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NASA NTRS2009

Modeling Unsteady Cavitation and Dynamic Loads in Turbopumps

A computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model that includes representations of effects of unsteady cavitation and associated dynamic loads has been developed to increase the accuracy of simulations of the performances of turbopumps. Although the model was originally intended to serve as a means of analyzing preliminary designs of turbopumps that supply cryogenic propellant liquids to rocket engines, the model could also be applied to turbopumping of other liquids: this can be considered to have been already demonstrated, in that the validation of the model was performed by comparing results of simulations performed by use of the model with results of sub-scale experiments in water. The need for this or a similar model arises as follows: Cavitation instabilities in a turbopump are generated as inlet pressure drops and vapor cavities grow on inducer blades, eventually becoming unsteady. The unsteady vapor cavities lead to rotation cavitation, in which the cavities detach from the blades and become part of a fluid mass that rotates relative to the inducer, thereby generating a fluctuating load. Other instabilities (e.g., surge instabilities) can couple with cavitation instabilities, thereby compounding the deleterious effects of unsteadiness on other components of the fluid-handling system of which the turbopump is a part and thereby, further, adversely affecting the mechanical integrity and safety of the system. Therefore, an ability to predict cavitation- instability-induced dynamic pressure loads on the blades, the shaft, and other pump parts would be valuable in helping to quantify safe margins of inducer operation and in contributing to understanding of design compromises. Prior CFD models do not afford this ability. Heretofore, the primary parameter used in quantifying cavitation performance of a turbopump inducer has been the critical suction specific speed at which head breakdown occurs. This parameter is a mean quantity calculated on the basis of assumed steady-state operation of the inducer; it does not account for dynamic pressure loads associated with unsteady flow caused by instabilities. Because cavitation instabilities occur well before mean breakdown in inducers, engineers have, until now, found it necessary to use conservative factors of safety when analyzing the results of numerical simulations of flows in turbopumps.

Hosangadi, Ashvin↗

NASA NTRS2010

Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

Jaap, John↗

NASA NTRS1981

On-board computer progress in development of A 310 flight testing program

Onboard computer progress in development of an Airbus A 310 flight testing program is described. Minicomputers were installed onboard three A 310 airplanes in 1979 in order to: (1) assure the flight safety by exercising a limit check of a given set of parameters; (2) improve the efficiency of flight tests and allow cost reduction; and (3) perform test analysis on an external basis by utilizing onboard flight types. The following program considerations are discussed: (1) conclusions based on simulation of an onboard computer system; (2) brief descriptions of A 310 airborne computer equipment, specifically the onboard universal calculator (CUB) consisting of a ROLM 1666 system and visualization system using an AFIGRAF CRT; (3) the ground system and flight information inputs; and (4) specifications and execution priorities for temporary and permanent programs.

Reau, P.↗

NASA NTRS1982

Energy efficient engine combustor test hardware detailed design report

The combustor for the Energy Efficient Engine is an annular, two-zone component. As designed, it either meets or exceeds all program goals for performance, safety, durability, and emissions, with the exception of oxides of nitrogen. When compared to the configuration investigated under the NASA-sponsored Experimental Clean Combustor Program, which was used as a basis for design, the Energy Efficient Engine combustor component has several technology advancements. The prediffuser section is designed with short, strutless, curved-walls to provide a uniform inlet airflow profile. Emissions control is achieved by a two-zone combustor that utilizes two types of fuel injectors to improve fuel atomization for more complete combustion. The combustor liners are a segmented configuration to meet the durability requirements at the high combustor operating pressures and temperatures. Liner cooling is accomplished with a counter-parallel FINWALL technique, which provides more effective heat transfer with less coolant.

Zeisser, M. H.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Terrain Safety Assessment in Support of the Mars Science Laboratory Mission

In August 2012, the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) mission will pioneer the next generation of robotic Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL) systems by delivering the largest and most capable rover to date to the surface of Mars. The process to select the MSL landing site took over five years and began with over 50 initial candidate sites from which four finalist sites were chosen. The four finalist sites were examined in detail to assess overall science merit, EDL safety, and rover traversability on the surface. Ultimately, the engineering assessments demonstrated a high level of safety and robustness at all four finalist sites and differences in the assessment across those sites were small enough that neither EDL safety nor rover traversability considerations could significantly discriminate among the final four sites. Thus the MSL landing site at Gale Crater was selected from among the four finalists primarily on the basis of science considerations.

