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NASA NTRS2016

Conceptual Drivers for an Exploration Medical System

Interplanetary spaceflight, such as NASA's proposed three-year mission to Mars, provides unique and novel challenges when compared with human spaceflight to date. Extended distance and multi-year missions introduce new elements of operational complexity and additional risk. These elements include: inability to resupply medications and consumables, inability to evacuate injured or ill crew, uncharted psychosocial conditions, and communication delays that create a requirement for some level of autonomous medical capability. Because of these unique challenges, the approaches used in prior programs have limited application to a Mars mission. On a Mars mission, resource limitations will significantly constrain available medical capabilities, and require a paradigm shift in the approach to medical system design and risk mitigation for crew health. To respond to this need for a new paradigm, the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element is assessing each Mars mission phase-transit, surface stay, rendezvous, extravehicular activity, and return-to identify and prioritize medical needs for the journey beyond low Earth orbit (LEO). ExMC is addressing both planned medical operations, and unplanned contingency medical operations that meld clinical needs and research needs into a single system. This assessment is being used to derive a gap analysis and studies to support meaningful medical capabilities trades. These trades, in turn, allow the exploration medical system design to proceed from both a mission centric and ethics-based approach, and to manage the risks associated with the medical limitations inherent in an exploration class mission. This paper outlines the conceptual drivers used to derive medical system and vehicle needs from an integrated vision of how medical care will be provided within this paradigm. Keywords: (Max 6 keywords: exploration, medicine, spaceflight, Mars, research, NASA)

Antonsen, Erik↗

NASA NTRS2018

Increasing Human Spaceflight Capabilities: Demonstration of Crew Autonomy Through Self-Scheduling Onboard International Space Station

For the first time in a spaceflight operational environment, our team enabled an ISS (International Space Station) crewmember to plan, reschedule, and execute their activities in real-time while abiding by flight and scheduling constraints. The Crew Autonomous Scheduling Test (CAST) investigated the novel concept of operations: allowing crew to manage their own timeline.

crew autonomy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of a Human Systems Integration Plan

NASA defines Human Systems Integration (HSI) as part of the overall systems engineering and acquisition strategy for space systems. The HSI Plan defines how HSI activities will be implemented across the lifecycle of the mission, as required by NPR 7123.1C, NASA Systems Engineering Processes and Requirements, and NPR 8705.2C Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems. The goal of this presentation is to share with government and industry how an HSI Plan can be implemented. The presentation will cover HSI implementation for flight systems, vehicle processing, and interfaces. These are divided into six NASA HSI Domains: human factors engineering, operations resources, safety, training, maintainability and supportability, habitability and environment. HSI activities go across the mission’s lifecycle from pre-formulation and acquisition through design, development, operations, maintenance, and decommissioning. The HSI Plan includes a description of the HSI activities and products that are essential for human rating, operability, maintainability, supportability, and affordability of the mission systems. It also describes the role of the HSI Team required as part of the Human Rating process. The HSI Plan utilizes the operational expertise within NASA to ensure designs and testing are successful, leading to acceptable human spaceflight vehicles.

Jackelynne Silva-Martinez↗

NASA NTRS2004

The Advanced Integration Matrix Project and Analog Sites: Difference or Duplication?

Several project teams have conducted Mars and Lunar mission simulations at analog sites and facilities over the past decade. These projects have a range of scope, participants, and objectives. NASA has provided many of these projects with funding, equipment, and personnel. Despite their variety, a consistent aim of these sites is advancing our capability to return to the Moon or to go to Mars. The Advanced Integration Matrix (AIM) Project was begun in 2002 with a corollary aim: that of advancing the technology needed for long duration human exploration of space. As a new project, it is prudent to ask and answer the question: "What does AIM offer to NASA that is distinct from what current and past analog sites offer?" The price tag for human spaceflight is high enough without needless duplication of efforts. The AIM Project concept is distinct from currently operating terrestrial analogs in three important ways. First, AIM is not strictly an analog site or facility; second, AIM is primarily focused on systems and integration issues; and finally, AIM is organizationally related to NASA s advanced development groups and subject to the rigors of the JSC Engineering Directorate s development process. The successful development of destination-independent, cost-effective, safe, and reliable long duration human exploration systems requires that NASA use both the analog sites and ground-based systems integration efforts. The Advanced Integration Matrix Project will not simply duplicate the former, but will give the agency the capability for the latter.

