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Nuclear Safety via Commercial Grade Dedication - Hitting the Right Target - 12163

S.A.Technology has developed and implemented a highly effective Commercial Grade Dedication program that has been used to qualify a variety of equipment to the rigorous requirements of ASTM NQA-1. In specific cases, S.A.Technology personnel have worked closely with clients to develop complex Commercial Grade Dedication plans that satisfy the scrutiny of the US Department of Energy. These projects have been as simple as Passive Mechanical systems, and as complicated as Active Mechanical and Electrical systems. S.A.Technology's Commercial Grade Dedication plans have even been used as presentation materials to a client's internal departments encompassing Engineering, Quality and Procurement. This is the new target of today's CGD: exposing the reasoning behind the dedication process. Previously, only test and inspection results were expected. Today's CGD now needs to show how the decisions presented are the right decisions to make. We must be willing to undergo the process of learning how each new piece of equipment is affected by the system it is placed into, as well as understanding how that equipment can affect the system itself. It is a much more complicated and time-consuming endeavor to undertake. On top of it all, we must be able to voice those discoveries and rationalizations in a clear and concise manner. Unless we effectively communicate our intentions to the reader, we will not be understood. If researched correctly and presented properly, today's Commercial Grade Dedication plans will answer the appropriate questions before they are asked. (authors)

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Review of Potential Candidate Stabilization Technologies for Liquid and Solid Secondary Waste Streams

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has initiated a waste form testing program to support the long-term durability evaluation of a waste form for secondary wastes generated from the treatment and immobilization of Hanford radioactive tank wastes. The purpose of the work discussed in this report is to identify candidate stabilization technologies and getters that have the potential to successfully treat the secondary waste stream liquid effluent, mainly from off-gas scrubbers and spent solids, produced by the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Down-selection to the most promising stabilization processes/waste forms is needed to support the design of a solidification treatment unit (STU) to be added to the Effluent Treatment Facility (ETF). To support key decision processes, an initial screening of the secondary liquid waste forms must be completed by February 2010.

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Investigations of Dual-Purpose Canister Direct Disposal Feasibility (FY14)

Results reported here continue to support the FY13 conclusion that direct disposal of DPCs is technically feasible, at least for some DPCs, and for some disposal concepts (geologic host media). Much of the work performed has reached a point where site-specific information would be needed for further resolution. Several activities in FY14 have focused on clay/shale media because of potential complications resulting from low thermal conductivity, limited temperature tolerance, and the need to construct hundreds of kilometers of emplacement drifts that will remain stable for at least 50 years. Technologies for rapid excavation and liner installation have significantly advanced in the past 20 years. Tunnel boring machines are the clear choice for large-scale excavation. The first TBM excavations, including some constructed in clay or shale media, are now approaching 50 years of service. Open-type TBMs are a good choice but the repository host formation would need to have sufficient compressive strength for the excavation face to be self-supporting. One way to improve the strength-stress relationship is to reduce the repository depth in soft formations (e.g., 300 m depth). The fastest construction appears to be possible using TBMs with a single-pass liner made of pre-fabricated concrete segments. Major projects have been constructed with prefabricated segmented liner systems, and with cast-in-place concrete liners. Cost comparisons show that differences in project management and financing may be larger cost factors than the choice of liner systems. Costs for large-scale excavation and construction in clay/shale media vary widely but can probably be limited to $10,000 per linear meter, which is similar to previous estimates for repository construction. Concepts for disposal of DPC-based waste packages in clay/shale media are associated with thermal management challenges because of the relatively low thermal conductivity and limited temperature tolerance. Peak temperature limits of 100°C or lower for clay-rich materials have been selected by some international programs, but a limit above 100°C could help to shorten the duration of surface decay storage and repository ventilation. The effects of locally higher peak temperatures on repository performance need to be evaluated (in addition to the effects at lower temperatures). This report describes a modeling approach that couples the TOUGH2 and FLAC3D codes to represent thermally driven THM processes, as a demonstration of the types of models needed.

