Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Instrumentation and Control Systems”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

Risk assessment of safety-critical data communication in digital safety feature control system - 205

As one of the safety-critical systems in Advanced Power Reactor-1400 (APR-1400) nuclear power plant (NPP), the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) employs safety data link and network communication for transmitting safety component actuation to effectively facilitate various safety-critical field controllers. However, data communication failure risk in the ESF-CCS has yet to be fully quantified, the probability that a safety-critical system in digitalized NPP becomes unsafe due to a network failure must be evaluated to quantify the risk of digital I and C system. In this study, a fault tree model was developed to assess the data link and data network failure-induced unavailability of a safety-critical system function used to generate an automated control signal for actuating design basis accident mitigation equipment. Especially, the risk of data communication failure in a digital safety feature control system was analyzed in consideration of interconnection between safety-critical controllers and the fault-tolerant algorithm implemented in the network configuration. Based on the developed fault tree model, case studies were performed to quantitatively assess the unavailability of ESF-CCS signal generation due to safety data link and network failure and their risk effect on safety signal generation unavailability. This study is expected to provide risk information on the safety-critical data communication in a digitalized NPP instrumentation and control system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

User Access to Scientific Facilities via 5G: A Cyber Security Thought Experiment

5G is more than an over-the-air radio technology upgrade. It is a strategy to extend Mobile Network Operator service offerings beyond traditional voice, instant messaging and Internet access. 5G Mobile Network Operators will offer new telecommunication services that include enhanced guarantees of confidentiality, integrity and availability. How could such services change the way Science collaborations connect scientists to supercomputers and other scientific facilities? Current scientific collaborations implicitly trust cloud service providers to securely store and process data. The perceived risks of outsourcing Science data security are counterbalanced by assurances that cloud providers operate at a scale that allows them to implement security measures impractical for Science collaborations (e.g. continuous system administrator behavioral monitoring and strict individual separation of duties). If that is true for a cloud service provider like Amazon Web Services (2018 revenue: $25.7 billion), could it also be true for Mobile Network Operators like Verizon Wireless (2018 revenue: $91.7 billion) or AT&T Mobility (2018 revenue: $71.3 billion)? DOE Leadership Class supercomputer facility users currently access them from the public Internet via Secure Shell. The sponsors and operators of the supercomputer facilities have determined that the public Internet path between the Scientist’s Device and the Login Node does not natively provide enough confidentiality or integrity to protect those communications. Therefore, the facilities achieve additional confidentiality and integrity by requiring Secure Shell encryption across those untrusted network paths. Using 5G Network Slice technology, a Mobile Network Operator may offer communication services between supercomputer users and facilities that natively provide confidentiality and integrity guarantees. Sponsors and operators of supercomputer facilities may determine that these guarantees provide enough confidentiality and integrity to protect those communications. If so, a 5G Network Slice could replace an SSH session running over the public Internet. Finally, this use case could be extended to other Office of Science user facility access requirements. Consider microscopy instruments at (e.g.) the Center for Nanoscale Materials or the Environmental Molecular Sciences Laboratory. The embedded systems controlling such instruments may not always support encrypted network access technologies like SSH. 5G Network Slices may offer an alternative to current VPN or SSH tunneling techniques, with additional benefits like guaranteed minimum bandwidth.

5G↗

Digital Engineering and Cybersecurity Decision Analysis in Early Phases of SMR-Driven IES Projects

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Preventing Aim At An Undesired Target

Electronic system controls changes in orientation of optical instrument. Slew-control system includes avoidance-control logic, which overrides slew-control error generator when line of sight of instrument comes within cone of avoidance around line of sight to Sun. Normal slewing trajectory interrupted by avoidance-control logic, which computes actuator torques taking line of sight around cone of avoidance. Used to protect delicate photodetectors in servocontrolled infrared spectrometer or imaging instrument against damage occurring if instrument aimed at Sun or another excessively bright object.

