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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations (BLEs) used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the coefficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for spacecraft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar surface assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) Testing, Ballistic Limit Equation Definition and Risk Assessment of the Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU)

A well-known hazard associated with exposure to the space environment is the risk of failure due to an impact from a micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) particle. As NASA prepares to return astronauts to the moon with the Artemis program, the next generation of spacesuit is in development to support future extravehicular activities (EVAs.) An MMOD impact to the spacesuit is of great concern as a large leak could prevent an astronaut from safely reaching an airlock in time resulting in a loss of life. The exploration extravehicular mobility unit (xEMU) must meet MMOD requirements for multiple environments including those in low earth orbit (LEO) as well as the meteoroid and secondary lunar regolith ejecta environments found on the lunar surface. The subject of this paper is an internal xEMU configuration design developed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) personnel. This paper will expand on the hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing and ballistic limit equation (BLE) definition work that was partially presented at the 2nd International Orbital De-bris (IOC-II) Conference held in Sugar Land, TX in December 2023. The xEMU shares similarities with the legacy Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) spacesuit that is currently used for ISS EVAs, however differences in the layup (e.g., materials, thicknesses, and layers) of the fabric environmental protection garment (EPG), portable life support system (xPLSS) and helmet required an extensive test program to determine ballistic performance. Over 100 hypervelocity impact (HVI) tests were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate ballistic limit equations (BLEs) for MMOD impacts. Additionally, over 50 low speed tests (< 1km/s) were performed by the NASA/JSC HVIT and Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) teams on the xEMU EPG, xPLSS and helmet to generate BLEs for lunar ejecta impacts. Post testing, ballistic limit equations used to define the performance of the various regions on the xEMU spacesuit were developed from a generic set of BLEs. The HVI and low speed testing was performed to establish a physical basis for the equations with the co-efficients and exponents of the generic BLEs adjusted to fit the test data. The xEMU BLEs were added to the NASA/JSC software application used for space-craft MMOD risk assessments (BUMPER-3). A finite element model (FEM) of the xEMU spacesuit, which defines the size and shape of the spacesuit as well as the locations of the various shielding configurations, was created based on a solid model provided by the xEMU program office. Using the FEM file and added xEMU BLEs, BUMPER-3 assessments of the xEMU spacesuit for probability of no penetration (PNP) were performed. For the LEO assessment of a typical ISS EVA, the orbital debris and meteoroids environments were defined using the latest engineering models, ORDEM 3.2 and MEM-3 respectively. The lunar sur-face assessment again used the MEM-3 engineering model to define the meteoroid environ-ment along with the current released lunar surface ejecta model, NASA SP-8013 (developed during the Apollo Program). The Space Team in the Natural Environments Branch at Mar-shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) will soon release the new Lunar Meteoroid Ejecta Engineering Model (LMEEM), at which time the xEMU lunar surface EVA will be reassessed. Assessment of the MMOD risk for an 8-hour, 2-person EVA in both LEO and on the lunar surface showed that the xEMU spacesuit meets the program technical requirement of 1 in 2500 failure odds. Similar to the legacy EMU spacesuit, the majority of the MMOD risk (96% of the LEO EVA risk and 99% of the lunar surface EVA risk) is concentrated in regions of xEMU that are comprised primarily of softgoods (arms, legs, and gloves) rather than the hardgoods (xPLSS, hard upper torso and helmet).

Micrometeoroid↗
NASA NTRS2022

Unique Science from the Moon in the Artemis Era

Since the beginning of the space age, the Moon has been proposed as a platform for astronomy. The Moon provides unique capabilities for astrophysics observations. NASA’s Artemis plan to return humans to the Moon in the mid-2020s in a sustainable manner provides an opportunity to advance synergistic approaches between human and robotic exploration. This NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) workshop assesses the feasibility and value proposition of using the Moon as a location for performing unique science observations, leveraging Artemis-era infrastructure while evaluating risks and key engineering challenges.

