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At least 199 records · Page 11

SU-F-T-476: Performance of the AS1200 EPID for Periodic Photon Quality Assurance

Purpose: To assess the dosimetric performance of a new amorphous silicon flat-panel electronic portal imaging device (EPID) suitable for high-intensity, flattening-filter-free delivery mode. Methods: An EPID-based QA suite was created with automation to periodically monitor photon central-axis output and two-dimensional beam profile constancy as a function of gantry angle and dose-rate. A Varian TrueBeamTM linear accelerator installed with Developer Mode was used to customize and deliver XML script routines for the QA suite using the dosimetry mode image acquisition for an aS1200 EPID. Automatic post-processing software was developed to analyze the resulting DICOM images. Results: The EPID was used to monitor photon beam output constancy (central-axis), flatness, and symmetry over a period of 10 months for four photon beam energies (6x, 15x, 6xFFF, and 10xFFF). EPID results were consistent to those measured with a standard daily QA check device. At the four cardinal gantry angles, the standard deviation of the EPID central-axis output was <0.5%. Likewise, EPID measurements were independent for the wide range of dose rates (including up to 2400 mu/min for 10xFFF) studied with a standard deviation of <0.8% relative to the nominal dose rate for each energy. Also, profile constancy and field size measurements showed good agreement with the reference acquisition of 0° gantry angle and nominal dose rate. XML script files were also tested for MU linearity and picket-fence delivery. Using Developer Mode, the test suite was delivered in <60 minutes for all 4 photon energies with 4 dose rates per energy and 5 picket-fence acquisitions. Conclusion: Dosimetry image acquisition using a new EPID was found to be accurate for standard and high-intensity photon beams over a broad range of dose rates over 10 months. Developer Mode provided an efficient platform to customize the EPID acquisitions by using custom script files which significantly reduced the time. This work was funded in part by Varian Medical Systems.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-F-T-493: An Investigation Into the Feasibility of Using PipsPro Software with Film for Linac QA

Purpose: To determine the feasibility of using radiochromic and radiographic film with Pipspro software for quality assurance of linear accelerators with no on-board imaging. Methods: The linear accelerator being used is a Varian Clinac 21EX. All IGRT is performed using the BrainLab ExacTrac system. Because of the lack of on board imaging, certain monthly and annual TG-142 quality assurance tests are more difficult to perform and analyze to a high degree of accuracy. Pipspro was not designed to be used with hard film, and to our knowledge its use with film had not been investigated. The film used will be GafChromic EBT3 film and Kodak EDR2 film, scanned with an Epson V700 scanner. The following routine tests will be attempted: MLC picket fence, light vs. radiation field coincidence, starshots, and MLC transmission. Results: The only tests that gave accurate and reliable results were the couch, gantry, and collimator starshots. Typical MV and kV images are acquired with a much higher level of contrast between the irradiated and non-irradiated areas when compared to film. Pipspro relies on this level of contrast to be able to automatically detect the fiducial points from its phantom devices, leaf edges for picket fence and transmission tests, and jaw edges for light vs. radiation field tests. Because of this, certain tests gave erroneous results and others were not able to be performed in the software at all, with either type of film. The number of monitor units delivered to the film, the experimental setup, and the scan settings was not able to rectify the problem. Conclusion: For linear accelerators with no on-board imaging, it is not recommended to use hard film with PipsPro to perform TG-142 quality assurance tests. Other software or methods should instead be investigated.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-G-BRB-02: An Open-Source Software Analysis Library for Linear Accelerator Quality Assurance