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FIRST INTERIM STATUS REPORT: MODEL 9975 LIFE EXTENSION PACKAGE TESTING

Three 9975 packages have been instrumented and exposed to bounding storage conditions to help identify the extent to which laboratory test results for fiberboard, O-rings and other components apply within a full-scale package. To date, changes observed in the fiberboard overpack and Oring seals are generally consistent with the behavior of laboratory samples. The lead shield within each package has developed a corrosion layer of lead carbonate, consistent with other 9975 packages. However, the morphology of the corrosion layer is different within these packages, possibly as a result of the severity of the conditioning environments beyond normal service conditions. Conditioning of the second package, LE2, has been discontinued due to the degree of degradation of the fiberboard, and its components have received a final examination. Additional testing will be performed on samples removed from the fiberboard assembly to verify its final condition. The other two packages will continue in test. This is an interim status report for experiments carried out per Task Technical Plan WSRC-TR-2005-00014 [1], which is part of the comprehensive 9975 package surveillance program [2]. The primary goal of this task is to validate aging models currently under development based on lab scale testing of the fiberboard overpack and containment vessel O-rings. A secondary goal is to examine the behavior of the lead shielding under bounding conditions. This task provides an integrated assessment of the package response to environmental extremes, and demonstrates the extent to which data from small samples scale up to a full package. Three 9975 packages have been modified to provide instrumentation for monitoring package response and performance to environmental aging. Each package has a different environmental exposure history.

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Deployment of Performance Management Methodology as part of Liquid Waste Program at Savannah River Site - 12178

In 2009, Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR) assumed the management lead of the Liquid Waste (LW) Program at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The four SRR partners and AREVA, as an integrated subcontractor are performing the ongoing effort to safely and reliably: - Close High Level Waste (HLW) storage tanks; - Maximize waste throughput at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF); - Process salt waste into stable final waste form; - Manage the HLW liquid waste material stored at SRS. As part of these initiatives, SRR and AREVA deployed a performance management methodology based on Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) at the DWPF in order to support the required production increase. This project took advantage of lessons learned by AREVA through the deployment of Total Productive Maintenance and Visual Management methodologies at the La Hague reprocessing facility in France. The project also took advantage of measurement data collected from different steps of the DWPF process by the SRR team (Melter Engineering, Chemical Process Engineering, Laboratory Operations, Plant Operations). Today the SRR team has a standard method for measuring processing time throughout the facility, a reliable source of objective data for use in decision-making at all levels, and a better balance between engineering department goals and operational goals. Preliminary results show that the deployment of this performance management methodology to the LW program at SRS has already significantly contributed to the DWPF throughput increases and is being deployed in the Saltstone facility. As part of the liquid waste program on Savannah River Site, SRR committed to enhance production throughput of DWPF. Beyond technical modifications implemented at different location of the facility, SRR deployed performance management methodology based on OEE metrics. The implementation benefited from the experience gained by AREVA in its own facilities in France. OEE proved to be a valuable tool in order to support the enhancement program in DWPF by providing unified metrics to measure plant performances, identify bottleneck location, and rank the most time consuming causes from objective data shared between the different groups belonging to the organization. Beyond OEE, the Visual Management tool adapted from the one used at La Hague were also provided in order to further enhance communication within the operating teams. As a result of all the initiatives implemented on DWPF, achieved production has been increased to record rates from FY10 to FY11. It is expected that thanks to the performance management tools now available within DWPF, these results will be sustained and even improved in the future to meet system plan targets. (authors)

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BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Acquisition and Testing to Support DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project

