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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Clusters of COVID ‐19 in long‐term care hospitals and facilities in Japan from 16 January to 9 May 2020

Aim To clarify the association of cluster number and size of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) in long‐term care (LTC) hospitals/facilities, general medical/welfare facilities and non‐medical/welfare facilities with morbidity and mortality in 47 prefectures during 16 January to 9 May 2020 in Japan. Methods Information on COVID‐19 clusters ( n ≥2), and morbidity and mortality of COVID‐19 was collected. Results A total of 381 clusters with 3786 infected cases were collected, accounting for 23.9% of 15 852 cumulated cases on 9 May 2020. Although the cluster number (/10 7 subjects) in LTC hospitals/facilities was significantly smaller compared with those in the other two groups, the cluster size in LTC hospitals/facilities was significantly larger than that in non‐medical/welfare facilities. Cluster numbers in general medical/welfare facilities and in non‐medical/welfare facilities were significantly positively correlated with morbidity (/10 5 ), indicating relatively early identification of clusters in these facilities. Unlike in these facilities, cluster size in LTC hospitals/facilities was significantly positively correlated with morbidity, indicating that clusters in LTC hospitals/facilities were finally identified after already having grown to a large size in areas where infection was prevalent. Multivariate logistic regression analysis showed that both cluster number and cluster size only in LTC hospitals/facilities were independently associated with higher mortality (≥median 0.64/10 5 subjects) after adjustment. Conclusions Preventive efforts against COVID‐19 outbreaks even at the early phase of the epidemic are critically important in LTC hospitals/facilities, as both the larger number and size of clusters only in LTC hospitals/facilities were independently linked to higher mortality in prefectures in Japan. Geriatr Gerontol Int 2020; 20: 715–719 .

Iritani, Osamu↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of Serial Testing After Exposure to COVID-19 in Early Care and Education Facilities, Illinois, March–May 2022

Objective: To understand SARS-CoV-2 transmission in early care and education (ECE) settings, we implemented a Test to Stay (TTS) strategy, which allowed children and staff who were close contacts to COVID-19 to remain in person if they agreed to test twice after exposure. We describe SARS-CoV-2 transmission, testing preferences, and the number of in-person days saved among participating ECE facilities. Methods: From March 21 through May 27, 2022, 32 ECE facilities in Illinois implemented TTS. Unvaccinated children and staff who were not up to date with COVID-19 vaccination could participate if exposed to COVID-19. Participants received 2 tests within 7 days after exposure and were given the option to test at home or at the ECE facility. Results: During the study period, 331 TTS participants were exposed to index cases (defined as people attending the ECE facility with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result during the infectious period); 14 participants tested positive, resulting in a secondary attack rate of 4.2%. No tertiary cases (defined as a person with a positive SARS-CoV-2 test result within 10 days after exposure to a secondary case) occurred in the ECE facilities. Most participants (366 of 383; 95.6%) chose to test at home. Remaining in-person after an exposure to COVID-19 saved approximately 1915 in-person days among children and staff and approximately 1870 parent workdays. Conclusion: SARS-CoV-2 transmission rates were low in ECE facilities during the study period. Serial testing after COVID-19 exposure among children and staff at ECE facilities is a valuable strategy to allow children to remain in person and parents to avoid missing workdays.

Public, Environmental & Occupational Health↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Impact of Extreme Weather Events on Physical Protection System Effectiveness for a Hypothetical Small Modular Reactor Facility: Systems Analysis and Considerations

