Results for “oversight” — Page 10

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Astrobee On-Orbit Commissioning

The Astrobee free flying robots operate autonomously inside the International Space Station (ISS) with oversight from a ground operator or ISS crew. They replace the Synchronized Position Hold Engage and Reorient Experimental Satellites (SPHERES) as research platforms for zero-g free-flying robotics. Astrobee can also serve as a mobile camera/sensor platform for flight and payload controllers to improve ISS operations. Development began in late 2014, and flight hardware deployed to the ISS on several launches starting from November 2018 to October 2019. Shortly after the first two robots arrived in April 2019, we began a series of commissioning activities to validate the Astrobee robots. This paper reviews the Astrobee system and describes the on-orbit commissioning activities and results.

ISS↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Government Personnel Participation in Suborbital Space Flight

In 2020, NASA issued a Request for Information (RFI) from potential sources for Suborbital Crew (SubC) space transportation services. NASA recognizes the advancement of the commercial suborbital space flight industry and is currently working to develop suborbital transportation for Government personnel that could fly on commercially available suborbital vehicles and determine a systems qualification approach for flight risk acceptance. Prior examples of risk assessment such as the purchase of Soyuz missions serve as a foundation for how the US Government’s best technical experts can partner with a successfully flying industry provider to understand risks. More recently, NASA, the FAA, and industry have successfully demonstrated that a company-owned operation with government oversight can successfully launch Government Astronauts safely. This paper explores the challenges and opportunities presented with the use of suborbital vehicles by Government personnel and how industry might leverage the Government’s efforts to maximize the success of the suborbital space industry.

Risk Management↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Genesis Solar Wind Sample Curation Documentation

Introduction: A scientist with experience as a sample science analyst, provider of flight hardware for multiple missions, and senior engineer in an ISO 2000-rated manufacturing plant has described the timeline of key participants in any PI-led sample return mission, the breadth of the organizations involved [1,2], and, of interest to this meeting, choosing the types of data to preserve and issues of future data accessibility. This work broadens that perspective by giving similar lessons from Genesis sample curation point-of-view. Curation participation regarding data gathering was part of the mission review process from the beginning. Genesis’ story illustrates outcome of several choices about types of data to record and preserve. Precision analysis of solar wind atoms captured in pure, ultraclean substrates is the driving science goal; therefore, detailed documentation was captured from all mission and curation phases and from investigator laboratories because these processes affect the final analytical results [3]. Pre-flight: Design and fabrication of the spacecraft. Like many modern small sample return missions, Genesis was a tightly managed team integrated across science, engineering and curation. Communication across the team was excellent, and, for the most part, the hands-on engineering technicians understood the impacts of “small choices” they routinely make, and the eyes-on oversight of manufacturing processes by scientists was mindful of details. The payload was designed by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the spacecraft by Lockheed Martin. Solar wind collectors and instruments were fabricated by multiple vendors and laboratories. The main portion of the payload was assembled at JSC. Fabrication procedures and contamination-control data (with witness coupons) were stored primarily at JSC. The original composition, dimensions and configuration of components, results of thermal testing, etc. are still needed for interpretation of analytical data. At times, these must be estimated from secondary information acquired pre-flight. Moreover, some files (e.g., original 3-D models and early Powerpoint) cannot be opened using software. Archived curation data includes 2-D drawings, material usage lists, QA documentation and analyses of consumables used during fabrication. Important chemical information still resides in archived hardware, paints and lubricants, material coupons, cleaning coupons, environmental witness plates and reference materials from manufacturing facilities. Purity and cleanliness of collector substrates. Semi-conductor vendors provided surface cleanliness data and some purity data. Purity for specific elements of interest was verified by science team members in their laboratories [4]. Curation archived procurement and shipping records, analysis reports, and non-proprietary fabrication data. A physical archive of flight collector reference materials is maintained for future use so additional data can be collected as analytical techniques improve. These are of increased value due to the hard landing upon re-entry. Cleaning and cleanliness assessments of flight hardware. Cleaning of the science canister payload was performed at JSC in a dedicated ISO 4 cleanroom using ultrapure water (UPW). The cleanliness of this UPW was monitored throughout processing. The archive for the clean lab also includes airborne particle counts, airborne molecular and inorganic contamination measurements as well as cleanroom construction material coupons and witness coupons. Hardware cleanliness was assessed by particle counts in rinse water batches. This information is recorded in batch cleaning forms and logbooks, and are, perhaps, of decreased value due to the hard landing. Post-flight: Curation-generated data. The curation handling history of each Genesis sample is documented in a typical astromaterials sample database which captures sample location, physical description and characterization data. Samples have a “shelf life”. Crucial to the preservation of samples is ongoing documentation of the sample environment, initially under curatorial control but is now a separate facility function with requires coordination. PI-generated data. Data on sample characterization and cleaning techniques continues to be generated by sample users [5]. These are often captured in LPSC abstracts, but these “engineering” results often are not publishable as stand-alone papers. We are actively looking for ways to make this information more accessible to users. Ion implants into samples have aided science return and can be shared among investigators. These (and similar) materials should be added to the curatorial collection with appropriate process and characterization data generated externally. Summary: Complete data archives for returned astromaterial samples must be broad in types and formats, and inclusive of environmental monitoring.