The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) within the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) campaign to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The SFWST program was created within SFWD to address issues of extended or long-term SNF storage and transportation. Some near-term objectives of SFWST are to use a science-based, engineering-driven approach to: Support the enhancement of the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure dry storage of SNF for extended periods; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for retrieving SNF after extended dry storage; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for transporting high burnup (HBU) fuel and transporting low burnup fuel and HBU fuel after dry storage DOE-NE, in partnership with the Electric Power Research Institute, developed the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project to perform a large-scale demonstration and laboratory-scale testing of HBU pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium [GWd/MTU]). Under this project, 25 sister rods—which are rods that have the same design, power histories, and other characteristics—were removed from assemblies at the North Anna Nuclear Power Station and sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in January 2016. ORNL performed detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) on all 25 rods. The NDE consisted of visual examinations, gamma and neutron scanning, profilometry and rod length measurements, and eddy current examinations. After completing the NDE, 10 of the sister rods were delivered to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a NAC International, Inc. legal-weight truck cask in September 2018 for destructive examination (DE). To date, SFWD work has focused on the PWR fuel that is part of the Sister Rod Test program. No boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel has been tested in the program, and the data needs that were identified for the PWR fuel have not been collected for BWR fuel. The goal to obtain six to nine BWR rods and test them at ORNL will support closing this important data gap. BWR fuel comprises approximately 56% of the total fuel assemblies currently in storage at nuclear power plants in the United States. BWR nuclear fuel and cladding designs and manufacturing are significantly different from PWRs. Differences include the following: BWR fuel pellets are larger than PWR pellets; Variations of Zircaloy-2 (including liners) are used instead of the Zircaloy-4 cladding materials used in PWRs; Clad manufacturing and stress-relief processes are different between PWRs and BWRs; The fuel rod dimensions are different because larger rod diameters and thicker cladding are used in BWRs; BWR fuel typically has lower internal rod pressures and sees vastly different operating conditions than PWR fuel (i.e., two-phase flow); BWR assemblies are “canned,” meaning each assembly is surrounded by a metal fuel channel; BWR cladding is often composed of an inner pure Zr liner that has widely different mechanical properties than the Zircaloy-2 alloy and exhibits a stronger affinity for hydrogen; The BWR SNF generally has more total hydrogen in the cladding/liner than typical PWR fuel; The construction of the PWR and BWR assemblies is vastly different; BWR rods are solidly attached to the assembly nozzles and experience a much different vibration and shock load than PWR rods, which are “floating” within a grid system attached to guide tubes, and the rods sit loosely on the bottom end plates. These numerous differences will affect the way the BWR SNF responds under dry storage preparation processes (e.g., vacuum drying) and during transportation. The results collected in the PWR experimental program must be compared with a subset of similar data collected on BWR SNF to establish a technical basis for whether the larger PWR database is sufficient to bound the BWR SNF end-of-life conditions as is currently assumed for several fuel/clad properties. Changes that occur in both fuel types at HBU could exacerbate any mechanical property differences. As the fuel burnup increases, several changes occur that might affect the performance of the fuel, cladding, and assembly hardware in storage and transportation. These changes include increased cladding corrosion layer thickness, increased cladding hydrogen content, increased cladding creep strains, increased fission gas release, and the formation of the HBU structure at the surface of the fuel pellets. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the current maximum rod-averaged burnup to 62 GWd/MTU due to these changes and the lack of data at higher burnups.

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Corrosion Evaluation for Tank 241-AP-106 Re-purposing