NASA Engineering and Safety Center↗
NASA NTRS2004

Risk Management Implementation Tool

Continuous Risk Management (CM) is a software engineering practice with processes, methods, and tools for managing risk in a project. It provides a controlled environment for practical decision making, in order to assess continually what could go wrong, determine which risk are important to deal with, implement strategies to deal with those risk and assure the measure effectiveness of the implemented strategies. Continuous Risk Management provides many training workshops and courses to teach the staff how to implement risk management to their various experiments and projects. The steps of the CRM process are identification, analysis, planning, tracking, and control. These steps and the various methods and tools that go along with them, identification, and dealing with risk is clear-cut. The office that I worked in was the Risk Management Office (RMO). The RMO at NASA works hard to uphold NASA s mission of exploration and advancement of scientific knowledge and technology by defining and reducing program risk. The RMO is one of the divisions that fall under the Safety and Assurance Directorate (SAAD). I worked under Cynthia Calhoun, Flight Software Systems Engineer. My task was to develop a help screen for the Continuous Risk Management Implementation Tool (RMIT). The Risk Management Implementation Tool will be used by many NASA managers to identify, analyze, track, control, and communicate risks in their programs and projects. The RMIT will provide a means for NASA to continuously assess risks. The goals and purposes for this tool is to provide a simple means to manage risks, be used by program and project managers throughout NASA for managing risk, and to take an aggressive approach to advertise and advocate the use of RMIT at each NASA center.

Wright, Shayla L.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Three-Dimensional, Transgenic Cell Models to Quantify Space Genotoxic Effects

The space environment contains radiation and chemical agents known to be mutagenic and carcinogenic to humans. Additionally, microgravity is a complicating factor that may modify or synergize induced genotoxic effects. Most in vitro models fail to use human cells (making risk extrapolation to humans more difficult), overlook the dynamic effect of tissue intercellular interactions on genotoxic damage, and lack the sensitivity required to measure low-dose effects. Currently a need exists for a model test system that simulates cellular interactions present in tissue, and can be used to quantify genotoxic damage induced by low levels of radiation and chemicals, and extrapolate assessed risk to humans. A state-of-the-art, three-dimensional, multicellular tissue equivalent cell culture model will be presented. It consists of mammalian cells genetically engineered to contain multiple copies of defined target genes for genotoxic assessment,. NASA-designed bioreactors were used to coculture mammalian cells into spheroids, The cells used were human mammary epithelial cells (H184135) and Stratagene's (Austin, Texas) Big Blue(TM) Rat 2 lambda fibroblasts. The fibroblasts were genetically engineered to contain -a high-density target gene for mutagenesis (60 copies of lacl/LacZ per cell). Tissue equivalent spheroids were routinely produced by inoculation of 2 to 7 X 10(exp 5) fibroblasts with Cytodex 3 beads (150 micrometers in diameter). at a 20:1 cell:bead ratio, into 50-ml HARV bioreactors (Synthecon, Inc.). Fibroblasts were cultured for 5 days, an equivalent number of epithelial cells added, and the fibroblast/epithelial cell coculture continued for 21 days. Three-dimensional spheroids with diameters ranging from 400 to 600 micrometers were obtained. Histological and immunohistochemical Characterization revealed i) both cell types present in the spheroids, with fibroblasts located primarily in the center, surrounded by epithelial cells; ii) synthesis of extracellular matrix; and iii,, mitotic cells located throughout the spheroids. Spheroidal integrity and cell viability were retained for the 30-day test period after removal of spheroids from the bioreactor. Potential utility of this three-dimensional, transgenic model for genotoxicity was initially assessed by exposure of spheroids to 0-2 Gy neon at dose rates of 0.3 to 1.5 Gy/min (National Institute of Radiological Sciences, Chiba, Japan). Quantification of mutation at the lacl gene revealed a linear dose response for mutation induction. Limited sequencing analysis of mutant clones revealed higher frequencies of deletions and multiple base sequence changes with increasing dose. These results suggest that our three-dimensional, transgenic model is applicable to a wide variety of studies involving the quantification, identification, and characterization of genotoxicity incurred in space and on Earth. This model uniquely allows investigation of the interaction of relevant factors, namely cell-to-cell interactions and the mechanistic interaction of microgravity with radiation insults and DNA repair. Using this three-dimensional model will allow us to obtain dual genotoxic information (i.e., mutation rate plus chromosome aberration data) from the same system so that one endpoint can be used to reference the other, thereby increasing the fidelity of the data set. Moreover, the tissue-equivalent nature of the three-dimensional model provides high confidence for relevance of risk assessment, i.e., the establishment of quality factors directly applicable to the microgravity environment.

