Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Crewed”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Crew Scheduling Performance

As NASA considers long-duration exploration missions (LDEMs), it is envisioned that crew will behave more autonomously as compared to low-Earth orbit missions. The necessary shift of Ops Planners’ complete management of scheduling and planning to provide flexibility for crew to manage their own schedule in real-time requires significant research and investigation in evaluation of concepts of operations, of software tools to support tasks, and of crew performance to complete scheduling tasks. Our research objective is to characterize the human performance envelope for the task of planning and scheduling (crew self-scheduling), develop countermeasures to mitigate adverse performance effects due to plan complexity, and inform performance standards and guidelines based on research results. In our efforts to understand and characterize scheduling performance of crew members, we have conducted subject matter expert interviews to obtain feedback on scheduling plan complexity drivers and plan goodness. Following the pilot study conducted last year, we designed a study and have begun remote human subject testing to evaluate non-expert human performance, workload, and situational awareness for the task of planning and scheduling. This study investigates the effects of the number and type of constraints on human performance, and the differences in scheduling metrics between scheduling and rescheduling tasks. Subject testing is currently in progress, and we aim to collect data from approximately thirty subjects. We will summarize the methods used and impacts of the number and type of scheduling constraints. We will also present lessons learned as well as relevant results of the study.

crew scheduling↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Crewed Surface Operations Training Dust Mitigation Test/Training Facility (DMTF)

Based on several Apollo mission(s) reports and lessons learned1 on lunar dust impacts, it is imperative for successful Artemis missions, to develop dust mitigation methods & train crew in dust cleaning techniques for efficient use of lunar surface time and for crew health. Longer durations and increased number of Extra Vehicular Activities (EVAs) for Artemis need better training. Apollo missions lacked training in a dust facility. Current facilities do not provide adequate fidelity to train crew in dust cleaning operations in suited, pressurized environments. Mimicking dust cleaning actions in existing facilities (eg- Neutral Buoyancy lab) does not provide in depth understanding of actions and time needed to clean suit or positions crew need to take to remove dust from suit. Available dust bins do not support suited/pressurized ops, personnel not trained in suited ops, more overhead/travel. A local facility at Johnson Space Center (JSC) w/ adequate fidelity supporting suited/pressurized ops, personnel in suited ops is a crucial need for rapid development/testing and training. This facility will provide NASA capabilities to: 1. Provide a dust containment bin to perform suited pressurized crewed training/testing activities for dust interaction/mitigation leveraging existing JSC facility infrastructure and 2. Perform end-to-end simulated lunar dust testing of fluid, mechanical, and electrical systems to provide “test like you fly” confidence for industry developed solutions.

EVA training↗
NASA NTRS1981

The role of communications, socio-psychological, and personality factors in the maintenance of crew coordination

The influence of group dynamics on the capability of aircraft crew members to make full use of the resources available on the flight deck in order to maintain flight safety is discussed. Instances of crewmembers withholding altimeter or heading information from the captain are cited as examples of domineering attitudes from command pilots and overconscientiousness on the parts of copilots, who may refuse to relay information forcefully enough or to take control of the aircraft in the case of pilot incapacitation. NASA studies of crew performance in controlled, simulator settings, concentrating on communication, decision making, crew interaction, and integration showed that efficient communication reduced errors. Acknowledgements served to encourage correct communication. The best crew performance is suggested to occur with personnel who are capable of both goal and group orientation. Finally, one bad effect of computer controlled flight is cited to be the tendency of the flight crew to think that someone else is taking care of difficulties in threatening situations.

Foushee, H. C.↗
NASA NTRS1983

A simulation study of crew performance in operating an advanced transport aircraft in an automated terminal area environment

A simulation study assessing crew performance operating an advanced transport aircraft in an automated terminal area environment is described. The linking together of the Langley Advanced Transport Operating Systems Aft Flight Deck Simulator with the Terminal Area Air Traffic Model Simulation was required. The realism of an air traffic control (ATC) environment with audio controller instructions for the flight crews and the capability of inserting a live aircraft into the terminal area model to interact with computer generated aircraft was provided. Crew performance using the advanced displays and two separate control systems (automatic and manual) in flying area navigation routes in the automated ATC environment was assessed. Although the crews did not perform as well using the manual control system, their performances were within acceptable operational limits with little increase in workload. The crews favored using the manual control system and felt they were more alert and aware of their environment when using it.