Tank AP-106 will be an integral part of the Direct Feed Low Activity Waste (DF-LAW) activity. This tank is an underground, carbon steel, double shell tank (DST). Before it can be utilized, the Cs-137 concentration levels in the waste must be reduced significantly. The AP-106 re-purposing process will manage normal waste tank additions procedures such that waste acceptance criteria objectives for Cs-137 removal are achieved. As this process was being developed, concerns regarding tank integrity during and after the process to Tank AP-106 and associated tanks (i.e., AP-102, AN-101, and AP-108) were addressed. The degradation mechanisms identified include: general and pitting corrosion, caustic stress corrosion cracking, galvanic corrosion, and microbiologically induced corrosion (MIC). Recommendations were provided to minimize the exposure of the tank to corrosive conditions (see Section 6.0). These recommendations included chemistry adjustments at defined steps in the process that will maintain the waste in compliance with the corrosion control program. Additionally, sampling and inspection (see Sections 6.0 and 7.0, respectively) recommendations that will assess the final condition of the tank environment and the tank were presented. The greatest risk for this process involves the handling of large quantities of Columbia River water (i.e., greater than 450,000 gallons) within the AP-106, associated tanks and supporting infrastructure (i.e., transfer line piping). As long as this water is blended into the supernate in a timely fashion, and the waste is adjusted appropriately with corrosion inhibitors, the final condition is expected to be within compliance. Recommendations were also made to address process interruptions that could result in exposure of the tank walls to aggressive conditions.

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Coupling Big Data Analytics and Reactive Transport Modeling for Cost-effective Groundwater Monitoring - 17163

This study presents an innovative approach for sustainable and cost-effective groundwater monitoring. This approach takes advantage of recent advances in various technologies: (1) in situ autonomous sensors, (2) big data analytics, and (3) parallel high-performance computing for flow and reactive transport modeling. In situ sensors are used to periodically measure the key variables (such as pH, redox potential, electrical conductivity, and groundwater level), which control contaminant mobility and the plume spatial and temporal distribution. Based on a limited number of groundwater sampling, the data analytics methods-data mining and machine learning-allow us to identify and quantify the correlations between the in situ-measured variables and contaminant concentrations, and also to detect significant changes associated with the plume mobility. In addition, a state-of-the-art parallel numerical flow and reactive transport simulator Amanzi, and uncertainty quantification software Agni are used to provide an improved physical and mechanistic understanding of the contaminated groundwater system behavior, and to predict the long-term plume distribution for optimizing and adapting the monitoring strategy. Amanzi and Agni were developed as part of the Advanced Simulation Capability for Environmental Management (ASCEM) program of the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Such modeling is critical, particularly, for assessing the impact of climate change and associated hydrological shifts. The developed approach is expected to significantly reduce the groundwater sampling frequency and associated cost. In addition, the real-time information on plume mobility serves as an early warning system, improving the resiliency of contaminated or potentially contaminated sites. We demonstrate this approach using as an example the Savannah River Site (SRS) F-Area, where groundwater is contaminated by various radionuclides, including uranium, tritium and technetium. (authors)

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Analysis of Tank 30H (HTF-30-18-54, -55), Tank 32H (HTF-32-18-56, -57), and Tank 37H (HTF-37-18-58, -59) Samples for Support of the Evaporator Feed Qualification and Corrosion Control Programs for the 3H-Evaporator

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 30H, Tank 32H, and Tank 37H to support the Evaporator Feed Qualification and Corrosion Control Programs for the 3H-Evaporator system. The six samples from Tanks 30H, 32H, and 37H all contain highly concentrated salt solution s with sodium concentrations ranging from 7.89 M to 15.0 M. The samples from Tank 30H show small differences in the concentrations of the major cations and anions between the surface sample and VDS. The two Tank 32H samples show significant differences in the concentrations of the major anions and cations with the VDS being nearly twice as concentrated as the surface sample. The surface sample and VDS from Tank 37H contain very similar compositions.