Purpose: Routine linac quality assurance (QA) tests have become complex enough to require automation of most test analyses. A new data analysis software library was built that allows physicists to automate routine linear accelerator quality assurance tests. The package is open source, code tested, and benchmarked. Methods: Images and data were generated on a TrueBeam linac for the following routine QA tests: VMAT, starshot, CBCT, machine logs, Winston Lutz, and picket fence. The analysis library was built using the general programming language Python. Each test was analyzed with the library algorithms and compared to manual measurements taken at the time of acquisition. Results: VMAT QA results agreed within 0.1% between the library and manual measurements. Machine logs (dynalogs & trajectory logs) were successfully parsed; mechanical axis positions were verified for accuracy and MLC fluence agreed well with EPID measurements. CBCT QA measurements were within 10 HU and 0.2mm where applicable. Winston Lutz isocenter size measurements were within 0.2mm of TrueBeam’s Machine Performance Check. Starshot analysis was within 0.2mm of the Winston Lutz results for the same conditions. Picket fence images with and without a known error showed that the library was capable of detecting MLC offsets within 0.02mm. Conclusion: A new routine QA software library has been benchmarked and is available for use by the community. The library is open-source and extensible for use in larger systems.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Solar Farm Development Impacts on Eastern Box Turtle ( Terrapene carolina ) Home Ranges

Eastern Box Turtle (Terrapene carolina) populations have declined drastically since 1970 because of continued destruction and fragmentation of their habitat. Although they are known to shift their home ranges because of environmental degradation, it is unknown how solar arrays impact Eastern Box Turtles. From 2011–2018, we collected data on Eastern Box Turtle movement and occupancy in a 79-ha solar farm. The solar farm is divided into six fenced areas, each containing wildlife openings for movement of terrestrial fauna every 23 m around the fenced solar arrays. For this work, we hypothesized that the solar arrays changed the home range sizes of turtles that interacted with the field. We fitted 41 Eastern Box Turtles with radio transmitters and tracked their locations twice per week in June–August from 2011–2018. Seventeen turtles had home ranges that overlapped with the solar arrays whereas 24 turtles had home ranges that never interacted with the solar arrays. We calculated home range sizes and tested for differences between overlapping and nonoverlapping groups. We further considered if the number of observations within the solar farm impacted home range size and displacement. We found that Eastern Box Turtles that used the solar farm exhibited 55–83% larger home ranges on average than turtles in natural habitats, but there was no significant association of home range size with the amount of time observed within the solar farm. Finally, we discuss strategies to mitigate negative impacts of solar farm development on turtles.

Radio telemetry↗

Assessment of neutron skyshine near unmodified Accumulator Debuncher storage rings under Mu2e operational conditions

Preliminary plans for providing the proton beam needed by the proposed Mu2e experiment at Fermilab will require the transport of 8 GeV protons to the Accumulator/Debuncher where they be processed into an intensity and time structure useful for the experiment. The intensities involved are far greater that those encountered with antiprotons of the same kinetic energy in the same beam enclosures under Tevatron Collider operational conditions, the operating parameters for which the physical facilities of the Antiproton Source were designed. This note explores some important ramifications of the proposed operation for radiation safety and demonstrates the need for extensive modifications of significant portions of the shielding of the Accumulator Debuncher storage rings; notably that underneath the AP Service Buildings AP10, AP30, and AP50. While existing shielding is adequate for the current operating mode of the Accumulator/Debuncher as part of the Antiproton Source used in the Tevatron Collider program, without significant modifications of the shielding configuration in the Accumulator/Debuncher region and/or beam loss control systems far more effective than seen in most applications at Fermilab, the proposed operational mode for Mu2e is not viable for the following reasons: 1. Due to skyshine alone, under normal operational conditions large areas of the Fermilab site would be exposed to unacceptable levels of radiation where most of the Laboratory workforce and some members of the general public who regularly visit Fermilab would receive measurable doses annually, contrary to workforce, public, and DOE expectations concerning the As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) principle. 2. Under normal operational conditions, a sizeable region of the Fermilab site would also require fencing due to skyshine. The size of the areas involved would likely invite public inquiry about the significant and visible enlargement of Fermilab's posted radiological areas. 3. There would be aesthetics questions about the employment of so much new fencing on the Fermilab site. 4. The assumption of only 1.0% 'normal condition' beam losses over the three locations is regarded as being extremely optimistic. Thus, it is evident that it is necessary to pursue shielding improvements to support viable operation of the Mu2e experiment.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 415: Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR), Nevada (Revision 0)