This report will summarize the group's work to provide recommendations to secure nuclear facilities before, during and after an extreme weather event. Extreme weather events can have drastic impacts to nuclear facilities as seen by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Recent hurricanes in the United States including Hurricane Harvey demonstrate the devastating effects these storms can have on infrastructure and the surrounding communities. The group is attempting to identify the gaps that potential small modular reactor (SMR) facilities will need to address in order to provide adequate site security before, during and after extreme weather events. This effort proceeded in three parts to provide insights and recommendations to secure Small Modular Reactor facilities for extreme weather events:(1) a literature review of academic articles as well as relevant documents including the existing regulatory framework and recommendations from the IAEA, NRC, and DOE, (2) subject matter expert interviews from a wide variety of security backgrounds, and (3) modeling and simulation on a hypothetical SMR facility. Special attention was paid to the interactions between stakeholders and nuclear facility design considerations, particularly the topics of safety and security. Engineering design issues from safety and security perspectives were discussed and included in simulation. Each step informed the proceeding, with the result including full tabletop scenarios of EWE impacts to security system effectiveness on the hypothetical model. This systems-level analysis provides results to inform recommendations to secure SMR facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Photographic Mitigation Documentation Related to the Engine Assembly and Disassembly Facility, Area 25, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This letter report provides documentation in partial fulfillment of the mitigation of adverse effects to the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly (E-MAD) facility, a major component of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Construction of the E-MAD facility began in 1962 for the purpose of disassembling and maintaining nuclear-powered rocket engines. Once the building was complete in 1967, the E-MAD facility remained in continuous operation until the nuclear rocket program was terminated in 1973. The mothballed facility was repurposed in 1977 for spent nuclear fuel handling and packaging activities. By the mid-1980s, all activities at the E-MAD facility had ceased (Reno et al. 2019). This submission is intended to comply with Stipulation III.D.1 of the Memorandum of Agreement DE-GM58-20NA25534 between the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer Regarding Corrective Action Activities and Demolition of the Engine Maintenance Assembly and Disassembly Facility and the Test Cell C Historic District, Major Components of the Nuclear Rocket Development Station Historic District Located in Area 25 at the Nevada National Security Site Nye County (hereafter referred to as the MOA). Stipulation III.D.1 states the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) will submit the existing supplementary collection of the large-format, black-and-white photographic prints taken during the 1996 Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) documentation of the E-MAD facility to the Nuclear Testing Archive (NTA), located on the second floor of the Rogers Building at Desert Research Institute (DRI) in Las Vegas, Nevada.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Technical analysis of filter testing at the U.S. Department of Energy Filter Test Facility

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) technical standard DOE-STD-3020-2015 requires verification testing at the Filter Test Facility (FTF) of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters to be installed in nuclear facility (Hazard Category 1, 2, 3, and radiological facilities) confinement ventilation systems, or to be installed in habitability systems (e.g., filters for protection of workers required to act for the control and mitigation of emergency situations). Filters in these applications perform a safety function in accident situations, are designated as important to safety, or are necessary for habitability systems. Different FTFs have operated for decades, and results of tests are available to examine the need for and benefits of continued execution of 100 percent QA verification testing. The objective of this study and resulting report was to assess the need for 100 percent QA testing at the current FTF in Maryland, based on an examination of a database of test results from 2013 to August 2020. Filters that require independent testing per DOE-STD-3020-2015 to be installed in nuclear facilities are sent to the FTF before being shipped to the facilities. The FTF examines the documentation (e.g., certificates of compliance, results of particle penetration and airflow resistance testing by the manufacturers, labels affixed to filters and packages, and other requirements specified in purchase orders by the nuclear facility operators), implements visual inspections of the physical state of the filters, and checks the dimensions of frames. Filters that meet the documentation and visual inspection requirements are subjected to particle penetration and airflow resistance testing. In case of rejections, the filters are shipped back to the manufacturers, at the cost of the manufacturers, for replacement. Filters that pass all tests are shipped to the nuclear facilities.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗
DOE OSTI2022

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Volume 9: Critical Facility with Add-On Ion Beam

Completion of the originally planned critical facility has been considered as part of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Sustaining and Enhancing Neutron Science Initiative at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). A working group of ORNL staff members was formed to develop the idea and to recommend one or more configurations to best support future HFIR operations and scientific capacities. HFIR was designed with a critical pool in the reactor bay that was projected to be outfitted as a critical facility. The primary purpose of the planned critical facility was to measure the subcritical worth of fresh fuel elements to support startup requirements. However, the Y-12 National Security Complex already housed a critical facility that was used for this purpose. This report presents the working group’s efforts, including determination of the proposed critical facility’s high-impact benefits. A generic low-power critical facility would be employed for reactor physics measurements, code and data validation, reactor operator and staff training, and education. This facility would be instrumental in supporting current HFIR operations, conversion of HFIR to low-enriched uranium, existing light water reactor operations, and advanced reactor development and deployment.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