Wells, Kevin M.↗

NASA NTRS2019

International Space Station Spacecraft Charging Hazards: Hazard Identification, Management, and Control Methodologies, with Possible Applications to Human Spaceflight Beyond LEO

In this paper, we present an overview of how the International Space Station (ISS) safety engineering methodology directed to controlling extravehicular activity (EVA) crew electrical shock hazards, caused by ISS spacecraft charging, has evolved over the past 25+ years. Long-term measurements of ISS charging severity and frequency-of-occurrence, combined with detailed probabilistic analysis of EVA electric shock- circuit completion, led to a change in hazard control methodology. The requirement for two-fault tolerant EVA shock hazard control during all EVAs was replaced with a less operationally burdensome and risky EVA shock hazard detection and warning process. The applicability of event probability-based detection-and- warning processes to human spaceflight charging hazard control beyond low-earth orbit (LEO) is also considered.

Koontz, Steve↗

NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle GN and C Development History and Evolution

Completion of the final Space Shuttle flight marks the end of a significant era in Human Spaceflight. Developed in the 1970 s, first launched in 1981, the Space Shuttle embodies many significant engineering achievements. One of these is the development and operation of the first extensive fly-by-wire human space transportation Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) System. Development of the Space Shuttle GN&C represented first time inclusions of modern techniques for electronics, software, algorithms, systems and management in a complex system. Numerous technical design trades and lessons learned continue to drive current vehicle development. For example, the Space Shuttle GN&C system incorporated redundant systems, complex algorithms and flight software rigorously verified through integrated vehicle simulations and avionics integration testing techniques. Over the past thirty years, the Shuttle GN&C continued to go through a series of upgrades to improve safety, performance and to enable the complex flight operations required for assembly of the international space station. Upgrades to the GN&C ranged from the addition of nose wheel steering to modifications that extend capabilities to control of the large flexible configurations while being docked to the Space Station. This paper provides a history of the development and evolution of the Space Shuttle GN&C system. Emphasis is placed on key architecture decisions, design trades and the lessons learned for future complex space transportation system developments. Finally, some of the interesting flight operations experience is provided to inform future developers of flight experiences.

Zimpfer, Douglas↗

NASA NTRS1991

A database containing operational experience in spaceflight

A relational data base, called the Operational Experience Data Base, was constructed to electronically store and organize human-factors information from the Skylab and Space Shuttle missions. The taxonomy used to organize this data base builds on the one used for the Skylab human-machine experiments. This information can be used by NASA engineers and operations personnel to remedy design problems, or expand on design successes. Work to improve and expand the data base is underway.

Callaghan, Thomas↗

NASA NTRS2008

Does NASA's Constellation Architecture Offer Opportunities to Achieve Multiple Additional Goals in Space?

Every major NASA human spaceflight program in the last four decades has been modified to achieve goals in space not incorporated within the original design goals: the Apollo Applications Program, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. Several groups in the US have been identifying major future science goals, the science facilities necessary to investigate them, as well as possible roles for augmented versions of elements of NASA's Constellation program. Specifically, teams in the astronomy community have been developing concepts for very capable missions to follow the James Webb Space Telescope that could take advantage of - or require - free-space operations by astronauts and/or robots. Taking as one example, the Single-Aperture Far-InfraRed (SAFIR) telescope with a approx.10+ m aperture proposed for operation in the 2020 timeframe. According to current NASA plans, the Ares V launch vehicle (or a variant) will be available about the same time, as will the capability to transport astronauts to the vicinity of the Moon via the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and associated systems. [As the lunar surface offers no advantages - and major disadvantages - for most major optical systems, the expensive system for landing and operating on the lunar surface is not required.] Although as currently conceived, SAFIR and other astronomical missions will operate at the Sun-Earth L2 location, it appears trivial to travel for servicing to the more accessible Earth-Moon L1,2 locations. Moreover, as the recent Orbital Express and Automated Transfer Vehicle missions have demonstrated, future robotic capabilities should offer capabilities that would (remotely) extend human presence far beyond the vicinity of the Earth. In addition to multiplying the value of NASA's architecture for future human spaceflight to achieve the goals multiple major stakeholders, if humans one day travel beyond the Earth-Moon system - say, to Mars - technologies and capabilities for operating for long periods in free space must be developed. The engineering. management, and operational successes of the Space Station have demonstrated that international collaboration is possible. However, there is a danger that the hard-won lessons of current programs will be lost without continuing development of in-space operations. A program to achieve. for example, major astronomical goals in space using astronauts and robots will sustain international capabilities, produce highly visible achievements, and appeal to an additional broad community of stakeholders not currently involved with missions to the lunar surface.

