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Considerations for an Integrated UAS CNS Architecture

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Glenn Research Center (GRC) is investigating revolutionary and advanced universal, reliable, always available, cyber secure and affordable Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS) options for all altitudes of UAS operations. In Spring 2015, NASA issued a Call for Proposals under NASA Research Announcements (NRA) NNH15ZEA001N, Amendment 7 Subtopic 2.4. Boeing was selected to conduct a study with the objective to determine the most promising candidate technologies for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) air-to-air and air-to-ground data exchange and analyze their suitability in a post-NextGen NAS environment. The overall objectives are to develop UAS CNS requirements and then develop architectures that satisfy the requirements for UAS in both controlled and uncontrolled air space. This contract is funded under NASAs Aeronautics Research Mission Directorates (ARMD) Aviation Operations and Safety Program (AOSP) Safe Autonomous Systems Operations (SASO) project and proposes technologies for the Unmanned Air Systems Traffic Management (UTM) service.There is a need for accommodating large-scale populations of Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in the national air space. Scale obviously impacts capacity planning for Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating millions of small UASs (sUAS) nationwide? Does the communications network provide sufficient Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow air traffic control to securely address both UAS teams as a whole as well as individual UAS within each team? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Our objective is to identify revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives supporting UASs operating at all altitudes and in all airspace while accurately navigating in the absence of navigational aids. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The approach will identify CNS technology candidates that can meet the needs of the range of UAS missions to specific air traffic management applications where they will be most beneficial and cost effective.

Templin, Fred L.↗

Role of PHM in Autonomous Decision-Making: Aerospace applications

There is an increased need for onboard decision-making capabilities in cyber-physical systems be it in energy, automotive, aviation, space, or other industries as they aim for increased efficiency, resiliency, and mission assurance capabilities. Emerging next-gen technologies such as multi-rover planetary missions, distributed satellites, unmanned ground and aerial vehicle operations and smart grid systems rely on in-time risk assessment and autonomous decision-making. One critical piece of the autonomy puzzle is reliable prediction of system behavior under time-varying and potentially uncertain environmental conditions. Further, if agent states change during operation such as initiation of faults or degradation, reliable diagnostic tools need to be investigated. In this tutorial, we will revise approaches that integrates existing physics-based and data-driven models of agents interacting with probability models of the environment and component operation state. Role of existing PHM methodologies as they feed into decision-making under uncertainty will be studied. Balancing critical trade-offs between high-fidelity prognostic models, prediction time-horizons and the computational requirements for in-time cost-effective decision-making will be discussed through the implementation of surrogate models. Finally, the audience will be introduced to a real-time application of in-time trajectory planning of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) based on its PHM assessments under uncertain and varying wind conditions.

decision-making↗

Reconfigurable HIL Testing of Earth Satellites

In recent years, hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing has carved a strong niche in several industries, such as automotive, aerospace, telecomm, and consumer electronics. As desktop computers have realized gains in speed, memory size, and data storage capacity, hardware/software platforms have evolved into high performance, deterministic HIL platforms, capable of hosting the most demanding applications for testing components and subsystems. Using simulation software to emulate the digital and analog I/O signals of system components, engineers of all disciplines can now test new systems in realistic environments to evaluate their function and performance prior to field deployment. Within the Aerospace industry, space-borne satellite systems are arguably some of the most demanding in terms of their requirement for custom engineering and testing. Typically, spacecraft are built one or few at a time to fulfill a space science or defense mission. In contrast to other industries that can amortize the cost of HIL systems over thousands, even millions of units, spacecraft HIL systems have been built as one-of-a-kind solutions, expensive in terms of schedule, cost, and risk, to assure satellite and spacecraft systems reliability. The focus of this paper is to present a new approach to HIL testing for spacecraft systems that takes advantage of a highly flexible hardware/software architecture based on National Instruments PXI reconfigurable hardware and virtual instruments developed using LabVIEW. This new approach to HIL is based on a multistage/multimode spacecraft bus emulation development model called Reconfigurable Hardware In-the-Loop or RHIL.