Genesis↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operational Health Physics for Radiation Source Payloads

Spacecraft payloads processed at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) frequently include ionizing and nonionizing radiation sources that require controls to protect the health of the workers involved in the ground operations. At KSC, a robust radiation protection program ensures that radiation hazards are identified, and appropriate controls are implemented using a radiation use authorization (RUA) process and Radiation Protection Committee review and approval. The Health Physics Office provides monitoring and oversight to ensure compliance. A brief overview of health physics activities in support of the Mars 2020 mission will be described to illustrate the overall management of radiation sources during payload ground processing.

Kurt R Geber↗

NASA NTRS2020

Enabling Assurance in the MBSE Environment

A number of specific benefits that fit within the hallmarks of effective development are realized with implementation of model-based approaches to systems and assurance. Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) enabled by standardized modeling languages (e.g., SysML®) is at the core. These benefits in the context of spaceflight system challenges can include [1]: • Improved management of complex development • Reduced risk in the development process • Improved cost management • Improved design decisions With appropriate modeling techniques the assurance community also can improve early oversight and insight into project development. NASA has shown the basic constructs of SysML in an MBSE environment offer several key advantages, within a Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA) initiative [2, 3]. These include the following: • Model viewpoints that promote rapid and systematic assessment of requirements coverage, hazard tagging and risk management • Embedded safety assessments for launch vehicles • Deployment of model assisted development of reliability products - Failure Modes and Effects Analyses (FMEAs) and Fault Trees • Test Planning • Validation and Verification of complex functions • Support of Assurance Case development for complex systems In addition, while there are benefits to be harvested, there is a realization that these do not come without effort and cost. Enabling model-based approaches requires structure, not only in an organizational context, but in a modeling context as well. There can be a steep learning curve and costs associated to train skilled modelers. But, on the other hand, not all of the assurance community need to be modelers. Models themselves must conform to ontologies that enable assurance. This places constraints upon the models and modelers. Optimums have yet to be developed where resources and constraints on modeling must be traded off in the organization and modeling efforts for projects. A number of barriers need to be overcome, as well, which pose challenges to the developers of the software that supports MBSE/MBMA. Information and data must be made to flow seamlessly through the life cycle. Because there is a wide variety of tools used in the community, to avoid the problems of the past of silos, delays, and diverging interests, information should flow among these tools to support the “single source of truth” paradigm of MBSE. This will greatly facilitate MBMA and advancement of assurance functions.

Evans, John W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Uncrewed Lunar Surface Operations and Support Activities