Gonda, S. R.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Enhancement of risk informed validation framework for external hazard scenario

In recent years, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have developed methodologies to assess the vulnerabilities of nuclear plants against site specific extreme hazards. In many cases, advanced simulation tools are being considered to simulate multi-physics, multi-scale phenomena and to evaluate vulnerability of nuclear facilities. The credibility of advanced simulation tools is assessed based on a formal verification, validation, and uncertainty quantification procedure. One of the key limitations in validation is the lack of relevant experimental data at system-level. This limitation leads to a decrease in the confidence of system-level risk predictions. Therefore, a robust validation framework is needed to formalize the confidence in predictive capability of advanced simulation results. Additionally, this study enhances the existing risk informed validation methodology, originally proposed by Kwag et al. [1] and Bodda et al. [2], by developing additional attributes and a new set of validation indicies for a complete and wider applicability of the framework. In this manuscript, the methodology to identify the critical path that leads to the system-level failure is illustrated. The overall validation is checked for completeness and consistency by comparing the critical path for both the system-level simulation and experimental models. The applicability of the code for an intended application is represented in terms of various maturity levels and helps in the process of decision making.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS2018

Exploration Medical System Trade Study Tools Overview

ExMC is creating an ecosystem of tools to enable well-informed medical system trade studies. The suite of tools address important system implementation aspects of the space medical capabilities trade space and are being built using knowledge from the medical community regarding the unique aspects of space flight. Two integrating models, a systems engineering model and a medical risk analysis model, tie the tools together to produce an integrated assessment of the medical system and its ability to achieve medical system target requirements. This presentation will provide an overview of the various tools that are a part of the tool ecosystem. Initially, the presentation's focus will address the tools that supply the foundational information to the ecosystem. Specifically, the talk will describe how information that describes how medicine will be practiced is captured and categorized for efficient utilization in the tool suite. For example, the talk will include capturing what conditions will be planned for in-mission treatment, planned medical activities (e.g., periodic physical exam), required medical capabilities (e.g., provide imaging), and options to implement the capabilities (e.g., an ultrasound device). Database storage and configuration management will also be discussed. The presentation will include an overview of how these information tools will be tied to parameters in a Systems Modeling Language (SysML) model, allowing traceability to system behavioral, structural, and requirements content. The discussion will also describe an HRP-led enhanced risk assessment model developed to provide quantitative insight into each capability's contribution to mission success. Key outputs from these various tools, to be shared with the space medical and exploration mission development communities, will be assessments of medical system implementation option satisfaction of requirements and per-capability contributions toward achieving requirements.

