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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 199 records · Page 11

Improving Life-Cycle Cost Management of Spacecraft Missions

This presentation will explore the results of a recent NASA Life-Cycle Cost study and how project managers can use the findings and recommendations to improve planning and coordination early in the formulation cycle and avoid common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns. The typical NASA space science mission will exceed both the initial estimated and the confirmed life-cycle costs by the end of the mission. In a fixed-budget environment, these overruns translate to delays in starting or launching future missions, or in the worst case can lead to cancelled missions. Some of these overruns are due to issues outside the control of the project; others are due to the unpredictable problems (unknown unknowns) that can affect any development project. However, a recent study of life-cycle cost growth by the Discovery and New Frontiers Program Office identified a number of areas that are within the scope of project management to address. The study also found that the majority of the underlying causes for cost overruns are embedded in the project approach during the formulation and early design phases, but the actual impacts typically are not experienced until late in the project life cycle. Thus, project management focus in key areas such as integrated schedule development, management structure and contractor communications processes, heritage and technology assumptions, and operations planning, can be used to validate initial cost assumptions and set in place management processes to avoid the common pitfalls resulting in cost overruns.

Clardy, Dennon↗

Examining the Trends in Financial Support Given to Science Teams for Data Analysis in Mission Proposals

Introduction: The goal of this summer internship research project was to analyze trends in financial support proposed for the science teams of planetary missions. The analysis focuses on the funding for Co-Investigators (Co-Is) to conduct research and/or data analysis needed to achieve the science objectives of the mission. The operational portion of the missions after launch (i.e., Phase E, including cruise and prime operations at the final destination) were examined since that is when the bulk of research is funded and conducted. The objectives of the project were to determine the average level of support for Co-Investigators, identify variation between mission competitions and over time, and determine the relationship between mission type and the amount of support requested. Methodology: This project was conducted using data from 90 proposals submitted to six mission competitions in the Discovery and New Frontiers programs. The level of support for Co-Is was determined by examining Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) 4 (Science Analysis) for Phase E, which was further subdivided into cruise and prime operations. This data represents a proxy rather than the actual funding Co-Is receive to perform research and data analysis because not every dollar in WBS 4 is spent on this activity. Therefore, the proxy obtained in this research represents an overestimate of the funds allocated to Co-Is for research and data analysis. Findings: Analysis shows that on average a Co-I receives approximately four full years of support spread across the entirety of Phase E for science analysis. The variation among proposed missions is less than expected given the variety of factors that are expected to drive this metric (length of mission, mission type, etc.). Additionally, the level of requested support for Co-Is has been remarkably consistent across every variable considered (by competition, over time, by mission type) over the six competitions and nearly 20 years spanned by this project. This remains true for cruise, primary operations, and all of Phase E. Conclusions: A remarkable amount of science is accomplished by the science teams of planetary missions. However, a surprisingly small amount of funding is requested to support the science analysis driving this productivity, both in terms of absolute magnitude of funding and as a portion of total mission cost. This suggests improvements are needed to refine the estimates of Co-I support and/or that Co-Is rely on other funding sources to conduct their research. Better estimates can be determined by engaging directly with Co-Is and NASA centers to obtain data as well as finding other data sources. Additionally, NASA could consider mandating improved reporting of requested funding levels in mission competitions.

E Murray↗

Implementation Plan for a NASA Integrated Lunar Science Strategy in the Artemis Era

This Implementation Plan provides a snapshot of NASA’s plans to implement the strategy recommended in OWL and to address the M2M objectives relevant to lunar science. The word “integrated” in the title refers to integrating the capabilities and new opportunities afforded by Artemis and CLPS alongside more traditional mechanisms such as The Discovery and New Frontiers Programs and various Research and Analysis (R&A) elements to achieve our lunar science objectives. It is an opportunity to present the full scope of tools currently available to NASA and how they map to high-priority lunar science that can be accomplished on and at the Moon. It is also an opportunity to build a plan for future NASA-led, lunar focused science and exploration activities that is flexible and can be adapted to a changing landscape (i.e., capability growth, priority evolution, and budgetary fluctuation).

