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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2010

Checklists and Monitoring in the Cockpit: Why Crucial Defenses Sometimes Fail

Checklists and monitoring are two essential defenses against equipment failures and pilot errors. Problems with checklist use and pilots failures to monitor adequately have a long history in aviation accidents. This study was conducted to explore why checklists and monitoring sometimes fail to catch errors and equipment malfunctions as intended. Flight crew procedures were observed from the cockpit jumpseat during normal airline operations in order to: 1) collect data on monitoring and checklist use in cockpit operations in typical flight conditions; 2) provide a plausible cognitive account of why deviations from formal checklist and monitoring procedures sometimes occur; 3) lay a foundation for identifying ways to reduce vulnerability to inadvertent checklist and monitoring errors; 4) compare checklist and monitoring execution in normal flights with performance issues uncovered in accident investigations; and 5) suggest ways to improve the effectiveness of checklists and monitoring. Cognitive explanations for deviations from prescribed procedures are provided, along with suggestions for countermeasures for vulnerability to error.

Dismukes, R. Key↗
NASA NTRS2008

Development of NASA's Models and Simulations Standard

From the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation, there were several NASA-wide actions that were initiated. One of these actions was to develop a standard for development, documentation, and operation of Models and Simulations. Over the course of two-and-a-half years, a team of NASA engineers, representing nine of the ten NASA Centers developed a Models and Simulation Standard to address this action. The standard consists of two parts. The first is the traditional requirements section addressing programmatics, development, documentation, verification, validation, and the reporting of results from both the M&S analysis and the examination of compliance with this standard. The second part is a scale for evaluating the credibility of model and simulation results using levels of merit associated with 8 key factors. This paper provides an historical account of the challenges faced by and the processes used in this committee-based development effort. This account provides insights into how other agencies might approach similar developments. Furthermore, we discuss some specific applications of models and simulations used to assess the impact of this standard on future model and simulation activities.

simulation↗
NASA NTRS2005

The Space Shuttle Columbia Preservation Project - The Debris Loan Process

The purpose of this project is to provide a process for loan of Columbia debris to qualified researchers and technical educators to: (1) Aid in advanced spacecraft design and flight safety development (2) Advance the study of hypersonic re-entry to enhance ground safety. (3) Train and instruct accident investigators and (4) Establish an enduring legacy for Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew.

Thurston, Scott↗
NASA NTRS2004

Effect of Clouds on Optical Imaging of the Space Shuttle During the Ascent Phase: A Statistical Analysis Based on a 3D Model

Clouds are highly effective in obscuring optical images of the Space Shuttle taken during its ascent by ground-based and airborne tracking cameras. Because the imagery is used for quick-look and post-flight engineering analysis, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended the return-to-flight effort include an upgrade of the imaging system to enable it to obtain at least three useful views of the Shuttle from lift-off to at least solid rocket booster (SRB) separation (NASA 2003). The lifetimes of individual cloud elements capable of obscuring optical views of the Shuttle are typically 20 minutes or less. Therefore, accurately observing and forecasting cloud obscuration over an extended network of cameras poses an unprecedented challenge for the current state of observational and modeling techniques. In addition, even the best numerical simulations based on real observations will never reach "truth." In order to quantify the risk that clouds would obscure optical imagery of the Shuttle, a 3D model to calculate probabilistic risk was developed. The model was used to estimate the ability of a network of optical imaging cameras to obtain at least N simultaneous views of the Shuttle from lift-off to SRB separation in the presence of an idealized, randomized cloud field.