User Access to Scientific Facilities via 5G: A Cyber Security Thought Experiment

5G is more than an over-the-air radio technology upgrade. It is a strategy to extend Mobile Network Operator service offerings beyond traditional voice, instant messaging and Internet access. 5G Mobile Network Operators will offer new telecommunication services that include enhanced guarantees of confidentiality, integrity and availability. How could such services change the way Science collaborations connect scientists to supercomputers and other scientific facilities? Current scientific collaborations implicitly trust cloud service providers to securely store and process data. The perceived risks of outsourcing Science data security are counterbalanced by assurances that cloud providers operate at a scale that allows them to implement security measures impractical for Science collaborations (e.g. continuous system administrator behavioral monitoring and strict individual separation of duties). If that is true for a cloud service provider like Amazon Web Services (2018 revenue: $25.7 billion), could it also be true for Mobile Network Operators like Verizon Wireless (2018 revenue: $91.7 billion) or AT&T Mobility (2018 revenue: $71.3 billion)? DOE Leadership Class supercomputer facility users currently access them from the public Internet via Secure Shell. The sponsors and operators of the supercomputer facilities have determined that the public Internet path between the Scientist’s Device and the Login Node does not natively provide enough confidentiality or integrity to protect those communications. Therefore, the facilities achieve additional confidentiality and integrity by requiring Secure Shell encryption across those untrusted network paths. Using 5G Network Slice technology, a Mobile Network Operator may offer communication services between supercomputer users and facilities that natively provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Sponsors and operators of supercomputer facilities may determine that these guarantees provide enough confidentiality and integrity to protect those communications. If so, a 5G Network Slice could replace an SSH session running over the public Internet. Finally, this use case could be extended to other Office of Science user facility access requirements. Consider microscopy instruments at (e.g.) the Center for Nanoscale Materials or the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory. The embedded systems controlling such instruments may not always support encrypted network access technologies like SSH. 5G Network Slices may offer an alternative to current VPN or SSH tunneling techniques, with additional benefits like guaranteed minimum bandwidth.

5G↗
DOE OSTI2023

Developing a Facility NMAC Plan

The table presented below suggests the basic information that should be covered in a facility NMAC Plan for an NMAC program that is designed for nuclear security. The topics are appropriate for and should be addressed by all facilities in their NMAC Plans. They are appropriate for NMAC Plans for nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel manufacturing facilities, facilities that produce medical isotopes, and other facilities. The difference is in the intensity with which the various measures are applied and the thoroughness of the description of the application (i.e., the program requirements). The robustness of a facility NMAC program and the content of its NMAC Plan should be graded in accordance with the type of facility and the category of its nuclear material.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Workflow for Developing and Operating Subsurface Hydrogen Storage Facilities in Porous Reservoirs

Long-duration (seasonal) storage of natural gas (NG), which primarily consists of methane (CH 4 ), has been practiced for more than a hundred years at underground gas storage (UGS) facilities that use depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs, saline aquifers, and salt caverns. To enable hydrogen (H 2 ) to be used as a long-duration, energy-storage medium, similar facilities are envisioned for underground H 2 storage (UHS) of either H 2 or H 2 /NG mixtures. Experience with UGS can be used to guide recommended practices for developing and operating UHS facilities in porous reservoirs. The most important factors (formation/fluid properties and engineering choices) that influence the performance of UHS reservoirs have been identified and quantified in previous studies. These factors and choices influence phenomena that determine the sweep efficiency of the stored working gas. These phenomena include viscous fingering, hysteretic capillary trapping, and gravity override of the working gas, as well as the upconing of nonproductive fluid that determine the sweep efficiency of the stored working gas. This report describes initial recommended-practices and a project-development workflow for UHS facilities that utilize porous reservoirs, based on the current state-of-knowledge about H 2 behavior in the subsurface. The workflow sequentially addresses all aspects of UHS project development, including the identification of H 2 sources and users, site ranking and down-selection, geologic and reservoir-engineering characterization, reservoir design, testing, risk management, commissioning, operations, and monitoring for a UHS facility. The goal is to enable UHS facilities to be developed in an efficient and timely manner, while carefully managing project risks. This workflow is similar to that which has been developed for UGS facilities (see Figure 1 of API, 2022), with the addition of tasks and subtasks specific to H 2 and UHS. The project-development workflow is broken down into three major stages: (1) define the H 2 use case; (2) rank, down-select, and characterize potential, candidate UHS sites; and (3) reservoir design, integrity testing, risk assessment, commissioning, operations, and monitoring for selected UHS sites. Each major stage is further broken down into tasks and subtasks, which are described at a high level. This report also provides more detailed descriptions of all tasks and subtasks that involve reservoir analysis and testing.

