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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of ISS Returned Hardware for MMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center in Houston has performed 26 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware that have been returned from the International Space Station. Data on 1,024 observations of MMOD damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) analysis to discern impactor source is included in the database. This paper will summarize the post-flight MMOD inspections, and focus on two inspections in particular: (1) Pressurized Mating Adapter-2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed damages, and (2) Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.7 years exposure with 58 MMOD damages. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper risk assessment code.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2017

Estimating Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on ISS

The threat from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration-broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA's Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper briefly describes the overall methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, H.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of Returned ISS Hardware for MMMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware returned from the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are included in the database when available. This paper will focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2018

Predicting the Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

The threat from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration-broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA's Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper briefly describes the overall methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Hyde, James↗
NASA NTRS2019

Consequences of MMOD Penetrations on the International Space Station

Risk from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts on space vehicles is often quantified in terms of the probability of no penetration (PNP). However, for large spacecraft, especially those with multiple compartments, a penetration may have a number of possible outcomes. The extent of the damage (diameter of hole, crack length or penetration depth), the location of the damage relative to critical equipment or crew, crew response, and even the time of day of the penetration are among the many factors that can affect the outcome. For the International Space Station (ISS), a Monte-Carlo style software code called Manned Spacecraft Crew Survivability (MSCSurv) is used to predict the probability of several outcomes of an MMOD penetration—broadly classified as loss of crew (LOC), crew evacuation (Evac), loss of escape vehicle (LEV), and nominal end of mission (NEOM). By generating large numbers of MMOD impacts (typically in the billions) and tracking the consequences, MSCSurv allows for the inclusion of a large number of parameters and models as well as enabling the consideration of uncertainties in the models and parameters. MSCSurv builds upon the results from NASA’s Bumper software (which provides the probability of penetration and critical input data to MSCSurv) to allow analysts to estimate the probability of LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM. This paper provides an overview of the methodology used by NASA to quantify LOC, Evac, LEV, and NEOM with particular emphasis on describing in broad terms how MSCSurv works and its capabilities and most significant models.

Evans, Hilary J.↗
NASA NTRS2019

An Astronaut's Risk of Experiencing a Critical Impact from Lunar Ejecta During Lunar EVA

The Moon is under constant bombardment by meteoroids. When the meteoroid is large, the impact craters the surface, launching crater ejecta far from the impact potentially threatening astronauts on the lunar surface. In the early 1960’s, the ejecta impact flux was thought no more than the sporadic meteoroid flux but with speeds one to two orders of magnitude smaller. However, the Lunar Module designers realized by 1965 that meteoroid bumpers do not perform well at the smaller ejecta impact speeds. Their estimates of the Lunar Module risk of penetration by ejecta were 25 to 50% of the total risk. This was in spite of the exposure time to ejecta being only a third of that to sporadic meteoroids. The standard committee based the 1969 NASA SP-8013 lunar ejecta environment on Zook’s 1967 flux analysis and Gault, Shoemaker and Moore’s 1963 test data for impacts into solid basalt targets. However, Zook noted in his 1967 analysis, that if the lunar surface was composed of soil, that the ejected soil particles would be smaller than ejected basalt fragments and that the ejection speeds would be smaller. Both effects contribute to reducing the risk of a critical failure due to lunar ejecta. The authors revised Zook’s analysis to incorporate soil particle size distributions developed from analysis of Apollo lunar soil samples and ejected mass as a function of ejecta speed developed from coupling parameter analyses of soil impact-test data. The authors estimated EVA risk by assuming failure occurs at a critical impact energy. At these impact speeds, this might be true for suit hard and soft goods. However, these speeds are small enough that there may be significant strength effects that require new test data to modify the hypervelocity critical energy failure criterion. With these caveats, Christiansen, Cour-Palais and Freisen list the critical energy of the ISS EMU hard upper torso as 44 J and the helmet and visor as 71 J at hypervelocity. The authors then assumed that the lunar EVA suit fails at 50 J critical energy. This results in a 1,700,000 years mean time to failure using the results of this analysis and a 3,800 years mean time to failure using NASA SP-8013.

Bjorkman, Michael D.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Optimization of Debris Shields on the NISAR Mission’s L-Band Radar Instrument

The NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) space mission is a collaboration between NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), launching in the 2020s to a polar orbit of 747km altitude. The mission will provide spatial and temporal measurements of land surface changes (e.g. ice sheets, vegetation, earthquakes). Many of the SAR electronics boxes are mounted on the exterior of the structure. Their singlewall box lids efficiently radiate heat for thermal control, but are not very efficient debris shields. The initial design showed an unacceptably high impact risk as estimated with NASA’s ORDEM3 debris model and Bumper impact analysis tool. Each box has a different role in instrument functionality, and this was captured in a reliability model used to optimize the distribution of shield mass among the boxes: total added mass was minimized while maintaining a threshold of functionality and survival probability that was acceptable to the project.