Source record↗

Unified Communications for Space Inventory Management

To help assure mission success for long-duration exploration activities, NASA is actively pursuing wireless technologies that promote situational awareness and autonomy. Wireless technologies are typically extensible, offer freedom from wire tethers, readily support redundancy, offer potential for decreased wire weight, and can represent dissimilar implementation for increased reliability. In addition, wireless technologies can enable additional situational awareness that otherwise would be infeasible. For example, addition of wired sensors, the need for which might not have been apparent at the outset of a program, night be extremely costly due in part to the necessary routing of cables through the vehicle. RFID, or radio frequency identification, is a wireless technology with the potential for significant savings and increased reliability and safety in space operations. Perhaps the most obvious savings relate to the application of inventory management. A fully automated inventory management system is highly desirable for long-term sustaining operations in space environments. This assertion is evidenced by inventory activities on the International Space Station, which represents the most extensive inventory tracking experience base in the history of space operations. In the short tern, handheld RFID readers offer substantial savings owing to reduced crew time for inventory audits. Over the long term, a combination of improved RFID technology and operational concepts modified to fully utilize the technology should result in space based inventory management that is highly reliable and requires very little crew time. In addition to inventory management, RFID is likely to find space applications in real-time location and tracking systems. These could vary from coarse-resolution RFID portals to the high resolution afforded by ultra-wideband (UWB) RFID. Longer range RFID technologies that leverage passive surface acoustic wave (SAW) devices are being investigated to track assets on a lunar or planetary surface.

Gifford, Kevin K.↗

The HL-20 lifting-body personnel launch system

The HL-20 early lifting-body personnel launch system (PSL) research, expected PSL mission requirements, the HL-20 concept design status, and those features which enhance aerodynamic and aerothermodynamic performance, operation, efficiency, maintainability, reliability, and crew safety are described. Results of the HL-20 PLS research to date show that the concept has definite advantages for efficiently satisfying future needs for assured manned access to space. The vehicle is designed with operational efficiency, low life-cycle costs, reliability, and safety as the primary criteria. It is shown that the HL-20 PLS can be developed and put into operation in the same timeframe that the Space Station Freedom is deployed.

Stone, Howard W.↗

X-15 auxiliary power units and reaction controls

Electrical and hydraulic power within the X-15 airplane is developed by a monopropellant auxiliary power unit. In addition, airplane altitude control at extreme altitude is by monopropellant rockets. Two duplicate installations are used to provide reliability beyond single-system capabilities to assure continuous availability of aerodynamic flight controls and space-altitude controls. All components have been developed and evaluation tested by the individual suppliers. The principal item, the auxiliary power unit, has completed a 150 hour endurance test comprising 300 typical mission duty cycles. (author)

Wagner, Bruce O↗

Reliability of Space-Shuttle Pressure Vessels with Random Batch Effects

In this article we revisit the problem of estimating the joint reliability against failure by stress rupture of a group of fiber-wrapped pressure vessels used on Space-Shuttle missions. The available test data were obtained from an experiment conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) in which scaled-down vessels were subjected to life testing at four accelerated levels of pressure. We estimate the reliability assuming that both the Shuttle and LLL vessels were chosen at random in a two-stage process from an infinite population with spools of fiber as the primary sampling unit. Two main objectives of this work are: (1) to obtain practical estimates of reliability taking into account random spool effects and (2) to obtain a realistic assessment of estimation accuracy under the random model. Here, reliability is calculated in terms of a 'system' of 22 fiber-wrapped pressure vessels, taking into account typical pressures and exposure times experienced by Shuttle vessels. Comparisons are made with previous studies. The main conclusion of this study is that, although point estimates of reliability are still in the 'comfort zone,' it is advisable to plan for replacement of the pressure vessels well before the expected Lifetime of 100 missions per Shuttle Orbiter. Under a random-spool model, there is simply not enough information in the LLL data to provide reasonable assurance that such replacement would not be necessary.

