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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1974

The Saturn management concept

Management of the Saturn launch vehicles was an evolutionary process, requiring constant interaction between NASA Headquarters, the Marshall Space Flight Center (particularly the Saturn 5 Program Office), and the various prime contractors. Successful Saturn management was a blend of the decades of experience of the von Braun team, management concepts from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Government, and private industry. The Saturn 5 Program Office shared a unique relationship with the Apollo Program Office at NASA Headquarters. Much of the success of the Saturn 5 Program Office was based on its painstaking attention to detail, emphasis on individual responsibilities (backed up by comprehensive program element plans and management matrices), and a high degree of visibility as embodied in the Program Control Center.

Bilstein, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1999

A Tribute to National Aeronautics and Space Administration Minority Astronauts: Past and Present

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has been selecting astronauts since 1959. The first group was called the "Mercury Seven." These seven men were chosen because of their performance as military officers and test pilots, their character, their intelligence, and their guts. Six of these seven flew in the Mercury capsule. Several additional groups were chosen between 1959 and 1978. It was an exciting period in the American space program. Many of these astronauts participated in the Gemini and Apollo programs, traveled and walked on the Moon, docked with the Russians during the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, and occupied America's first space station, the Skylab. With the onset of the Space Shuttle, a new era began. The astronauts selected in 19 78 broke the traditional mold. For the first time, minorities and women became part of America's astronaut corps. Since then, eight additional groups have been selected, with an increasing mix of African American, Hispanic, Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Native American men and women. These astronauts will continue the American space program into the new millennium by continuing flights on the Space Shuttle and participating in the construction and occupancy of the International Space Station. These astronauts, and those who will be chosen in the future, will lead America and its partners to future voyages beyond the influence of Earth's gravity.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2017

Flame Retardant Fibers for Human Space Exploration - Past, Present, and Future

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has led the development of unique flame retardant fibers for the specific requirements of different space programs. Three of these fibers have greatly contributed to the safety of all the space missions since the Apollo program. Beta alumina-silica microfiber developed for the outer layer of the space suit after the Apollo 1 fire is no longer used and has been replaced by other glass fibers. Expanded polytetrafluoroethylene (e-PTFE) fiber used in the current spacesuit is mostly known today through its trade mark Gore-Tex®. Polybenzimidazole (PBI) filament fiber used in many applications from the Apollo to the Space Shuttle program is no longer available. More recently, TOR"TM" copolymer of polyimide fiber developed during the space shuttle program to resist the atomic oxygen present in Low Earth Orbit has been barely used. The high cost and narrow range of aeronautical and aerospace applications have, however, led to a limited production of these fibers. Only fibers that found niche markets survived. Yet, deep space exploration will require more of these inherently flame retardant fibers than what is available today. There is a need for new flame retardant fabrics inside the space vehicles as well as a need for logistics reduction for long term space missions. Materials like modacrylic and polyimide are good candidates for future flame retardant aerospace fabrics. New fabrics must be developed for astronauts' clothing, as well as crew quarters and habitat. Therefore, both staple and filament fibers of various linear densities are needed for a three years mission to Mars.

Orndoff, Evelyne↗
NASA NTRS1971

Evolution of escape systems for manned space flight.

Detailed outline of the research, development, and actual operational usage of emergency systems starting with the X-15 program and continuing through the early Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs into future space station and planetary missions. The changing nature of the risk that confronts space flight system designers as program objectives are expanded is discussed. It is shown how risk complexity increased as space programs moved from a ballistic or low earth orbit mission on to lunar and ultimately planetary research efforts. Performance criteria for those emergency systems that have been designed are included. Aspects of feasibility are considered.

Bolger, P. H.↗
NASA NTRS1973

Remotely Manned Systems for operation and exploration in space

A brief overview is presented of Remotely Manned Systems with emphasis on their use as tools for exploration and operation in space. Remotely Manned Systems missions and functions in space are described and classified in relation to other existing or planned space systems. Problem areas of large-scale man-machine systems are identified based on experience in the Surveyor program, the Mariner 9 Mars orbiter project and the Apollo program. The effects of communication time delay on system performance are investigated using the average velocity of a Martian rover as performance indicator. A substantial performance increase can be achieved by providing certain autonomous capabilities to the remote system.

