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NASA NTRS2008

Approximation of Failure Probability Using Conditional Sampling

In analyzing systems which depend on uncertain parameters, one technique is to partition the uncertain parameter domain into a failure set and its complement, and judge the quality of the system by estimating the probability of failure. If this is done by a sampling technique such as Monte Carlo and the probability of failure is small, accurate approximation can require so many sample points that the computational expense is prohibitive. Previous work of the authors has shown how to bound the failure event by sets of such simple geometry that their probabilities can be calculated analytically. In this paper, it is shown how to make use of these failure bounding sets and conditional sampling within them to substantially reduce the computational burden of approximating failure probability. It is also shown how the use of these sampling techniques improves the confidence intervals for the failure probability estimate for a given number of sample points and how they reduce the number of sample point analyses needed to achieve a given level of confidence.

Giesy. Daniel P.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Lunar Base Life Support Failures

Dynamic simulation of the lunar outpost habitat life support was undertaken to investigate the impact of life support failures and to investigate responses. Some preparatory static analysis for the Lunar Outpost life support model, an earlier version of the model, and an investigation into the impact of Extravehicular Activity (EVA) were reported previously. (Jones, 2008-01-2184, 2008-01-2017) The earlier model was modified to include possible resupply delays, power failures, recycling system failures, and atmosphere and other material storage failures. Most failures impact the lunar outpost water balance and can be mitigated by reducing water usage. Food solids, nitrogen can be obtained only by resupply from Earth. The most time urgent failure is a lass of carbon dioxide removal capability. Life support failures might be survivable if effective operational solutions are provided in the system design.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) Approach to Determine the Probability of Cross-System Failures for a Space Launch Vehicle

Quantifying the probability of significant launch vehicle failure scenarios for a given design, while still in the design process, is critical to mission success and to the safety of the astronauts. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is chosen from many system safety and reliability tools to verify the loss of mission (LOM) and loss of crew (LOC) requirements set by the NASA Program Office. To support the integrated vehicle PRA, probabilistic design analysis (PDA) models are developed by using vehicle design and operation data to better quantify failure probabilities and to better understand the characteristics of a failure and its outcome. This PDA approach uses a physics-based model to describe the system behavior and response for a given failure scenario. Each driving parameter in the model is treated as a random variable with a distribution function. Monte Carlo simulation is used to perform probabilistic calculations to statistically obtain the failure probability. Sensitivity analyses are performed to show how input parameters affect the predicted failure probability, providing insight for potential design improvements to mitigate the risk. The paper discusses the application of the PDA approach in determining the probability of failure for two scenarios from the NASA Ares I project

Shih, Ann T.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Life Support with Failures and Variable Supply

The life support system for long duration missions will recycle oxygen and water to reduce the material resupply mass from Earth. The impact of life support failures was investigated by dynamic simulation of a lunar outpost habitat life support model. The model was modified to simulate resupply delays, power failures, recycling system failures, and storage failures. Many failures impact the lunar outpost water supply directly or indirectly, depending on the water balance and water storage. Failure effects on the water supply are reduced if Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) water use is low and the water supply is ample. Additional oxygen can be supplied by scavenging unused propellant or by production from regolith, but the amounts obtained can vary significantly. The requirements for oxygen and water can also vary significantly, especially for EVA. Providing storage buffers can improve efficiency and reliability, and minimize the chance of supply failing to meet demand. Life support failures and supply variations can be survivable if effective solutions are provided by the system design

Jones, Harry↗

NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program and at the beginning of a new and untested program. The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation Branch in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic materials failure analyses and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This paper will explore a variety of failure case studies at the Kennedy Space Center and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Failure Modes in Capacitors When Tested Under a Time-Varying Stress

Power-on failure has been the prevalent failure mechanism for solid tantalum capacitors in decoupling applications. A surge step stress test (SSST) has been previously applied to identify the critical stress level of a capacitor batch to give some predictability to the power-on failure mechanism [1]. But SSST can also be viewed as an electrically destructive test under a time-varying stress (voltage). It consists of rapidly charging the capacitor with incremental voltage increases, through a low resistance in series, until the capacitor under test is electrically shorted. When the reliability of capacitors is evaluated, a highly accelerated life test (HALT) is usually adopted since it is a time-efficient method of determining the failure mechanism; however, a destructive test under a time-varying stress such as SSST is even more time efficient. It usually takes days or weeks to complete a HALT test, but it only takes minutes for a time-varying stress test to produce failures. The advantage of incorporating a specific time-varying stress profile into a statistical model is significant in providing an alternative life test method for quickly revealing the failure mechanism in capacitors. In this paper, a time-varying stress that mimics a typical SSST has been incorporated into the Weibull model to characterize the failure mechanism in different types of capacitors. The SSST circuit and transient conditions for correctly surge testing capacitors are discussed. Finally, the SSST was applied for testing Ta capacitors, polymer aluminum capacitors (PA capacitors), and multi-layer ceramic (MLC) capacitors with both precious metal electrodes (PME) and base metal electrodes (BME). The test results are found to be directly associated with the dielectric layer breakdown in Ta and PA capacitors and are independent of the capacitor values, the way the capacitors were built, and the capacitors manufacturers. The test results also show that MLC capacitors exhibit surge breakdown voltages much higher than the rated voltage and that the breakdown field is inversely proportional to the dielectric layer thickness. The SSST data can also be used to comparatively evaluate the voltage robustness of capacitors for decoupling applications.