Sustained human presence on the surface of the Moon and future missions to Mars require increased independence from surface crews and Earth-based mission control to operate efficiently, safely, and reliably. The time for surface crews to perform tasks will be limited. Extravehicular activities by surface personnel are burdensome and time-consuming, even when a continuous human presence on the surface occurs. Identifying and balancing human/automation roles and tasks and infusing automation and autonomy practices early in a system’s lifecycle will be essential to achieve mission objectives. Among these objectives are attaining a sustained human presence, improving performance and mission effectiveness, reducing operations and maintenance (O&M) costs, and ensuring operations that are robust to communication delays. To achieve these objectives, an operational shift toward increased automation and autonomy with less reliance on humans is needed. Uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities occur when surface crews are not present or are independent of surface crew timeline activities requiring no surface crew oversight or intervention. These uncrewed surface opportunities can also be planned to minimize crew workload that avoids routine maintenance and support tasks, thus maximizing crew exploration time. Uncrewed preparations such as staging and prepositioning equipment and materials before the crew arrives could improve crew task efficiency. Additional opportunities exist to conduct uncrewed science, exploration, and utilization. Uncrewed surface architecture functions can include science and exploration; habitation; launch and landing support; surface communication and navigation; surface power generation and distribution; human surface mobility; lifting, handling, manipulating; excavation, construction, and site preparation; logistics management; maintenance and repair; surface resource utilization; integrated site operations and shared support services (e.g., site scheduling/prioritization, dust mitigation/contamination control, and surface safety). Early robotic lunar surface campaigns will provide information on the availability of resources, such as oxygen and water, and demonstrate surface-based technologies. After the Artemis III human lunar return mission, a series of landers will deliver surface systems, cargo, supplies, science packages, spare parts, and commodities. A balance of crewed and uncrewed surface operations will enable a sustained lunar surface presence at the South Pole of the Moon at a site that will be known as the Artemis Base Camp (ABC). It is envisioned that base camp operations on and around the Moon will then help prepare for the mission durations and activities needed to support the first human mission to Mars. Before long-duration crew missions to the base camp can occur, the necessary surface infrastructure will be pre-deployed and verified operational. Surface assets will be teleoperated and remotely managed from Earth. Additionally, robotic and short-duration crewed missions to the ABC will ensure the site’s merit to achieve long-term science objectives, availability of usable resources, and that terrain, seasonal variations, and illumination conditions are acceptable. ABC will consist of different areas where specific functions and services are rendered, including: • Launch and Landing Area • Habitation Area • Power Production Area • Resource Areas Launch and Landing Area—The launch and landing area will support associated functions for the arrival and departure of vehicles, such as crewed landing and ascent and uncrewed cargo deliveries and offloading. It will evolve from an unimproved site at the beginning of the exploration campaign to a more sustainable landing and launch area that can support repeated arrivals and departures. Initial uncrewed Lunar Terrain Vehicle (LTV) surface operations may include emplacement of navigation beacons and communication equipment, real-time video and photography of landing/liftoff events, and element repositioning, such as portable utility power (PUP) (applicable for other landed assets at other areas). Site preparations, such as surface leveling, soil compaction, and berm/path construction, may be needed for a more sustainable launch and landing area capable of accommodating vehicles that are increasingly more reusable and reduce the effects of plume surface interactions and ejecta impacts on nearby surface assets. During the ABC missions, cargo and logistics will be delivered to the lunar surface via robotic cargo landers before the crew arrives. These shipments, which can arrive in pressurized logistics carriers, will deliver the logistics necessary to support a crewed mission and include items such as food, water, equipment spares, etc. Providing the capability to retrieve, offload, and transport the logistics closer to the ABC site before the arrival of the crew will increase the overall efficiency of crew operations once they arrive. In the sustained phase of exploration, other supporting services may be needed, such as lander propellant servicing, surface power services, commodity refreshes, and additional inspection, maintenance, and repair capabilities, to sustain a cadence of extended personnel stays and cargo arrivals and departures. Habitation Area—Uncrewed support to surface habitation could involve supporting activation and pre-entry operations of the habitat while the crew is in orbit at the Gateway outpost preparing for a surface landing. Surface Habitat (SH) uncrewed operations may include bringing the cabin environment to a habitable temperature and air mix and activating other critical crew support systems. Potential crop production uncrewed tasks in the SH could also include autonomous watering and tending. Additionally, when the crew departs, the SH enters dormancy for the long period of uncrewed operation. A logistical staging area could also be collocated near the SH. If so, staging operations for crew supplies, waste re-location, and recycling operations may be opportunities for uncrewed operations. Power Production Area—The Fission Surface Power (FSP) element and its supporting distribution equipment provide power to surface elements as needed across the ABC to supplement day-to-day operations and survive lunar nights. Uncrewed support of this power system includes any initial LTV-assisted deployments of cables and other distributed equipment, associated electrical connections, and system testing and activation operations. Robotically performing some inspections, maintenance, or repair tasks on the power distribution equipment could reduce the surface crew workload. Resource Area— Uncrewed resource prospecting, mapping, and characterizing possible resource sites is likely to be time-consuming and represents an opportunity for uncrewed operations between crewed missions. Uncrewed mobile equipment operations will be needed in the extreme environments of permanently shadowed locations where resource extractions occur. As In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) pilot plant operations begin, uncrewed surface support activities with available mobile and portable assets (LTV, PUP, etc.) will better support these operations. Any produced commodities can be stored at a centralized storage location for future use. Also associated with these operations is the use of mobile robotic excavators for resource acquisition and robotic/autonomous regolith processing. The waste tailings generated during excavation and regolith processing would also need to be transported and deposited at a dedicated location. Surface assets will continue operating between crew visits to maintain surface capabilities, conduct lunar surface science, technology demonstrations, and public outreach opportunities. Additionally, certain sustaining tasks that would consume valuable crew time could be performed before crew arrival, or after their departure. This capability may offer more affordable options to construct, activate, test, and maintain a broad set of surface assets. Telerobotically operated human surface mobility systems, such as the LTV and Pressurized Rover (PR), can be utilized for various tasks. Surface environmental conditions pose a distinct challenge for all these activities. Surface illumination and localized shadows are one such factor. Night-survival operations could consist of thermal management, battery pre-charging, and load shedding. Some surface systems may hibernate through the night and then awake and continue nominal operations. Uncrewed mobile assets may use a more adaptive approach to optimize their power and operations; one method is to follow the sunlight. Night-survival operations may be initiated remotely by teleoperation, automated, or accomplished by supervised autonomous operation. The ability to pre-deploy and control remote assets in orbit or on Mars before the arrival of the mission crew is a key capability that can be simulated on the moon. The base camp provides a venue where these advanced operational concepts, technologies, and autonomous methods and techniques, including the incorporation of time delays to simulate Earth-Mars latency can be replicated to help buy down future Mars mission risks. This paper will examine the evolution of uncrewed lunar surface operations and support activities. It will also discuss the lunar surface environmental conditions (thermal, lighting, terrain, topography, communications) along with the challenges they pose on uncrewed surface operations, and the performance of these activities with limited to minimal human interaction and/or teleoperation. Since lunar missions include Mars mission analogs, such investigation provides the framework for future uncrewed Mars mission support.

