spine responses were the only metrics included because of the limitations imposed by the model.Lunar landing acceleration limits must assume the crew is standing during landing, an orientation for which we have limited data.Although the Apollo missions did employ a standing orientation for the crew, much of the data is lost. Therefore data from othersources havebeen examined to inform lunar landing acceleration limits.

Jeffrey T Somers↗

NASA NTRS2014

Aviation Safety Risk Modeling: Lessons Learned From Multiple Knowledge Elicitation Sessions

Aviation safety risk modeling has elements of both art and science. In a complex domain, such as the National Airspace System (NAS), it is essential that knowledge elicitation (KE) sessions with domain experts be performed to facilitate the making of plausible inferences about the possible impacts of future technologies and procedures. This study discusses lessons learned throughout the multiple KE sessions held with domain experts to construct probabilistic safety risk models for a Loss of Control Accident Framework (LOCAF), FLightdeck Automation Problems (FLAP), and Runway Incursion (RI) mishap scenarios. The intent of these safety risk models is to support a portfolio analysis of NASA's Aviation Safety Program (AvSP). These models use the flexible, probabilistic approach of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) and influence diagrams to model the complex interactions of aviation system risk factors. Each KE session had a different set of experts with diverse expertise, such as pilot, air traffic controller, certification, and/or human factors knowledge that was elicited to construct a composite, systems-level risk model. There were numerous "lessons learned" from these KE sessions that deal with behavioral aggregation, conditional probability modeling, object-oriented construction, interpretation of the safety risk results, and model verification/validation that are presented in this paper.

Luxhoj, J. T.↗

NASA NTRS2017

Particle Radiation Sources, Propagation and Interactions in Deep Space, at Earth, the Moon, Mars, and Beyond: Examples of Radiation Interactions and Effects

Particle radiation has significant effects for astronauts, satellites and planetary bodies throughout the Solar System. Acute space radiation hazards pose risks to human and robotic exploration. This radiation also naturally weathers the exposed surface regolith of the Moon, the two moons of Mars, and other airless bodies, and contributes to chemical evolution of planetary atmospheres at Earth, Mars, Venus, Titan, and Pluto. We provide a select review of recent areas of research covering the origin of SEPs from coronal mass ejections low in the corona, propagation of events through the solar system during the anomalously weak solar cycle 24 and important examples of radiation interactions for Earth, other planets and airless bodies such as the Moon.

Schwadron, Nathan A.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Evidence Report: Risk of Inadequate Human-Computer Interaction

Human-computer interaction (HCI) encompasses all the methods by which humans and computer-based systems communicate, share information, and accomplish tasks. When HCI is poorly designed, crews have difficulty entering, navigating, accessing, and understanding information. HCI has rarely been studied in an operational spaceflight context, and detailed performance data that would support evaluation of HCI have not been collected; thus, we draw much of our evidence from post-spaceflight crew comments, and from other safety-critical domains like ground-based power plants, and aviation. Additionally, there is a concern that any potential or real issues to date may have been masked by the fact that crews have near constant access to ground controllers, who monitor for errors, correct mistakes, and provide additional information needed to complete tasks. We do not know what types of HCI issues might arise without this "safety net". Exploration missions will test this concern, as crews may be operating autonomously due to communication delays and blackouts. Crew survival will be heavily dependent on available electronic information for just-in-time training, procedure execution, and vehicle or system maintenance; hence, the criticality of the Risk of Inadequate HCI. Future work must focus on identifying the most important contributing risk factors, evaluating their contribution to the overall risk, and developing appropriate mitigations. The Risk of Inadequate HCI includes eight core contributing factors based on the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS): (1) Requirements, policies, and design processes, (2) Information resources and support, (3) Allocation of attention, (4) Cognitive overload, (5) Environmentally induced perceptual changes, (6) Misperception and misinterpretation of displayed information, (7) Spatial disorientation, and (8) Displays and controls.

Kritina Holden↗