Thronson, Harley A.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Does NASA's Constellation Architecture Offer Opportunities to Achieve Multiple Additional Goals in Space?

Every major NASA human spaceflight program in the last four decades has been modified to achieve goals in space not incorporated within the original design goals: the Apollo Applications Program, Skylab, Space Shuttle, and International Space Station. Several groups in the US have been identifying major future science goals, the science facilities necessary to investigate them, as well as possible roles for augmented versions of elements of NASA's Constellation program. Specifically, teams in the astronomy community have been developing concepts for very capable missions to follow the James Webb Space Telescope that could take advantage of - or require - free-space operations by astronauts and/or robots. Taking as one example, the Single-Aperture Far-InfraRed (SAFIR) telescope with a approx. 10+ m aperture proposed for operation in the 2020 timeframe. According to current NASA plans, the Ares V launch vehicle (or a variant) will be available about the same time, as will the capability to transport astronauts to the vicinity of the Moon via the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle and associated systems. [As the lunar surface offers no advantages - and major disadvantages - for most major optical systems, the expensive system for landing and operating on the lunar surface is not required.] Although as currently conceived, SAFIR and other astronomical missions will operate at the Sun-Earth L2 location, it appears trivial to travel for servicing to the more accessible Earth-Moon L1,2 locations. Moreover. as the recent Orbital Express and Automated Transfer Vehicle missions have demonstrated, future robotic capabilities should offer capabilities that would (remotely) extend human presence far beyond the vicinity of the Earth. In addition to multiplying the value of NASA's architecture for future human spaceflight to achieve the goals multiple major stakeholders. if humans one day travel beyond the Earth-Moon system - say, to Mars - technologies and capabilities for operating for long periods in free space must be developed. The engineering, management. and operational successes of the Space Station have demonstrated that international collaboratio~i is possible. However, there is a danger that the hard-won lessons of cLul+sent programs will be lost without continuing development of in-space operations. A program to achieve. for example. major astronomical goals in space using astronauts and robots will sustain international capabilities. produce highly visible achievements. and appeal to a11 additional broad community of stakeholders not currently involved with missions to the lunar surface.

Thronson, Harley↗

NASA NTRS2020

Preparing for Human Missions to Mars: The role of ISS and Artemis as Analogs for Research and Technology Testing

The hazards of spaceflight to the human system are present in in varying degrees on different spaceflight platforms: altered gravity, isolation and confinement, distance from Earth, radiation, and hostile closed environments. A strategic view of the fidelity of hazards experienced on different platforms can shape the testing plans for human research and technology demonstration related to crew health and performance. Working across the international partnership, the International Space Station (ISS) is planning periods of modified operations to improve the fidelity of Mars simulations. To understand transit durations as an independent variable, a series of 1-year, 6-month and 30-45 day missions are being planned on ISS. Standard measurements across ISS missions of different durations, lunar missions and ground analogs offers the opportunity to distinguish different hazards and their effects in the context of the relevance to future mission concepts. The ISS partnership is planning for additional test cases that are aligned with Mars mission plans. (1) Evaluating crew performance capabilities when transitioning to gravity after long durations in microgravity representative of a Mars transit. (2) Simulating crew medical care under Mars-like autonomous operations. (3) Identification and testing of operations under communications delay and autonomy expected for Mars missions and the linked effects on behavioral health and performance of the crew. Artemis missions serve as a valuable analogs for Mars surface operations, with partial gravity and deep space radiation hazards, but with crewmembers that are probably more physically capable than their counterparts would be after a Mars transit. Getting unobtrusive data from early Artemis missions, and knowledge gained from operational experience as Artemis operations develop can improve engineering design, medical requirements and countermeasures, and ultimately ensure mission success on Mars. Linking Mars architectures with the plans and capabilities for ISS and Artemis allows us to plan to most operationally relevant tests of crew health and performance on current spaceflight missions to inform planning for future missions to Mars. By using human spaceflight platforms as well as ground simulation in an integrated way, the international community can improve exploration readiness, develop countermeasures and reduce risks of future human space missions.