Kipp, Devin↗

NASA NTRS2014

Fault Management Design Strategies

Development of dependable systems relies on the ability of the system to determine and respond to off-nominal system behavior. Specification and development of these fault management capabilities must be done in a structured and principled manner to improve our understanding of these systems, and to make significant gains in dependability (safety, reliability and availability). Prior work has described a fundamental taxonomy and theory of System Health Management (SHM), and of its operational subset, Fault Management (FM). This conceptual foundation provides a basis to develop framework to design and implement FM design strategies that protect mission objectives and account for system design limitations. Selection of an SHM strategy has implications for the functions required to perform the strategy, and it places constraints on the set of possible design solutions. The framework developed in this paper provides a rigorous and principled approach to classifying SHM strategies, as well as methods for determination and implementation of SHM strategies. An illustrative example is used to describe the application of the framework and the resulting benefits to system and FM design and dependability.

systems engineering↗

NASA NTRS2005

Taking the Risk Out of Risk Assessment

The ability to understand risks and have the right strategies in place when risky events occur is essential in the workplace. More and more organizations are being confronted with concerns over how to measure their risks or what kind of risks they can take when certain events transpire that could have a negative impact. NASA is one organization that faces these challenges on a daily basis, as effective risk management is critical to the success of its missions especially the Space Shuttle missions. On July 29, 1996, former NASA Administrator Daniel Goldin charged NASA s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance with developing a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) tool to support decisions on the funding of Space Shuttle upgrades. When issuing the directive, Goldin said, "Since I came to NASA [in 1992], we've spent billions of dollars on Shuttle upgrades without knowing how much they improve safety. I want a tool to help base upgrade decisions on risk." Work on the PRA tool began immediately. The resulting prototype, the Quantitative Risk Assessment System (QRAS) Version 1.0, was jointly developed by NASA s Marshall Space Flight Center, its Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, and researchers at the University of Maryland. QRAS software automatically expands the reliability logic models of systems to evaluate the probability of highly detrimental outcomes occurring in complex systems that are subject to potential accident scenarios. Even in its earliest forms, QRAS was used to begin PRA modeling of the Space Shuttle. In parallel, the development of QRAS continued, with the goal of making it a world-class tool, one that was especially suited to NASA s unique needs. From the beginning, an important conceptual goal in the development of QRAS was for it to help bridge the gap between the professional risk analyst and the design engineer. In the past, only the professional risk analyst could perform, modify, use, and perhaps even adequately understand PRA. NASA wanted to change this by developing a PRA tool that would be friendlier, more understandable, and more useful to the broader engineering community. This concept ultimately led to the look, feel, and functionality that QRAS has today.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS1973

Space shuttle sortie payload crew safety and systems compatibility criteria. Volume 1: Executive summary

As part of the effort to reduce the costs of shuttle payloads, this study was performed to determine the minimum, mandatory design and verification criteria necessary to insure that sortie payloads are compatible with the space shuttle system; distinguishing them from those criteria related primarily to mission success, configuration choices, management prerogatives, or other cost-benefit variables which are, therefore, discretionary to payload project management. It was concluded that utilization of the mandatory design criteria, presented in this report, as the basis for sortie payload specifications will produce basic systems compatibility between the orbiter and its sortie payloads at reduced costs. Also, when additional criteria are generated due to changes in subsystems, designs, or guidelines, the categorization methodology developed can aid managerial decision-making concerning these criteria. To a limited degree, the compatibility criteria as defined in this study reflect a portion of the total system safety effort involved in a manned space program.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRS2013

Preliminary Recommendations for the Collection, Storage, and Analysis of UAS Safety Data

Although the use of UASs in military and public service operations is proliferating, civilian use of UASs remains limited in the United States today. With efforts underway to accommodate and integrate UASs into the NAS, a proactive understanding of safety issues, i.e., the unique hazards and the corresponding risks that UASs pose not only through their operations for commercial purposes, but also to existing operations in the NAS, is especially important so as to (a) support the development of a sound regulatory basis, (b) regulate, design and properly equip UASs, and (c) effectively mitigate the risks posed. Data, especially about system and component failures, incidents, and accidents, provides valuable insight into how performance and operational capabilities/limitations contribute to hazards. Since the majority of UAS operations today take place in a context that is significantly different from the norm in civil aviation, i.e., with different operational goals and standards, identifying that which constitutes useful and sufficient data on UASs and their operations is a substantial research challenge.