Liu, David (Donhang)↗

NASA NTRS2012

Failure detection system risk reduction assessment

A process includes determining a probability of a failure mode of a system being analyzed reaching a failure limit as a function of time to failure limit, determining a probability of a mitigation of the failure mode as a function of a time to failure limit, and quantifying a risk reduction based on the probability of the failure mode reaching the failure limit and the probability of the mitigation.

Aguilar, Robert B.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Failure Analysis at the Kennedy Space Center

History has shown that failures occur in every engineering endeavor, and what we learn from those failures contributes to the knowledge base to safely complete future missions. The necessity of failure analysis is at its apex at the end of one aged program (i.e. Shuttle) and at the beginning of a new and untested program (i.e. Constellation). The information that we gain through failure analysis corrects the deficiencies in the current vehicle to make the next generation of vehicles more efficient and safe. The Failure Analysis and Materials Evaluation section in the Materials Science Division at the Kennedy Space Center performs metallurgical, mechanical, electrical, and non-metallic failure analysis and accident investigations on both flight hardware and ground support equipment (GSE) for the Shuttle, International Space Station, Constellation, and Launch Services Programs. This presentation will explore a variety of failure case studies at KSC and the lessons learned that can be applied in future programs.

Salazar, Victoria L.↗

NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗

NASA NTRS2011

Failure Modes in Capacitors When Tested Under a Time-Varying Stress

Steady step surge testing (SSST) is widely applied to screen out potential power-on failures in solid tantalum capacitors. The test simulates the power supply's on and off characteristics. Power-on failure has been the prevalent failure mechanism for solid tantalum capacitors for decoupling applications. On the other hand, the SSST can also be reviewed as an electrically destructive test under a time-varying stress. It consists of rapidly charging the capacitor with incremental voltage increases, through a low resistance in series, until the capacitor under test is electrically shorted. Highly accelerated life testing (HALT) is usually a time-efficient method for determining the failure mechanism in capacitors; however, a destructive test under a time-varying stress like SSST is even more effective. It normally takes days to complete a HALT test, but it only takes minutes for a time-varying stress test to produce failures. The advantage of incorporating specific time-varying stress into a statistical model is significant in providing an alternative life test method for quickly revealing the failure modes in capacitors. In this paper, a time-varying stress has been incorporated into the Weibull model to characterize the failure modes. The SSST circuit and transient conditions to correctly test the capacitors is discussed. Finally, the SSST was applied for testing polymer aluminum capacitors (PA capacitors), Ta capacitors, and multi-layer ceramic capacitors with both precious metal electrode (PME) and base-metal-electrodes (BME). It appears that testing results are directly associated to the dielectric layer breakdown in PA and Ta capacitors and are independent on the capacitor values, the way the capacitors being built, and the manufactures. The testing results also reveal that ceramic capacitors exhibit breakdown voltages more than 20 times the rated voltage, and the breakdown voltages are inverse proportional to the dielectric layer thickness. The possibility of ceramic capacitors in front-end decoupling applications to block the surge noise from a power supply is also discussed.

Liu, David (Donhang)↗

NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗

NASA NTRS2016

We Can't Count on Repairing All Failures Going to Mars

Reliability analysis often assumes that a complex system can be kept operating indefinitely with scheduled maintenance and emergency repair using a stock of spare parts, as long as the spare parts are not depleted. This assumption seems justified for well-tested, widely used, long operational systems with a multigenerational history of failure, redesign, and reliability growth. It seems doubtful that newer, relatively untried, high technology space systems can always be repaired. We cannot assume space systems will have a low rate of random failures that can all be repaired with a few identical spares. New untried systems usually have a high initial failure rate, called infant mortality, due to errors in requirements, design, parts, materials, and operations planning. These problems can cause groups of related failures called Common Cause Failures (CCFs). The practical definition of a CCF is any failure mode that cannot be cured using identical redundant systems or spare parts. Systems with CCFs may fail repeatedly for the same reason. Can a life support system be kept operating on the way to Mars using only redundant systems and spare parts? The failure history of International Space Station (ISS) life support systems suggests that CCFs are likely to occur and will probably require design changes rather than being reparable with spare parts.