Mindock, J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Error Localization Examples: Looking for a Needle in a Hay-stack

Finite element models (FEM) are routinely developed and used during fabrication of high dollar-value hardware. NASA as part of the pre-flight certification of launch vehicles routinely conducts vibration and static tests to calibrate models used for flight-risk assessments. As part of the calibration process, certain areas in the model are modified, using engineering judgment and sensitivity analysis, to match the test results. Unfortunately, tools to identify problem areas in the FEM using test data directly are scarce. Over the years, Error Localization Algorithms (ELA) have been proposed with very limited success. Recently, the Analytical Dynamics Model Improvement (ADMI) algorithm, which computes closed-form mass and stiffness corrections to match the test data exactly, have been shown to be effective for error localization. The paper will present several FEM example problems where ELA is used with simulated test data to determine FEM problem areas. For each example, the correct answer is shown along with ELA results. It is shown that the ELA process is able to identify general problem areas in the FEM, which are consistent with known model perturbations. However, in most cases the ELA identified area of improvement is larger than the true answer. Nonetheless, with proper optimization tools, calibration results using the ELA identified areas provide excellent results.

error localization↗
NASA NTRS2007

The Road to Mach 10: A History of the X-43A Hypersonic Flight Test Program at NASA Dryden...Toward the Future

In terms of technology, the X-43A/Hyper-X represented a singular milestone. After nearly a half century of high hopes, studies, wind tunnel tests, proposals, and canceled projects, a scramjet-powered vehicle had flown. The performance of the engine qualified the scramjet design tools and scaling laws. In turn, the theoretical calculations and ground testing could be used to design more advanced engine concepts. Just as important, both the scramjet and vehicle systems had successfully operated in the variable temperatures and densities of the atmosphere. The X-43A systems were able to maintain the exact flight conditions necessary for the scramjet to operate properly. Control deflections to correct the engine-induced moments were close to pre-flight predictions. When the unexpected occurred, such as when the vehicle pitched up during the cowl opening on the second flight, the control system was sufficiently designed to correct the situation. The airframe and wing structure, the thermal protection material, and the internal conditions of the X-43A performed largely as predicted. The HXLV thermal anomaly during the ascent on the third flight and "the Mach 8 unpleasantness" during the descent indicated that the HXLV and X-43A were not as resilient to aerodynamic heating as expected. The X-43A 's airframe drag and lift both were slightly higher than predicted, but still within preflight uncertainty predictions. The stability and control were as predicted, as was the boundary layer transition. The biggest aerodynamic worry before the flight was the separation of the HXLV and the X- 43A. After all was said and done, this went exactly as predicted, proving that non-symmetrical/high-dynamic pressure stage separations could be performed. This in turn meant that two-stage-to-orbit vehicles employing this technology were feasible. The Hyper-X program also served as a training ground for a new generation of scramjet and hypersonic researchers. This included both NASA and contractor personnel, providing them with experience in ground testing and component development; vehicle design, construction, integration, system checkout, and, ultimately, flight testing and data analysis. Additionally, researchers learned the practical details of running a project within finite budget and time limits, about the ambiguousness of risk assessment, and about the need to spend a significant amount of time and effort dealing with engineering problems, such as those with the FAS, that have nothing to do with the project's research goals. Finally, all those who worked on the X-43A project now know what it is like to spend years transforming an idea into a functional vehicle, only for it to be lost in a matter of seconds. And then to go through years of work to correct the problems, to face the possibility that still more might exist, and finally to savor the triumph of two successful flights. For those who will work on the hypersonic projects that emerge in coming years, these experiences may prove to be the most valuable of all.

Peebles, Curtis↗
DOE OSTI2021

Review of Release Behavior of Hydrogen & Natural Gas Blends from Pipelines

Hydrogen can be used to reduce carbon emissions by blending into other gaseous energy carriers, such as natural gas. However, hydrogen blending into natural gas has important implications for safety which need to be evaluated. Hydrogen has different physical properties than natural gas, and these properties affect safety evaluations concerning a leak of the blended gas. The intent of this report is to begin to investigate the safety implications of blending hydrogen into the natural gas infrastructure with respect to a leak event from a pipeline. A literature review was conducted to identify existing data that will better inform future hazard and risk assessments for hydrogen/natural gas blends. Metrics with safety implications such as heat flux and dispersion behavior may be affected by the overall blend ratio of the mixture. Of the literature reviewed, there was no directly observed separation of the hydrogen from the natural gas or methane blend. No literature was identified that experimentally examined unconfined releases such as concentration fields or concentration at specific distances. Computational efforts have predicted concentration fields by modified versions of existing engineering models, but the validation of these models is limited by the unavailability of literature data. There are multiple literature sources that measured flame lengths and heat flux values, which are both relevant metrics to risk and hazard assessments. These data can be more directly compared to the outputs of existing engineering models for validation.

