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This slide presentation reviews the failure of the Helios solar aircraft failure. Included are pictures of the aircraft, inflight, and after the mishap, analysis of the root causes of the mishap, contributing factors, recommendations and lessons learned in respect to crew training, and assessing the level of risk.
In the course of defining the level of risks and mitigating the risks for exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit, NASA s Human Research Program (HRP) has identified the need for technology development in several areas. Long duration missions increase the risk of serious medical conditions due to limited options for return to Earth; no resupply; highly limited mass, power, volume; and communication delays. New space flight compatible medical capabilities required include: diagnostic imaging, oxygen concentrator, ventilator, laboratory analysis (saliva, blood, urine), kidney stone diagnosis & treatment, IV solution preparation and delivery. Maintenance of behavioral health in such an isolated, confined and extreme environment requires new sensory stimulation (e.g., virtual reality) technology. Unobtrusive monitoring of behavioral health and treatment methods are also required. Prolonged exposure to weightlessness deconditions bone, muscle, and the cardiovascular system. Novel exercise equipment or artificial gravity are necessary to prevent deconditioning. Monitoring of the degree of deconditioning is required to ensure that countermeasures are effective. New technologies are required in all the habitable volumes (e.g., suit, capsule, habitat, exploration vehicle, lander) to provide an adequate food system, and to meet human environmental standards for air, water, and surface contamination. Communication delays require the crew to be more autonomous. Onboard decision support tools that assist crew with real-time detection and diagnosis of vehicle and habitat operational anomalies will enable greater autonomy. Multi-use shield systems are required to provide shielding from solar particle events. The HRP is pursuing the development of these technologies in laboratories, flight analog environments and the ISS so that the human health and performance risks will be acceptable with the available resources.
On January 13, 2005, at approximately 1355, smoke was noticed on the 4th floor of D Tower in the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB). Subsequently, a 911 call was made, a fire alarm pull station was activated, and the VAB was evacuated. The source of the smoke was determined to be a fire on the Low Bay M/N section roof near the Launch Control Center (LCC) Crossover. Due to the high visibility of the mishap, the KSC Center Director appointed a Mishap Investigation Board. Damage to government property was limited to the roof and a small number of ceiling tiles that were damaged by the fire fighters during the response. At the time of the mishap, there were hazardous commodities in the VAB including Solid Rocket Motors (SRMs) with open grain due to Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) igniter inspections. The Board agrees with the SGS Fire Services' theory that large amounts of smoke concentrated in the VAB D Tower and moved downward into the cable tunnel. The Board determined the proximate cause of this incident to be torching. HRI was installing a torch applied roof membrane which resulted in the ignition of combustible materials under the membrane near a wooden roof expansion joint. The torch applied roofing method is a universally accepted safe industry practice when applied to non-combustible surfaces. The combination of an open flame torch and combustible materiaLs presents an increased level of risk even with skilled applicators. The addition of high winds to this combination results in a risk the Board thinks can not be adequately mitigated. An appropriate risk assessment and analysis must be performed on the proposed roofing method to be used on high visibility facilities which represent unique national assets even when using common industry practices for repair and modification. The Board identified three root causes which contributed to or created the proximate cause and, if eliminated or modified, would have prevented the mishap: 1. Combustible materials in existing roof system 2. Wind speed and direction 3. Inadequate fire watch technique. Two contributing factors were identified which may have contributed to the occurrence but, if eliminated or modified, would not have prevented the occurrence: 1. HRI rushed to dry in and seal the roof on January 13 because heavy rain was predicted for the next day 2. No guidance on torching in windy conditions A total of 17 significant observations were noted during this investigation, which could lead to another mishap, or increase the severity of a mishap, but were not contributing factors in this mishap.
This software evaluates the terrain within reach of a lander s robotic arm for dig hazards using a stereo pair of cameras that are part of the lander s sensor system. A relative level of risk is calculated for a set of dig sectors. There are two versions of this software; one is designed to run onboard a lander as part of the flight software, and the other runs on a PC under Linux as a ground tool that produces the same results generated on the lander, given stereo images acquired by the lander and downlinked to Earth. Onboard dig hazard assessment is accomplished by executing a workspace panorama command sequence. This sequence acquires a set of stereo pairs of images of the terrain the arm can reach, generates a set of candidate dig sectors, and assesses the dig hazard of each candidate dig sector. The 3D perimeter points of candidate dig sectors are generated using configurable parameters. A 3D reconstruction of the terrain in front of the lander is generated using a set of stereo images acquired from the mast cameras. The 3D reconstruction is used to evaluate the dig goodness of each candidate dig sector based on a set of eight metrics. The eight metrics are: 1. The maximum change in elevation in each sector, 2. The elevation standard deviation in each sector, 3. The forward tilt of each sector with respect to the payload frame, 4. The side tilt of each sector with respect to the payload frame, 5. The maximum size of missing data regions in each sector, 6. The percentage of a sector that has missing data, 7. The roughness of each sector, and 8. Monochrome intensity standard deviation of each sector. Each of the eight metrics forms a goodness image layer where the goodness value of each sector ranges from 0 to 1. Goodness values of 0 and 1 correspond to high and low risk, respectively. For each dig sector, the eight goodness values are merged by selecting the lowest one. Including the merged goodness image layer, there are nine goodness image layers for each stereo pair of mast images.