Moon↗

A Scalable Analysis Toolkit

The Scalable Analysis Toolkit (SAT) project aimed to demonstrate that it is feasible and useful to statically detect software bugs in very large systems. The technical focus of the project was on a relatively new class of constraint-based techniques for analysis software, where the desired facts about programs (e.g., the presence of a particular bug) are phrased as constraint problems to be solved. At the beginning of this project, the most successful forms of formal software analysis were limited forms of automatic theorem proving (as exemplified by the analyses used in language type systems and optimizing compilers), semi-automatic theorem proving for full verification, and model checking. With a few notable exceptions these approaches had not been demonstrated to scale to software systems of even 50,000 lines of code. Realistic approaches to large-scale software analysis cannot hope to make every conceivable formal method scale. Thus, the SAT approach is to mix different methods in one application by using coarse and fast but still adequate methods at the largest scales, and reserving the use of more precise but also more expensive methods at smaller scales for critical aspects (that is, aspects critical to the analysis problem under consideration) of a software system. The principled method proposed for combining a heterogeneous collection of formal systems with different scalability characteristics is mixed constraints. This idea had been used previously in small-scale applications with encouraging results: using mostly coarse methods and narrowly targeted precise methods, useful information (meaning the discovery of bugs in real programs) was obtained with excellent scalability.

Aiken, Alexander↗

STS-114: Discovery Day 5 Post MMT Briefing

Wayne Hill, Space Shuttle Deputy Program Manager, and Chair of the Mission Management Team, reports the following: the testing of the thermal protection system in space, on orbit was successful; the MMT meeting formally approved the mission extension for one day; image analysis from the launch phase has been completed; tile and blankets had been formally cleared by the Engineering team; additional inspection of the reinforced carbon-carbon (RCC); gap filler, heat shield and small black spot phenomenon are carefully inspected and evaluated to prepare the safe return of the Discovery. Bill Gerstenmaier, ISS Program Manager reports on the extra vehicular activities (EVA): replaced the GPS antenna; prepared the airlock to attach the ESP2; re-powered CMG2; transfer of CWCs; and the MISSE packages were wrapped around thru at the end of the air lock. He mentioned the high currents problem seen on CMG3, which they will have to take off line to check and understand the problem. Consumables, engineering performance of the three sensors (LCS, LDRI, ITVC), CMG removal and replacement, EVA2 and EVA3, gap fillers, RCC, hydrogen tank pre-press cycles, thermal protection system, inspection, ISS supply maintenance, and projection of next flight are topics covered with the News Media.

Source record↗

Near-Earth asteroid discovery rate review

Fifteen to twenty years ago the discovery of 1 or 2 Near Earth Asteroids (NEAs) per year was typical from one systematic search program, Palomar Planet Crossing Asteroid Survey (PCAS), and the incidental discovery from a variety of other astronomical program. Sky coverage and magnitude were both limited by slower emulsions, requiring longer exposures. The 1970's sky coverage of 15,000 to 25,000 sq. deg. per year led to about 1 NEA discovery every 13,000 sq. deg. Looking at the years from 1987 through 1990, it was found that by comparing 1987/1988 and 1989/1990, the world discovery rate of NEAs went from 20 to 43. More specifically, PCAS' results when grouped into the two year periods, show an increase from 5 discoveries in the 1st period to 20 in the 2nd period, a fourfold increase. Also, the discoveries went from representing about 25 pct. of the world total to about 50 pct. of discoveries worldwide. The surge of discoveries enjoyed by PCAS in particular is attributed to new fine grain sensitive emulsions, film hypering, more uniformity in the quality of the photograph, more equitable scheduling, better weather, and coordination of efforts. The maximum discoveries seem to have been attained at Palomar Schmidt.

