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Audit Report on "The Office of Science's Management of Information Technology Resources"

The Department of Energy's Office of Science (Science) and its facility contractors are aggressive users of information technology (IT) to support fundamental research in areas such as energy, environmental remediation and computational sciences. Of its $4 billion Fiscal Year 2008 budget, Science spent about $287 million to manage its IT program. This included cyber security activities, acquisition of hardware and software, and support service costs used to maintain the operating environments necessary to support the missions of the program. Prior Office of Inspector General reports have identified various issues with Science's management of its IT programs and resources. For instance, our report on Facility Contractor Acquisition and Management of Information Technology Hardware (DOE/IG-0768, June 2007) noted that the Science sites reviewed spent more than necessary when acquiring IT hardware. In another example, our review of The Department's Efforts to Implement Common Information Technology Services at Headquarters (DOE/IG-0763, March 2007) disclosed that Science's reluctance to adopt the Department of Energy Common Operating Environment (DOE-COE) at Headquarters contributed to the Department's inability to fully realize potential cost savings through consolidation and economies of scale. In light of the magnitude of the Office of Science IT program and previously identified program weaknesses, we initiated this audit to determine whether Science adequately managed its IT resources. Science had taken a number of actions to improve its cyber security posture and align its program to Federal requirements. Yet, our review disclosed that it had not taken some basic steps to enhance security and reduce costs. In particular, we found that: (1) For their non-scientific computing environments, all seven of the field sites reviewed (two Federal, five contractor) had implemented security configurations that were less stringent than those included in the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. This configuration was designed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology and its use was mandated by the Office of Management and Budget; (2) Although we previously highlighted weaknesses and recommended corrective actions, Science still had not fully established or enforced IT hardware standards for acquiring hardware such as desktop and laptop computers or related peripherals, contributing to significant unnecessary expenditures; and (3) While we have noted in a series of past reports that significant savings could be realized from aggregating demand for IT services and products across the enterprise, Science had not implemented a common infrastructure for users at its Federal sites and continued to maintain an IT environment independent of the Department's Common IT Operating Environment. The weaknesses identified were attributable, at least in part, to a lack of adequate policies and procedures for ensuring effective cyber security and hardware acquisition practices. In addition, Science had not effectively monitored the performance of its field sites to ensure that previously reported internal control weaknesses were addressed and had not implemented an appropriate mechanism to track its IT-related costs. Without improvements, Science may be unable to realize the benefits of improved security over its information systems, reduce costs associated with hardware acquisition, and lower IT support costs through consolidation of services. In particular, we determined that Science could potentially realize savings of more than $3.3 million over the next three years by better controlling hardware costs and implementing standards for certain equipment. Furthermore, Science could continue to pay for duplicative IT support services and fail to take advantage of opportunities to lower costs and apply potential savings to mission-related work. During the course of our audit work, we learned from Science officials that they had initiated the process of revising the Program Cyber Security Plan to better clarify its policy for implementing Federal cyber security requirements. In addition, we noted that the Oak Ridge National Laboratory had taken action to establish and enforce hardware standards on both its administrative and scientific workforce. Although these actions are positive steps, additional action is needed to strengthen Science's IT program. To that end, our report contains several recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help Science improve the management of its IT resources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Biosequence-based Approach to Software Characterization

For many applications, it is desirable to have some process for recognizing when software binaries are closely related without relying on them to be identical or have identical segments. Some examples include monitoring utilization of high performance computing centers or service clouds, detecting freeware in licensed code, and enforcing application whitelists. But doing so in a dynamic environment is a nontrivial task because most approaches to software similarity require extensive and time-consuming analysis of a binary, or they fail to recognize executables that are similar but nonidentical. Presented herein is a novel biosequence-based method for quantifying similarity of executable binaries. Using this method, it is shown in an example application on large-scale multi-author codes that 1) the biosequence-based method has a statistical performance in recognizing and distinguishing between a collection of real-world high performance computing applications better than 90% of ideal; and 2) an example of using family tree analysis to tune identification for a code subfamily can achieve better than 99% of ideal performance.

cyber security↗

Graphs, matrices, and the GraphBLAS: Seven good reasons

The analysis of graphs has become increasingly important to a wide range of applications. Graph analysis presents a number of unique challenges in the areas of (1) software complexity, (2) data complexity, (3) security, (4) mathematical complexity, (5) theoretical analysis, (6) serial performance, and (7) parallel performance. Implementing graph algorithms using matrix-based approaches provides a number of promising solutions to these challenges. The GraphBLAS standard (istcbigdata.org/GraphBlas) is being developed to bring the potential of matrix based graph algorithms to the broadest possible audience. The GraphBLAS mathematically defines a core set of matrix-based graph operations that can be used to implement a wide class of graph algorithms in a wide range of programming environments. This paper provides an introduction to the GraphBLAS and describes how the GraphBLAS can be used to address many of the challenges associated with analysis of graphs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Overview of the MCNP6® SQA Plan and Requirements [Memorandum]