FROM↗
NASA NTRS2004

Development of Columbia Leading Edge Reconstruction System

After the loss of Columbia in 2003, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board and NASA KSC directed personnel at the Launch Equipment Test Facility (LETF) to design and build high fidelity mock-ups of Columbia's left wing leading edges. These leading edge segments, constructed of reinforced carbon-carbon, were a major point of inquiry by the investigation team. The LETF engineers developed a concept of building a clear Lexan panel with an aluminum support structure ten percent larger than the original panel. The leading edge debris are attached to the Lexan panels and both the front and back side of each panel are visible for inspection. The entire assembly can be rotated, to provide visual access to the entire panel. Six carts were fabricated to support the thirteen panels. These carts could be set up in order, next to each other, to provide the desired inspection access. The carts and attached debris are currently located in the Vehicle Assembly Building at KSC.

Trautwein, John↗
NASA NTRS2006

A Silent Safety Program

NASA's Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) referred 8 times to the NASA "Silent Safety Program." This term, "Silent Safety Program" was not an original observation but first appeared in the Rogers Commission's Investigation of the Challenger Mishap. The CAIB on page 183 of its report in the paragraph titled 'Encouraging Minority Opinion,' stated "The Naval Reactor Program encourages minority opinions and "bad news." Leaders continually emphasize that when no minority opinions are present, the responsibility for a thorough and critical examination falls to management. . . Board interviews revealed that it is difficult for minority and dissenting opinions to percolate up through the agency's hierarchy. . ." The first question and perhaps the only question is - what is a silent safety program? Well, a silent safety program may be the same as the dog that didn't bark in Sherlock Holmes' "Adventure of the Silver Blaze" because system safety should behave as a devil's advocate for the program barking on every occasion to insure a critical review inclusion. This paper evaluates the NASA safety program and provides suggestions to prevent the recurrence of the silent safety program alluded to in the Challenger Mishap Investigation. Specifically targeted in the CAM report, "The checks and balances the safety system was meant to provide were not working." A silent system safety program is not unique to NASA but could emerge in any and every organization. Principles developed by Irving Janis in his book, Groupthink, listed criteria used to evaluate an organization's cultural attributes that allows a silent safety program to evolve. If evidence validates Jams's criteria, then Jams's recommendations for preventing groupthink can also be used to improve a critical evaluation and thus prevent the development of a silent safety program.

Goodin, James Ronald↗
NASA NTRS2012

Fatigue Management Strategies for the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy

Operation of the Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy entails a great deal of night-time work, with the potential for both acute and chronic sleep loss, as well as circadian rhythm dysynchrony. Such fatigue can result in performance decrements, with an increased risk of operator error. The NASA Dryden Flight Research Center manages this fatigue risk by means of a layered approach, to include: 1) Education and Training 2) Work Schedule Scoring 3) Obtained Sleep Metrics 4) Workplace and Operational Mitigations and 5) Incident or Accident Investigation. Specifically, quantitative estimation of the work schedule score, as well as the obtained sleep metric, allows Supervisors and Managers to better manage the risk of fatigue within the context of mission requirements.

Bendrick, Gregg↗
NASA NTRS2012

Flexible Plug Repair for Shuttle Wing Leading Edge

In response to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, a plug repair kit has been developed to enable astronauts to repair the space shuttle's wing leading edge (WLE) during orbit. The plug repair kit consists of several 17.78- cm-diameter carbon/silicon carbide (C/SiC) cover plates of various curvatures that can be attached to the refractory carbon-carbon WLE panels using a TZM refractory metal attach mechanism. The attach mechanism is inserted through the damage in the WLE panel and, as it is tightened, the cover plate flexes to conform to the curvature of the WLE panel within 0.050 mm. An astronaut installs the repair during an extravehicular activity (EVA). After installing the plug repair, edge gaps are checked and the perimeter of the repair is sealed using a proprietary material, developed to fill cracks and small holes in the WLE.