Chinn, James Z.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Challenges of Debris-Impact Risk Assessment for Robotic Spacecraft

This paper describes an orbital debris impact risk assessment performed on the command and data subsystem electronics box of QuikSCAT, a functioning spacecraft with approximately 18 years on orbit. Several aspects of the analysis are paid particular attention. First is the modeling of a thermal blanket at a small stand-off distance from the box chassis. The properties of the blanket are such that under some assumptions, it may be treated as an effective bumper shield, and under other assumptions, it may not. The assumptions and their effects on the results of the analysis are explored. Similarly, the configuration of the electronic components inside the chassis are such that several definitions of failure criteria appear plausible. The results of each treatment are presented together and compared with the status of the actual electronics box. The failure predictions vary widely between treatments, and the more conservative assumption sets predict incredulously high probabilities of failure. This is problematic because the conservative assumptions are the ones typically used in analyses for flight projects.

Ratliff, Martin↗
NASA NTRS2018

A Dual Multilayer Insulation Blanket Concept to Radically Reduce Heat Loss From Thermally Controlled Spacecraft and Instruments

At large distances from the Sun (e.g. Jupiter/Saturn), the solar flux is less than 4% that at Earth. This requires very large solar arrays to meet the power demands of a typical new mission concept. Heat loss through Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) blankets typically constitutes the vast majority of the total heat loss. Hence, improvements to MLI blankets that reduce heat loss are advantageous to the spacecraft design. The overall effective emittance (ε*) of MLI is usually a range dependent on the number of layers, size of blanket, seams, feedthroughs, layer density and operating temperatures of the heat source and heat sink. A concept has been developed at JPL to reduce the ε* by as much as a factor of two, which produces a corresponding reduction in heat losses. This concept utilizes two MLI blankets physically separated by traditional bumpers or spacers used for micrometeoroid protection. The outer surface of the inner blanket and the inner surface of the outer blanket are low emissivity surfaces to further minimize the total ε* of the overall dual MLI system. Analytical predictions of a dual MLI concept have been made using test data based ε* correlations. A development test has been conducted to validate the dual blanket design’s performance. This paper will describe the dual blanket design concept, schemes for its implementation, and the corresponding test results to validate its performance.

Duran, Mark↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon 1 Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

Introduction The SpaceX Dragon 1 spacecraft performed 20 resupply missions to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team from the NASA John-son Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology Group inspected each Dragon 1 capsule for hypervelocity impact damage features. Data from these inspections are collected into a database that includes impact feature dimensions as well as the location on the vehicle. Additional details on the type and size of particle that produced the damage site are provided when sampling data and definitive spectroscopic analysis results are available. Observation data can be compared with impact estimates from risk assessment codes as a check on the micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environment predictions. Scope A general description of the areas of the vehicle that were inspected are provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. The paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected as well as the results of analysis of intact samples collected for spectroscopic analysis to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest MMOD environments are also presented. Findings Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides de-tails of each of these variables. (1) Damage equations (2) Impact condition assumptions a. Projectile density b. Impact speed c. Impact angle (3) Analysis results a. pre-flight vs. on-orbit damage b. MMOD vs. non-MMOD Conclusions and Recommendations The ISS visiting vehicle impact database is an ongoing project. SpaceX provides crew rotations as well as resupply and cargo return with the Dragon 2 spacecraft. Sierra Space is manifested for resupply and cargo return services starting in 2023. Boeing is expected to provide crew rotations as well. All of these spacecraft will provide additional opportunities for post flight MMOD inspections of space exposed hardware. Acknowledgements Over the course of the inspection campaign various personnel at the SpaceX Texas Test Site in McGregor and at the SpaceX headquarters in Hawthorne CA provided valuable support to this activity.

James L Hyde↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prediction and Enhancement of Thermal Protection Systems from Meteoroid Damage using a Smooth Particle Hydrodynamic Code

Interplanetary spacecraft are exposed to meteoroid fluxes that range in speeds from 10 to 72 km/sec, far above the capability of today’s test facilities to provide predictions for the likelihood of spacecraft critical penetration. Of special interest are sample return missions, which (though protected by shielding) must often survive years of exposure to the meteoroid environment in order to re-enter Earth’s atmosphere with their scientific cargo. This paper describes the simulation of meteoric material damage to thermal protection systems (TPS) housed beneath protective “garage” (shielding) enclosures using the Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics Code (SPHC) operated by the Institute for Defense Analyses and Stellingwerf Consulting in support of ongoing NASA tasks. The study outlined in this paper considered the impact effect of both meteoric materials such as iron, ice, and chondrites (dunnite), and non-meteoric materials such as aluminum and nylon against both external shielding materials (single and dual aluminum bumpers) and Heat shield for Extreme Entry Environments Technology (HEEET) TPS materials, used alone and in conjunction with shielding. A general predictive damage equation to HEEET TPS is developed from these SPHC simulations for velocities up to 70 km/sec.