Heer, E.↗
NASA NTRS1969

Analysis of a Multiprocessor Guidance Computer

The design of the next generation of spaceborne digital computers is described. It analyzes a possible multiprocessor computer configuration. For the analysis, a set of representative space computing tasks was abstracted from the Lunar Module Guidance Computer programs as executed during the lunar landing, from the Apollo program. This computer performs at this time about 24 concurrent functions, with iteration rates from 10 times per second to once every two seconds. These jobs were tabulated in a machine-independent form, and statistics of the overall job set were obtained. It was concluded, based on a comparison of simulation and Markov results, that the Markov process analysis is accurate in predicting overall trends and in configuration comparisons, but does not provide useful detailed information in specific situations. Using both types of analysis, it was determined that the job scheduling function is a critical one for efficiency of the multiprocessor. It is recommended that research into the area of automatic job scheduling be performed.

Maltach, E. G.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Planned Environmental Microbiology Aspects of Future Lunar and Mars Missions

With the establishment of the Constellation Program, NASA has initiated efforts designed similar to the Apollo Program to return to the moon and subsequently travel to Mars. Early lunar sorties will take 4 crewmembers to the moon for 4 to 7 days. Later missions will increase in duration up to 6 months as a lunar habitat is constructed. These missions and vehicle designs are the forerunners of further missions destined for human exploration of Mars. Throughout the planning and design process, lessons learned from the International Space Station (ISS) and past programs will be implemented toward future exploration goals. The standards and requirements for these missions will vary depending on life support systems, mission duration, crew activities, and payloads. From a microbiological perspective, preventative measures will remain the primary techniques to mitigate microbial risk. Thus, most of the effort will focus on stringent preflight monitoring requirements and engineering controls designed into the vehicle, such as HEPA air filters. Due to volume constraints in the CEV, in-flight monitoring will be limited for short-duration missions to the measurement of biocide concentration for water potability. Once long-duration habitation begins on the lunar surface, a more extensive environmental monitoring plan will be initiated. However, limited in-flight volume constraints and the inability to return samples to Earth will increase the need for crew capabilities in determining the nature of contamination problems and method of remediation. In addition, limited shelf life of current monitoring hardware consumables and limited capabilities to dispose of biohazardous trash will drive flight hardware toward non-culture based methodologies, such as hardware that rapidly distinguishes biotic versus abiotic surface contamination. As missions progress to Mars, environmental systems will depend heavily on regeneration of air and water and biological waste remediation and regeneration systems, increasing the need for environmental monitoring. Almost complete crew autonomy will be needed for assessment and remediation of contamination problems. Cabin capacity will be limited; thus, current methods of microbial monitoring will be inadequate. Future methodology must limit consumables, and these consumables must have a shelf life of over three years. In summary, missions to the moon and Mars will require a practical design that prudently uses available resources to mitigate microbial risk to the crew.

Ott, C. Mark↗
NASA NTRS2019

Program Promotion Can Distort Space Systems Engineering and Deny Risk

NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings was achieved against the odds by an obsessive dedication to reducing the great risk. But risk analysis predicted so many astronaut fatalities that it was thought to be unreasonably pessimistic and potentially damaging to the Apollo program. Risk analysis was discontinued, risk was neglected in space shuttle engineering, and so the space shuttle design was unnecessarily dangerous. Since the Apollo era it has been understood that long human space missions would recycle oxygen and water to avoid the very high launch cost of directly supplying them. The development of recycling systems was justified by the need to increase material closure and reduce launch mass. When it was recognized that increasing closure leads to rapidly diminishing returns, the program goal was changed to reducing launch mass and reliability, cost, and risk were considered irrelevant. Systems engineering and especially the discouraging problems of risk and cost have been deliberately ignored because they detract from program promotion, with unfortunate results. Current human launch system design does account for risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Current life support design continues to assume recycling, even though the recent great reduction in launch cost now allows direct supply of oxygen and water with significantly better quality, reliability, cost, and risk.