Houck, J. A.↗
NASA NTRS1983

Space-station crew-safety requirements

Baseline rescue and survival concepts for future space station crews are described. Preliminary studies are being carried out to identify potential threats to crew safety and means to counteract the dangers. Significant factors being considered include the type of threat, the warning time, the number of crewmembers, strategies for protection of the crew (including life-support measures redundancy), and the dependence of space station crews on ground personnel. Attention is being given to the impact of safety devices on the space station geometry and cost, as well as the equipment necessary to maintain the crew in a psychological status positive enough to cope with emergencies. Typical threats would be fire, crewmember illness or injury, and abandonment of the station. A Shuttle launch could take up to 12 days, while equipping the space station with an emergency return capsule would permit return on the same day as the capsule was occupied.

Witcofski, R. D.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Group-level issues in the design and training of cockpit crews

Cockpit crews always operate in an organizational context, and the transactions between the crew and representatives of that context (e.g., organizational managers, air traffic controllers) are consequential for any crew's performance. For a complete understanding of crew performance a look beyond the traditional focus on individual pilots is provided to see how team- and organization-level factors can enhance (or impede) the ability of even well-trained individuals to work together effectively. This way of thinking about cockpit crews (that is, viewing them as teams that operate in organizations) offers some potentially useful avenues for thinking about next steps in the development of CRM training programs. Those possibilities are explored, emphasizing how they can enrich (not replace) individually-focussed CRM training.

Hackman, J. Richard↗
NASA NTRS1986

Analysis of crew functions as an aid in Space Station interior layout

The Space Station must be designed to facilitate all of the functions that its crew will perform, both on-duty and off-duty, as efficiently and comfortably as possible. This paper examines the functions to be performed by the Space Station crew in order to make inferences about the design of an interior layout that optimizes crew productivity. Twenty-seven crew functions were defined, as well as five criteria for assessing relationships among all pairs of those functions. Hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling techniques were used to visually summarize the relationships. A key result was the identification of two dimensions for describing the configuration of crew functions: 'Private-Public' and 'Group-Individual'. Seven specific recommendations for Space Station interior layout were derived from the analyses.

Steinberg, A. L.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Contamination control of the space shuttle Orbiter crew compartment

Effective contamination control as applied to manned space flight environments is a discipline characterized and controlled by many parameters. An introduction is given to issues involving Orbiter crew compartment contamination control. An effective ground processing contamination control program is an essential building block to a successful shuttle mission. Personnel are required to don cleanroom-grade clothing ensembles before entering the crew compartment and follow cleanroom rules and regulations. Prior to crew compartment entry, materials and equipment must be checked by an orbiter integrity clerk stationed outside the white-room entrance for compliance to program requirements. Analysis and source identification of crew compartment debris studies have been going on for two years. The objective of these studies is to determine and identify particulate generating materials and activities in the crew compartment. Results show a wide spectrum of many different types of materials. When source identification is made, corrective action is implemented to minimize or curtail further contaminate generation.

Bartelson, Donald W.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Crew procedures for microwave landing system operations

The objective of this study was to identify crew procedures involved in Microwave Landing System (MLS) operations and to obtain a preliminary assessment of crew workload. The crew procedures were identified for three different complements of airborne equipment coupled to an autopilot. Using these three equipment complements, crew tasks were identified for MLS approaches and precision departures and compared to an ILS approach and a normal departure. Workload comparisons between the approaches and departures were made by using a task-timeline analysis program that obtained workload indexes, i.e., the radio of time required to complete the tasks to the time available. The results showed an increase in workload for the MLS scenario for one of the equipment complements. However, even this workload was within the capacity of two crew members.