Camarda, Charles J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Dimensions of Credibility in Models and Simulations

Based on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) work in developing a standard for models and simulations (M&S), the subject of credibility in M&S became a distinct focus. This is an indirect result from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), which eventually resulted in an action, among others, to improve the rigor in NASA's M&S practices. The focus of this action came to mean a standardized method for assessing and reporting results from any type of M&S. As is typical in the standards development process, this necessarily developed into defming a common terminology base, common documentation requirements (especially for M&S used in critical decision making), and a method for assessing the credibility of M&S results. What surfaced in the development of the NASA Standard was the various dimensions credibility to consider when accepting the results from any model or simulation analysis. The eight generally relevant factors of credibility chosen in the NASA Standard proved only one aspect in the dimensionality of M&S credibility. At the next level of detail, the full comprehension of some of the factors requires an understanding along a couple of dimensions as well. Included in this discussion are the prerequisites for the appropriate use of a given M&S, the choice of factors in credibility assessment with their inherent dimensionality, and minimum requirements for fully reporting M&S results.

Steele, Martin J.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program (i.e. Shuttle) and at the beginning of a new and untested program (i.e. Constellation). The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation section in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic failure analysis and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE) for the Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This presentation will explore a variety of failure case studies at KSC and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Debris Assessment

The Space Shuttle Columbia Accident revealed a fundamental problem of the Space Shuttle Program regarding debris. Prior to the tragedy, the Space Shuttle requirement stated that no debris should be liberated that would jeopardize the flight crew and/or mission success. When the accident investigation determined that a large piece of foam debris was the primary cause of the loss of the shuttle and crew, it became apparent that the risk and scope of - damage that could be caused by certain types of debris, especially - ice and foam, were not fully understood. There was no clear understanding of the materials that could become debris, the path the debris might take during flight, the structures the debris might impact or the damage the impact might cause. In addition to supporting the primary NASA and USA goal of returning the Space Shuttle to flight by understanding the SRB debris environment and capability to withstand that environment, the SRB debris assessment project was divided into four primary tasks that were required to be completed to support the RTF goal. These tasks were (1) debris environment definition, (2) impact testing, (3) model correlation and (4) hardware evaluation. Additionally, the project aligned with USA's corporate goals of safety, customer satisfaction, professional development and fiscal accountability.

Kendall, Kristin↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Standard for Models and Simulations: Philosophy and Requirements Overview

Following the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report, the NASA Administrator chartered an executive team (known as the Diaz Team) to identify those CAIB report elements with NASA-wide applicability and to develop corrective measures to address each element. One such measure was the development of a standard for the development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations. This report describes the philosophy and requirements overview of the resulting NASA Standard for Models and Simulations.

Blattnig, Steve R.↗
NASA NTRS2013

NASA Handbook for Models and Simulations: An Implementation Guide for NASA-STD-7009

The purpose of this Handbook is to provide technical information, clarification, examples, processes, and techniques to help institute good modeling and simulation practices in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). As a companion guide to NASA-STD- 7009, Standard for Models and Simulations, this Handbook provides a broader scope of information than may be included in a Standard and promotes good practices in the production, use, and consumption of NASA modeling and simulation products. NASA-STD-7009 specifies what a modeling and simulation activity shall or should do (in the requirements) but does not prescribe how the requirements are to be met, which varies with the specific engineering discipline, or who is responsible for complying with the requirements, which depends on the size and type of project. A guidance document, which is not constrained by the requirements of a Standard, is better suited to address these additional aspects and provide necessary clarification. This Handbook stems from the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident Investigation (2003), which called for Agency-wide improvements in the "development, documentation, and operation of models and simulations"' that subsequently elicited additional guidance from the NASA Office of the Chief Engineer to include "a standard method to assess the credibility of the models and simulations."2 General methods applicable across the broad spectrum of model and simulation (M&S) disciplines were sought to help guide the modeling and simulation processes within NASA and to provide for consistent reporting ofM&S activities and analysis results. From this, the standardized process for the M&S activity was developed. The major contents of this Handbook are the implementation details of the general M&S requirements ofNASA-STD-7009, including explanations, examples, and suggestions for improving the credibility assessment of an M&S-based analysis.