03 NATURAL GAS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Defining A Modelling Language to Support Functional Hazard Assessment

Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) is a key early-stage engineering process that supports the incorporation of safety in design by identifying the high-level functional hazards the system may encounter. While many FHA-like methodologies have been proposed in the design engineering literature, many of these methodologies have had difficulty becoming accepted industry practice. Industry standards, on the other hand, either provide too little recommendation on how to represent the function of the system to perform FHA, or rely on existing design artefacts which insufficiently support the goals of the process. This paper presents some of the problems with current modeling languages (both proposed and used) for FHA which limit the scope, expressiveness, flexibility, and precision of the analysis. It then outlines desirable principles an FHA-supporting analysis language should embody, and introduces the Functional Reasoning Design Language (FRDL), a formal modeling language for describing the functional elements of a system and their interactions, which aims to satisfy these principles. To demonstrate the use of this language, the modeling and hazard analysis of a disaster response drone is presented. While this case study is limited in scope, it highlights how FRDL can represent system function while reducing the ambiguity present in typical FHA-supporting functional modeling languages

Hazard Assessment↗
NASA NTRS1989

Dynamic systems-engineering process - The application of concurrent engineering

A system engineering methodology is described which enables users, particulary NASA and DOD, to accommodate changing needs; incorporate emerging technologies; identify, quantify, and manage system risks; manage evolving functional requirements; track the changing environment; and reduce system life-cycle costs. The approach is a concurrent, dynamic one which starts by constructing a performance model defining the required system functions and the interrelationships. A detailed probabilistic risk assessment of the system elements and their interrelationships is performed, and quantitative analysis of the reliability and maintainability of an engineering system allows its different technical and process failure modes to be identified and their probabilities to be computed. Decision makers can choose technical solutions that maximize an objective function and minimize the probability of failure under resource constraints.

Wiskerchen, Michael J.↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis Techniques for Informing Select Agent Designation and Decision Making

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Select Agent Program establishes a list of biological agents and toxins that potentially threaten public health and safety, the procedures governing the possession, utilization, and transfer of those agents, and training requirements for entities working with them. Every 2 years the Program reviews the select agent list, utilizing subject matter expert (SME) assessments to rank the agents. In this study, we explore the applicability of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques and logic tree analysis to support the CDC Select Agent Program biennial review process, applying the approach broadly to include non-select agents to evaluate its generality. We conducted a literature search for over 70 pathogens against 15 criteria for assessing public health and bioterrorism risk and documented the findings for archiving. The most prominent data gaps were found for aerosol stability and human infectious dose by inhalation and ingestion routes. Technical review of published data and associated scoring recommendations by pathogen-specific SMEs was found to be critical for accuracy, particularly for pathogens with very few known cases, or where proxy data (e.g., from animal models or similar organisms) were used to address data gaps. Analysis of results obtained from a two-dimensional plot of weighted scores for difficulty of attack (i.e., exposure and production criteria) vs. consequences of an attack (i.e., consequence and mitigation criteria) provided greater fidelity for understanding agent placement compared to a 1-to-n ranking and was used to define a region in the upper right-hand quadrant for identifying pathogens for consideration as select agents. A sensitivity analysis varied the numerical weights attributed to various properties of the pathogens to identify potential quantitative (x and y) thresholds for classifying select agents. The results indicate while there is some clustering of agent scores to suggest thresholds, there are still pathogens that score close to any threshold, suggesting that thresholding “by eye” may not be sufficient. The sensitivity analysis indicates quantitative thresholds are plausible, and there is good agreement of the analytical results with select agent designations. A second analytical approach that applied the data using a logic tree format to rule out pathogens for consideration as select agents arrived at similar conclusions.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Design and requirements of a hydrogen component reliability database (HyCReD)