Helin, Eleanor F.↗

Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Summer Conference: NASA/USRA University Advanced Aeronautics Design Program and Advanced Space Design Program

The NASA/USRA University Advanced Design Program was established in 1984 as an attempt to add more and better design education to primarily undergraduate engineering programs. The original focus of the pilot program encompassing nine universities and five NASA centers was on space design. Two years later, the program was expanded to include aeronautics design with six universities and three NASA centers participating. This year marks the last of a three-year cycle of participation by forty-one universities, eight NASA centers, and one industry participant. The Advanced Space Design Program offers universities an opportunity to plan and design missions and hardware that would be of usc in the future as NASA enters a new era of exploration and discovery, while the Advanced Aeronautics Design Program generally offers opportunities for study of design problems closer to the present time, ranging from small, slow-speed vehicles to large, supersonic and hypersonic passenger transports. The systems approach to the design problem is emphasized in both the space and aeronautics projects. The student teams pursue the chosen problem during their senior year in a one- or two-semester capstone design course and submit a comprehensive written report at the conclusion of the project. Finally, student representatives from each of the universities summarize their work in oral presentations at the Annual Summer Conference, sponsored by one of the NASA centers and attended by the university faculty, NASA and USRA personnel and aerospace industry representatives. As the Advanced Design Program has grown in size, it has also matured in terms of the quality of the student projects. The present volume represents the student work accomplished during the 1992-1993 academic year reported at the Ninth Annual Summer Conference hosted by NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, June 14-18, 1993.

Source record↗

Development of gold alloy catalyst cathode for alkaline electrolyte fuel cells

A program for the development of improved catalyst and Teflon-bonded electrode structures using this improved catalyst is described, for use in fuel cell cathodes. It was found that Au-Pt was superior to the traditional platinum black as a catalyst. The impetus to the program was provided by the discovery that a life-limiting mechanism on the old catalyst was the gradual dissolution of platinum from the cathode and subsequent redeposition in the electrolyte-containing matrix.

Freed, M. S.↗

Comparison of satellite derived dynamical quantities in the stratosphere of the Southern Hemisphere

The proceedings are summarized from a pre-MASH planning workshop on the intercomparison of Southern Hemisphere observations, analyses and derived dynamical quantities held in Williamsburg, Virginia during April 1986. The aims of this workshop were primarily twofold: (1) comparison of Southern Hemisphere dynamical quantities derived from various satellite data archives (e.g., from limb scanners and nadir sounders); and (2) assessing the impact of different base-level height information on such derived quantities. These tasks are viewed as especially important in the Southern Hemisphere because of the paucity of conventional measurements. A further strong impetus for the MASH program comes from the recent discovery of the springtime ozone hold over Antarctica. Insight gained from validation studies such as the one reported here will contribute to an improved understanding of the role of meteorology in the development and evolution of the hold, in its interannual variability, and in its interhemispheric differences. The dynamical quantities examined in this workshop included geopotential height, zonal wind, potential vorticity, eddy heat and momentum fluxes, and Eliassen-Palm fluxes. The time periods and data sources constituting the MASH comparisons are summarized.

Miles, Thomas↗

Repairs In Space

Four thermal protection repair technologies will be carried by the STS-114 mission on Discovery when the space shuttle program resumes flights as early as mid-May. Three of the concepts will be tested in orbit and the fourth kept in reserve.

Covault, Craig↗

On-Orbit Software Analysis

The On-Orbit Software Analysis Research Infusion Project was done by Intrinsyx Technologies Corporation (Intrinsyx) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research Center (ARC). The Project was a joint collaborative effort between NASA Codes IC and SL, Kestrel Technology (Kestrel), and Intrinsyx. The primary objectives of the Project were: Discovery and verification of software program properties and dependencies, Detection and isolation of software defects across different versions of software, and Compilation of historical data and technical expertise for future applications

Moran, Susanne I.↗

The NASA Space Infrared Telescope Facility

The NASA Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) will begin definition phase funding in November of 1996. The instrumentation is being designed to accomodate scientific investigation programs in four key areas: discovery and study of brown dwarfs and super planets, discovery and study of protoplanetary and planetary debris disks, study of ultra-luminous galaxies and active galactic nuclei (AGN) and study of the early universe.