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Annual Site Environmental Report, 2007(ASER)

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year (CY) of 2007 at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that span the calendar year, i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2007/2008 (October 2007 through May 2008), are also included. Production of an annual site environmental report (ASER) is a requirement established by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for all management and operating (M&O) contractors throughout the DOE complex. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423 and DOE Order 450.1, 'Environmental Protection Program', SLAC effectively implemented and integrated the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2007, SLAC focused on development and implementation of SLAC management systems to ensure continual improvement. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13148. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. SLAC continues to demonstrate significant progress in implementing and integrating EMS into day-to-day operations at SLAC. The annual management review and ranking of environmental aspects were completed this year by SLAC's EMS Steering Committee, the Environmental Safety Committee (ESC) and thirteen objectives and targets were established for 2007. For each objective and target, a work plan, or Environmental Management Program (EMP) was completed and progress reports were routinely provided to SLAC senior management. During 2007, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued during 2007. SLAC replaced two process tanks at the Plating Shop which previously contained chromium solutions with non-chromium containing solutions, reducing the overall use of hazardous chemicals. In addition, 346 polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated capacitors were replaced with non-PCB capacitors, reducing the potential of a release of oil with PCBs during an event such as a fire or an earthquake. SLAC operates its industrial and sanitary wastewater management program in compliance with established permit conditions. During 2007, SLAC obtained a new facility-wide wastewater discharge permit which replaced four separate permits that were previously issued to SLAC. In 2007, no radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC has implemented programs and systems to ensure compliance with all radiological requirements related to the environment. Specifically, the Radiation Protection Radiological Waste Management (RPRWM) Group developed a training course to certify Radioactive Waste Generators, conducted a training pilot, and developed a list of potential radioactive waste generators to train. In 2007, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil. SLAC is regulated under a site cleanup requirements order (board order) issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), San Francisco Bay Region in May 2005 for the investigation and remediation of impacted soil and groundwater at SLAC. The board order lists specific tasks and deadlines for completion of groundwater and soil characterization and other remediation activities. All 2007 submittals to the RWQCB were completed and submitted on time.

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Assessing Technological Readiness and Maturity on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

There are many challenges in the design and construction of Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford site. The plant is being built to process some 53 million gallons of radioactive waste from 177 underground tanks. Engineering and construction are progressing on this largest project in the DOE complex. The technologies employed to accomplish the waste processing and immobilization have undergone various levels of development over a number of years. In some cases, the treatment approach involves extrapolation or novel applications of existing technologies. Because of the time schedule for the WTP, it is desirable, in some cases, to mature the technologies in parallel with design and construction. From the outset, the project plan has included an assessment and adjustment of the performance and design of the key technologies through an extensive research and testing program. This paper describes two review programs pioneered on WTP to further assess the technical readiness and maturity of the design: an External Flowsheet Review process and a Technology Readiness Assessment process. Although the results of the two reviews have a good degree of similarity, the two approaches differed in a number of ways and therefore allowed some issues to surface in one review and not in the other. It is concluded that the two reviews provide greater confidence to DOE on the readiness to proceed with design, fabrication, and construction and that the facilities will function as performed. (authors)

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Analysis of Tank 38H (HTF-38-22-31, -32) and Tank 43H (HTF-43-22-33, -34) Samples for Support of the Enrichment Control and Corrosion Control Programs

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 38H and Tank 43H to support ECP and CCP. The results indicate the concentrations of most soluble species in the Tank 38H surface sample increased from the previous surface sample. The Tank 38H sub-surface sample shows changes in concentration for soluble species in the solution with some increasing and some decreasing. The current Tank 38H sub-surface sample contains less sludge solids than the previous sample based on visual appearance. The small differences in the concentrations of major components between the Tank 38H surface and sub-surface samples indicate only minimal stratification of solution species within the tank.

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The role of acceptable knowledge in transuranic waste disposal operations - 11117