Mark E Lewis↗

NASA NTRS1997

The Next Generation Space Telescope: Visiting a Time When Galaxies Were Young

In the spring and summer of 1996, three independent teams studied the feasibility of a large aperture space telescope to follow the Hubble Space Telescope. The scientific goals for the new telescope had been laid out in a report by the HST & Beyond Committee, a group appointed by the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy to consider the needs of the astronomical community after the nominal end of the HST mission in 2005. The technical capabilities and constraints on the new observatory were daunting: the telescope optics should be at least 4 meters in diameter and passively cooled to achieve optimum sensitivity in the near-infrared portion of the spectrum. Moreover, the costs should be kept within a fraction of those for the HST: approximately $500M for construction and $900M for lifetime costs, not including support for scientific data analysis. In their presentations to NASA on 19-21 August, 1996, the teams led by Lockheed Martin, TRW, and the Goddard Space Flight Center concluded that a Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST) was not only feasible and affordable, but that it could be made more powerful using recent breakthroughs in space technologies. Coming on the heels of breathtaking HST observations of distant galaxies in the process of formation, such an NGST could bridge the gap in our understanding of the earliest origins of stars, galaxies, and the elements that are the foundations of Life. This report presents the findings of the three teams and the technological roadmap which will guide us to the successful development of the NGST over the next decade. We have made liberal use of the written material, tables, and diagrams prepared by the three study teams. We have also taken advantage of the knowledge and ideas of our colleagues in government, industry and academia. In Appendix A, we list the members of the three study groups, the NGST Science Working Group and the NGST Scientific Oversight Committee. We deeply appreciate their assistance, advice, and enthusiasm. The scientific and technological goals of NGST are part of the Origins initiative in the Office of Space Science, NASA Headquarters. We are pleased to acknowledge the support and leadership of Edward Weiler, a steadfast friend of HST, Harley Thronson, a proponent of all things infrared, and Mike Kaplan, a tireless advocate of new technology. John Campbell, Project Manager for HST, initiated the NGST study at GSFC and we deeply appreciate his formative efforts and continued support. We are also grateful for the foresight of Riccardo Giacconi, Director General of the European Southern Observatory (ESO), and the efforts of his staff. We note that European Space Agency (ESA) staff at the Space Telescope Science Institute and ESO played important roles in the NGST scientific and technical studies. We look forward to future collaboration with ESA, ESO, and other international partners.