Summers, Leland G.↗
NASA NTRS1989

The Space Station Freedom evolution-phase - Crew-EVA demand for robotic substitution by task primitive

Space Station Freedom represents a significant demand for automation and robotics services as substitutes for crew EVAs. Results are reported from a study aimed at identifying the demand for crew EVA and the crew-task primitive distributions derived for input to future robotic substitution studies. Generic EVA tasks are developed from historical EVA mission timelines, and a set of 70 task primitives defined. The generic task activities are partitioned into task setup, kernel, and tear-down, with standardized task times and frequencies. These standardized times are coupled with inputs from numerous mission data bases in a probabilistic simulation to obtain estimates of total crew-EVA task time demand by crew task primitive. The use of probabilistic model is found to be crucial for understanding, isolating, and addressing the large uncertainties in the EVA task kernels.

Smith, Jeffrey H.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Project EGRESS: Earthbound Guaranteed Reentry from Space Station. the Design of an Assured Crew Recovery Vehicle for the Space Station

Unlike previously designed space-based working environments, the shuttle orbiter servicing the space station will not remain docked the entire time the station is occupied. While an Apollo capsule was permanently available on Skylab, plans for Space Station Freedom call for a shuttle orbiter to be docked at the space station for no more than two weeks four times each year. Consideration of crew safety inspired the design of an Assured Crew Recovery Vehicle (ACRV). A conceptual design of an ACRV was developed. The system allows the escape of one or more crew members from Space Station Freedom in case of emergency. The design of the vehicle addresses propulsion, orbital operations, reentry, landing and recovery, power and communication, and life support. In light of recent modifications in space station design, Project EGRESS (Earthbound Guaranteed ReEntry from Space Station) pays particular attention to its impact on space station operations, interfaces and docking facilities, and maintenance needs. A water-landing medium-lift vehicle was found to best satisfy project goals of simplicity and cost efficiency without sacrificing safety and reliability requirements. One or more seriously injured crew members could be returned to an earth-based health facility with minimal pilot involvement. Since the craft is capable of returning up to five crew members, two such permanently docked vehicles would allow a full evacuation of the space station. The craft could be constructed entirely with available 1990 technology, and launched aboard a shuttle orbiter.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1990

Modeling strength data for CREW CHIEF

The Air Force has developed CREW CHIEF, a computer-aided design (CAD) tool for simulating and evaluating aircraft maintenance to determine if the required activities are feasible. CREW CHIEF gives the designer the ability to simulate maintenance activities with respect to reach, accessibility, strength, hand tool operation, and materials handling. While developing the CREW CHIEF, extensive research was performed to describe workers strength capabilities for using hand tools and manual handling of objects. More than 100,000 strength measures were collected and modeled for CREW CHIEF. These measures involved both male and female subjects in the 12 maintenance postures included in CREW CHIEF. The data collection and modeling effort are described.

Mcdaniel, Joe W.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Leader personality and crew effectiveness - A full-mission simulation experiment

A full-mission simulation research study was completed to assess the impact of individual personality on crew performance. Using a selection algorithm described by Chidester (1987), captains were classified as fitting one of three profiles along a battery of personality assessment scales. The performances of 23 crews led by captains fitting each profile were contrasted over a one and one-half day simulated trip. Crews led by captains fitting a positive Instrumental-Expressive profile (high achievement motivation and interpersonal skill) were consistently effective and made fewer errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Expressive profile (below average achievement motivation, negative expressive style, such as complaining) were consistently less effective and made more errors. Crews led by captains fitting a Negative Instrumental profile (high levels of competitiveness, Verbal Aggressiveness, and Impatience and Irritability) were less effective on the first day but equal to the best on the second day. These results underscore the importance of stable personality variables as predictors of team coordination and performance.

Chidester, Thomas R.↗
NASA NTRS1991

The impact of cockpit automation on crew coordination and communication. Volume 1: Overview, LOFT evaluations, error severity, and questionnaire data

The purpose was to examine, jointly, cockpit automation and social processes. Automation was varied by the choice of two radically different versions of the DC-9 series aircraft, the traditional DC-9-30, and the glass cockpit derivative, the MD-88. Airline pilot volunteers flew a mission in the simulator for these aircraft. Results show that the performance differences between the crews of the two aircraft were generally small, but where there were differences, they favored the DC-9. There were no criteria on which the MD-88 crews performed better than the DC-9 crews. Furthermore, DC-9 crews rated their own workload as lower than did the MD-88 pilots. There were no significant differences between the two aircraft types with respect to the severity of errors committed during the Line-Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) flight. The attitude questionnaires provided some interesting insights, but failed to distinguish between DC-9 and MD-88 crews.