International Space Station↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Human Mars Mission Transit Abort Options for Ballistic High Thrust and Hybrid Transportation Systems

Throughout the entire history of human spaceflight, astronauts have never been more than a few day's journey from Earth. For missions to the International Space Station, or even to the Moon, aborting the mission and returning home is a relatively straightforward operation in the event of a life-threatening contingency. But on the journey to Mars, a mission abort is complicated by a single factor: the sheer distance to Mars that will take time to cover regardless of how powerful the propulsion system is. In a significant departure from the entire human spaceflight experience to date, a Mars mission abort will not mean an immediate return to Earth due to the heliocentric nature of the transit. After escaping Earth’s gravity and entering heliocentric space, aborting a mission to Mars will be measured in months not days even if the abort is initiated relatively early in the mission. This represents a fundamental shift in the way mission aborts are utilized to reduce mission risks and this change must be part of the narrative when discussing reliability, crew risk, contingency planning, and mission operations. Abort capability will vary between transportation propulsion systems depending on final design, operational implementation, and actual mission parameters such as departure date, but the difference is relatively insignificant given that ``mission abort'' in the heliocentric frame of reference is a wildly different paradigm than that historically used for Earth-centric missions which rely on abort as a risk mitigation strategy. The primary objective of this paper is to provide a clearer definition of human Mars mission aborts from a celestial physics and orbital mechanics perspective in the context of different propulsion systems.

Mars Architecture Team↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Earth Independent Operations Development for NASA’s Mars Campaign Office

NASA’s Moon to Mars Objectives lay out a strategic vision for the future of human spaceflight that culminates in crewed missions to the surface of Mars. The Mars Campaign Office (MCO) of the Moon to Mars Program is responsible for developing the technologies and capabilities necessary to support Mars missions. One such set of technologies supports a need for increased independence from Earth driven primarily by a communications delay between Earth and Mars that can reach twenty minutes or more. This paper lays out the initial strategy and approach for the MCO Earth-Independent Operations (EIO) portfolio and identifies areas targeted for investment between now and Mars missions tentatively planned for the early 2040s.

Ian D Maddox↗

NASA NTRS2012

Review of Human Cognitive Performance in Spaceflight

Human space exploration is inherently hazardous, particularly for lon g duration (LD) missions (22 days or longer). Maintenance of cognitive functioning is essential, but flight environments pose numerous pote ntial risks to the brain and cognitive performance (eg, radiation, to xins, chronic stress, sleep deprivation, hypercarbia, fluid shifts, h ormone imbalances, and injury). There have been persistent anecdotal reports of cognitive deficits during missions, but an up?-to-date rev iew of the evidence for such changes has remained unavailable. Method s: We identified and reviewed English language publications found via electronic searches in PubMed, PsycInfo, Inspec, the NASA Technical Report Server, and the Defense Technical Information Center, plus rec ursive searches of publication bibliographies. Search terms included the word cognition, cognitive, or performance along with spaceflight, flight, mission, or closely related terms. Results: Inter?-study variability precluded meta?-analysis. Some 32 published studies involving cognitive assessment during spaceflight were identified, involving a total of 110 participants (mean: 3.4 participants per study). The lo ngest?-duration study spanned 438 days, with six additional studies i nvolving flight durations of 90 days, and 11 more studies involved fl ight durations exceeding 21 days. The available evidence failed to st rongly support or refute the existence of cognitive deficits in LD sp aceflight, in part due to inadequate power or control conditions. Evi dence of increased variability in cognitive performance during spacef light, both within and between individuals, was common. Discussion: T hese results represent a negative finding based on small numbers of s ubjects for any given cognitive function. The increased variability within and (particularly) between individuals highlights the potential danger of generalizing from case studies. A mismatch therefore remain s between anecdotal reports describing generalized cognitive slowing, attention and memory problems during missions and the experimental e vidence supporting such deficits. Since a major justification for man ned spaceflight rests with the cognitive flexibility of humans, addit ional studies and further analysis of existing operational data appea rs warranted.