Goodzeit, Neil E.↗

Three-Axis Attitude Estimation With a High-Bandwidth Angular Rate Sensor

A continuing challenge for modern instrument pointing control systems is to meet the increasingly stringent pointing performance requirements imposed by emerging advanced scientific, defense, and civilian payloads. Instruments such as adaptive optics telescopes, space interferometers, and optical communications make unprecedented demands on precision pointing capabilities. A cost-effective method was developed for increasing the pointing performance for this class of NASA applications. The solution was to develop an attitude estimator that fuses star tracker and gyro measurements with a high-bandwidth angular rotation sensor (ARS). An ARS is a rate sensor whose bandwidth extends well beyond that of the gyro, typically up to 1,000 Hz or higher. The most promising ARS sensor technology is based on a magnetohydrodynamic concept, and has recently become available commercially. The key idea is that the sensor fusion of the star tracker, gyro, and ARS provides a high-bandwidth attitude estimate suitable for supporting pointing control with a fast-steering mirror or other type of tip/tilt correction for increased performance. The ARS is relatively inexpensive and can be bolted directly next to the gyro and star tracker on the spacecraft bus. The high-bandwidth attitude estimator fuses an ARS sensor with a standard three-axis suite comprised of a gyro and star tracker. The estimation architecture is based on a dual-complementary filter (DCF) structure. The DCF takes a frequency- weighted combination of the sensors such that each sensor is most heavily weighted in a frequency region where it has the lowest noise. An important property of the DCF is that it avoids the need to model disturbance torques in the filter mechanization. This is important because the disturbance torques are generally not known in applications. This property represents an advantage over the prior art because it overcomes a weakness of the Kalman filter that arises when fusing more than one rate measurement. An additional advantage over prior art is that, computationally, the DCF requires significantly fewer real-time calculations than a Kalman filter formulation. There are essentially two reasons for this: the DCF state is not augmented with angular rate, and measurement updates occur at the slower gyro rate instead of the faster ARS sampling rate. Finally, the DCF has a simple and compelling architecture. The DCF is exactly equivalent to flying two identical attitude observers, one at low rate and one at high rate. These attitude observers are exactly of the form currently flown on typical three-axis spacecraft.

Bayard, David S.↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering for Nuclear Reactor Digital Instrumentation and Control

As nuclear reactors transition from analog to digital technology, the benefits of enhanced operational capabilities and improved efficiencies are potentially offset by cyber risks. Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) is an approach that can be used by engineers and staff to characterize and reduce new cyber risks in digital instrumentation and control systems. CIE provides guidance that can be applied throughout the entire systems engineering lifecycle, from conceptual design to decommissioning. In addition to outlining the use of CIE in nuclear reactor applications, this chapter provides a brief primer on nuclear reactor instrumentation and control and the associated cyber risks in existing light water reactors as well as the digital technology that will likely be used in future reactor designs and applications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Draft Function Allocation Framework and Preliminary Technical Basis for Advanced SMR Concepts of Operations

This report presents preliminary research results from the investigation into the development of new models and guidance for Concepts of Operations in advanced small modular reactor (AdvSMR) designs. AdvSMRs are nuclear power plants (NPPs), but unlike conventional large NPPs that are constructed on site, AdvSMRs systems and components will be fabricated in a factory and then assembled on site. AdvSMRs will also use advanced digital instrumentation and control systems, and make greater use of automation. Some AdvSMR designs also propose to be operated in a multi-unit configuration with a single central control room as a way to be more cost-competitive with existing NPPs. These differences from conventional NPPs not only pose technical and operational challenges, but they will undoubtedly also have regulatory compliance implications, especially with respect to staffing requirements and safety standards.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Technical Challenges and Gaps in Integration of Advanced Sensors, Instrumentation, and Communication Technologies with Digital Twins for Nuclear Application

This paper explores integrating advanced sensor, instrumentation, and communication technologies with digital twin technologies for nuclear energy application. Digital twins and digital-twin-enabling technologies are expected to integrate with future nuclear reactor designs and have the potential to impact currently operating nuclear power plants. Greater digital integration, advanced instrumentation and control systems, and advanced operations and maintenance practices are all associated with digital-twin-enabling technologies. Advanced sensors, instrumentation, and communication technology are expected to comprise important elements of the infrastructure required to develop and operate a nuclear digital twin system. This paper identifies and discusses challenges and gaps in developing and implementing advanced sensors and instrumentation and communication technology to be integrated with a digital twin in current and advanced reactor applications. It is important to address some challenge and gap to enable a successful near-term deploying advanced sensors, instrumentation, and communication technologies integrated with digital twins.