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 415, Project 57 No. 1 Plutonium Dispersion (NTTR). CAU 415 is located on Range 4808A of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) and consists of one corrective action site: NAFR-23-02, Pu Contaminated Soil. The CAU 415 site consists of the atmospheric release of radiological contaminants to surface soil from the Project 57 safety experiment conducted in 1957. The safety experiment released plutonium (Pu), uranium (U), and americium (Am) to the surface soil over an area of approximately 1.9 square miles. This area is currently fenced and posted as a radiological contamination area. Vehicles and debris contaminated by the experiment were subsequently buried in a disposal trench within the surface-contaminated, fenced area and are assumed to have released radiological contamination to subsurface soils. Potential source materials in the form of pole-mounted electrical transformers were also identified at the site and will be removed as part of closure activities.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DoD. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked contamination area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil is thought to attach preferentially to smaller particles. Therefore, redistribution of soil particulates by wind (dust) is the mechanism most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 contamination area. In 2011, DRI installed two instrumentation towers to measure radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions. The monitoring activity was implemented to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Collected data also permits comparison of radiological conditions at the Project 57 monitoring stations to conditions observed at Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations around the NTTR. Biweekly samples of airborne particulates are submitted for laboratory assessment of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity and for determination of gamma-emitting radionuclides. Annual average gross alpha values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are in the same range as the highest two values reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Annual average gross beta values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are slightly higher than the lowest value reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Gamma spectroscopy analyses on samples collected from the Project 57 stations identified only naturally occurring radionuclides. No manmade radionuclides were detected. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is higher than the dose determined at surrounding CEMP stations but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public as a result of exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 contamination area. These comparisons show that the gross alpha, gross beta, and gamma spectroscopy levels at the Project 57 monitoring stations are similar to levels observed at the CEMP stations but that the average annual dose rate is higher than at the CEMP stations. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph begin to generate dust movement by saltation (migration of sand at the ground surface) or direct suspension in the air. Saltated sand, PM10 (inhalable) dust, and PM2.5 (fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occur for winds exceeding 20 mph. During the reporting period, winds in excess of 20 mph occurred approximately 1.6 percent of the time. Preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation is highly variable likely because of the influence of other meteorological and environmental parameters. Although winds sufficient to generate significant amounts of dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. Additionally, the potential for wind transport of dust is dependent on other parameters whose influence have not yet been assessed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Lakeview, Oregon, Disposal Site

9.1 Compliance Summary The Lakeview, Oregon, Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I Disposal Site was inspected September 16 and 17, 2015. Other than some ongoing concern with erosion-control rock riprap degradation, the disposal cell was in good condition. Some minor fence repairs and vegetation removal, and minor erosion repair work along the west site fence is planned. Inspectors identified no other maintenance needs or cause for a follow-up or contingency inspection. Disposal cell riprap is evaluated annually to ensure continued long-term protection of the cell from erosion during a severe precipitation event. Degradation of the rock riprap was first observed at the site in the mid-1990s. Rock gradation monitoring of the riprap on the west side slope has been performed as part of the annual inspection since 1997 to determine the mean diameter (D 50 ) value. As prescribed by the monitoring procedure, the rock monitoring is routinely conducted at random locations. However, at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) request, the 2015 rock monitoring approach deviated from the normal procedure by using a pre-established monitoring grid in a subset area of the west side slope. This changed the monitoring approach from random sampling to biased sampling. The D 50 value measured during the 2015 gradation monitoring is 2.39 inches, which falls below the original D 50 design size range of 2.7–3.9 inches for the Type B size side slope riprap. At NRC’s request, rock durability monitoring was added to the gradation monitoring in 2009 to monitor durability by rock type. Results of the 2015 durability monitoring showed that74 percent of the total rock sampled is durability class code A rock with an assigned durability class of “highly durable” or durability class code B “durable” rock, and that over 90 percent of the 3-inch or larger rock is durability class code A or B. The rock durability classifications are further explained in Section 9.4.2.2.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2016