H.S. Stockman↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Application of Objectives-Driven Assurance Cases to System Development in an Evolving Acquisition Model

System properties such as “safety” and “dependability” cannot, in practice, be proven, and must be argued in an “assurance case” aimed at supporting risk-acceptance decisions that have to be made by system acquirers and/or regulatory authorities. The paper is concerned with applications of the “assurance case” idea early in design and development of new systems, when (apart from dedicated testing) the only available operating experience information derives from previous (non-identical) systems. Much of the discussion is based on an evolving acquisition model at the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration; previously, most major systems were developed in-house, but some major systems will now be developed by and acquired from commercial providers. Key points discussed include the following. (1) By promoting a particular kind of focused discussion between acquirers and providers, the use of assurance cases should be particularly valuable under the new acquisition model. (2) In principle, objectives-driven (sometimes called “performance-based”) approaches to assurance of performance have significant advantages in cases where they are applicable. (3) For truly novel systems, completeness of the safety analysis is a significant issue; it is important for the assurance case to include a commitment by the provider (or applicant) to seriously pursue analysis of operating experience, so that previously unrecognized hazards can be identified and addressed. (4) Inquiries into major accidents often point to deficiencies in management oversight in all parts of the life cycle; management processes need to be addressed in the formulation and the implementation of an assurance case. Under the new acquisition model, these considerations imply a serious reconsideration of the way in which the development process is managed by both providers and acquirers.

Objectives-driven↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Corridor Design and Analysis for UAM Operations

The Urban Air Mobility (UAM) concept is a part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), a joint initiative between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), NASA, and industry to develop an air transportation system that uses new electric (i.e., green) air vehicles in geographical areas previously underserved by traditional aviation. Market forecast studies predict that there will be demand for alternate modes of air transportation using electric Vertical Take-off and Landing aircraft. UAM expands transportation networks by introducing short flights to move people and goods around metropolitan areas. UAM is expected to improve mobility for the public, decongest road traffic, reduce trip time, and decrease strain on existing public transportation networks. Various challenges exist to make the introduction of UAM operations successful in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). These include but are not limited to integration with existing airports and airspace, provision of air traffic services (e.g., separation), vehicle design and certification, and community acceptance. The focus of this paper is on integration of UAM operations into the NAS via introduction of new airspace structures. UAM will operate within a regulatory, operational, and technical environment that is incorporated into the NAS. As per the UAM Concept of Operations (ConOps), the FAA retains regulatory authority and is responsible for establishing operational parameters and maintaining oversight. The FAA’s UAM ConOps describes flights at low altitudes (below 5,000 ft) with minimal disruption to established conventional aircraft traffic and limited voice interactions with the Air Traffic Control (ATC). Early stages of UAM may use existing procedures to safely integrate UAM with conventional flights. This would involve flying under Part 91 Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and using voice for communications. The initial UAM ecosystem will utilize the current infrastructure such as routes, helipads, and ATC services, where practicable. A NASA study explored the use of existing helicopter routes in Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) airspace for initial UAM operations with a Letter of Agreement (LOA) that included procedures to request a Class B (controlled airspace) clearance. The research showed that the chosen approach was feasible for near-term, low-demand UAM traffic, but was not scalable. The growth of operations in today’s aviation system has resulted in airspace reorganization and procedures to ensure safety and efficiency as traffic rates increase. One proposed operating innovation that can help with the scalability of UAM is establishing routes and corridors. This may look similar to the Area Navigation (RNAV) procedures used today to streamline operations into busy airports. However, instead of FAA automation systems and ATC managing the flow of traffic, some UAM concepts envision a third-party service provider performing this role as part of the Provider of Services for UAM (PSU) network. The FAA’s UAM ConOps posits that new airspace structures such as UAM corridors include the following design criteria: 1) Minimal impact on existing NAS operations, 2) no or minimal additional ATC services, 3) public interest considerations such as noise, safety, and security, and 4) customer needs. The airspace available in urban environments is limited by the height of buildings, the effect of weather including wind gusts, privacy needs, and a clearance envelope. The new airspace structure would need to be designed around large airports and urban areas where the initial market demand is likely to exist. NASA has started evaluating airspace in the Dallas Fort Worth area to design new airspace structures, keeping the first two design criteria in mind. It is assumed that there will be an on-board pilot-in-command, and the flights will operate under VFR in Visual Meteorological Conditions. Corridors will be required in controlled airspace, whereas UAM operations can fly in uncontrolled Class G and E airspace using current day rules. Keeler et. al identified factors and heuristics for development of routes for UAM operations for integration with airspace close to large airports such as Dallas Fort Worth and Dallas Love Field. This paper describes the heuristics applied to define the corridors, analyzes them with respect to legacy traffic and presents key results.