Strangman, Gary↗

NASA NTRS2013

Interface Anywhere: Development of a Voice and Gesture System for Spaceflight Operations

The Interface Anywhere Project was funded through Innovation Charge Account (ICA) at NASA JSC in the Fall of 2012. The project was collaboration between human factors and engineering to explore the possibility of designing an interface to control basic habitat operations through gesture and voice control; (a) Current interfaces require the users to be physically near an input device in order to interact with the system; and (b) By using voice and gesture commands, the user is able to interact with the system anywhere they want within the work environment.

Thompson, Shelby↗

NASA NTRS2016

Human Flight to Lunar and Beyond - Re-Learning Operations Paradigms

For the first time since the Apollo era, NASA is planning on sending astronauts on flights beyond LEO. The Human Space Flight (HSF) program started with a successful initial flight in Earth orbit, in December 2014. The program will continue with two Exploration Missions (EM): EM-1 will be unmanned and EM-2, carrying astronauts, will follow. NASA established a multi-center team to address the communications, and related tacking/navigation needs. This paper will focus on the lessons learned by the team designing the architecture and operations for the missions. Many of these Beyond Earth Orbit lessons had to be re-learned, as the HSF program has operated for many years in Earth orbit. Unlike the Apollo missions that were largely tracked by a dedicated ground network, the HSF planned missions will be tracked (at distances beyond GEO) by the DSN, a network that mostly serves robotic missions. There have been surprising challenges to the DSN as unique modern human spaceflight needs stretch the experience base beyond that of tracking robotic missions in deep space. Close interaction between the DSN and the HSF community to understand the unique needs (e.g. 2-way voice) resulted in a Concept of Operations (ConOps) that leverages both the deep space robotic and the Human LEO experiences. Several examples will be used to highlight the unique challenges the team faced in establishing the communications and tracking capabilities for HSF missions beyond Earth Orbit, including: Navigation. At LEO, HSF missions can rely on GPS devices for orbit determination. For Lunar-and-beyond HSF missions, techniques such as precision 2-way and 3-way Doppler and ranging, Delta-Difference-of-range, and eventually possibly on-board navigation will be used. At the same time, HSF presents a challenge to navigators, beyond those presented by robotic missions - navigating a dynamic/"noisy" spacecraft. Impact of latency - the delay associated with Round-Trip-Light-Time (RTLT). Imagine trying to have a 2-way discussion (audio or video) with an astronaut, with a 2-3 sec or more delay inserted (for lunar distances) or 20 minutes delay (for Mars distances). Balanced communications link. For robotic missions, there has been a heavy emphasis on higher downlink data rates, e.g. bringing back science data. Higher uplink data rates were of secondary importance, as uplink was used only to send commands (and occasionally small files) to the spacecraft. The ratio of downlink-to-uplink data rates was often 10:1 or more. For HSF, a continuous forward link is established and rates for uplink and downlink are more similar.

