The German product quality control of the compacted metallic nuclear waste - 15311
The treatment and safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel is a key challenge of nuclear energy utilization and has to be accomplished regardless the future nuclear of electricity production or phase-out policies. Until June 2005 approx. 6662 tons of spent fuel from German nuclear power plants was sent to the La Hague (France) and Sellafield (UK) plants for reprocessing. An equivalent amount of nuclear waste compounds has contractually to be returned to Germany, which is currently in progress. The returnable waste streams comprise mainly highly-active vitrified waste containing a major part of fission products and actinides, and intermediate-active super-compacted metallic waste containing reprocessed fuel element's structural materials and some technological waste from the reprocessing process itself. Shearing and dissolution of spent fuel leaves scraps of fuel metal cladding, the end-pieces and spacers which are contaminated, activated and irradiating from their life in a reactor core. In fact, this metallic intermediate level radioactive waste makes up a bit more than half of the total volume of the reprocessed waste. At La Hague the metallic waste is super-compacted. Several, typically eight, compacted discs are stacked in a stainless steel container, named CSD-C as for 'Colis Standard de Dechets Compactes'. 4104 containers of such CSD-Cs in 152 transport/storages casks have to be returned to Germany. Each one of them has to be checked and quality certified for its conformity with German national product specifications and acceptance criteria by independent national product quality control inspectors (PKS). The residue package documentation has to be complete and the characterization methods have to be comprehensive. Due to the heterogeneity of metallic waste the characterization and control of its properties is very complex. The nuclear characterization is performed by means of non-destructive measurements, where only a few key nuclides are measured directly. In fact, the proper calculation of the whole nuclear inventory relies on numerous supplementary simulations. The measurement and calculation methodology is scrutinized by PKS in detail and key points are benchmarked with our own simulations for the sake of an independent nuclear inventory declaration check. With respect to the vast amount of documentation and parameters, which have to be checked and verified, PKS had to optimize their checking procedures. For this purpose dedicated proof tools have been developed that shall be applied for selected indicative cross-checks of the relevant parameters. This contribution is dedicated to the procedure of quality control by PKS and examples of actually performed computational verifications of declared nuclear inventory. (authors)