Steele, Martin J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document for Human Health and Performance Models and Simulations

Rigorous verification, validation, and credibility (VVC) processes are imperative to ensure that models and simulations (MS) are sufficiently reliable to address issues within their intended scope. The NASA standard for MS, NASA-STD-7009 (7009) [1] was a resultant outcome of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to ensure MS are developed, applied, and interpreted appropriately for making decisions that may impact crew or mission safety. Because the 7009 focus is engineering systems, a NASA-STD-7009 Guidance Document is being developed to augment the 7009 and provide information, tools, and techniques applicable to the probabilistic and deterministic biological MS more prevalent in human health and performance (HHP) and space biomedical research and operations.

numerical analysis↗
NASA NTRS2011

Accident Case Study of Organizational Silence Communication Breakdown: Shuttle Columbia, Mission STS-107

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) ESMD Risk and Knowledge Management team. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of key lessons learned derived from the official Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB). Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document. This report is accompanied by a video that will be sent at request

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2016

Computational Modeling of Space Physiology

The Digital Astronaut Project (DAP), within NASAs Human Research Program, develops and implements computational modeling for use in the mitigation of human health and performance risks associated with long duration spaceflight. Over the past decade, DAP developed models to provide insights into space flight related changes to the central nervous system, cardiovascular system and the musculoskeletal system. Examples of the models and their applications include biomechanical models applied to advanced exercise device development, bone fracture risk quantification for mission planning, accident investigation, bone health standards development, and occupant protection. The International Space Station (ISS), in its role as a testing ground for long duration spaceflight, has been an important platform for obtaining human spaceflight data. DAP has used preflight, in-flight and post-flight data from short and long duration astronauts for computational model development and validation. Examples include preflight and post-flight bone mineral density data, muscle cross-sectional area, and muscle strength measurements. Results from computational modeling supplement space physiology research by informing experimental design. Using these computational models, DAP personnel can easily identify both important factors associated with a phenomenon and areas where data are lacking. This presentation will provide examples of DAP computational models, the data used in model development and validation, and applications of the model.

simulation↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA's Journey to Safety Culture

One of the organizational causes of the Shuttle Columbia mishap found by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was a "Broken Safety Culture". Since its release, NASA has strived to improve its Safety Culture In 2009, the Chief of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance asked a member of the Air Force Safety Center and of the CAIB for assistance to develop a NASA Safety Culture Program. This presentation describes the journey that NASA personnel has taken developing a NASA Safety Culture Program to "repair" its Safety Culture.

Dillinger, Tracy↗
NASA NTRS2019

Gateway Modeling and Simulation Plan

This plan institutes direction across the Gateway Program and the Element Projects to ensure that Cross Program M&S are produced in a manner that (1) generate the artifacts required for NASA-STD-7009 compliance, (2) ensures interoperability of M&S exchanged and integrated across the program and, (3) drives integrated development efforts to provide cross-domain integrated simulation of the Gateway elements, space environment, and operational scenarios. This direction is flowed down via contractual enforcement to prime contractors and includes both the GMS requirements specified in this plan and the NASASTD- 7009 derived requirements necessary for compliance. Grounding principles for management of Gateway Models and Simulations (M&S) are derived from the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) report and the Diaz team report, “A Renewed Commitment to Excellence.” As an outcome of these reports, and in response to Action 4 of the Diaz team report, the NASA Standard for Models and Simulations, NASA-STD-7009 was developed. The standard establishes M&S requirements for development and use activities to ensure proper capture and communication of M&S pedigree and credibility information to Gateway program decision makers. Through the course of the Gateway program life cycle M&S will be heavily relied upon to conduct analysis, test products, support operations activities, enable informed decision making and ultimately to certify the Gateway with an acceptable level of risk to crew and mission. To reduce risk associated with M&S influenced decisions, this plan applies the NASA-STD-7009 requirements to produce the artifacts that support credibility assessments and ensure the information is communicated to program management.

NASA-STD-7009↗