08 HYDROGEN↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

October 2025 Semiannual Composite Salt Waste Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure Results

The aqueous waste from the Salt Waste Processing Facility is sampled semiannually for transfers to the Saltstone Disposal Facility. Salt solution is treated at the Saltstone Production Facility and disposed of in the Saltstone Disposal Facility. Per request of customer, X-TTR-Z-00027, Revision 0, one Saltstone Processing Facility Decontaminated Salt Solution and Z area premix material for the October 2025 semiannual Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure sample. The sample contained 60:40 (by weight) of slag and fly ash (referred to as the “Cement-Free grout sample”). Results from the technical report support Task 2: ‘Grout Leaching Analyses’ of the Task Technical Request prepared by Savannah River Mission Completion. At 51 days cured, the Saltstone sample was collected and shipped to a certified laboratory for analysis using the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure. The October 2025 Semiannual Cement-Free grout sample met 61 79.268.48 requirements for a non-hazardous waste form with respect to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act metals and Underlying Hazardous Constituents and met the Saltstone Production Facility Waste Acceptance Criteria that was in effect at the time of the sample collection at the Salt Waste Processing Facility.

Hsieh, Madison [Savannah River National Laboratory↗
NASA NTRS1978

DOE LeRC photovoltaic systems test facility

The facility was designed and built and is being operated as a national facility to serve the needs of the entire DOE National Photovoltaic Program. The object of the facility is to provide a place where photovoltaic systems may be assembled and electrically configured, without specific physical configuration, for operation and testing to evaluate their performance and characteristics. The facility as a breadboard system allows investigation of operational characteristics and checkout of components, subsystems and systems before they are mounted in field experiments or demonstrations. The facility as currently configured consist of 10 kW of solar arrays built from modules, two inverter test stations, a battery storage system, interface with local load and the utility grid, and instrumentation and control necessary to make a flexible operating facility. Expansion to 30 kW is planned for 1978. Test results and operating experience are summaried to show the variety of work that can be done with this facility.

Cull, R. C.↗
NASA NTRS1978

Propulsion test facilities - Capabilities and use

A review is conducted of the additional test facilities required in connection with the National Aeronautical Facilities Program and of other new propulsion test facilities. Attention is given to the National Transonic Facility, the AMES wind tunnel, the Turbine Engine Load Simulator, facilities for the conduction of compressor research, a fuels and lubricants laboratory, and test facilities in the UK, France, and Germany. It is pointed out that there is a need for government and industry to support the facility investment necessary to make progress in aerospace technology. Aspects of international cooperation are also discussed.

Kamchi, J. S.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Astronomical facilities for Spacelab

Three significant Spacelab facilities which are being developed, or planned by NASA will use the 1-2 week observational capability for attached payloads on Shuttle to carry out advanced astronomical observations in the ultraviolet visible, and infrared spectral regions during the decade of the 1980s. The three facilities are expected to evolve in capability over several Shuttle flights with a final objective of protracted observational capability from a permanent facility in space with periodic servicing and/or retrieval. The three facilities are the Office of Space Science package (OSS-3/7), the Solar Optical Telescope (SOT), and the Shuttle Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF). The scientific and technical objectives of these astronomical facilities include both their current and projected capabilities, their use of the manned Shuttle, and their eventual disposition to a long-term facility. International aspects of the missions, including General Investigator programs, are also being planned.

Reeves, E. M.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Life sciences space station planning document: A reference payload for the exobiology research facilities

The Cosmic Dust Collection and Gas Grain Simulation Facilities represent collaborative efforts between the Life Sciences and Solar System Exploration Divisions designed to strengthen a natural exobiology/Planetary Sciences connection. The Cosmic Dust Collection Facility is a Planetary Science facility, with Exobiology a primary user. Conversely, the Gas Grain Facility is an exobiology facility, with Planetary Science a primary user. Requirements for the construction and operation of the two facilities, contained herein, were developed through joint workshops between the two disciplines, as were representative experiments comprising the reference payloads. In the case of the Gas Grain Simulation Facility, the astrophysics Division is an additional potential user, having participated in the workshop to select experiments and define requirements.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1988

Lunar base launch and landing facility conceptual design, 2nd edition

This report documents the Lunar Base Launch and Landing Facility Conceptual Design study. The purpose of this study was to examine the requirements for launch and landing facilities for early lunar bases and to prepare conceptual designs for some of these facilities. The emphasis of this study is on the facilities needed from the first manned landing until permanent occupancy. Surface characteristics and flight vehicle interactions are described, and various facility operations are related. Specific recommendations for equipment, facilities, and evolutionary planning are made, and effects of different aspects of lunar development scenarios on facilities and operations are detailed. Finally, for a given scenario, a specific conceptual design is developed and presented.

Source record↗