Hydrogen technologies are expected to play a key role in the decarbonization of several sectors including energy storage and transportation. Rigorous investigation and quantification of the risk and reliability issues associated with hydrogen technologies will be critical to ensuring both their wider adoption and safe, economical operations. Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is an important tool that has been used to enable the safe deployment of many engineering systems, including hydrogen fueling stations and hydrogen storage systems. However, QRA studies require reliability data which is currently lacking for expanding applications of hydrogen systems. Here, to address this gap, we present a new structure for a hydrogen component reliability database (HyCReD) that can be used to generate reliability data to be used in QRA, reliability, safety studies, maintenance planning, and more. Building on our previous work examining four major hydrogen safety data collection tools (West et al., 2022) [1], our approach in this work was to consult scientific literature on reliability data collection as well as a number of existing reliability engineering databases in the oil & gas, chemical processing, and nuclear power plant sectors. The evaluation of these databases led to identifying best practices to be implemented in a data collection framework for a hydrogen component reliability database. Based on these best practices, a set of 24 requirements for the proposed database are presented, covering its characteristics and the types of data to be collected. We define the structure of the HyCReD database and 25 data elements to be collected, spanning system description, failure, shutdown, or near-miss events, and maintenance events. The data elements are then defined according to international standards used in the safety and reliability practice and potential choice lists are provided for each field. Since this database is being piloted for hydrogen fueling stations, a generic station component hierarchy developed by West (2021) [2] is used to standardize system data. Finally, we demonstrate populating the database with information extracted from five narrative reports on hydrogen fueling station incidents.

08 HYDROGEN↗
NASA NTRS2010

Identification and Classification of Common Risks in Space Science Missions

Due to the highly constrained schedules and budgets that NASA missions must contend with, the identification and management of cost, schedule and risks in the earliest stages of the lifecycle is critical. At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) it is the concurrent engineering teams that first address these items in a systematic manner. Foremost of these concurrent engineering teams is Team X. Started in 1995, Team X has carried out over 1000 studies, dramatically reducing the time and cost involved, and has been the model for other concurrent engineering teams both within NASA and throughout the larger aerospace community. The ability to do integrated risk identification and assessment was first introduced into Team X in 2001. Since that time the mission risks identified in each study have been kept in a database. In this paper we will describe how the Team X risk process is evolving highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches. The paper will especially focus on the identification and classification of common risks that have arisen during Team X studies of space based science missions.

Risk Identification↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Systems Engineering and Safety Culture: Aerospace Project Design and Implementation Challenges

Using Systems Engineering principles and the NASA Glenn Safety procedures and protocols, a rigorous method was developed to ensure safe testing and operation of a small, commercial off the shelf turbofan engine at the Aero-Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory (AAPL). The DGEN380 is a small, ~500-lbf thrust class, high-bypass, geared- turbofan engine with a separate flow nozzle. It is a modular, compact, lightweight turbofan with Full-Authority Digital Engine Control. It’s general characteristics make it an ideal candidate for utilization as a testbed for engine aero-acoustic technology maturation in a relevant performance environment. The DGEN380 is the core component of the DGEN Aero-propulsion Research Turbofan (DART) mobile test rig. The full presentation will describe the risk assessment and mitigation process applied to the DART by the project team. The identification and analysis of failure modes led to the development of risk mitigation plans, which include administrative, engineering, and physical controls for the safe operation of the DART test rig at the AAPL facility.

Systems Engineering, Aeronautics, safety↗