Safety Data↗

NASA NTRS1996

Statistical Process Control for KSC Processing

The 1996 Summer Faculty Fellowship Program and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) served as the basis for a research effort into statistical process control for KSC processing. The effort entailed several tasks and goals. The first was to develop a customized statistical process control (SPC) course for the Safety and Mission Assurance Trends Analysis Group. The actual teaching of this course took place over several weeks. In addition, an Internet version of the same course complete with animation and video excerpts from the course when it was taught at KSC was developed. The application of SPC to shuttle processing took up the rest of the summer research project. This effort entailed the evaluation of SPC use at KSC, both present and potential, due to the change in roles for NASA and the Single Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC). Individual consulting on SPC use was accomplished as well as an evaluation of SPC software for KSC use in the future. A final accomplishment of the orientation of the author to NASA changes, terminology, data format, and new NASA task definitions will allow future consultation when the needs arise.

Ford, Roger G.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Flight Testing of the Space Launch System (SLS) Adaptive Augmenting Control (AAC) Algorithm on an F/A-18

The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Flight Mechanics and Analysis Division developed an adaptive augmenting control (AAC) algorithm for launch vehicles that improves robustness and performance on an as-needed basis by adapting a classical control algorithm to unexpected environments or variations in vehicle dynamics. This was baselined as part of the Space Launch System (SLS) flight control system. The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to partner with the SLS Program and the Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) Game Changing Development Program (GCDP) to flight test the AAC algorithm on a manned aircraft that can achieve a high level of dynamic similarity to a launch vehicle and raise the technology readiness of the algorithm early in the program. This document reports the outcome of the NESC assessment.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Proof-Carrying Code with Correct Compilers

In the late 1990s, proof-carrying code was able to produce machine-checkable safety proofs for machine-language programs even though (1) it was impractical to prove correctness properties of source programs and (2) it was impractical to prove correctness of compilers. But now it is practical to prove some correctness properties of source programs, and it is practical to prove correctness of optimizing compilers. We can produce more expressive proof-carrying code, that can guarantee correctness properties for machine code and not just safety. We will construct program logics for source languages, prove them sound w.r.t. the operational semantics of the input language for a proved-correct compiler, and then use these logics as a basis for proving the soundness of static analyses.

Appel, Andrew W.↗

NASA NTRS1982

Experimental stress analysis of a thin-walled pressurized torus loaded by contact with a plane

It is pointed out that pneumatic tires have a large effect on the overall landing characteristics of an aircraft. The dynamic response upon landing and steering are crucial to the safety of the vehicle and the occupants. The present investigation has the objective to compare experimentally determined strains on an inner tube in contact with a flat plate with numerical values obtained on the basis of a finite element prediction, taking into account an employment of the Structural Analysis of General Shells (STAGS). The obtained results suggest that the clamped boundary condition utilized in the STAGS calculation is not exactly simulated by the employed test setup.

Hill, D. E.↗

NASA NTRS1993

Development and use of computational techniques in Army Aviation research and development programs for crash resistant helicopter technology

During the 1960's over 30 full-scale aircraft crash tests were conducted by the Flight Safety Foundation under contract to the Aviation Applied Technology Directorate (AATD) of the U.S. Army Aviation Systems Command (AVSCOM). The purpose of these tests were to conduct crash injury investigations that would provide a basis for the formulation of sound crash resistance design criteria for light fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft. This resulted in the Crash Survival Design Criteria Designer's Guide which was first published in 1967 and has been revised numerous times, the last being in 1989. Full-scale aircraft crash testing is an expensive way to investigate structural deformations of occupied spaces and to determine the decelerative loadings experienced by occupants in a crash. This gave initial impetus to the U.S. Army to develop analytical methods to predict the dynamic response of aircraft structures in a crash. It was believed that such analytical tools could be very useful in the preliminary design stage of a new helicopter system which is required to demonstrate a level of crash resistance and had to be more cost effective than full-scale crash tests or numerous component design support tests. From an economic point of view, it is more efficient to optimize for the incorporation of crash resistance features early in the design stage. However, during preliminary design it is doubtful if sufficient design details, which influence the exact plastic deformation shape of structural elements, will be available. The availability of simple procedures to predict energy absorption and load-deformation characteristics will allow the designer to initiate valuable cost, weight, and geometry tradeoff studies. The development of these procedures will require some testing of typical specimens. This testing should, as a minimum, verify the validity of proposed procedures for providing pertinent nonlinear load-deformation data. It was hoped that through the use of these analytical models, the designer could optimize aircraft design for crash resistance from both a weight and cost increment standpoint, thus enhancing the acceptance of the design criteria for crash resistance.

