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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2008

GN&C Engineering Best Practices for Human-Rated Spacecraft System

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) recently completed an in-depth assessment to identify a comprehensive set of engineering considerations for the Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) of safe and reliable human-rated spacecraft systems. Reliability subject matter experts, discipline experts, and systems engineering experts were brought together to synthesize the current "best practices" both at the spacecraft system and subsystems levels. The objective of this paper is to summarize, for the larger Community of Practice, the initial set of Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) engineering Best Practices as identified by this NESC assessment process.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Postures and Motions Library Development for Verification of Ground Crew Human Factors Requirements

Spacecraft and launch vehicle ground processing activities require a variety of unique human activities. These activities are being documented in a primitive motion capture library. The library will be used by human factors engineering analysts to infuse real to life human activities into the CAD models to verify ground systems human factors requirements. As the primitive models are being developed for the library, the project has selected several current human factors issues to be addressed for the Space Launch System (SLS) and Orion launch systems. This paper explains how the motion capture of unique ground systems activities is being used to verify the human factors engineering requirements for ground systems used to process the SLS and Orion vehicles, and how the primitive models will be applied to future spacecraft and launch vehicle processing.

Stambolian, Damon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Performance Support Tools for Space Medical Operations

Early Constellation space missions are expected to have medical capabilities similar to those currently on board the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS). Flight surgeons on the ground in Mission Control will direct the Crew Medical Officer (CMO) during medical situations. If the crew is unable to communicate with the ground, the CMO will carry out medical procedures without the aid of a flight surgeon. In these situations, use of performance support tools can reduce errors and time to perform emergency medical tasks. The research presented here is part of the Human Factors in Training Directed Research Project of the Space Human Factors Engineering Project under the Space Human Factors and Habitability Element of the Human Research Program. This is a joint project consisting of human factors teams from the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and the Ames Research Center (ARC). Work on medical training has been conducted in collaboration with the Medical Training Group at JSC and with Wyle that provides medical training to crew members, biomedical engineers (BMEs), and flight surgeons under the Bioastronautics contract. Human factors personnel at Johnson Space Center have investigated medical performance support tools for CMOs and flight surgeons.

Byrne, Vicky↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Resilience Modeling in Complex Engineered Systems with Human-Machine Interactions

In recent times, there has been a growing interest in resilience-based design. Resilience-based design operates on the concept that failures and unexpected events will happen, and when they occur, complex engineered systems should be able to operate within acceptable bounds and recover reasonably. Humans can contribute to the resilience of a system by quickly detecting unforeseen events and taking corrective measures. To this effect, researchers have proposed guidelines and design approaches that can help promote human-system resilience. However, there is no early design stage tool to validate if a system is indeed resilient after applying these guidelines and design methods. In this research, we integrate the Human Error and Functional Failure Reasoning (HEFFR) framework into the fmdtools toolkit to enable designers to model the combined (machine, human, and joint) failures, including their propagation and dynamic effects, during early design stages. This integrated tool also allows designers to model the effects of performance shaping factors, team dynamics, and human-machine interactions in systems of systems. A demonstrative example of a remotely operated rover is explored to demonstrate how this approach can be applied to understand resilience in complex engineered systems with human interactions.

Lukman Irshad↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗
NASA NTRS2004

How Systems Engineering and Risk Management Defend Against Murphy's Law and Human Error

Systems Engineering and Risk Management processes can work synergistically to defend against the causes of many mission ending failures. Defending against mission ending failures is facilitated by fostering a team that has a healthy respect for Murphy's Law and a team with a of curiosity for how things work, how they can fail, and what they need to know. This curiosity is channeled into making the unknowns known or what is uncertain more certain. Efforts to assure mission success require the expenditure of energy in the following areas: 1. Understanding what defines Mission Success as guided by the customer's needs, objectives and constraints. 2. Understanding how the system is supposed to work and how the system is to be produced, fueled by the curiosity of how the system should work and how it should be produced. 3. Understanding how the system can fail and how the system might not be produced on time and within cost, fueled by the curiosity of how the system might fail and how production might be difficult. 4. Understanding what we need to know and what we need learn for proper completion of the above three items, fueled by the curiosity of what we might not know in order to make the best decisions.