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2017

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a non-nuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) by posting signs 200 to 400 ft (60 to 120 m) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil attaches preferentially to smaller particles (Tamura, 1985; Friesen, 1992; Murarik et al., 1992; and Misra et al., 1993). Therefore, redistribution of soil particles by wind (dust) and water are the mechanisms most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 CA. Monitoring was implemented in 2011 by Desert Research Institute (DRI) to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and to characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Initially, two monitoring stations consisting of radiological, meteorological, and dust sampling equipment were installed near the southeast and northeast corners of the CA. In January 2015, the original monitoring stations were dismantled and moved farther to the west along the CA boundary. This move was made to place the monitoring stations downwind of ground zero and the High Contamination Area (HCA) during the dominant northerly and southerly winds. Samples of particles suspended in the air are collected every two weeks and submitted for laboratory assessments of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity, and for determinations of gamma-emitting radionuclides. In calendar year (CY) 2017, the mean gross alpha concentration at monitoring station P57-4 was approximately 4.25 times the value at monitoring station P57-3. In CY2015 and CY2016, the difference in mean gross alpha concentration at the two stations was approximately 1.5. The mean gross alpha concentrations at P57-3 and P57-4 were approximately 1.9 and 7.9 times, respectively, the mean gross alpha concentrations at the surrounding Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations. The minimum gross alpha concentrations reported for the Project 57 stations are in the range of the minimum values observed at the CEMP stations. However, maximum gross alpha concentrations are greater than the maximum concentrations observed at the surrounding CEMP stations. Gamma spectroscopy analyses resulted in the detection of seven radionuclides. Except for americium-241 (Am-241), all reported radionuclides occur naturally in the environment. The Am-241 detection by gamma spectroscopy was confirmed by alpha spectroscopy. During each quarter of CY2017, four suspended particulate matter samples were selected for alpha spectroscopy analysis. Two were selected each quarter from the regular biweekly samples collected at each of the two monitoring stations. Of the eight samples from P57-3, one was reported to have plutonium-238 (Pu-238) above the minimum detectable activity (MDA) and five were reported to have plutonium 239/240 (Pu-239/240) above the MDA. Of the eight samples from P57-4, three were reported to have Pu-238 above the MDA and six were reported to have Pu-239/240 above the MDA. Soil material is also transported by saltation, which is a wind driven phenomena that bounces sand-sized soil particles across the land surface because they are too heavy to be suspended in the air. Samples of particles transported by saltation were collected downwind and upwind of the CA at both monitoring stations in May 2017 after a 190-day deployment and again in September 2017 after a 114-day deployment. Mass of the saltation samples was determined after oven drying. The September sample had greater mass than the May sample. The same relationship was observed for the suspended particulate matter samples during periods of saltation sample collection. The difference in the collected mass appears to be because of the amount of soil moisture. Higher soil moisture exerts additional isotopic bonds between soil particles and water molecules, and between water molecules that envelop soil particles, making it more difficult for wind to raise the particles as dust. In general, samples collected from saltation traps facing south contained more material than samples collected from traps facing north. This suggests that although saltation material may have been moving back and forth in conjunction with the two dominant wind directions, there was a net trend for saltation material to be transported toward the north. Radiological analyses of the saltation samples show that the smaller particle size faction (<63 μm) generally produced the highest activity levels of Am-241, Pu-238, and Pu-239/240. In general, the isotope activity levels decreased as the particle size increased. These results are consistent with the expectation that the greatest potential for transport of radiological contamination is with the smaller particles. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual external radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is slightly higher than the dose determined at the surrounding CEMP stations, but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public from exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 CA. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph (24 km/hr) begin to generate dust movement by saltation or suspension, as determined by the monitoring instruments. Saltated particles, PM10 (i.e., inhalable dust), and PM2.5 (i.e., fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occurred for winds exceeding 20 mph (32 km/hr). When the wind/dust analysis was performed for winds separated into the dominant northerly and southerly wind directions, it was evident that the northerly winds generated the higher PM10 concentrations and had the dominate influence on the PM10 concentration determined for all wind speeds when all wind directions were evaluated together. During the year, winds in excess of 20 mph (32 km/hr) occurred approximately one percent of the time. Although winds sufficient to generate dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. A preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation in response to specific wind conditions is highly variable. Wind speeds that would be expected to generate noticeable dust may not do so in every instance. Additionally, saltation transport in response to wind conditions was less common than expected. These variations were likely because of the influence of meteorological and environmental parameters other than wind.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2018 (Revision 0)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calender year 2018. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit Number NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110 the site fence, gate, lock and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Automated Identification of Human Incursion