Yadav, Vaibhav↗

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Failure Mechanism Traceability and Application in Human System Interface of Nuclear Power Plants using RESHA

In recent years, there has been considerable effort to modernize existing and new nuclear power plants with digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C). However, there has also been considerable concern both by industry and regulatory bodies for the risk and consequence analysis of these systems. Of particular concern are digital common cause failures (CCFs) specifically related to software defects. These “misbehaviors” by the software can occur in both the control and monitoring of a system. While many new methods have been proposed to identify potential software failure modes, such as Systems-theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), etc., these methods are focused primarily on the control action pathway of a system. In contrast, the information feedback pathway lacks unsafe control actions (UCAs), which are typically related to software basic events; thus, assessment of software basic events in such systems is unclear. In this work, we present the idea of intermediate processors and unsafe information flow (UIF) to help safety analysts trace failure mechanisms in the feedback pathway and how they can be integrated into a fault tree for improved assessment capability. The concepts presented are demonstrated in two comprehensive case studies, a smart sensor integrated platform for unmanned autonomous vehicles and another on a representative advanced human system interface (HSI) for safety critical plant monitoring. The qualitative software basic events are identified, and a fault tree analysis is conducted based on a modified Redundancy-guided Systems-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) methodology. The case studies demonstrate the use of UIF and intermediate processors in the fault tree to improve traceability of software failures in highly complex digital instrumentation feedback. The improved method can also clarify fault tree construction when multiple component dependencies are present in the system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Target Diagnostics Supports NIF's Path to Ignition

The physics requirements derived from the National Ignition Facility (NIF) experimental campaigns are leading to a wide variety of target diagnostics. Software development for the control and analysis of these diagnostics is included in the NIF Integrated Computer Control System, Diagnostic Control System and Data Visualization. These projects implement the configuration, controls, data analysis and visual representation of most of these diagnostics. To date, over 40 target diagnostics have been developed to support NIF experiments. In 2011 diagnostics were developed or enhanced to measure Ignition performance in a high neutron yield environment. Performance is optimized around four key variables: Adiabat (a) which is the strength and timing of four shocks delivered to the target, Velocity (V) of the imploding target, Mix (M) is the uniformity of the burn, and the Shape (S) of the imploding Deuterium Tritium (DT) hot spot. The diagnostics used to measure each of these parameters is shown in figure 1. Adiabat is measured using the Velocity Interferometer System for Any Reflector (VISAR) diagnostic consisting of three streak cameras. To provide for more accurate adiabat measurements the VISAR streak cameras were enhanced in FY11 with a ten comb fiducial signal controller to allow for post shot correction of the streak camera sweep non-linearity. Mix is measured by the Neutron Time of Flight (NTOF) and Radiochemical Analysis of Gaseous Samples (RAGS) diagnostics. To accommodate high neutron yield shots, NTOF diagnostic controls are being modified to use Mach Zehnder interferometer signals to allow the digitizers to be moved from near the target chamber to the neutron shielded diagnostic mezzanine. In December 2011 the first phase of RAGS diagnostic commissioning will be completed. This diagnostic will analyze the tracers that are added to NIF target capsules that undergo nuclear reactions during the shot. These gases are collected and purified for nuclear counting by the RAGS system. Three new instrument controllers were developed and commissioned to support this diagnostic. A residual-gas analyzer (RGA) instrument measures the gas content at various points in the system. The Digital Gamma Spectrometer instrument measures the radiological spectrum of the decaying gas isotopes. A final instrument controller was developed to interface to a PLC based Gas collection system. In order to support the implosion velocity measurements an additional Gated X-ray Detector (GXD) diagnostic was tested and commissioned. This third GXD views the target through a slit contained in its snout and allows the other GXD diagnostics to be used for measuring the shape on the same shot. In order to measure the implosion shape in a high neutron environment, Actide Readout In A Neutron Environment (ARIANE) and Neutron Imaging (NI) diagnostics were commissioned. The controls for ARIANE, a fixed port gated x-ray imager, contain a neutron shielded camera and micro channel plate pulser with its neutron sensitive electronics located in the diagnostic mezzanine. The NI diagnostic is composed of two Spectral Instruments SI-1000 cameras located 20M from the target and provides neutron images of the DT hot spot for high yield shots. The development and commissioning of these new or enhanced diagnostics in FY11 have provided meaningful insight that facilitates the optimization of the four key Ignition variables. In FY12 they will be adding three new diagnostics and enhancing four existing diagnostics in support of the continuing optimization series of campaigns.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Advanced instrumentation for next-generation aerospace propulsion control systems

New control concepts for the next generation of advanced air-breathing and rocket engines and hypersonic combined-cycle propulsion systems are analyzed. The analysis provides a database on the instrumentation technologies for advanced control systems and cross matches the available technologies for each type of engine to the control needs and applications of the other two types of engines. Measurement technologies that are considered to be ready for implementation include optical surface temperature sensors, an isotope wear detector, a brushless torquemeter, a fiberoptic deflectometer, an optical absorption leak detector, the nonintrusive speed sensor, and an ultrasonic triducer. It is concluded that all 30 advanced instrumentation technologies considered can be recommended for further development to meet need of the next generation of jet-, rocket-, and hypersonic-engine control systems.