Feiveson, Alan H.↗

Making space nuclear power a reality

Our current space exploration missions are power limited. Space nuclear reactors could provide the power for both onboard electrical power and propulsion to enable a new generation of space science and exploration. Implementing a mission using a space nuclear reactor presents many technical challenges. However, nuclear technologies are safely and reliably used throughout U.S. industries and the Government. Well-defined processes and regulations currently exist for the use of nuclear technologies in space or any other application. These processes and regulations assure safe, reliable use of nuclear technology in a manner that protects the public and the environment. The question is not one of choosing between safety and space science, but of investing in a technology that includes rigorous processes and procedures to assure safe.

nuclear↗

The Application of a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique Used for Expendable Launch Vehicles

This presentation provides a Residual Risk Evaluation Technique (RRET) developed by Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Launch Services Division. This technique is one of many procedures used by S&MA at KSC to evaluate residual risks for each Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) mission. RRET is a straight forward technique that incorporates the proven methodology of risk management, fault tree analysis, and reliability prediction. RRET derives a system reliability impact indicator from the system baseline reliability and the system residual risk reliability values. The system reliability impact indicator provides a quantitative measure of the reduction in the system baseline reliability due to the identified residual risks associated with the designated ELV mission. An example is discussed to provide insight into the application of RRET.

Latimer, John A.↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASA's Space Launch System

The engineering development of the new Space Launch System (SLS) launch vehicle requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The characteristics of these spacecraft systems must be matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex system engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in specialized Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through Flight Software certification are an important focus of this development effort to further insure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. NASA formed a dedicated M&FM team for addressing fault management early in the development lifecycle for the SLS initiative. As part of the development of the M&FM capabilities, this team has developed a dedicated testbed that integrates specific M&FM algorithms, specialized nominal and off-nominal test cases, and vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating these algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction for the SLS program. The flexibility of the Vehicle Management End-to-end Testbed (VMET) enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS. The intent of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software development infrastructure and its related testing entities. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts into software through requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM analysis group working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, the Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission and Loss of Crew probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses that can be tested in VMET to ensure that failures can be detected, and confirm that responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - ARINC 653 partitioned OS, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by Flight Software. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure the effectiveness of M&FM algorithms performance in the FSW development and test processes.

Trevino, Luis↗

Space Shuttle Main Engine - The Relentless Pursuit of Improvement

The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is the only reusable large liquid rocket engine ever developed. The specific impulse delivered by the staged combustion cycle, substantially higher than previous rocket engines, minimized volume and weight for the integrated vehicle. The dual pre-burner configuration permitted precise mixture ratio and thrust control while the fully redundant controller and avionics provided a very high degree of system reliability and health diagnosis. The main engine controller design was the first rocket engine application to incorporate digital processing. The engine was required to operate at a high chamber pressure to minimize engine volume and weight. Power level throttling was required to minimize structural loads on the vehicle early in flight and acceleration levels on the crew late in ascent. Fatigue capability, strength, ease of assembly and disassembly, inspectability, and materials compatibility were all major considerations in achieving a fully reusable design. During the multi-decade program the design evolved substantially using a series of block upgrades. A number of materials and manufacturing challenges were encountered throughout SSME s history. Significant development was required for the final configuration of the high pressure turbopumps. Fracture control was implemented to assess life limits of critical materials and components. Survival in the hydrogen environment required assessment of hydrogen embrittlement. Instrumentation systems were a challenge due to the harsh thermal and dynamic environments within the engine. Extensive inspection procedures were developed to assess the engine components between flights. The Space Shuttle Main Engine achieved a remarkable flight performance record. All flights were successful with only one mission requiring an ascent abort condition, which still resulted in an acceptable orbit and mission. This was achieved in large part via extensive ground testing to fully characterize performance and to establish acceptable life limits. During the program over a million seconds of accumulated test and flight time was achieved. Post flight inspection and assessment was a key part of assuring proper performance of the flight hardware. By the end of the program the predicted reliability had improved by a factor of four. These unique challenges, evolution of the design, and the resulting reliability will be discussed in this paper.