NASA Space Infrared Telescope Facility SIRTF↗

The Stardust solar array

The Stardust program, part of NASA's Discovery Missions was launched on February 7. 1999. It's seven-year mission is to gather interstellar dust and material from the comet Wild-2 and return the material to earth in January 2006. In order to accomplish this mission, the satellite will orbit the sun a total of three times, traversing distances from a little under 1 AU to 2.7 AU. On April 18 2002 , the Stardust spacecraft reached its furthest distance and broke the record for being the farthest spacecraft from the sun powered by solar energy, The Stardust solar panels were built with standard off the shelf 10 Ohm-cm high efficiency silicon solar cells. These solar cells are relatively inexpensive and have shown excellent characteristics under LILT conditions. In order to accommodate the varying temperature and intensity conditions on the electrical power subsystem, an electronic switch box was designed to reconfigure the string length and number of swings depending on the mission phase. This box allowed the use of an inexpensive direct energy transfer system for the electrical power system architecture. The solar panels and electrical power system have met all requirements. Telemetry data from the solar panels at 2.7 AU are in excellent agreement with flight predictions.

Stardust interstellar dust Wild-2 solar panels sol↗

Modeling Regular Replacement for String Constraint Solving

Bugs in user input sanitation of software systems often lead to vulnerabilities. Among them many are caused by improper use of regular replacement. This paper presents a precise modeling of various semantics of regular substitution, such as the declarative, finite, greedy, and reluctant, using finite state transducers (FST). By projecting an FST to its input/output tapes, we are able to solve atomic string constraints, which can be applied to both the forward and backward image computation in model checking and symbolic execution of text processing programs. We report several interesting discoveries, e.g., certain fragments of the general problem can be handled using less expressive deterministic FST. A compact representation of FST is implemented in SUSHI, a string constraint solver. It is applied to detecting vulnerabilities in web applications

Fu, Xiang↗

NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop Results

Fault Management is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. For the purposes of this paper, fault management is defined as the ability of a system to detect, isolate, and mitigate events that impact, or have the potential to impact, nominal mission operations. The fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, as well as opportunities identified for future investment in tools, processes, and products to facilitate the development of space flight fault management capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗

Results from the NASA Spacecraft Fault Management Workshop: Cost Drivers for Deep Space Missions

Fault Management, the detection of and response to in-flight anomalies, is a critical aspect of deep-space missions. Fault management capabilities are commonly distributed across flight and ground subsystems, impacting hardware, software, and mission operations designs. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for five missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that four out of the five missions studied had significant overruns due to underestimating the complexity and support requirements for fault management. As a result of this and other recent experiences, the NASA Science Mission Directorate (SMD) Planetary Science Division (PSD) commissioned a workshop to bring together invited participants across government, industry, and academia to assess the state of the art in fault management practice and research, identify current and potential issues, and make recommendations for addressing these issues. The workshop was held in New Orleans in April of 2008. The workshop concluded that fault management is not being limited by technology, but rather by a lack of emphasis and discipline in both the engineering and programmatic dimensions. Some of the areas cited in the findings include different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; unclear ownership of end-to-end fault management engineering; inadequate understanding of the impact of mission-level requirements on fault management complexity; and practices, processes, and tools that have not kept pace with the increasing complexity of mission requirements and spacecraft systems. This paper summarizes the findings and recommendations from that workshop, particularly as fault management development issues affect operations and the development of operations capabilities.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗

Heritage and Advanced Technology Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from NASA Deep Space Missions

In the design and development of complex spacecraft missions, project teams frequently assume the use of advanced technology systems or heritage systems to enable a mission or reduce the overall mission risk and cost. As projects proceed through the development life cycle, increasingly detailed knowledge of the advanced and heritage systems within the spacecraft and mission environment identifies unanticipated technical issues. Resolving these issues often results in cost overruns and schedule impacts. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Discovery & New Frontiers (D&NF) Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that optimistic hardware/software inheritance and technology readiness assumptions caused cost and schedule growth for four of the five missions studied. The cost and schedule growth was not found to result from technical hurdles requiring significant technology development. The projects institutional inheritance and technology readiness processes appear to adequately assess technology viability and prevent technical issues from impacting the final mission success. However, the processes do not appear to identify critical issues early enough in the design cycle to ensure project schedules and estimated costs address the inherent risks. In general, the overruns were traceable to: an inadequate understanding of the heritage system s behavior within the proposed spacecraft design and mission environment; an insufficient level of development experience with the heritage system; or an inadequate scoping of the system-wide impacts necessary to implement an advanced technology for space flight applications. The paper summarizes the study's lessons learned in more detail and offers suggestions for improving the project's ability to identify and manage the technology and heritage risks inherent in the design solution.

Barley, Bryan↗