Urban Air Mobility↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Promoting Crew Autonomy in a Human Spaceflight Earth Analog Mission through Self-Scheduling

Deep space exploration missions face the challenge of communication transmission latencies between ground stations and astronaut crews due to increasing distance between the Earth and spacecraft in transit. To address this, research at NASA has aimed toward supporting crew autonomy by enabling astronauts to schedule their own timelines with minimal oversight from Mission Control. While self-scheduling has been shown to be feasible, it is yet to be studied as an integral part of autonomous crew operations. The current paper reviews the operationalization of self-scheduling and a number of related objectives during Campaign 6 of HERA, a Human Exploration Research Analog. Research objectives include studying the effects of phasic autonomy over the course of a 45-day mission, evaluating differences in scheduling performance produced by software interface aids, and deploying a novel measure of crew attitudes toward self-scheduling and plan execution.

crew autonomy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Promoting Crew Autonomy in a Human Spaceflight Earth Analog Mission through Self-Scheduling

Deep space exploration missions face the challenge of communication transmission latencies between ground stations and astronaut crews due to increasing distance between the Earth and spacecraft in transit. To address this, research at NASA has aimed toward supporting crew autonomy by enabling astronauts to schedule their own timelines with minimal oversight from Mission Control. While self-scheduling has been shown to be feasible, it is yet to be studied as an integral part of autonomous crew operations. The current paper reviews the operationalization of self-scheduling and a number of related objectives during Campaign 6 of HERA, a Human Exploration Research Analog. Research objectives include studying the effects of phasic autonomy over the course of a 45-day mission, evaluating differences in scheduling performance produced by software interface aids, and deploying a novel measure of crew attitudes toward self-scheduling and plan execution.

crew autonomy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Ground Test Technology Demonstration for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Engines

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) engines have been deemed a key technology to enable human missions to Mars due to their high efficiency, also known as specific impulse (Isp). Ground testing the NTP engine is critical in maturing the technology and increasing the design’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL), thus mitigating risk from NTP engine performance/operations. NTP engine development began with open-air ground testing through the Rover/NERVA program back in the 1960s when regulatory requirements were not as stringent as they are today. Due to the formation of regulatory bodies, increase in oversight and environmental requirements, the exhaust gas released from NTP engines must be captured or processed to gain approval in the case that the exhaust gas contains fission products from the nuclear fuel elements within the reactor. Ground test campaigns following Rover/NERVA focused on the certification of a full scale NTP engine, which led to exhaust processing systems such as the Rocket Exhaust Capture System (RECS) and Real Time (RT) exhaust processing. These systems were deemed favorable for regulatory compliance but have a high initial investment cost. Reassurance on the feasibility of ground testing and the NTP engine technology likely need to be achieved before NASA invests in these systems. Recently the objectives for NTP engine ground testing have shifted from certification testing of a full scale engine to demonstration testing of a subscale engine. The shift to demonstration testing allows for a shorter testing duration and a lower operational thrust (for demo testing purposes only) to demonstrate the NTP engine (5k-12.5k lbf). Due to these factors, the infrastructure, consumables, total footprint, and exhaust system complexity are able to be drastically reduced, thus reducing cost significantly. The High-pressure Exhaust Capture System (HECS) concept was designed for a NTP engine ground test demonstration. The HECS concept greatly reduces cost compared to previous concepts and suggests favorable regulatory acceptance due to its ability to capture all of the exhaust gas from the NTP engine.