VanHooser, Katherine P.↗

A Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing and Analysis Platform for Validation of Mission and Fault Management Algorithms to Reduce Risk for NASAs Space Launch System

The engineering development of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) new Space Launch System (SLS) requires cross discipline teams with extensive knowledge of launch vehicle subsystems, information theory, and autonomous algorithms dealing with all operations from pre-launch through on orbit operations. The nominal and off-nominal characteristics of SLS's elements and subsystems must be understood and matched with the autonomous algorithm monitoring and mitigation capabilities for accurate control and response to abnormal conditions throughout all vehicle mission flight phases, including precipitating safing actions and crew aborts. This presents a large and complex systems engineering challenge, which is being addressed in part by focusing on the specific subsystems involved in the handling of off-nominal mission and fault tolerance with response management. Using traditional model-based system and software engineering design principles from the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Systems Modeling Language (SysML), the Mission and Fault Management (M&FM) algorithms for the vehicle are crafted and vetted in Integrated Development Teams (IDTs) composed of multiple development disciplines such as Systems Engineering (SE), Flight Software (FSW), Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) and the major subsystems and vehicle elements such as Main Propulsion Systems (MPS), boosters, avionics, Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC), Thrust Vector Control (TVC), and liquid engines. These model-based algorithms and their development lifecycle from inception through FSW certification are an important focus of SLS's development effort to further ensure reliable detection and response to off-nominal vehicle states during all phases of vehicle operation from pre-launch through end of flight. To test and validate these M&FM algorithms a dedicated test-bed was developed for full Vehicle Management End-to-End Testing (VMET). For addressing fault management (FM) early in the development lifecycle for the SLS program, NASA formed the M&FM team as part of the Integrated Systems Health Management and Automation Branch under the Spacecraft Vehicle Systems Department at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). To support the development of the FM algorithms, the VMET developed by the M&FM team provides the ability to integrate the algorithms, perform test cases, and integrate vendor-supplied physics-based launch vehicle (LV) subsystem models. Additionally, the team has developed processes for implementing and validating the M&FM algorithms for concept validation and risk reduction. The flexibility of the VMET capabilities enables thorough testing of the M&FM algorithms by providing configurable suites of both nominal and off-nominal test cases to validate the developed algorithms utilizing actual subsystem models such as MPS, GNC, and others. One of the principal functions of VMET is to validate the M&FM algorithms and substantiate them with performance baselines for each of the target vehicle subsystems in an independent platform exterior to the flight software test and validation processes. In any software development process there is inherent risk in the interpretation and implementation of concepts from requirements and test cases into flight software compounded with potential human errors throughout the development and regression testing lifecycle. Risk reduction is addressed by the M&FM group but in particular by the Analysis Team working with other organizations such as S&MA, Structures and Environments, GNC, Orion, Crew Office, Flight Operations, and Ground Operations by assessing performance of the M&FM algorithms in terms of their ability to reduce Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) probabilities. In addition, through state machine and diagnostic modeling, analysis efforts investigate a broader suite of failure effects and associated detection and responses to be tested in VMET to ensure reliable failure detection, and confirm responses do not create additional risks or cause undesired states through interactive dynamic effects with other algorithms and systems. VMET further contributes to risk reduction by prototyping and exercising the M&FM algorithms early in their implementation and without any inherent hindrances such as meeting FSW processor scheduling constraints due to their target platform - the ARINC 6535-partitioned Operating System, resource limitations, and other factors related to integration with other subsystems not directly involved with M&FM such as telemetry packing and processing. The baseline plan for use of VMET encompasses testing the original M&FM algorithms coded in the same C++ language and state machine architectural concepts as that used by FSW. This enables the development of performance standards and test cases to characterize the M&FM algorithms and sets a benchmark from which to measure their effectiveness and performance in the exterior FSW development and test processes. This paper is outlined in a systematic fashion analogous to a lifecycle process flow for engineering development of algorithms into software and testing. Section I describes the NASA SLS M&FM context, presenting the current infrastructure, leading principles, methods, and participants. Section II defines the testing philosophy of the M&FM algorithms as related to VMET followed by section III, which presents the modeling methods of the algorithms to be tested and validated in VMET. Its details are then further presented in section IV followed by Section V presenting integration, test status, and state analysis. Finally, section VI addresses the summary and forward directions followed by the appendices presenting relevant information on terminology and documentation.