The Acceptable Knowledge (AK) process plays a key role in the delineation of waste streams destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). General Electric's Vallecitos Nuclear Center (GEVNC) provides for an ideal case study of the application of AK in a multiple steward environment. In this review we will elucidate the pivotal role Acceptable Knowledge played in segregating Department of Energy (DOE) responsibilities from a commercial facility. The Acceptable Knowledge process is a necessary component of waste characterization that determines whether or not a waste stream may be considered for disposal at the WIPP site. This process may be thought of as an effort to gain a thorough understanding of the waste origin, chemical content, and physical form gleaned by the collection of documentation that concerns generator/storage site history, mission, and operations; in addition to waste stream specific information which includes the waste generation process, the waste matrix, the quantity of waste concerned, and the radiological and chemical make up of the waste. The collection and dissemination of relevant documentation is the fundamental requirement for the AK process to work. Acceptable Knowledge is the predominant process of characterization and, therefore, a crucial part of WIPP's transuranic waste characterization program. This characterization process, when conducted to the standards set forth in WIPP's operating permit, requires confirmation/verification by physical techniques such as Non-Destructive Examination (NDE), Visual Examination (VE), and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA). These physical characterization techniques may vary in their appropriateness for a given waste stream; however, nothing will allow the substitution or exclusion of AK. Beyond the normal scope of operations, AK may be considered, when appropriate, a surrogate for the physical characterization techniques in a procedure that appeals to concepts such As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and budgetary savings. This substitution is referred to as an Acceptable Knowledge Sufficiency Determination. With a Sufficiency Determination Request, AK may supplant the need for one or all of the physical analysis methods. This powerful procedure may be used on a scale as small as a single container to that of a vast waste stream. Only under the most stringent requirements will an AK Sufficiency Determination be approved by the regulators and, to date, only six such Sufficiency Determinations have been approved. Although Acceptable Knowledge is legislated into the operational procedures of the WIPP facility there is more to it than compliance. AK is not merely one of a long list of requirements in the characterization and verification of transuranic (TRU) waste destined for the WIPP. Acceptable Knowledge goes beyond the regulatory threshold by offering a way to reduce risk, cost, time, and uncertainty on its own laurels. Therefore, AK alone can be argued superior to any other waste characterization technique.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 2, July-December 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 195 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part III: Chernobyl Source Term Release Dynamics and Reconstruction of Events During the Active Phase, A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 218 Second ANS Workshop on the Safety of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants, R. A. Bari; 234 Elements of a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, C. M. Hopper; 243 Rickover, Excellence, and Criticality Safety Programs, R. E. Wilson; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 249 Transient Analysis of the PIUS Advanced Reactor Design with the TRAC-PF1/MOD2 Code, B. E. Boyack, J. L Steiner, S. C. Harmony, H. J. Stumpf, and J. F. Lime; 278 The Hierarchy-By-Interval Approach to Identifying Important Models that Need Improvement in Severe-Accident Simulation Codes, T. J. Heames, M. Khatib-Rahbar, J. E. Kelly, R. P. Jenks-Johnson, and Y.-S. Chen; 290 RELAP5/MOD3 Code Coupling Model, R. P. Martin; 299 Missiles Caused by Severe Pressurized-Water Reactor Accidents, R. Krieg; DESIGN FEATURES: 310 Validation of COMMIX with Westinghouse AP-600 PCCS Test Data, J. G. Sun, T. H. Chien, J. Ding, and W T. Sha; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 321 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization for a Bounding Reference Assembly for the Receiving Basin for Off-Site Fuel, S. D. Kahook, R. L. Garrett, L. R. Canas, and M J. Beckum; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 332 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 335 Reactor Coolant System Blowdown at Wolf Creek on September 17, 1994, J. V. Kauffman and S. L. Israel; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 344 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Oueener; 349 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1995; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 320 Symposium on Acceptability of Risk From Radiation—Application to Manned Space Flight; 320 24th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference; 361 Radiation Biology and Radiation Protection— Modern Developments and Tendencies in Radiation Biology; 362 1997 IEEE Sixth Conference on Human Factors and Power Plants; 354 The Authors; 360 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 36.