According to a CBS news report, on April 16, 2013 a San Jose, CA PG&E substation’s security fence was breached, and five transformers were damaged. The damaged transformers had a lead time of several months, leaving the electrical system with reduced capacity through the summer. With the increasing value of copper, the theft of copper electrical lines has also become an issue. Such occurrences highlight the vulnerability of our electrical grid and the need for greater security than fencing.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Tonopah Test Range Air Monitoring: Meteorological, Radiological, and Wind Transported Particulate Observations (CY 2019)

In 1963, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (formerly the Atomic Energy Commission [AEC]), implemented Operation Roller Coaster on the Tonopah Test Range (TTR) and an adjacent area of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) (formerly the Nellis Air Force Range). This operation resulted in radionuclide-contaminated soils at the Double Tracks site and Clean Slate I, II, and III sites. This report documents observations made during ongoing monitoring of radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions at stations installed adjacent to the Clean Slate sites and at the TTR Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) Range Operations Center (ROC). The main objectives of the monitoring effort are to support the DOE Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) in the safe remediation of the environmental legacy of nuclear device development and testing by determining if wind blowing across the Clean Slate sites is transporting particles of radionuclide-contaminated soil beyond the physical and administrative boundaries of the sites, and providing information for designing long-term monitoring of the sites. The monitoring program in 2019 included five stations. Station 400, located within TTR Area 3 and near the ROC, monitors conditions near the local workforce center. Stations 401 and 403 are located on the northern and southeastern perimeter fence lines, respectively, of the Clean Slate III site. Stations 404 and 405 are along the northern and eastern boundary fence, respectively, at Clean Slate II. The stations are generally downwind of the contaminated areas during either northwesterly or southerly winds, which are the predominant wind directions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: January 1 through December 31, 2019

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley northeast of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DOD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was performed to (1) assess a technique for estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation, (2) develop biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments, (3) evaluate methods of surface decontamination, and (4) evaluate instruments and field procedures for the prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Various radiological surveys were performed in the area and the DOE expanded the demarked Contamination Area (CA) in 2007 by posting signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) outside of the original fence.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Precipitation Meteorological Instruments (PRECIPMET) Handbook

The PRECIPMET surface meteorology instrument system provides temperature, relative humidity, pressure, wind speed and direction, and precipitation data relevant to the precipitation network instruments: laser disdrometer (PARS2) and radar wind profiler (RWP). The PRECIPMET is installed at the intermediate facilities (IF) of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)’s Atmospheric Radiation Measurement (ARM) Southern Great Plains (SGP) atmospheric observatory. The instrument system consists of a Vaisala WXT520 weather transmitter and a 12”-diameter Novalynx tipping bucket rain gauge (TBRG). The WXT520 is mounted on top of the control building at a height of approximately 4 meters. The tipping bucket is mounted on a pole level with the surrounding fencing (approximately 2 meters) to prevent physical interference with the gauge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 452: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 452: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, April 1998 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additional information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for CASs: • 25-25-09, Spill H940825C (from UST 25-3101-1) • 25-25-14, Spill H940314E (from UST 25-3102-3) • 25-25-15, Spill H941020E (from UST 25-3152-1) These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Addendum 2 to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 454: Historical Underground Storage Tank Release Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, April 1998 as described in the document Supplemental Investigation Report for FFACO Use Restrictions, Nevada Test Site, Nevada (SIR) dated November 2008. The SIR document was approved by NDEP on December 5, 2008. The approval of the SIR document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR removals. In conformance with the SIR document, this addendum consists of: • This page that refers the reader to the SIR document for additional information • The cover, title, and signature pages of the SIR document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the SIR document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for CASs: • 12-25-08, Spill H950524F (from UST 12-B-1) • 12-25-10, Spill H950919A (from UST 12-COMM-1) These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to remove these URs because contamination is not present at these sites above the risk-based FALs. Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