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Engine Technology Demonstration Testing

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) engines have been deemed a key technology to enable human missions to Mars due to their high efficiency, also known as specific impulse (Isp). Ground testing the NTP engine is critical in maturing the technology and increasing the design’s Technology Readiness Level (TRL), thus mitigating risk from NTP engine performance/operations. NTP engine development began with open-air ground testing through the Rover/NERVA program back in the 1960s when regulatory requirements were not as stringent as they are today. Due to the formation of regulatory bodies, increase in oversight and environmental requirements, the exhaust gas released from NTP engines must be captured or processed to gain approval in the case that the exhaust gas contains fission products from the nuclear fuel elements within the reactor. Ground test campaigns following Rover/NERVA focused on the certification of a full scale NTP engine, which led to exhaust processing systems such as the Rocket Exhaust Capture System (RECS) and Real Time (RT) exhaust processing. These systems were deemed favorable for regulatory compliance but have a high initial investment cost. Reassurance on the feasibility of ground testing and the NTP engine technology likely need to be achieved before NASA invests in these systems. Recently the objectives for NTP engine ground testing have shifted from certification testing of a full scale engine to demonstration testing of a subscale engine. The shift to demonstration testing allows for a shorter testing duration and a lower operational thrust (for demo testing purposes only) to demonstrate the NTP engine (5k-12.5k lbf). Due to these factors, the infrastructure, consumables, total footprint, and exhaust system complexity are able to be drastically reduced, thus reducing cost significantly. The High-pressure Exhaust Capture System (HECS) concept was designed for a NTP engine ground test demonstration. The HECS concept greatly reduces cost compared to previous concepts and suggests favorable regulatory acceptance due to its ability to capture all of the exhaust gas from the NTP engine.

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effects of Communication Delay on Human Spaceflight Missions

Missions onboard the International Space Station rely on the real-time availability of a large ground team of system experts to command the vehicle, solve safety-critical problems, and guide the crew during complex operations. Also, in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), supplies can be sent and crews evacuated quite quickly if needed. Future missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit (BLEO) will not have this 24/7, real-time safety net as communication latency increases, resupply difficulty increases, and evacuation opportunities diminish. There are few, if any, terrestrial analogs for human spaceflight missions BLEO that reflect the conditions—including extreme environments, long mission durations, and small crew sizes – that make these missions so high risk. Studies on specific conditions, such as communication delays and asynchronous interactions, have been performed in NASA Earth-based analog missions and have found that communication delays can disrupt ground-crew interactions and adversely impact team performance. However, there are gaps and limitations in studies conducted to date, notably on human spacecraft system failure response and recovery, the impacts of shorter lunar-relevant communication delays on complex operations, and the effectiveness of countermeasures. The work presented here breaks down real anomalies that occurred on ISS and Apollo missions and creates example scenarios fort Lunar Surface and Mars missions to explore the impact of communication delays of varying length on onboard operations and mission outcomes. Our analyses indicate that short communication delays (e.g., seconds to a minute) adversely impact the ability for ground to provide real-time oversight and guidance and to catch quickly emerging problems in time. Longer communication delays (e.g., up to 40 minutes on Mars missions) call for a shift of responsibility for tactical operations from ground to crew; crew must make time-critical decisions independently and respond to time-critical vehicle anomalies to prevent consequences.

human-systems integration↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Support for Commercial Crew Launch Capabilities