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Annual Site Environmental Report: 2008 (ASER) for the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year of 2008 at the SLAC National Accelerator Laboratory (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that span the calendar year, i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2008/2009 (October 2008 through May 2009), are also included. Production of an annual site environmental report (ASER) is a requirement established by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for all management and operating (M&O) contractors throughout the DOE complex. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423, Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, and DOE Order 450.1A, Environmental Protection Program, SLAC effectively implements and integrates the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2008, SLAC continued to improve its management systems. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13423 and DOE Orders 450.1A and 430.2B. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. SLAC continues to demonstrate significant progress in implementing and integrating EMS into day-to-day operations and construction activities at SLAC. The annual management review and ranking of environmental aspects were completed this year by SLAC's EMS Steering Committee, the Environmental Safety Committee (ESC), and twelve objectives and targets were established for 2008. For each objective and target, a work plan, or Environmental Management Program (EMP) was completed and progress reports were routinely provided to SLAC senior management and the DOE SLAC Site Office (SSO). During 2008, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued during the year. The following are amongst SLAC's environmental accomplishments for 2008: a composting program at SLAC's onsite cafeteria was initiated, greater than 800 cubic feet of legacy radioactive waste were packaged and shipped from SLAC, a chemical redistribution program was developed, SLAC reduced the number of General Services Administration leased vehicles from 221 to 164, recycling of municipal waste was increased by approximately 140 tons during 2008, and site-wide releases of sulfur hexafluoride were reduced by 50 percent. In 2008, no radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC has implemented programs and systems to ensure compliance with all radiological requirements related to the environment. Specifically, the Radiation Protection Radiological Waste Management Group developed a training course to certify Radioactive Waste Generators, conducted a training pilot, and developed a list of potential radioactive waste generators to train. Twenty eight generators were trained in 2008. As a best management practice, SLAC also reduced its tritium inventory by at least 95 percent by draining one of its accelerator cooling water systems; with the cooperation of the South Bayside System Authority, the West Bay Sanitary District and the DOE, SLAC discharged the cooling water to the sanitary sewer according to federal regulations and replenished the system with clean water. In 2008, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program personnel continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil. SLAC is regulated under a site cleanup requirements order (board order) issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), San Francisco Bay Region in May 2005 for the investigation and remediation of impacted soil and groundwater at SLAC. The board order lists specific tasks and deadlines for completion of groundwater and soil characterization and other remediation activities. All 2008 submittals to the RWQCB were completed and submitted on time.

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Results of a Strategic Assessment of NRC's Low-Level Radioactive Waste Program

NRC recently completed a strategic assessment of its low-level radioactive waste (LLW) regulatory program. In this paper, we provide the results of this assessment - a prioritized list of activities for our LLW program in the next several years - along with a description of the circumstances that required us to undertake this assessment and the process we used. We obtained ideas from a wide variety of stakeholders on activities we could undertake, and we evaluated them in light of our overall strategic objectives for ensuring safety and security, as well as a number of other factors. We ranked 7 of the 20 activities evaluated as high priority. Their completion in the next several years will help to ensure that LLW will continue to be managed and disposed of safely and securely. (authors)

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Remotely controlled manipulators using tele-robotic software provide enhanced efficiency and ergonomy for work in hot cells - 15101

Computer aid and electrical assistance have been applied to remote manipulation inside hostile environments. A heavy duty master/slave manipulator system, the MT200, has been updated with the addition of an electronic bay with specialized software, a motion module and a poly-articulated master arm. This is the result of an ambitious 20-year continuous improvement program undertaken by the French nuclear institutions, CEA LIST Interactive Robotics Unit and AREVA in order to improve ergonomics, safety and efficiency at the AREVA La Hague nuclear plant. The new manipulator system, named MT200 TAO, uses tele-robotics to improve ergonomics by literally lightening the workload transmitted to operators. The link between the master and slave arms is electrical rather than mechanical. The poly-articulated master arm uses haptic (force feedback) technology, so the operator effort is multiplied by a homothetic coefficient in the slave arm. Simplification of the offset function, now integrated into the master arm, means that the operator can be correctly positioned for each task. Some repetitive tasks can be carried out with great precision in playback (robotic mode). In addition, this technology contributes to better efficiency, higher availability rate, lower maintenance costs with increased MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures), reduced waste, improved performance and safer use (remote workstations are feasible). (authors)