Bay, Michael↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modeling Distributed Situation Awareness in Resilience-Based Design of Complex Engineered Systems

Human operators play a major role in the resilience of complex systems–while human error is one of the biggest contributors to hazardous events, operators additionally play a critical role in mitigating hazardous events. A key factor underlying this operator resilience is situation awareness–the ability of operators to understand their environment and each other to achieve desired system functions. In contrast to situation awareness-related accident models in the literature, which are largely conceptual in nature, this work proposes the use of a dynamic simulation framework to concretely model both the effects of situation awareness-related human errors and situation awareness-related hazard-mitigating properties using the distributed situation awareness theory. This work then presents specialized model constructs to enable agents’ individual perceptions of the system state and transactions with other agents (and thus distributed situation awareness) to be represented in simulation. To demonstrate this framework, it is then adapted to an aircraft taxiway case study, where it is used to model aircraft conflicts due to lack of vision and poor communications from the air traffic controller. This demonstration shows the potential of using simulation models to rigorously understand situation awareness-related human errors and thus inform the design of resilience.

Resilience Modeling↗
NASA NTRS2020

Lunar Dust and Its Impact on Human Exploration: A NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Workshop

The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) former Chief Scientist provided support to produce an NESC final report on the " Lunar Dust and Its Impact on Human Exploration" workshop held February 11 - 13, 2020, in Houston, Texas. This report follows the standard NESC report format to describe the findings, observations, and NESC recommendations developed by the workshop participants.

Lunar Dust; Human Exploration; NASA Engineering an↗
NASA NTRS1998

A Human Factors Framework for Payload Display Design

During missions to space, one charge of the astronaut crew is to conduct research experiments. These experiments, referred to as payloads, typically are controlled by computers. Crewmembers interact with payload computers by using visual interfaces or displays. To enhance the safety, productivity, and efficiency of crewmember interaction with payload displays, particular attention must be paid to the usability of these displays. Enhancing display usability requires adoption of a design process that incorporates human factors engineering principles at each stage. This paper presents a proposed framework for incorporating human factors engineering principles into the payload display design process.

Dunn, Mariea C.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Assessment of Human Factors

Human Factors Engineering, often referred to as Ergonomics, is a science that applies a detailed understanding of human characteristics, capabilities, and limitations to the design, evaluation, and operation of environments, tools, and systems for work and daily living. Human Factors is the investigation, design, and evaluation of equipment, techniques, procedures, facilities, and human interfaces, and encompasses all aspects of human activity from manual labor to mental processing and leisure time enjoyments. In spaceflight applications, human factors engineering seeks to: (1) ensure that a task can be accomplished, (2) maintain productivity during spaceflight, and (3) ensure the habitability of the pressurized living areas. DSO 904 served as a vehicle for the verification and elucidation of human factors principles and tools in the microgravity environment. Over six flights, twelve topics were investigated. This study documented the strengths and limitations of human operators in a complex, multifaceted, and unique environment. By focusing on the man-machine interface in space flight activities, it was determined which designs allow astronauts to be optimally productive during valuable and costly space flights. Among the most promising areas of inquiry were procedures, tools, habitat, environmental conditions, tasking, work load, flexibility, and individual control over work.