Since the earliest days of U.S. human spaceflight, NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, has played a key role in American crew launch capability, from engineering support for the first Mercury-Redstone launches, to the Saturn launches to the Moon, through Shuttle and now Artemis. Today, Marshall brings that expertise gained through decades of crewed space launches to NASA’s Commercial Crew Program (CCP), providing launch vehicle engineering and programmatic support. The team’s responsibilities have included human certification of commercial launch systems for the CCP missions, including Atlas V and Falcon 9, and verifying each launch vehicle complies with flight certification. MSFC provides expertise in nearly all aspects of launch vehicle design and performance including solid motors and liquid engines, stage propulsion, thrust vector control, structural and dynamics, safety and mission assurance. During each commercial crew launch, an engineering support team is on console at Marshall’s Huntsville Operations Support Center, which has provided launch operations support since Apollo, providing real-time oversight to safety standards for the vehicle and verifying data. Launch vehicle support for Commercial Crew has come as a paradigm shift for the MSFC team, inspiring new approaches that leverage expertise and best practices from past NASA-developed launch vehicle missions, while at the same time providing new synergies from work with commercial partners on CCP. This paper will explore the role that the Marshall launch vehicle services team plays in the Commercial Crew Program, as well as lessons learned from the program that will continue to benefit a new era of spaceflight partnerships.

Commercial Crew↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

2023 Artemis Crew Health and Performance System Model Development

While the NASA Human Research Program (HRP) utilizes a Crew Health and Performance (CHP) System to represent all the Agency’s efforts to ensure the health and performance of NASA astronauts, there is no shared mental model of a CHP system at NASA. Some groups may consider a CHP system to be only a medical kit, while others may not be using the concept at all. To facilitate the integration of functions and capabilities to ensure astronaut health and performance during vehicle development, HRP has proposed a CHP Shared Mental Model derived from the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards (NASA-STD-3001 Vol.1/Vol.2). [1] Even though many vehicle, ground, and communication systems as well as mission operations are modeled for the Artemis Campaigns, no mission level CHP system model was created to achieve the intent of the HRP CHP Shared Mental Model. The lack of this model renders it difficult to visualize and understand how the many programs work together to provide the necessary cross program functions and capabilities to ensure the health and performance of the crew throughout an Artemis mission. For this purpose, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) element of HRP developed a CHP system model for the Artemis III and IV missions to provide a view of how each program contributes to and interacts with the overall CHP system. To develop the 2023 Artemis CHP system model, ExMC leveraged existing data and models from the Moon to Mars Program Office, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) and the Orion, Gateway, Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility (EHP) and Human Landing System (HLS) programs. By using a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach, existing requirements, functions, and concepts of operations were combined to create a single system model focused on representing CHP from the launch to the return to Earth segments of the Artemis III and IV missions. Additionally, by incorporating the HRP Systems Platform for Aggregating and Relating Capabilities, or SPARC tool, the data from the programs was also related back to the 2nd volume of the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standard (NASA-STD-3001, Vol.2) and the human system risks identified by the Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The first version of the 2023 Artemis CHP system model was baselined in Fall of 2023 after the model was demonstrated to be a potentially useful tool for systems engineers integrating CHP capabilities in vehicle development as well as members of the Health and Medical Technical Authority providing oversight of those programs. The model may also be useful to any stakeholder of astronaut health and performance by providing insights on how an Artemis mission satisfies the NASA Human Health, Medical, and Performance Spaceflight Standards as well as how they mitigate the HSRB Human System Risks. This presentation highlights how the model was developed and the possible benefits of the model. [1] NASA HRP (2022), Crew Health and Performance System Whitepaper

Systems engineering↗

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Research Operations and Integration Flight Session – Always Sweat the Small Stuff

Human research routinely involves elaborate operations with substantial hardware setup, such as functional MRIs, CT scans, ultrasounds, exercise sessions, and cardiac evaluations. These conspicuous operations garner most of our attention and, understandably, resources, but the unsung heroes of spaceflight human research often get by with little fanfare. The collection of human samples and surveys is often just as much of a challenge in terms of both planning and logistics. The samples and surveys are often collected or completed by the crew autonomously, with little to no oversight from science support staff, which puts them the most at risk for data loss. The Research Operations and Integration team will host an interactive session with audience participation to demonstrate the importance of the written communications and instructions that are provided to the astronauts. During this hands-on session, ROI will walk through the challenges faced to ensure astronaut subjects can successfully collect all the various samples (e.g., saliva, fecal, urine, and blood) that the human research community needs. The format will be part lecture and part game show intended to provide both an enlightening and fun session. As we often instruct the crew: “Don’t forget to arrive fasted and bring a list of all the medications you’ve taken in the past week.”

Cherie Morgan Oubre↗