Hypervelocity Impact, hydrocode, meteoroid and orb↗
NASA NTRS2023

Orbital Debris Shape Effect Investigations for Mitigating Risk

NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) and Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) team have coordinated to better understand the risks to upper stages and spacecraft from non-spherical orbital debris. It is well understood that fragmentation (collision or explosion) events in orbit produce fragments of various materials, sizes, and shapes. To further characterize these parameters, the ODPO is developing the next-generation Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) version 4.0 to include orbital debris shape distributions. Ground-based assets, such as radar and optical sensors, can provide size estimates and some insight into material based on radar return or optical filter photometry/spectroscopy, respectively. Characterizing an object’s shape requires more laboratory analyses to infer how shape affects these measurements. More importantly, in addition to size and material/density, the shape of fragments in orbit will alter the ballistic limit equations used in orbital debris risk assessments with NASA’s Bumper Code. The ODPO plans to release ORDEM 4.0 in the coming years. Performing ground-based laboratory impact tests on high-fidelity spacecraft mockups provides the means to directly measure size, mass, material/density, and shape of fragments, all key parameters needed to characterize real-world break up events. The DebriSat test, the results of which are provided, showcases the details of this type of experiment. The goal of this collaborative research between the ODPO and the HVIT team is to include a shape parameter in the environmental and breakup models used to assess risk for various space structures. This paper examines ground-based laboratory impact tests and the associated fragment shape categories. Provided these defined shapes, the approach is simplified by assuming a right circular cylinder (RCC) approximation with varying length-to-diameter ratios. Highlights of impact tests conducted by the HVIT team using non-spherical projectiles based on the RCC approximation are presented. Hydrocode simulations have also been performed to expand on the complexity of variations with non-spherical projectiles. Lastly, ray-tracing simulations of various RCCs of known material are provided to support the ongoing research on optical reflectance distributions with known shapes and to highlight how this may modify the current optical size estimation model. The status and plan forward are outlined for NASA's orbital debris shape effect investigation using a multidisciplinary approach by the ODPO and the HVIT team.

Heather Cowardin↗
NASA NTRS2023

Orbital Debris Shape Effect Investigations for Mitigating Risk

NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) and Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) team have coordinated to better understand the risks to upper stages and spacecraft from non-spherical orbital debris. It is well understood that fragmentation (collision or explosion) events in orbit produce fragments of various materials, sizes, and shapes. To further characterize these parameters, the ODPO is developing the next-generation Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) version 4.0 to include orbital debris shape distributions. Ground-based assets, such as radar and optical sensors, can provide size estimates and some insight into material based on radar return or optical filter photometry/spectroscopy, respectively. Characterizing an object’s shape requires more laboratory analyses to infer how shape affects these measurements. More importantly, in addition to size and material/density, the shape of fragments in orbit will alter the ballistic limit equations used in orbital debris risk assessments with NASA’s Bumper Code. The ODPO plans to release ORDEM 4.0 in the coming years. Performing ground-based laboratory impact tests on high-fidelity spacecraft mockups provides the means to directly measure size, mass, material/density, and shape of fragments, all key parameters needed to characterize real-world break up events. The DebriSat test, the results of which are provided, showcases the details of this type of experiment. The goal of this collaborative research between the ODPO and the HVIT team is to include a shape parameter in the environmental and breakup models used to assess risk for various space structures. This paper examines ground-based laboratory impact tests and the associated fragment shape categories. Provided these defined shapes, the approach is simplified by assuming a right circular cylinder (RCC) approximation with varying length-to-diameter ratios. Highlights of impact tests conducted by the HVIT team using non-spherical projectiles based on the RCC approximation are presented. Hydrocode simulations have also been performed to expand on the complexity of variations with non-spherical projectiles. Lastly, ray-tracing simulations of various RCCs of known material are provided to support the ongoing research on optical reflectance distributions with known shapes and to highlight how this may modify the current optical size estimation model. The status and plan forward are outlined for NASA's orbital debris shape effect investigation using a multidisciplinary approach by the ODPO and the HVIT team.