Trevino, Luis↗

Requirements for significant problem reporting and trend analysis

This handbook supplements policies, requirements, and procedures of NMI 8070.3 to ensure that NASA management at each organizational level is: fully aware of trends affecting both the level of safety and the potential for mission success established for both NASA manned space programs and its supporting institutions; fully and independently informed of problems that represent significant risk to the safety of all personnel (including the general populace) and to the success of a mission or operation through a program mechanism herein defined as Significant Problem Reporting; and in full agreement with the level of elimination of these problems through the closed-loop accounting of corrective actions. The requirements of this handbook are supportive of the agency's safety, reliability, maintainability, and quality assurance (SRM&QA) program objectives and are applicable to all organizational elements of NASA connected with or supporting developmental or operational manned space program/projects (including associated payloads) and the related institutional facilities.

George A Rodney↗

Microbial Food Safety in Space Production Systems

While traveling to deep space is difficult for many reasons, food is a crucial one. Round-trip Mars mission scenarios last 3 years, demanding food with a shelf-life of 5 years; this means that feeding human crew sustainably for long-duration missions beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) will ultimately lead to a paradigm shift away from the current Earth-based food production system, which depends upon storing and transporting prepackaged foods, and toward bio-regenerative production of food in space. Pharmaceuticals and nutritional supplements face similar challenges. Moreover, the methods we currently use to detect dangerous microbes in food require sample return to Earth, a situation not viable for deep-space missions. While the science behind generating foods and bioproducts is covered by other white papers, in this paper we discuss a crucial gap uniting all of them: how to ensure that such products are free of unwanted microbial contamination and safe for crew to consume. Because Earth-based food safety systems cannot be directly applied in space, safety assurance is currently a critical bottleneck in the space production of food and other bioproducts. Future sustainable deep-space missions will require NASA to devote more resources in the coming decade to understanding the biological and physical science principles underlying microbial food safety in space, and to developing efficient, reliable methods in this area.

microbiology↗

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗

RELIABILITY PROGRAMS FOR ''L'' SYSTEMS

The AFSC Program Structure assigns numbers and letters to the various programs in order to identify the efforts for management control. The fact that most of the command and control systems have the designator "L" affixed has prompted the reference to them as the "L" systems. In this paper the mission of "L" systems has been described, the complexity of the equipment indicated, and the importance of these systems to our national defense efforts pointed out. The efforts by the Electronic Systems Division to comply With the Air Force policy that a comprehensive reliability program be required for each contract to assure delivery of reliable systems and equipment to the Air Force inventory are described in considerable detail.

RELIABILITY↗

The evolution of the Space Shuttle

As the mission manifest develops in response to the needs of the users, new capabilities are being developed for the Shuttle. Other changes are being introduced in order to provide Assured Shuttle Availability (ASA), that is, safe efficient flight operations into the 21st century. These changes will provide simpler turnaround processing procedures, enhanced subsystem reliability, a reduction in critical failure modes, and enhanced operational flexibility.

Cohen, Aaron↗