For all X Computational Physics Division (XCP) software under the Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapons Physics (ALDX), the Weapons Research Services Secure Networks and Assurance Group (WRS-SNA) manages the software quality assurance (SQA) plan, requirements and guidance with respect to development processes and tools to meet the broader LANL SQA requirements. Each XCP software product is categorized into one of three software types: Safety Software, Non-Safety Risk Significant Software, and Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software. In 2018, using LANL Form 2033, the MCNP6 code was categorized by the XCP division as Non-Safety Commercially Controlled Software, provided in Appendix A. Using WRSFORM- 0001U, the MCNP6 code was graded as a Medium Impact software product, provided in Appendix B. Given these determinations, the WRS-AD-0010U SQA plan is followed for all MCNP6 developments, documentation and code releases.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Simple, Secure, Internet Delivery of MOOSE-based Applications

Application packaging and distribution are the final steps for delivering software to end-users; both are frequently neglected when creating scientific software. Commercial businesses rely on electronic distribution systems that have rendered disk drives obsolete. Still, national laboratories continue to rely heavily on removable media to distribute and limit access to controlled applications. With increasing concerns of unauthorized copying of sensitive applications, a modern distribution system that utilizes cryptographically secure communication and authentication protocols has been developed. This new distribution system will secure the chain of custody for nuclear software while simultaneously simplifying access to these tools. This report summarizes four primary advancements made toward the secure distribution of Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS)-developed, Multiphysics Object Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE)-based applications: application installation, package distribution, automated package building, and distribution of documentation. NEAMS is currently developing more than ten separate applications based on the open-source MOOSE Framework. Distribution of these applications has primarily been accomplished by distributing source code, with end-users compiling the applications themselves. This work created a mechanism where MOOSE applications can be installed in a similar way to any other software. This allows both administrators and end-users simplified access to runnable executables. With this new installation capability, it was then possible to rethink distribution. A new, secure capability for delivering MOOSE-based applications over the internet has been created. This system requires unique cryptographic tokens for authentication, greatly securing the custody chain for software. Once granted access, installation of any NEAMS code can be accomplished with these terminal commands: "conda install ncrc" "ncrc install ncrc-bison." After these two commands (and authenticating) the BISON application will be securely down- loaded from Idaho National Laboratory (INL)’s servers, installed, and ready to use. To enable this new distribution capability to be successful, the open-source Continuous Integration, Verification, Enhancement, and Testing (CIVET) Continuous Integration (CI) capability was augmented to add Continuous Delivery (CD). CD enables the automated building and packaging of MOOSE-based applications as they are modified by development teams, ensuring that our customers can obtain up-to-date versions of the software at any time. The need for instruction on how to use these applications was addressed through modifications to the MOOSE documentation system. The MooseDocs capability, which enables robust documentation of MOOSE-based applications, has been extended to allow both for the installation of documentation and the packaging of documentation with installed applications. Together, these enhancements form the core of a new, secure distribution mechanism for nuclear simulation tools. In concert with the Nuclear Computational Resource Center (NCRC), NEAMS- developed applications will now be straightforward to obtain securely.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

RAMSeS: Rapid Analysis of Mission Software Systems

Over the past few decades, software has become ubiquitous as it has been integrated into nearly every aspect of society, including household appliances, consumer electronics, industrial control systems, public utilities, government operations, and military systems. Consequently, many critical national security questions can no longer be answered convincingly without understanding software, including its purpose, its capabilities, its flaws, its communication, or how it processes and stores data. As software continues to become larger, more complex, and more widespread, our ability to answer important mission questions and reason about software in a timely way is falling behind. Today, to achieve such understanding of third-party software, we rely predominantly on the ability of reverse engineering experts to manually answer each particular mission question for every software system of interest. This approach often requires heroic human effort that nevertheless fails to meet current mission needs and will never scale to meet future needs. The result is an emerging crisis: a massive and expanding gap between the national security need to answer mission questions about software and our ability to do so. Sandia National Laboratories has established the Rapid Analysis of Mission Software Systems (RAMSeS) effort, a collaborative long-term effort aimed at dramatically improving our nation’s ability to answer mission questions about third-party software by growing an ecosystem of tools that augment the human reverse engineer through automation, interoperability, and reuse. Focusing on static analysis of binary programs, we are attempting to identify reusable software analysis components that advance our ability to reason about software, to automate useful aspects of the software analysis process, and to integrate new methodologies and capabilities into a working ecosystem of tools and experts. We aim to integrate existing tools where possible, adapt tools when modest modifications will enable them to interoperate, and implement missing capability when necessary. Although we do hope to automate a growing set of analysis tasks, we will approach this goal incrementally by assisting the human in an ever-widening range of tasks.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