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Radioactive Waste Disposal Strategies within the US Army Corps of Engineers FUSRAP - 18328

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) highest priority is the protection of human health and the environment and public and worker safety during the cleanup, transportation, and disposal of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) material. In addition to following all appropriate federal and state rules and regulations, the USACE has its own safety program that ensures that we are being protective. One aspect of the USACE FUSRAP is the radioactive waste disposal strategies that we must consider. The USACE will only dispose of FUSRAP material in a facility that is licenses/permitted to accept it. The estimated exposures to facility workers and members of the public from the permitted disposal of FUSRAP wastes is evaluated as part of this process. The USACE uses the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process to study and remediate FUSRAP sites. An evaluation is performed to decide whether it is best to manage the waste on-site or off-site and the requirements for disposal. The action selected must be protective of human health and the environment and must comply with regulations. When making the decision, there are several other factors taken into consideration including cost of the disposal and whether the public and state agencies support the action. Prior to determining disposal options, wastes must first be characterized. This involves an evaluation of both site history and analytical data. Determining the proper disposal requirements and subsequent disposal option involves: Characterizing the waste as stated above. This is important because there are several regulatory agencies which may oversee management of the waste. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the US Department of Transportation, and state hazardous waste and/or radiation protection agencies may all have varying degrees of involvement. Identifying disposal requirements. Certain wastes must be disposed at licensed radioactive waste disposal facilities. Wastes containing US EPA regulated hazardous waste must be disposed at permitted hazardous waste disposal facilities. Certain wastes must be disposed at facilities licensed/permitted for both radioactive and hazardous waste. Some lower activity wastes may be accepted for disposal at other types of landfills. Considering acceptance criteria of the disposal facility. Radionuclides and/or hazardous constituents in the waste, as well as physical and chemical form of the waste, are evaluated to ensure they meet the acceptance criteria of the receiving facility's license and/or permit. If they don't, another disposal location must be used. Considering the accessibility and location of the disposal facility. Some facilities are able to accept shipments only by truck and others can accept material via railcar as well. The distance to a disposal facility impacts the risk of transportation accidents and efficient use of project resources such as the number of trucks required to perform the transportation. These factors are also important in evaluating whether material can be cost effectively shipped to a disposal facility. Evaluating the compliance status of the receiving facility. It is not assumed that just because a facility has a license or permit that it is acceptable for the USACE' waste. Prior to selecting a facility for disposal of FUSRAP waste, a site visit, audit and consultation with the US EPA is required to determine whether there are any known relevant violations at the facility. Facilities that have violations that negatively impact the USACE or US EPA approval of the facility are not used for disposal of FUSRAP waste. Once a facility is selected. The USACE procures contracts, or utilizes existing contracts, to facilitate the transportation and disposal action. Additionally, the USACE continues to consult with US EPA routinely to confirm the compliance status of the facility. Considering state acceptance of wastes to a facility. The USACE seeks to obtain written authorization from the facility state regulator indicating the action is compliant with existing licenses, permits, laws, and regulations. Each of these factors is considered by the USACE in selecting a FUSRAP disposal location. The goal is to provide safe, cost effective disposal which is protective of human health and the environment and which complies with all regulatory requirements. These steps all feed in to the disposal strategy consideration that USACE must go through for our FUSRAP waste streams. There are a number of challenges in the process to include In order to achieve the Congressional mandate of completing cleanup work under FUSRAP in a more cost effective, timely manner, while assuring protection of public health and safety. USACE must determine all disposal options that are available for the types of waste at each FUSRAP site. As a solution, completion of a disposal strategy document can help ensure this goal is met and will foster consistency across the FUSRAP. (authors)

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