System design of a Mars probe/lander.
System design of Voyager-class Mars Probe/ Lander, considering selections of entry aeroshell, landed capsule and descent and postimpact instrumentation
SYSTEMS DESIGN↗
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The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis
NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.
Harry W. Jones↗
Cross Cutting Structural Design for Exploration Systems
The challenge of our new National Space Policy and NASA's Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) is keyed to the development of more effective space access and transportation systems. Optimizing in-space systems through innovative cross cutting structural designs that reduce mass, combine functional requirements and improve performance can significantly advance spacecraft designs to meet the ever growing demands of our new National Space Policy. Dependence on limited structural designs is no longer an option. We must create robust materials, forms, function and evolvable systems. We must advance national policy objectives in the design, development, test and operation of multi-billion dollar new generation crew capsules by enabling them to evolve in meeting the requirements of long duration missions to the moon and mars. This paper discusses several current issues and major design drivers for consideration in structural design of advanced spacecraft systems. Approaches to addressing these multifunctional requirements is presented as well as a discussion on utilizing Functional Analysis System Technique (FAST) in developing cross cutting structural designs for future spacecraft. It will be shown how easy it is to deploy such techniques in any conceptual architecture definition or ongoing preliminary design. As experts in merging mission, safety and life support requirements of the frail human existence into robust vehicle and habitat design, we will conquer the final frontier, harness new resources and develop life giving technologies for mankind through more innovative designs. The rocket equation tells us that a reduction in mass optimizes our propulsive results. Primary and secondary structural elements provide for the containment of gases, fluids and solids; translate and sustain loads/impacts; conduct/radiate thermal energy; shield from the harmful effects of radiation; provide for grounding/bonding of electrical power systems; compartmentalize operational functions; and provide physical interface with multiple systems. How can we redefine, combine, substitute, rearrange and otherwise modify our structural systems to reduce mass? New technologies will be needed to fill knowledge gaps and propagate new design methods. Such an integrated process is paramount in maintaining U.S. leadership and in executing our national policy goals. The cross cutting process can take many forms, but all forms will have a positive affect on the demanding design environment through initial radical thinking. The author will illustrate such cross cutting results achievable through a formal process called FAST. The FAST example will be used to show how a multifunctional structural system concept for long duration spacecraft might be generated.
Semmes, Edmund B.↗
Apollo to Artemis: Mining 50-Year Old Records to Inform Future Human Lunar Landing Systems
Under the Artemis lunar exploration program, NASA is committed to landing American astronauts on the moon by 2024. While NASA’s new Space Launch System rocket and Orion capsule will carry astronauts from Earth to the Gateway, the human lunar landing system has not yet been fully defined. As in the Apollo program, there are concerns for vehicle weight and internal volume such that seats may not be desirable, and standing during lunar descent and ascent may be a preferred engineering solution. With such a design, astronauts will experience +GZ (head-to-foot) accelerations during capsule accelerations, and it is unclear whether spaceflight deconditioned astronauts can tolerate these. Apollo astronauts stood during lunar descent and ascent, and the data contained in the early program records for those missions represent a unique resource that may provide insights to the cardiovascular stress associated with this human landing system design.
Petersen, D.↗
SpaceX Dragon Air Circulation System
The Dragon capsule is a reusable vehicle being developed by Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) that will provide commercial cargo transportation to the International Space Station (ISS). Dragon is designed to be a habitable module while it is berthed to ISS. As such, the Dragon Environmental Control System (ECS) consists of pressure control and pressure equalization, air sampling, fire detection, illumination, and an air circulation system. The air circulation system prevents pockets of stagnant air in Dragon that can be hazardous to the ISS crew. In addition, through the inter-module duct, the air circulation system provides fresh air from ISS into Dragon. To utilize the maximum volume of Dragon for cargo packaging, the Dragon ECS air circulation system is designed around cargo rack optimization. At the same time, the air circulation system is designed to meet the National Aeronautics Space Administration (NASA) inter-module and intra-module ventilation requirements and acoustic requirements. A flight like configuration of the Dragon capsule including the air circulation system was recently assembled for testing to assess the design for inter-module and intra-module ventilation and acoustics. The testing included the Dragon capsule, and flight configuration in the pressure section with cargo racks, lockers, all of the air circulation components, and acoustic treatment. The air circulation test was also used to verify the Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model of the Dragon capsule. The CFD model included the same Dragon internal geometry that was assembled for the test. This paper will describe the Dragon air circulation system design which has been verified by testing the system and with CFD analysis.