Kenny, Edward (Ted)↗

NASA NTRS2016

Characterization of Evidence for Human System Risk Assessment

Understanding the kinds of evidence available and using the best evidence to answer a question is critical to evidenced-based decision-making, and it requires synthesis of evidence from a variety of sources. Categorization of human system risks in spaceflight, in particular, focuses on how well the integration and interpretation of all available evidence informs the risk statement that describes the relationship between spaceflight hazards and an outcome of interest. A mature understanding and categorization of these risks requires: 1) sufficient characterization of risk, 2) sufficient knowledge to determine an acceptable level of risk (i.e., a standard), 3) development of mitigations to meet the acceptable level of risk, and 4) identification of factors affecting generalizability of the evidence to different design reference missions. In the medical research community, evidence is often ranked by increasing confidence in findings gleaned from observational and experimental research (e.g., "levels of evidence"). However, an approach based solely on aspects of experimental design is problematic in assessing human system risks for spaceflight. For spaceflight, the unique challenges and opportunities include: (1) The independent variables in most evidence are the hazards of spaceflight, such as space radiation or low gravity, which cannot be entirely duplicated in terrestrial (Earth-based) analogs, (2) Evidence is drawn from multiple sources including medical and mission operations, Lifetime Surveillance of Astronaut Health (LSAH), spaceflight research (LSDA), and relevant environmental & terrestrial databases, (3) Risk metrics based primarily on LSAH data are typically derived from available prevalence or incidence data, which may limit rigorous interpretation, (4) The timeframe for obtaining adequate spaceflight sample size (n) is very long, given the small population, (5) Randomized controlled trials are unattainable in spaceflight, (6) Collection of personal and environmental data on the astronaut population may create opportunities for advanced analytics and human-environment modeling that goes beyond that achieved in isolated experimental designs; and (7) Translation of relevant research to operations is a complex, transdisciplinary enterprise in which the approach must apply across the physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. The approach to synthesizing evidence must address both source and fidelity of data, and reflect the most general attributes of quality of evidence in science and engineering: reliability and validity. The authors are developing a two-factor approach which includes the various kinds of evidence required to understand risks and for the integrated interpretation of all evidence that is essential to develop standards and countermeasures. A unified framework for aggregating and assessing different kinds of evidence provides a consistent, traceable, evidence-based decision-making process to translate research to operations in an environment where engineers, scientists, physicians, and managers all engage in analyzing the trade space of vehicle design, standards, requirements and solutions for spaceflight.

Steinberg, S. L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Innovative Approaches to Using the International Space Station as a Mars Transit Analog

Human research on the International Space Station (ISS) crew has made significant advances in understanding of the effects of physiology on human health in space missions. However, ISS has not been as suitable for research on other hazards of human spaceflight such as isolation and communications delay. NASA recently completed a special assessment of whether modifications could be made to operations or facilities so that ISS could be used more effectively as an analog to simulate long-duration crew missions beyond low earth orbit. A cross-disciplinary team met to identify concept of operations, trade spaces, challenges, and opportunities to making ISS more operationally relevant as a Mars transit mission analog, and the results and implementation plans are summarized in this manuscript. In addition to the use case of 12-month missions (already in planning by the NASA ISS Program to bound expected Mars transit durations), three new use cases where ISS could provide valuable high-fidelity experience were identified. (1) Testing of operations procedures and medical care could be enhanced by demonstrating crew handling a simulated medical event in microgravity, autonomously, and with significant communications delay. (2) Isolation and confinement effects of deep space transit could be studied on ISS to validate current habitable volume requirements for Mars transit as well as provide context for evaluating the results of the extensive ground-based simulations in HERA and NEK. A trade study of possible operational and hardware changes that would make ISS applicable to these use cases was completed. (3) Surface operations after the physiological deconditioning of a long transit could be conducted to validate crew ability to perform critical ground tasks after 6-month Mars transit and aid in conceptual design of Mars surface element architectures. Each of the case studies includes a trade space between operational impacts on nominal ISS activities and degree of fidelity. A phased approach to implementation means that several "quick start" activities can be done in 2019-2020 at the same time as planning continues for more complex exploration analog options beginning as early as 2022. The team determined that many of these quick-start tasks could be done with available assets, entirely independent of other exploration system development timelines (such as Orion, Space Launch System). The consideration of the full suite of human spaceflight capabilities in the lunar vicinity can also be included as each step in human exploration serves as a simulation opportunity for some aspect of subsequent missions. Further discussions of options with the international community are critical for considering the benefits as well as impacts of simulation activities on ISS, as well as to better formulate future mission architectures.

Robinson, Julie A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

MIT January Operational Internship Experience 2011

This slide presentation reviews the 2011 January Operational Internship experience (JOIE) program which allows students to study operational aspects of spaceflight, how design affects operations and systems engineering in practice for 3 weeks. Topics include: (1) Systems Engineering (2) NASA Organization (3) Workforce Core Values (4) Human Factors (5) Safety (6) Lean Engineering (7) NASA Now (8) Press, Media, and Outreach and (9) Future of Spaceflight.

DeLatte, Danielle↗