Heather Cowardin↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

SpaceX Dragon Spacecraft Post Flight MMOD Inspection Campaign

The SpaceX Dragon spacecraft performed 20 resupply flights to the International Space Station (ISS) between 2012 and 2020. After each mission, a team led by the NASA Johnson Space Center Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Group inspected each Dragon vehicle exterior for hypervelocity impact damage. A general description of the inspected vehicle areas is provided as well as mission details such as exposure duration and launch dates. This paper documents the general inspection procedure for collection of data and the post inspection data analysis process. It also provides details of the observation data collected in addition to the spectroscopic analysis results of intact samples collected to discern the source of the impacting particle. A comparison between observed impacts and the expected number of damage features calculated by Bumper 3 with the latest micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) environments are also presented. Statistics on the >300 impact features documented in the database will provide insight into the depth to diameter ratios and other relationships. The quality of the comparison between the observations and code predictions are dependent on several factors. The paper provides details of each of these variables.

orbital debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRS2024

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office - In Service of Space Safety

Since the NASA Orbital Debris Program Office’s (ODPO) founding in 1979 at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, it has been at the forefront of orbital debris research, modeling, and policy development. The ODPO has worked in collaboration with NASA and other U.S. government missions since the 1980s to mitigate the growth of the orbital debris environment and protect the population of the Earth. Two main products from the ODPO, the Orbital Debris Engineering Model (ORDEM) and the Debris Assessment Software (DAS), are frequently among the top three most-downloaded software packages from the NASA Software Catalog. These products are provided free of charge to the public in furtherance of the goal to ensure that new space missions, in compliance with NASA’s orbital debris mitigation requirements, are developed, operated, and disposed of responsibly. In addition to these external-facing software tools, the ODPO maintains high-fidelity internal tools for reentry simulation (the Object Reentry Survival Analysis Tool, ORSAT), short-term risk assessment for robotic and human spaceflight missions (the Satellite Breakup Risk Assessment Module, SBRAM), among others. Using data from the ORDEM model, as well as using the Meteoroid Environment Model (MEM) developed by the Meteoroid Environment Office (MEO) at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) team uses the BUMPER code to assess penetration risk to space vehicles in Earth orbit and beyond. This paper will discuss the services that the ODPO and HVIT provide, from mission concept development through end-of-mission, for NASA-related and commercial missions.

Chris Ostrom↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Review of International Space Station Extravehicular Activity Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Risk

Nearly 300 spacewalks have been conducted over the last 25 years to support the construction and maintenance of the International Space Station (ISS). During the nearly 2,000 hours of extra-vehicular activity (EVA), crew wore extra-vehicular mobility unit (EMU) “spacesuits” to help mitigate hazards of the space environment including impacts from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particles. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts detailed EMU MMOD risk analyses as part of the ISS EVA review and approval process. This paper provides a general historical overview of the ISS EVA MMOD risks and the associated risk assessment process. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) Team produces the ISS EVA MMOD risk analyses using the Bumper MMOD risk analysis code in conjunction with detailed information about the EVA including crew member EVA work sites, crew translation paths, suit orientation, and durations. Detailed physical models of the EMU spacesuit and the ISS are included and tailored for each EVA analysis. Two types of MMOD risk are included: (1) Penetration, and (2) Catastrophic. Penetration risk is for any size leak in the EMU suit. Catastrophic risk is a subset of Penetration Risk and only includes penetrations that cause a 4mm diameter hole (or larger) in the pressure-maintaining “bladder” layer of the EMU suit. This size hole will exceed the ability of the EMU suit to compensate. The MMOD risk analyses also utilize the latest orbital debris environment and meteoroid environment models including additional transient factors to account for recent satellite break-ups and annual meteor storms. These additional factors and the associated increase in EVA MMOD risk are considered when scheduling EVAs to reduce EMU MMOD risk.

Dana M. Lear↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Preliminary Experimental Investigation of Multi-Shock Shield Performance Against Meteoritic Other Lithic Projectiles

The protection capabilities of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) shields are invariably linked to the physical properties of the impactor. Regardless of the shield type, or bumper material employed, the general principles of purposefully designed multi-walled MMOD protection relies on the ability to disrupt, shock, melt, and/or vaporize the projectile before it interacts with a critical spacecraft component. Here, we begin to study the influence of projectile heterogeneity on the performance of multi-shock shields by conducting hypervelocity impact tests using meteorite and a variety of other rock-like (i.e., lithic) materials. Testing was conducted using a .17 caliber two-stage light-gas gun, launching cylindrical lithic projectiles between 5.66 and 7.06 km/s. Shield layups included three layers of Nextel and one layer of graphite composite as a rear wall, with each layer having a 35 mm standoff. After testing a comparison of rear wall and witness plate damage was made to separate tests conducted using spherical Al projectiles of similar mass. It was observed that the more heterogenous meteorite projectile gave rise to notably more damage to the witness plate than an Al projectile of equivalent mass, while the other, more homogeneous lithic projectiles, did not.

meteorite↗