SD-WAN Evaluation Criteria for a Defense Information Systems Network Expeditionary Customer Edge

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) has identified a service provision gap midway between the capacity and capability of a Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) transport Edge Points of Presence (POP) and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Enterprise Classified Travel Kit (DECTK). Some deployed force 100-user Tactical Operations Centers are in field locations far removed from the DISN transport core, in challenging environmental conditions with limitations on space, weight, power, and cooling for network equipment. As part of a multi-phase project, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) will gather and analyze requirements, design, develop, prototype, and test a miniaturized and ruggedized DISN Customer Edge POP scaled to support approximately 100 users in a field Tactical Operations Center. An Expeditionary Customer Edge (ECE) will be more suitable for field deployment than a DISN transport Edge POP, using ruggedized hardware and network function virtualization (NFV) to operate in challenging field environmental conditions, plus reduce weight, power, and cooling requirements. A key enabling technology for ECE is Software Defined Wide Area Networking (SD-WAN). This document provides: • A brief overview of SD-WAN use cases and how they apply to ECE • How SD-WAN technology compares to existing networks like DISN that use Optical Transport Networking (OTN) and Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) • SD-WAN functional requirements relevant to ECE • A description of an ECE Virtual Prototype, including simulated wide area network paths and a DISN-representative implementation of MPLS, in Cisco Modeling Labs • Detailed network flow walkthroughs • Evaluation criteria based on ECE-relevant SD-WAN functional requirements Finally, an appendix provides an informal evaluation of Speedify—a commercial retail Virtual Private Network service—against the ECE SD-WAN evaluation criteria.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Report on a 2009 mini-demonstration of the ARG-US Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) system in transportation.

The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM), Office of Packaging and Transportation (EM-14), has developed a radio frequency identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring system for the management of nuclear materials during storage and transportation. The system, developed by the PCP team at Argonne National Laboratory, consists of hardware (Mk-series sensor tags, fixed and handheld readers, form factor for multiple drum types, seal integrity sensors, and enhanced battery management), software (application programming interface, ARG-US software for local and remote/web applications, secure server and database management), and cellular/satellite communication interfaces for vehicle tracking and item monitoring during transport. The ability of the above system to provide accurate, real-time tracking and monitoring of the status of multiple, certified containers of nuclear materials has been successfully demonstrated in a week-long, 1,700-mile DEMO performed in April 2008. While the feedback from the approximately fifty (50) stakeholders who participated in and/or observed the DEMO progression were very positive and encouraging, two major areas of further improvements - system integration and web application enhancement - were identified in the post-DEMO evaluation. The principal purpose of the MiniDemo described in this report was to verify these two specific improvements. The MiniDemo was conducted on August 28, 2009. In terms of system integration, a hybrid communication interface - combining the RFID item-monitoring features and a commercial vehicle tracking system by Qualcomm - was developed and implemented. In the MiniDemo, the new integrated system worked well in reporting tag status and vehicle location accurately and promptly. There was no incompatibility of components. The robust commercial communication gear, as expected, helped improve system reliability. The MiniDemo confirmed that system integration is technically feasible and reliable with the existing RFID and Qualcomm satellite equipment. In terms of web application, improvements in mapping, tracking, data presentation, and post-incident spatial query reporting were implemented in ARG-US, the application software that manages the dataflow among the RFID tags, readers, and servers. These features were tested in the MiniDemo and found to be satisfactory. The resulting web application is both informative and user-friendly. A joint developmental project is being planned between the PCP and the DOE TRANSCOM that uses the Qualcomm gear in vehicles for tracking and communication of radioactive material shipments across the country. Adding an RFID interface to TRANSCOM is a significant enhancement to the DOE infrastructure for tracking and monitoring shipments of radioactive materials.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Monte Carlo Simulation with CAD Interface for Calculation of 3D Maps of Residual Dose (CRADA)