Advocacy↗
NASA NTRS1974

Apollo experience report: Apollo lunar surface experiments package data processing system

Apollo Program experience in the processing of scientific data from the Apollo lunar surface experiments package, in which computers and associated hardware and software were used, is summarized. The facility developed for the preprocessing of the lunar science data is described, as are several computer facilities and programs used by the Principal Investigators. The handling, processing, and analyzing of lunar science data and the interface with the Principal Investigators are discussed. Pertinent problems that arose in the development of the data processing schemes are discussed so that future programs may benefit from the solutions to the problems. The evolution of the data processing techniques for lunar science data related to recommendations for future programs of this type.

Eason, R. L.↗
NASA NTRS2022

Evidence Report: Risk of Injury and Compromised Performance due to EVA Operations

During future missions to the Moon and Mars, each crewmember will most likely perform up to 24 hours a week of extravehicular activity (EVA) in support of exploration, science, construction, and maintenance tasks. Achieving mission objectives will require EVA systems and operations concepts that maximize human performance and efficiency while minimizing health and safety risks for crewmembers. Currently, over 450 EVAs have been performed in microgravity using the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). The EMU space suit has enabled the successful assembly and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS) for over 20 years, as well as deployment of payload experiments, solar arrays, satellite launches and repairs. This EVA work was accomplished at a slower cadence than is expected for Moon and Mars, with ISS crewmembers performing no more than 7 EVAs during a single mission and without any back-to-back EVAs. Despite their success, ISS EVAs have resulted in more injury to EVA crewmembers than may be acceptable for long-duration exploration missions. The Apollo astronauts completed EVA tasks in suits that were designed for their short-duration lunar missions, although suit mobility problems were evident. The more frequent EVAs and more varied EVA tasks that are anticipated during the future longer-duration exploration missions will require EVA suits and systems that are better oriented to human health and performance than those used during the Apollo Program. Many of the problems that were encountered with the Apollo EVA suits (e.g., limited mobility and dexterity, high and aft center of gravity, and other features requiring significant crew compensation) will need to be corrected or mitigated to optimize EVA objectives of exploration missions. It is critical that we understand how EVA system design variables such as suit pressure, weight/mass, center-of-gravity location, joint ranges of motion, and biomedical monitoring, affects the ability of astronauts to perform safe, efficient, and effective EVAs. To achieve this understanding, EVA researchers will need to develop and execute an integrated human testing program across multiple environments. The research will provide objective data that will enable informed design decisions and crewmember standards, thereby ensuring EVA systems that optimize crewmember health, safety, efficiency, and performance. This report describes the risks to crew health, safety, performance, and efficiency caused by EVA operations, and it provides the evidence base to substantiate the importance of the risk.

EVA↗
NASA NTRS2004

Earth return maneuver strategies for Genesis and Stardust

As part of NASA's Discovery Program, Genesis and Stardust will be the first missions since the Apollo Program to return samples collected in deep space. To constrain costs of recovery, entry requirements must be much tighter than those imposed on Apollo. Spacecraft designs were also greatly simplified to limit costs, giving rise to a variety of operational limitations and constraints. In light of these considerations, approach to Earth presents a challenge in terms of both mission planning and navigation. This paper discusses strategies for trajectory correction during the Earth return phases of both missions.

Williams, Kenneth E.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Luna: What Did We Learn and What Should We Expect?

This presentation presents a look at the space program's background prior to lunar exploration and highlights the Apollo program and lessons learned from lunar exploration. The possibilities of exposures and difficulties attributed to lunar dust are described, including obscured vision, clogged equipment, coated surfaces, and inhalation, among others. A lunar dust simulant is proposed to support preliminary studies. Lunar dust is constantly activated by meteorite lunar dust, UV radiation and elements of solar wind - this active dust could produce reactive species. Methods of deactivation must be determined before new lunar missions, but first we must understand how to reactivate dust on Earth. Activation methods tested and described here include crushing/grinding or UV activation. Grinding time has a direct effect on amount of hydroxyl radicals produced upon addition of ground quartz to a solution. An increase in hydroxyl production was also seen for a lunar simulant with increased grinding.

Wallace, William T.↗