Mount, Frances↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors Research for Space Exploration: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation

As part of NASA's Human Research Program, the Space Human Factors Engineering Project serves as the bridge between Human Factors research and Human Spaceflight applications. Our goal is to be responsive to the operational community while addressing issues at a sufficient level of abstraction to ensure that our tools and solutions generalize beyond the point design. In this panel, representatives from four of our research domains will discuss the challenges they face in solving current problems while also enabling future capabilities. Historically, engineering-dominated organizations have tended to view good Human Factors (HF) as a desire rather than a requirement in system design and development. Our field has made significant gains in the past decade, however; the Department of Defense, for example, now recognizes Human-System Integration (HSI), of which HF is a component, as an integral part of their divisions hardware acquisition processes. And our own agency was far more accepting of HF/HSI requirements during the most recent vehicle systems definition than in any prior cycle. Nonetheless, HF subject matter experts at NASA often find themselves in catch up mode... coping with legacy systems (hardware and software) and procedures that were designed with little regard for the human element, and too often with an attitude of we can deal with any operator issues during training. Our challenge, then, is to segregate the true knowledge gaps in Space Human Factors from the prior failures to incorporate best (or even good) HF design principles. Further, we strive to extract the overarching core HF issues from the point-design-specific concerns that capture the operators (and managers) attention. Generally, our approach embraces a 3M approach to Human Factors: Measurement, Modeling, and Mitigation. Our first step is to measure human performance, to move from subjective anecdotes to objective, quantified data. Next we model the phenomenon, using appropriate methods in our field, modifying them to suit the unique aspects of the space environment. Finally, we develop technologies, tools, and procedures to mitigate the decrements in human performance and capabilities that occur in space environments. When successful, we decrease risks to crew safety and to mission success. When extremely successful (or lucky), we devise generalizable solutions that advance the state of our practice. Our panel is composed of researchers from diverse domains of our project... from different boxes, if you will, of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).

Kaiser, Mary K.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Human Factors in Training: Space Medical Proficiency Training

The early Constellation space missions are expected to have medical capabilities very similar to those currently on the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station (ISS). For Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) missions to the ISS, medical equipment will be located on the ISS, and carried into CEV in the event of an emergency. Flight surgeons (FS) on the ground in Mission Control will be expected to direct the crew medical officer (CMO) during medical situations. If there is a loss of signal and the crew is unable to communicate with the ground, a CMO would be expected to carry out medical procedures without the aid of a FS. In these situations, performance support tools can be used to reduce errors and time to perform emergency medical tasks. The space medical training work is part of the Human Factors in Training Directed Research Project (DRP) of the Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE) Project under the Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) Element of the Human Research Program (HRP). This is a joint project consisting of human factors team from the Ames Research Center (ARC) with Immanuel Barshi as Principal Investigator and the Johnson Space Center (JSC). Human factors researchers at JSC have recently investigated medical performance support tools for CMOs on-orbit, and FSs on the ground, and researchers at the Ames Research Center performed a literature review on medical errors. Work on medical training has been conducted in collaboration with the Medical Training Group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) and with Wyle Laboratories that provides medical training to crew members, biomedical engineers (BMEs), and to flight surgeons under the Bioastronautics contract. One area of research building on activities from FY08, involved the feasibility of just-in-time (JIT) training techniques and concepts for real-time medical procedures. A second area of research involves FS performance support tools. Information needed by the FS during the ISS mission support, especially for an emergency situation (e.g., fire onboard ISS), may be located in many different places around the FS s console. A performance support tool prototype is being developed to address this issue by bringing all of the relevant information together in one place. The tool is designed to include procedures and other information needed by a FS during an emergency, as well as procedures and information to be used after the emergency is resolved. Several walkthroughs of the prototype with FSs have been completed within a mockup of an ISS FS console. Feedback on the current tool design as well as recommendations for existing ISS FS displays were captured. The tool could have different uses depending on the situation and the skill of the user. An experienced flight surgeon could use it during an emergency situation as a decision and performance support tool, whereas a new flight surgeon could use it as JITT, or part of his/her regular training. The work proposed for FY10 continues to build on this strong collaboration with the Space Medical Training Group and previous research.

Byrne, Vicky E.↗