Mars↗

NASA NTRS2020

A Method and Model to Predict Initial Failure Rates

It has long been well known that actual system reliability typically falls well short of early estimates. Failure rates are often ten or more times higher than anticipated. Many reasons have been given for this, but over-optimism is the fundamental cause of too-favorable reliability predictions. Most forecasts of reliability are essentially best-case scenarios, as are predictions of budget and schedule. Confident engineers assemble estimates bottom-up, including the known factors and ignoring problems that they hope won’t happen. Traditional reliability estimation is based on simply summing up the component failure rates. This ignores most actual failure causes. The way to reduce over-optimism is to use the historical system level failure rate from similar projects. Adjustments should not be made based purely on engineering judgment, but only if there is so logical quantitative justification. The traditional component-based reliability estimate is useful as a lower bound on the system failure rate. The difference between this lower bound component-based reliability and the historical system level reliability indicates how much of the total failure rate is due to system level problems rather than component failures.

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRS2020

A Method and Model to Predict Initial Failure Rates

It has long been well known that actual system reliability typically falls well short of early estimates. Failure rates are often ten or more times higher than anticipated. Many reasons have been given for this, but over-optimism is the fundamental cause of too-favorable reliability predictions. Most forecasts of reliability are essentially best-case scenarios, as are predictions of budget and schedule. Confident engineers assemble estimates bottom-up, including the known factors and ignoring problems that they hope won't happen. Traditional reliability estimation is based on simply summing up the component failure rates. This ignores most actual failure causes. The way to reduce over-optimism is to use the historical system level failure rate from similar projects. Adjustments should not be made based purely on engineering judgment, but only if there is so logical quantitative justification. The traditional component-based reliability estimate is useful as a lower bound on the system failure rate. The difference between this lower bound component-based reliability and the historical system level reliability indicates how much of the total failure rate is due to system level problems rather than component failures

Jones, Harry W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Gas Turbine Control Considerations for the Mitigation of Potential Failure Modes and Hazards

This paper provides a high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards to which electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems are susceptible, along with potential gas turbine control-based strategies to assist in the mitigation of those failures. To introduce the types of failures that an EAP system may experience, a generic EAP system is considered, consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems is discussed, along with their potential failure modes, and possible strategies for mitigating those failures. To further illustrate the role of gas turbine controls in mitigating EAP failure modes, an example based on a simulated EAP concept aircraft proposed by NASA is given. The effects of failures are discussed, along with turbomachinery control strategies, including reversionary control modes, and control limit logic.

Donald L Simon↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adaptive Stress Testing: Using Reinforcement Learning to Find Failures in Safety-Critical Systems

Emerging applications in artificial intelligence, such as driverless cars and autonomous aircraft promise to be more efficient, cheaper to operate, and always available. However, ensuring the safety of these systems remains a major challenge to their certification and adoption. These autonomous systems are expected to routinely make safety-critical decisions where failures can have serious consequences including loss of life and property. Testing and validation techniques aim to identify and diagnose potential failures before the system is deployed. However, finding failure scenarios in autonomous systems can be very challenging due to high-dimensional and continuous state spaces, interaction with large environments over many time steps, and the rarity of failures. This talk presents Adaptive Stress Testing (AST), a simulation-based testing framework for finding the most likely path to a failure event of a safety-critical system. The key idea of AST is that stress testing can be formulated as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), which enables reinforcement learning techniques to be used for finding failure events. Reinforcement learning algorithms can efficiently explore the search space and have been shown to scale to very large systems. We present applications of AST to find failures in various safety-critical systems including the aircraft collision avoidance systems, autonomous cars, and small unmanned aerial vehicles.

autonomous vehicles↗

NASA NTRS2021

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion Systems: Gas Turbine Control Considerations for the Mitigation of Potential Failure Modes and Hazards

This paper provides a high-level review of the potential failure modes and hazards to which electrified aircraft propulsion (EAP) systems are susceptible along with potential gas turbine control-based strategies to assist in the mitigation of those failures. To introduce the types of failures that an EAP system may experience, a generic EAP system is considered consisting of gas turbine engines, mechanical drives, electric machines, power electronics and distribution systems, energy storage devices, and motor driven propulsors. The functionality provided by each of these EAP subsystems is discussed along with their potential failure modes and possible strategies for mitigating those failures. To further illustrate the role of gas turbine controls in mitigating EAP failure modes, an example based on a simulated EAP concept aircraft proposed by NASA is given. The effects of failures are discussed, along with turbomachinery control strategies, including reversionary control modes, and control limit logic

Electrified Aircraft Propulsion↗