Since ~400 BC, when man first replicated flying behavior with kites, up until the turn of the 20th century, when the Wright brothers performed the first successful powered human flight, flight functions have become available to man via significant support from man-made structures and devices. Over the past 100 years or so, technology has enabled several flight functions to migrate to automation and/or decision support systems. This migration continues with the United States NextGen and Europe s Single European Sky (a.k.a. SESAR) initiatives. These overhauls of the airspace system will be accomplished by accommodating the functional capabilities, benefits, and limitations of technology and automation together with the unique and sometimes overlapping functional capabilities, benefits, and limitations of humans. This paper will discuss how a safe and effective migration of any flight function must consider several interrelated issues, including, for example, shared situation awareness, and automation addiction, or over-reliance on automation. A long-term philosophical perspective is presented that considers all of these issues by primarily asking the following questions: How does one find an acceptable level of risk tolerance when allocating functions to automation versus humans? How does one measure or predict with confidence what the risks will be? These two questions and others will be considered from the two most-discussed paradigms involving the use of increasingly complex systems in the future: humans as operators and humans as monitors.
Super Koropon primer (MB0125-055) plays a significant role in the corrosion protection of areas throughout the Orbiter. Because the Shuttle Program relies so heavily upon the performance of the Koropon primer, it is necessary to fully understand all aspects of the behavior of the coating. One area where little understanding of the Koropon primer still exists is the level of risk associated with age related degradation. Recently, efforts were undertaken to better understand the age life of the Koropon primer and to gain some insight into the aging process of this coating. In that study, an aluminum access panel from the Orbiter Enterprise was used to investigate the performance of the old Koropon film. A control panel was also used to study the performance of new Koropon coating. Preliminary investigations into the performance of aged Super Koropon primer indicated a significant decrease in corrosion protection. This investigation serves as an example of how Focused Ion Beam/Scanning Microscopy can be used to characterize the changes that occur as coatings age.
Model and simulation (MS) credibility is defined as, the quality to elicit belief or trust in MS results. NASA-STD-7009 [1] delineates eight components (Verification, Validation, Input Pedigree, Results Uncertainty, Results Robustness, Use History, MS Management, People Qualifications) that address quantifying model credibility, and provides guidance to the model developers, analysts, and end users for assessing the MS credibility. Of the eight characteristics, input pedigree, or the quality of the data used to develop model input parameters, governing functions, or initial conditions, can vary significantly. These data quality differences have varying consequences across the range of MS application. NASA-STD-7009 requires that the lowest input data quality be used to represent the entire set of input data when scoring the input pedigree credibility of the model. This requirement provides a conservative assessment of model inputs, and maximizes the communication of the potential level of risk of using model outputs. Unfortunately, in practice, this may result in overly pessimistic communication of the MS output, undermining the credibility of simulation predictions to decision makers. This presentation proposes an alternative assessment mechanism, utilizing results parameter robustness, also known as model input sensitivity, to improve the credibility scoring process for specific simulations.
The Orion EFT-1 heatshield suffered from two major certification challenges: First, the mechanical properties used in design were not evident in the flight hardware and second, the flight article itself cracked during fabrication. The combination of these events motivated the Orion Program to pursue an engineering-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as part of heatshield certification rationale. The PRA provided loss of Mission (LOM) likelihoods considering the probability of a crack occurring during the mission and the likelihood of subsequent structure over-temperature. The methods and input data for the PRA are presented along with a discussion of the test data used to anchor the results. The Orion program accepted an EFT-1 Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk of 1-in-160,000 due to in-mission Avcoat cracking based on the results of this analysis. Conservatisms in the result, along with future considerations for Exploration Missions (EM) are also addressed.