Hernandez, Brenda↗
Nuclear design data for experiments to be conducted in Horizontal Through Hole 1 of the Plum Brook Reactor
Design data for gas cooled test loop, and inpile capsule facility from mockup reactor experiments
Ciesla, E. J.↗
Preliminary design of an isotope reentry vehicle /IRV/ for use with a Brayton cycle space power system.
Isotope reentry vehicle/Brayton cycle space power system design, noting blunt conical aeroshell housing of heat source capsule
Georgiev, S.↗
Blindness
The possibilities are considered that modern electronics and engineering have to offer the individual with a damaged or disordered nervous system, especially the blind person. Discussed are the incidence and principal causes of blindness, past research activities, and a capsule review of some of the more interesting programs designed to provide the blind with the ability to be mobile in their environment and to read printed matter.
Pudenz, R. H.↗
Effect of Counterflow Jet on a Supersonic Reentry Capsule
Recent NASA initiatives for space exploration have reinvigorated research on Apollo-like capsule vehicles. Aerothermodynamic characteristics of these capsule configurations during reentry play a crucial role in the performance and safety of the planetary entry probes and the crew exploration vehicles. At issue are the forebody thermal shield protection and afterbody aeroheating predictions. Due to the lack of flight or wind tunnel measurements at hypersonic speed, design decisions on such vehicles would rely heavily on computational results. Validation of current computational tools against experimental measurement thus becomes one of the most important tasks for general hypersonic research. This paper is focused on time-accurate numerical computations of hypersonic flows over a set of capsule configurations, which employ a counterflow jet to offset the detached bow shock. The accompanying increased shock stand-off distance and modified heat transfer characteristics associated with the counterflow jet may provide guidance for future design of hypersonic reentry capsules. The newly emerged space-time conservation element solution element (CESE) method is used to perform time-accurate, unstructured mesh Navier-Stokes computations for all cases investigated. The results show good agreement between experimental and numerical Schlieren pictures. Surface heat flux and aerodynamic force predictions of the capsule configurations are discussed in detail.
Chang, Chau-Lyan↗
Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs
Over the past 50 years, various NASA communities have contributed significantly to maturing NASA s meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD)1 programs to their current state. As a result of these community efforts, and to NASA s credit, NASA s MMOD programs and models are now widely used and respected by the providers and users of both government and commercial satellites, nationally as well as internationally. Satellites have been redesigned to protect critical components from MMOD damage by moving critical components from exterior surfaces to deep inside a satellite s structure. Orbits are monitored and altered to minimize the risk of collision with tracked orbital debris. MMOD shielding added to the International Space Station (ISS) protects critical components and astronauts from potentially catastrophic damage that might result from smaller, untracked debris and meteoroid impacts. The space shuttle, as it orbited Earth, and whether docked to the ISS or not, was optimally oriented to protect its fragile thermal protection and thermal radiation systems from MMOD damage. In addition, astronauts inspected its thermal protection system for MMOD damage before the shuttle reentered Earth s atmosphere; Orion, NASA s capsule to carry astronauts to low Earth orbit, includes designs to mitigate the threat of MMOD damage and provide increased safety to the crew. When a handful of reasonable assumptions are used in NASA s MMOD models, scenarios are uncovered that conclude that the current orbital debris environment has already reached a "tipping point." That is, the amount of debris - in terms of the population of large debris objects, as well as overall mass of debris in orbit - currently in orbit has reached a threshold where it will continually collide with itself, further increasing the population of orbital debris. This increase will lead to corresponding increases in spacecraft failures, which will only create more feedback into the system, increasing the debris population growth rate. The increase thus far has been most rapid in low Earth orbit (LEO), with geosynchronous Earth orbits (GEOs) potentially suffering the same fate, but over a much longer time period. The exact timing and pace of this exponential growth are uncertain, but the serious implications of such a scenario require careful attention because of the strategic importance of U.S. space operations. The Office of Science and Technology Policy and the Office of Management and Budget contracted with the National Research Council for a study to perform three tasks: review NASA s MMOD programs and efforts, recommend in which of those NASA should increase or decrease its effort or change focus, and determine whether NASA should pursue work in any new MMOD areas. The official letter requesting the study and the full statement of task for the Committee for the Assessment of NASA s Orbital Debris Programs are in Appendixes A and B, respectively.
Source record↗
The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision
NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment.