Objective: To develop an easy-to-use software application to predict and mitigate radiation effects in research environment, space instruments, nuclear plants and medical facilities and help nonproliferation and national security efforts. Tech-X will develop standalone software libraries and command-line tools for ( 1) translating CAD into tessellated surfaces and tetrahedral meshes in GDML (for Geant4 and MARS 15), ROOT (for MARS 15) and HDF5 (for compact representation and for the visualization) formats, (2) healing CAD geometries to make them suitable for Monte Carlo simulations; (3) creating uniform and variable Cartesian and cylindrical meshes for detailed scoring; and ( 4) efficient Monte Carlo navigation in CAD geometries. JLAB will finish automation of simulations of residual dose in CAD geometries and integrate Tech-X software into Geant4 and MARS15. Finally, Tech-X will develop a Graphical User Interface to set up and heal CAD geometries, create input files, run and visualize simulations for residual dose. This application will run on local desktops, local and remote clusters and supercomputers and will be made available through public clouds, such as Amazon Web Services.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Testing contamination source identification methods for water distribution networks

In the event of contamination in a water distribution network (WDN), source identification (SI) methods that analyze sensor data can be used to identify the source location(s). Knowledge of the source location and characteristics are important to inform contamination control and cleanup operations. Various SI strategies that have been developed by researchers differ in their underlying assumptions and solution techniques. The following manuscript presents a systematic procedure for testing and evaluating SI methods. The performance of these SI methods is affected by various factors including the size of WDN model, measurement error, modeling error, time and number of contaminant injections, and time and number of measurements. This paper includes test cases that vary these factors and evaluates three SI methods on the basis of accuracy and specificity. The tests are used to review and compare these different SI methods, highlighting their strengths in handling various identification scenarios. These SI methods and a testing framework that includes the test cases and analysis tools presented in this paper have been integrated into EPA’s Water Security Toolkit (WST), a suite of software tools to help researchers and others in the water industry evaluate and plan various response strategies in case of a contamination incident. Lastly, a set of recommendations are made for users to consider when working with different categories of SI methods.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DISARM: Target Electronic Device Informed Mitigation of Software Runtime Side-Channel Vulnerabilities

Program runtime/timing attacks exploit variations in a program’s execution times to extract sensitive information from the program (e.g. encryption keys, sensitive variable data, intellectual property). State-of-the-art solutions to runtime side-channel attacks attempt to balance the execution time of the sensitive code for different control flow paths to eliminate the timing leakage. However, during the mitigation process, most techniques do not consider the underlying hardware/device on which the target program is supposed to run on. This can lead to over-fixing (unnecessary extra operations), under-fixing (not solving the imbalance properly), and even failures. Here, we propose DISARM, a joint hardware-software methodology (unlike any existing solution) for mitigating runtime side-channel vulnerabilities that utilizes timing values from real embedded devices to generate targeted software fixes. We implement DISARM to support C/C++/Java source codes and validate it across 22 standard benchmarks. DISARM outperforms state-of-the-art solutions such as PENDULUM and DifFuzzaR in terms of execution time overhead, code size overhead, and correctness on five different embedded/edge devices.

Timing/runtime side-channel↗

Los Alamos National Security, LLC Request for Information on how industry may partner with the Laboratory on KIVA software.

KIVA is a family of Fortran-based computational fluid dynamics software developed by LANL. The software predicts complex fuel and air flows as well as ignition, combustion, and pollutant-formation processes in engines. The KIVA models have been used to understand combustion chemistry processes, such as auto-ignition of fuels, and to optimize diesel engines for high efficiency and low emissions. Fuel economy is heavily dependent upon engine efficiency, which in turn depends to a large degree on how fuel is burned within the cylinders of the engine. Higher in-cylinder pressures and temperatures lead to increased fuel economy, but they also create more difficulty in controlling the combustion process. Poorly controlled and incomplete combustion can cause higher levels of emissions and lower engine efficiencies.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

StructuredFuzzer: Fuzzing Structured Text-Based Control Logic Applications

Rigorous testing methods are essential for ensuring the security and reliability of industrial controller software. Fuzzing, a technique that automatically discovers software bugs, has also proven effective in finding software vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, fuzzing has been applied to a wide range of platforms, including programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, current approaches, such as coverage-guided evolutionary fuzzing implemented in the popular fuzzer American Fuzzy Lop Plus Plus (AFL++), are often inadequate for finding logical errors and bugs in PLC control logic applications. They primarily target generic programming languages like C/C++, Java, and Python, and do not consider the unique characteristics and behaviors of PLCs, which are often programmed using specialized programming languages like Structured Text (ST). Furthermore, these fuzzers are ill suited to deal with complex input structures encapsulated in ST, as they are not specifically designed to generate appropriate input sequences. This renders the application of traditional fuzzing techniques less efficient on these platforms. To address this issue, this paper presents a fuzzing framework designed explicitly for PLC software to discover logic bugs in applications written in ST specified by the IEC 61131-3 standard. The proposed framework incorporates a custom-tailored PLC runtime and a fuzzer designed for the purpose. We demonstrate its effectiveness by fuzzing a collection of ST programs that were crafted for evaluation purposes. We compare the performance against a popular fuzzer, namely, AFL++. The proposed fuzzing framework demonstrated its capabilities in our experiments, successfully detecting logic bugs in the tested PLC control logic applications written in ST. On average, it was at least 83 times faster than AFL++, and in certain cases, for example, it was more than 23,000 times faster.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Management of Control System Information SecurityI: Control System Patch Management