In 2014 a team at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) studied the feasibility of using active aerocapture to reduce the chemical Delta V requirements for inserting a small scientific satellite into Titan polar orbit. The scientific goals of the mission would be multi-spectral imaging and active radar mapping of Titan's surface and subsurface. The study objectives were to: (i) identify and select from launch window opportunities and refine the trajectory to Titan; (ii) study the aerocapture flight path and refine the entry corridor; (iii) design a carrier spacecraft and systems architecture; (iv) develop a scientific and engineering plan for the orbital portion of the mission. Study results include: (i) a launch in October 2021 on an Atlas V vehicle, using gravity assists from Earth and Venus to arrive at Titan in January 2031; (ii) initial aerocapture via an 8-km wide entry corridor to reach an initial 350X6000 km orbit, followed by aerobraking to reach a 350X1500 km orbit, and a periapse raise maneuver to reach a final 1500 km circular orbit; (iii) a three-part spacecraft system consisting of a cruise stage, radiator module, and orbiter inside a heat shield; (iv) a 22-month mission including station keeping to prevent orbital decay due to Saturn perturbations, with 240 Gb of compressed data returned. High-level issues identified include: (i) downlink capability - realistic downlink rates preclude the desired multi-spectral, global coverage of Titan's surface; (ii) power - demise of the NASA ASRG (Advanced Stirling Radioisotope Generator) program, and limited availability at present of MMRTGs (Multi-Mission Radioisotope Generators) needed for competed outer planet missions; (iii) thermal - external radiators must be carried to remove 4 kW of waste heat from MMRTGs inside the aeroshell, requiring heat pipes that pass through the aeroshell lid, compromising shielding ability; (iv) optical navigation to reach the entry corridor; (v) the NASA requirement of continuous critical event coverage for the orbiter, especially during the peak heating of the aerocapture when the radio link will be broken. In conclusion, although Titan aerocapture allows for considerable savings in propellant mass, this comes at a cost of increased mission complexity. Further architecture study and refinement is required to reduce high-level mission risks and to elucidate the optimum architecture.
Small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) have the potential for a large array of highly-beneficial applications. These applications are too numerous to comprehensively list, but include search and rescue, fire spotting, precision agriculture, etc. to name a few. Typically sUAS vehicles weigh less than 55 lbs and will be performing flight operations in the National Air Space (NAS). Certain sUAS applications, such as package delivery, will include operations in the close proximity of the general public. The full benefit from sUAS is contingent upon the resolution of several technological areas in order to provide an acceptable level of risk for widespread sUAS operations. Operations of sUAS vehicles pose risks to people and property on the ground as well as manned aviation. Several of the more significant sUAS technological areas include, but are not limited to: autonomous sense and avoid and deconfliction of sUAS from other sUAS and manned aircraft, communications and interfaces between the vehicle and human operators, and the overall reliability of the sUAS and constituent subsystems. While all of the technological areas listed contribute significantly to the safe execution of the sUAS flight operations, contingency or emergency systems can greatly contribute to sUAS risk mitigations to manage situations where the vehicle is in distress. The Safe2Ditch (S2D) system is an autonomous crash management system for sUAS. Its function is to enable sUAS to execute emergency landings and avoid injuring people on the ground, damaging property, and lastly preserving the sUAS and payload. A sUAS flight test effort was performed to test the integration of sub-elements of the S2D system with a representative sUAS multi-rotor.
This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.
In recognition of the increasing prospects for Earth-like exoplanet discoveries and its significance for spurring future interstellar voyages of discovery, the United States Congress recently directed NASA to undertake an interstellar mission technology assessment report. In response to this legislative charge to action, NASA has undertaken a series of extramural interstellar workshops aimed at identifying and evaluating technology concepts for enabling an interstellar scientific probe mission, associated technical challenges, technology readiness level assessments, risks, potential near-term milestones, and funding requirements. This paper summarizes these activities and discusses the scientific and technical rationale for a long-term program consisting of incremental, staged technical developments that are extensible for interstellar travel to a nearby star system over many decades.
Emerging Advanced Air Mobility(AAM)operations will be enabled by increasingly autonomous systems, requiring technologies to take on more responsibilities and fundamentally altering traditional human-automation interaction paradigms. The growing reliance on higher levels of automation will necessitate research to identify capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machines working and thinking better together, i.e., human-autonomy teaming (HAT). Trust is an inherent requirement in effective teams because when members work interdependently, those agents (human, automation) must be willing to accept a level of risk to rely upon each other to reach goals and contribute to team tasks. This work provides an initial approach to enabling AAM operations through appropriate trust within HAT. The main contributions of this approach resides in connecting the construct of trust to mental models. Using the outlined mental model approach, we propose novel HAT strategies, such as Adaptive Trust Calibration, and preview planned research activities derived from this approach. Additionally, we propose several practical applications that can currently be employed by AAM development communities.
• NASA SCaN Program plans to pursue commercial services for communications with Spacecrafts in near-earth Orbit • The Communications Services Project (CSP) formulated at GRC to establish partnerships with commercial SATCOM companies to develop and demonstrate the feasibility of providing SATCOM capabilities that could be offered as a service for future spacecraft users • CSP pursued an Announcement of Proposals (AFP) in 2021 • Awarded 6 industry vendors out of 14 (~ $278 million) • Viasat, SES Government Solutions, SpaceX; Kuiper Government Solutions (KGS), Telesat U.S. Services, Inmarsat Government. (4 RF and 2 Optical) • AFP’s objectives to develop and demonstrate end-to-end operational capabilities that could meet the needs of Government and private sector customers and maximize interoperability between them. • NASA completed assessment and analysis of the 6 industry proposals. • Results identified optimal portfolio that best meet AFP’s Objectives when considering capability coverage, risk spread, levels of confidence, U.S. domestic market stimulation, price and NASA budget.