Harry W Jones↗
Assessing the Effects of Various Surface Textures and Features on Turbulent Heat Transfer in Hypersonic Flight
Experiments were conducted in the NASA Ames Hypervelocity Free Flight Aerodynamic Facility (ballistic range) to quantify the effects on turbulent convective heat transfer of distributed surface roughness, and of isolated features, representative of thermal protection systems on atmospheric entry vehicles. The surface textures and features were applied on the conic frusta of 45o sphere-cone models having a nose-to-base radius ratio of 0.5, similar to the forebody geometry of the Galileo and Pioneer-Venus entry probes. Test conditions were selected to provide turbulent roughness Reynolds numbers, k+, in the ranges expected for outer planet entry missions. Turbulent flow on the conic frustum was achieved by tripping the flow on the sphere-segment nose cap with distributed surface roughness, created by sand-blasting the nose cap. Surface textures included distributed, acreage, roughness, as well as cavity and groove discrete features. The majority of the data to be presented are results for distributed roughness, which includes both random, sand-grain-like roughness, and regular pattern roughness. The pattern roughness was designed to represent the roughness on woven thermal protection system materials, such as NASA’s 3-D Medium Density Carbon Phenolic (3MDCP), also known as HEEET, developed by the Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environments Technology project. The pattern roughness tested is a 3-D wavy surface, and includes three different roughness element height-to-spacing ratios representative of two configurations of 3MDCP, and spanning ratios measured both before, and after, ablation in an arc jet test facility. The patterns tested in the ballistic range were laser-etched on metal models, and represented an idealized version of the real-world materials in which each roughness element was nearly identical. Additional tests were performed wherein the laser-etched patterns were degraded by sand-blasting with various sized grit media, to produce regular patterns with superimposed irregular roughness, more representative of flight materials. Results of each will be compared. The discrete features tested included cylindrical cavities and rectangular grooves of various width-to-depth ratios. Cavities represent either heatshield damage, such as from micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage, or from designed penetrations, such as on the Genesis sample return capsule. The grooves were scaled representations of seams between segments of HEEET material in a notional tiled thermal protection system. The tests examined the effects on turbulent heating downstream of the isolated features. The tests were conducted at speeds between 3 km/s and 4 km/s in air between 0.15 atm and 0.25 atm (Mach numbers between 9 and 12). Roughness Reynolds numbers, k+, ranged from 12 to 70 for the sand roughness, and as high as 200 for the pattern roughness. Boundary-layer parameters required for calculating k+ were evaluated using computational fluid dynamics simulations using the DPLR (Data Parallel Line Relaxation) code. Each model included both rough- and smooth-wall segments, and heat transfer augmentation factors were determined as the ratio of the rough-wall to smooth-wall heat flux measured on each test.
hypersonic↗
Autonomous Cargo Management and Distribution for Surface Logistics
The BLiSS: Cargo Management and Retrieval project is a submission to the NASA X-Hab challenge for an autonomous system of cargo storage and retrieval for use on the Lunar Gateway system. The system is designed to stow 5 tonnes of cargo within a capsule that has an internal diameter of 3.2 meters and height of 6 meters for cargo that will be up to 0.8 meters in any one dimension. The system will inventory all cargo items placed in each cargo container and then track the containers using RFID chips for autonomous stowage and retrieval upon request by on-station crew.