Burrows, Leroy T.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Using Risk Assessment Methodologies to Meet Management Objectives

Current decision making involves numerous possible combinations of technology elements, safety and health issues, operational aspects and process considerations to satisfy program goals. Identifying potential risk considerations as part of the management decision making process provides additional tools to make more informed management decision. Adapting and using risk assessment methodologies can generate new perspectives on various risk and safety concerns that are not immediately apparent. Safety and operational risks can be identified and final decisions can balance these considerations with cost and schedule risks. Additional assessments can also show likelihood of event occurrence and event consequence to provide a more informed basis for decision making, as well as cost effective mitigation strategies. Methodologies available to perform Risk Assessments range from qualitative identification of risk potential, to detailed assessments where quantitative probabilities are calculated. Methodology used should be based on factors that include: 1) type of industry and industry standards, 2) tasks, tools, and environment 3) type and availability of data and 4) industry views and requirements regarding risk & reliability. Risk Assessments are a tool for decision makers to understand potential consequences and be in a position to reduce, mitigate or eliminate costly mistakes or catastrophic failures.

DeMott, D. L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Identified Risks of Adverse Outcomes Due to Inadequate Human Systems Integration Architecture in Human Spaceflight

The NASA Human System Risk Board (HSRB) has the overall responsibility for tracking the evolution of the top ~30 human system risks that it has identified to be associated with human spaceflight. As part of this process, the Board is charged with maintaining a consistent, integrated process to mitigate those risks, and developing evidence-based risk posture recommendations. One of the identified risks is due to inadequate human systems integration architecture (HSIA) and a driving factor of this risk is that given decreasing real-time ground support for execution of complex operations during future exploration missions, there is a possibility of adverse performance outcomes including that crew are unable to adequately respond to unanticipated critical malfunctions or detect safety critical procedural errors. The HSRB uses Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) as a communication tool for describing how astronaut exposure to spaceflight hazards leads to meaningful mission-level health and performance outcomes and as the basis for understanding intermediate causal relationships between risk contributing factors and countermeasures that link hazards to outcomes. The HSIA risk DAG will be presented and described. Historically, critical malfunctions requiring Crew/MCC management occurred at a rate of 1.7 times per year for ISS averaged over the lifetime and 3-4 times per year in the burn in phase for the vehicle. These averages do not include EVA data, which greatly increases the incident rate. Prior experience from the Apollo program showed 10/11 crewed missions experienced significant anomalies where crew relied heavily on MCC expertise in real-time. These failure patterns are in line with those observed in other complex engineered systems (e.g., oil rigs, launch systems, commercial aviation, etc.) It is likely that general malfunction and error rates are > 10% for short duration missions (<30 days), based on past and current spaceflight operations data. Likelihood of adverse outcomes has the potential to increase as crew conduct work with new, complex systems and with less ground support. For Low Earth Orbit missions and Lunar missions less than 30 days, assuming minimal comm delays, disruptions and bandwidth limitations, malfunctions and errors can affect mission objectives and crew health but may be mitigated by ground support. For Lunar missions greater than 30 days and any potential Mars mission malfunctions and errors can have Loss of Crew and Loss of Mission consequences due to reduced ground support (communication delays, constraints and blackouts) for more complex operations, as well as reduced resupply and evacuation options.

Daniel M Buckland↗

NASA NTRS1982

Single pilot IFR accident data analysis

The aircraft accident data recorded and maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board for 1964 to 1979 were analyzed to determine what problems exist in the general aviation single pilot instrument flight rules environment. A previous study conducted in 1978 for the years 1964 to 1975 provided a basis for comparison. The purpose was to determine what changes, if any, have occurred in trends and cause-effect relationships reported in the earlier study. The increasing numbers have been tied to measures of activity to produce accident rates which in turn were analyzed in terms of change. Where anomalies or unusually high accident rates were encountered, further analysis was conducted to isolate pertinent patterns of cause factors and/or experience levels of involved pilots. The bulk of the effort addresses accidents in the landing phase of operations. A detailed analysis was performed on controlled/uncontrolled collisions and their unique attributes delineated. Estimates of day vs. night general aviation activity and accident rates were obtained.

Harris, D. F.↗