Trust is expected to be a critical construct that drives successful use of advanced air mobility (AAM) technologies. As yet, though, the role of trust in human-autonomy interaction is underexplored. Kaber (2018) argues that autonomy requires the highest level of three independent dimensions -- viability, independence, and self-governance. The present study examined whether trust varies across the three dimensions of autonomy under varying levels of risk. Participants in the high-risk group read a series of vignettes on a drone that delivers medical supplies over a city where the current study was conducted. Participants in the low-risk group read a series of vignettes on a drone that delivers fast food over a fictitious city. Each vignette described a drone that is either autonomous (i.e., possesses all dimensions) or automated (i.e., one of the dimensions is compromised). Results imply that the three dimensions of autonomy do not equally influence human-technology trust and behavior.
An exploratory human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to investigate and characterize a Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Assistant to support a remote operator of multiple small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) using a ground control station (GCS) in the context of a wildland fire surveillance mission. Operator performance using the GCS with the HAT Assistant (Assisted Mode) was compared to operator performance using the GCS without the HAT Assistant (Unassisted Mode) during two types of contingency-event scenarios (Low and High Complexity). In the Assisted Mode, the HAT Assistant provided updates to the level of risk to the mission along with recommendations for risk mitigation, which were not provided in the Unassisted Mode. No significant differences in objective performance and subjective ratings of workload, situation awareness, and trust in automation between the Assisted and Unassisted Modes were detected, however there were indications that participants preferred the Assisted GCS over the Unassisted GCS and directions for further development were explored. Additional work is necessary to further refine the HAT Assistant and better characterize its effects on remote operator performance while managing multiple sUAS assets. Future work is recommended to optimize the implementation of an assistant to support operator performance during different missions and across vehicle classes.
An exploratory human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted to investigate and characterize a Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) Assistant to support a remote operator of multiple small Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (sUAS) using a ground control station (GCS) in the context of a wildland fire surveillance mission. Operator performance using the GCS with the HAT Assistant (Assisted Mode) was compared to operator performance using the GCS without the HAT Assistant (Unassisted Mode) during two types of contingency-event scenarios (Low and High Complexity). In the Assisted Mode, the HAT Assistant provided updates to the level of risk to the mission along with recommendations for risk mitigation, which were not provided in the Unassisted Mode. No significant differences in objective performance and subjective ratings of workload, situation awareness, and trust in automation between the Assisted and Unassisted Modes were detected, however there were indications that participants preferred the Assisted GCS over the Unassisted GCS and directions for further development were explored. Additional work is necessary to further refine the HAT Assistant and better characterize its effects on remote operator performance while managing multiple sUAS assets. Future work is recommended to optimize the implementation of an assistant to support operator performance during different missions and across vehicle classes
Space sustainability is crucial for the continuation of humanity's exploration and utilization of space. NASA recognizes the imperative of maintaining a sustainable space operating environment to safeguard the future of space activities. On April 9, 2024, NASA released its first part of an integrated Space Sustainability Strategy focused on the domain of earth orbit, with future volumes to address impacts of space operations on earth itself; cislunar space, including the Lagrange points and the lunar surface; and deep space, including other celestial bodies. This commitment extends to ensuring the safety of astronauts conducting operations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), as well as enabling missions to the Moon and Mars. Moreover, sustainable space practices are essential for the uninterrupted operation of NASA's robotic science missions, which monitor Earth's changes and probe the mysteries of the universe. The strategy sets out a set of goals, the first of which is to establish a framework for assessing space sustainability at NASA, addressing the absence of a universally accepted framework with key metrics that promotes understanding of how metrics are interconnected. This framework will provide a basis for evaluating the sustainability of orbital activities, with metrics informed by input from the domestic and international space community. Objectives under this goal include defining key parameters affecting space sustainability, determining tolerable levels of risk, and annually publishing NASA's effect on space sustainability, including compliance with orbital debris mitigation standards. The subsequent goals build upon this foundation, identifying effective actions for enhancing space sustainability, incentivizing adoption of these actions through technology development and policy changes, and ensuring coordination with the global space community. An organizational change within NASA is also proposed to facilitate day-to-day coordination and accountability for space sustainability efforts. By pursuing these goals, NASA aims to strengthen the technical foundations of and continue to set an example for sustainable space operations. Regular evaluation of NASA mission performance in context with meeting sustainability objectives will ensure alignment with evolving challenges in the space operating environment.