Luke McFarling↗
Mars Sample Return Landed with Red Dragon
A Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission is the highest priority science mission for the next decade as recommended by the recent Decadal Survey of Planetary Science. However, an affordable program to carry this out has not been defined. This paper describes a study that examined use of emerging commercial capabilities to land the sample return elements, with the goal of reducing mission cost. A team at NASA Ames examined the feasibility of the following scenario for MSR: A Falcon Heavy launcher injects a SpaceX Dragon crew capsule and trunk onto a Trans Mars Injection trajectory. The capsule is modified to carry all the hardware needed to return samples collected on Mars including a Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV), an Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) and Sample Collection and Storage hardware. The Dragon descends to land on the surface of Mars using SuperSonic Retro Propulsion (SSRP) as described by Braun and Manning [IEEEAC paper 0076, 2005]. Samples are acquired and deliverd to the MAV by a prelanded asset, possibly the proposed 2020 rover. After samples are obtained and stored in the ERV, the MAV launches the sample-containing ERV from the surface of Mars. We examined cases where the ERV is delivered to either low Mars orbit (LMO), C3 = 0 (Mars escape), or an intermediate energy state. The ERV then provides the rest of the energy (delta V) required to perform trans-Earth injection (TEI), cruise, and insertion into a Moon-trailing Earth Orbit (MTEO). A later mission, possibly a crewed Dragon launched by a Falcon Heavy (not part of the current study) retrieves the sample container, packages the sample, and performs a controlled Earth re-entry to prevent Mars materials from accidentally contaminating Earth. The key analysis methods used in the study employed a set of parametric mass estimating relationships (MERs) and standard aerospace analysis software codes modified for the MAV class of launch vehicle to determine the range of performance parameters that produced converged spacecraft designs capable of meeting mission requirements. Subsystems modeled in this study included structures, power system, propulsion system, nose fairing, thermal insulation, actuation devices, and GN&C. Best practice application of loads and design margins for all resources were used. Both storable and cryogenic propellant systems were examined. The landed mass and lander capsule size provide boundary conditions for the MAV design and packaging. We estimated the maximum mass the Dragon capsule is capable of landing. This and the volume capability to store the MAV was deduced from publically available data from SpaceX as well as our own engineering and aerodynamic estimates. Minimum gross-liftoff mass (GLOM) for the MAV were obtained for configurations that used pump-fed storable bi-propellant rocket engines for both the MAV and the ERV stage. The GLOM required fits within our internal estimate of the mass that Dragon can land at low elevation/optimal seasons on Mars. Based on the analysis, we show that a single Mars launch sample return mission is feasible using current commercial capabilities to deliver the return spacecraft assets.
Mars Ascent Vehicle (MAV)↗
Design Guide for Aerodynamics Testing of Earth and Planetary Entry Vehicles in a Ballistic Range
The purpose of this manual is to aid in the design of an aerodynamics test of an earth or planetary entry capsule in a ballistic range. In this manual, much use is made of the results and experience gained in 50 years of ballistic range aerodynamics testing at the NASA Ames Research Center, and in particular, that gained in the last 27 years, while the author was working at NASA Ames. The topics treated herein include: Data to be obtained; flight data needed to design test; Reynolds number and dynamic similarity of flight trajectory and ballistic range test; capabilities of various ballistic ranges; Calculations of swerves due to average and oscillating lift and of drag-induced velocity decreases; Model and sabot design; materials, weights and stresses; Sabot separation; Launches at angle of attack and slapping with paper to produce pitch/yaw oscillations.
Test Design↗
Radioisotope thermionic power supply for spacecraft
Power supply design for unmanned electric propulsion missions to outer planets utilizes a store of curium-244 in compact array of capsules as energy source. Supply subassemblies are: heat source, converter equipment which supplies power, and safety equipment. System is designed for a 72,000 hour mission.
Homeyer, W. G.↗
Preliminary Aerodynamic Measurements from a Magnetic Suspension and Balance System in a Low-Speed Wind Tunnel
An existing Magnetic Suspension and Balance System (MSBS) has been restored to operation in a small (octagonal test section, 6-inches across flats) low-speed wind tunnel as the first phase of a project to develop new dynamic test capabilities for planetary entry capsules at supersonic speeds. The MSBS and associated wind tunnel were originally designed and built at MIT and were subsequently relocated to NASA Langley Research Center. NASA ceased operations of the system in the late 1990s and it was transferred to Old Dominion University where it had been mothballed until the present work started in 2015. All-new position sensor electronics, electromagnet power supplies, digital controller, and other hardware have been developed, leading to more efficient and reliable operation. Important features of the new hardware will be briefly described. Wind tunnel testing has commenced, focusing first on static aerodynamics of re-entry capsule shapes. Some preliminary results will be reviewed, including comparison to reference data. The proposed extension to dynamic stability testing, using a variety of free-to-pitch approaches will be described. Finally, the preliminary design of the all-new Phase II (supersonic) system will be briefly outlined.
Schoenenberger, Mark↗
Preliminary design of the Shuttle-C avionics recovery system
The analysis done in developing a recovery system for the Shuttle-C cargo vehicle is presented. This recovery system is comprised of a reentry capsule which houses the vehicles avionics. The avionics are contained in a single package which is extracted from the capsule by the parachute recovery system. The Shuttle-C will be able to satisfy NASA's design and mission requirements. Included, is an analysis of the structural, thermal protection, and parachute recovery systems. A discussion of the merits of the proposed system is also included.
Brookfield, Morgan↗