The use of information technologies in control systems poses additional potential threats due to the frequent disclosure of software vulnerabilities. The management of information security involves a series of policy-making on the vulnerability discovery, disclosure, patch development and patching. In this paper, we use a system approach to devise a model to understand the interdependencies of these decision processes. In more details, we establish a theoretical framework for making patching decision for control systems, taking into account the requirement of functionability of control systems. We illustrate our results with numerical simulations and show that the optimal operation period of control systems given the currently estimated attack rate is roughly around a half a month.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

CORE (Common Operating Response Environment) Software Technology Suite

Agencies that oversee complex, multi-stakeholder programs need efficient, secure ways to link people and knowledge within and across organizations. The Common Operating Response Environment (CORE), a software suite developed by PNNL researchers does just that. The CORE tool—which is customizable for a multitude of uses—facilitates situational awareness by integrating diverse data streams without the need to reformat them, summarizing that information, and providing users with the information they need to rapidly understand and appropriately respond to situations. It is mobile device-ready, has a straightforward interface for ease of use across organizations and skill sets, and is incredibly configurable to the needs of each specific user, whether they require data summaries for high-level decision makers or tactical maps, operational data, or weather information for responders in the field. Information can be input into CORE and queried in a variety of ways—using customized forms, reports, visuals, or other organizational templates—according to the needs of each user’s organization, teams, and business processes. CORE data forms, for instance, could be accessed and used in real-time to capture information about vessels being inspected for nuclear material.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The Many Faces of a Software Engineer in a Research Community

The ability to gather, analyze and make decisions based on real world data is changing nearly every field of human endeavor. These changes are particularly challenging for software engineers working in a scientific community, designing and developing large, complex systems. To avoid the creation of a communications gap (almost a language barrier), the software engineers should possess an ‘adaptive’ skill. In the science and engineering research community, the software engineers must be responsible for more than creating mechanisms for storing and analyzing data. They must also develop a fundamental scientific and engineering understanding of the data. This paper looks at the many faces that a software engineer should have: developer, domain expert, business analyst, security expert, project manager, tester, user experience professional, etc. Observations made during work on a power-systems scientific software development are analyzed and extended to describe more generic software development projects.

agile methodologies↗

Operation Request Gatekeeper: A software system for remote access control of diagnostic instruments in fusion experiments

Tokamak diagnostic settings are repeatedly modified to meet the changing needs of each experiment. Enabling the remote diagnostic control has significant challenges due to security and efficiency requirements. The Operation Request Gatekeeper (ORG) is a software system that addresses the challenges of remotely but securely submitting modification requests. The ORG provides a framework for screening all the requests before they enter the secure machine zone and are executed by performing user authentication and authorization, grammar validation, and validity checks. A prototype ORG was developed for the ITER CODAC that satisfies their initial requirements for remote request submission and has been tested with remote control of the KSTAR Plasma Control System. This paper describes the software design principles and implementation of ORG as well as worldwide test results.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Finite Energy and Bounded Attacks on Control System Sensor Signals

Control system networks are increasingly being connected to enterprise level networks. These connections leave critical industrial controls systems vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Most of the effort in protecting these cyber-physical systems (CPS) has been in securing the networks using information security techniques and protection and reliability concerns at the control system level against random hardware and software failures. However, besides these failures the inability of information security techniques to protect against all intrusions means that the control system must be resilient to various signal attacks for which new analysis and detection methods need to be developed. In this paper, sensor signal attacks are analyzed for observer-based controlled systems. The threat surface for sensor signal attacks is subdivided into denial of service, finite energy, and bounded attacks. In particular, the error signals between states of attack free systems and systems subject to these attacks are quantified. Optimal sensor and actuator signal attacks for the finite and infinite horizon linear quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the corresponding cost functions are computed. The closed-loop system under optimal signal attacks are provided. Illustrative numerical examples are provided together with an application to a power network with distributed LQ controllers.

Cyber-physical↗