Wiener, Earl L.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Coordination strategies of crew management

An exploratory study that describes and contrasts two three-person flight crews performing in a B-727 simulator is presented. This study specifically attempts to delineate crew communication patterns accounting for measured differences in performance across routine and nonroutine flight patterns. The communication patterns in the two crews evaluated indicated different modes of coordination, i.e., standardization in the less effective crew and planning/mutual adjustment in the more effective crew.

Conley, Sharon↗
NASA NTRS1993

Flight crew interface aspects of forward-looking airborne windshear detection systems

The goal of this research effort was to conduct analyses and research which could provide guidelines for design of the crew interface of an integrated windshear system. Addressed were HF issues, crew/system requirements, candidate display formats, alerting criteria, and crew procedures. A survey identified five flight management issues as top priority: missed alert acceptability; avoidance distance needed; false alert acceptability; nuisance rate acceptability; and crew procedures. Results of a simulation study indicated that the warning time for a look-ahead alert needs to be between 11 and 36 seconds (target of 23 seconds) before the reactive system triggers in order to be effective. Pilots considered the standard go-around maneuver most appropriate for look-ahead alerts, and the escape maneuvers used did not require lateral turns. Prototype display formats were reviewed or developed for alerting the crew; providing guidance to avoid or escape windshear; and status displays to provide windshear situational awareness. The three alerting levels now in use were considered appropriate, with a fourth (time-critical) level as a possible addition, although many reviewers felt only two levels of alerting were needed. Another survey gathered expert opinion on what crew procedures and alerting criteria should be used for look-ahead, or integrated, windshear systems, with a wide diversity of opinion in these areas.

Anderson, Charles D.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Soyuz-TM-based interim Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) for the Space Station Freedom

The concept of using the available Soyuz-TM Assured Crew Return Vehicle (ACRV) spacecraft for the assurance of the safety of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) crew after the departure of the Space Shuttle from SSF was proposed by the NPO Energia and was accepted by NASA in 1992. The ACRV will provide the crew with the capability to evacuate a seriously injured/ill crewmember from the SSF to a ground-based care facility under medically tolerable conditions and with the capability for a safe evacuation from SSF in the events SSF becomes uninhabitable or the Space Shuttle flights are interrupted for a time that exceeds SSF ability for crew support and/or safe operations. This paper presents the main results of studies on Phase A (including studies on the service life of ACRV; spacecraft design and operations; prelaunch processing; mission support; safety, reliability, maintenance and quality and assurance; landing, and search/rescue operations; interfaces with the SSF and with Space Shuttle; crew accommodation; motion of orbital an service modules; and ACRV injection by the Expendable Launch Vehicles), along with the objectives of further work on the Phase B.

Yu P Semenov↗
NASA NTRS1994

Influence of the helicopter environment on patient care capabilities: Flight crew perceptions

Flight crew perceptions of the effect of the rotary wing environment on patient care capabilities have not been subject to statistical analysis. We hypothesized that flight crew perceived significant difficulties in performing patient care tasks during air medical transport. A survey instrument was distributed to a convenience sample of flight crew members from twenty flight programs. Respondents were asked to compare the difficulty of performing patient care tasks in rotary wing and standard (emergency department or intensive care unit) settings. Demographic data collected on respondents included years of flight experience, flights per month, crew duty position, and primary aircraft in which the respondent worked. Statistical analysis was performed as appropriate using Student's t-test, type 111 sum of squares, and analysis of variance. Alpha was defined as p is less than or equal to .05. Fifty-five percent of programs (90 individuals) responded. All tasks were rated significantly more difficult in the rotary wing environment. Ratings were not significantly correlated with flight experience, duty position, flights per month, or aircraft used. We conclude that the performance of patient care tasks are perceived by air medical flight crew to be significantly more difficult during rotary wing air medical transport than in hospital settings.

Meyers, K. Jeffrey↗