Barkhoudarian, S.↗

Improving nuclear power plant safety and operating margins through linear quadratic estimation - 290

Redundant measurement, trip, and actuation channels are required for reactor trips and engineered safety systems in nuclear power plants. There are three or four independent channels in existing plants, depending on the system. To prevent failures, consistent signals from any two channels together can trip the reactor or actuate safety systems. Measurements associated with safety trips and actuations include uncertainties related to the instruments making the measurements and to process conditions. Margins that include measurement uncertainties are set for each trip and actuation channel as though it were the only one taking action, thus preserving independence. There are sensors, however, that provide partially redundant information that could be used to decrease the uncertainty associated with measurements of plant conditions, while maintaining the three-channel redundancy important to plant safety. Reducing these uncertainties would both improve plant safety by providing more accurate knowledge of plant conditions and improve the operating margins that must take such uncertainties into account. This paper demonstrates how information that is already available to plant instrumentation and control systems and is already redundant can be used through software routines to reduce the error that must be taken into account in reactor trip and safety system actuation setpoints. Issues that would have to be addressed related to standards, licensing, and implementation are also discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Palomar Testbed Interferometer

The Palomar Testbed Interferometer (PTI) is a long-baseline infrared interferometer located at Palomar Observatory, California. It was built as a testbed for interferometric techniques applicable to the Keck Interferometer. First fringes were obtained in 1995 July. PTI implements a dual-star architecture, tracking two stars simultaneously for phase referencing and narrow-angle astrometry. The three fixed 40 cm apertures can be combined pairwise to provide baselines to 110 m. The interferometer actively tracks the white-light fringe using an array detector at 2.2 microns and active delay lines with a range of +/-38 m. Laser metrology of the delay lines allows for servo control, and laser metrology of the complete optical path enables narrow-angle astrometric measurements. The instrument is highly automated, using a multiprocessing computer system for instrument control and sequencing.

Colavita, M. M.↗

Closing plenary summary of working group 4 instrumentation and controls for ERL2011

Working group 4 was charged with presentations and discussions on instrumentation and controls with regards to Energy Recovery Linacs (ERL). There were 4 sessions spanning 3.5 hours in which 7 talks were delivered, the first being an invited plenary presentation. The time allotted for each talk was limited to 20-25 minutes in order to allow 5-10 minutes for discussion. Most of the talks were held in joint session with working group 5 (Unwanted Beam Loss). This format was effective for the purpose of this workshop. A final series of discussion sessions were also held with working group 5. Summary of the working group 4 activities, presented in the closing plenary session. We had a plenary presentation on operational performance, experience, and future plans at the existing ERL injector prototype at Cornell. This included instrumentation data, controls system configurations, as well as description of future needs. This was followed by four talks from KEK and RIKEN/SPring-8 that described electron beam instrumentation already in use or under development that can be applied to ERL facilities. The final talks described the ERLs under construction at KEK and BNL. The format of having joint sessions with working group 5 was beneficial as there were a significant number of common topics and concerns with regards to the causes of beam loss, instrumentation hardware, and techniques used to measure and analyze beam loss.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Root Cause Correlation Analysis of Software Failures via Orthogonal Defect Classification and Natural Language Processing

Systems theoretic process analysis (STPA) is becoming an increasingly popular technique to assess how complex digital software systems can fail. Rather than defining failures by their observable failure events, which may be sparse especially for safety rated nuclear digital instrumentation and control systems (DI&C), failures are defined as postulated unsafe actions under specific contextual conditions. This permits a top-down analysis of system hazards and identifies whether imposed constraints and requirements can sufficiently address undesirable hazards. However, STPA is a qualitative approach at identifying inadequacies in the development process and cannot currently be used to quantify unsafe action likelihoods for probabilistic risk assessment. Therefore, in this work, we examine the root causes of software failure and explore whether a consistent correlation can be linked to specific unsafe action classes. We implement Lbl2Vec, an unsupervised document classification and retrieval algorithm, on a database of 4,096 software defect reports acquired from various open-source software systems. By analyzing sentence structure, embedded labels, and word vectors, we show that certain defect types positively correlate to specific unsafe action classes over others. The correlations developed can be used to estimate the failure probability of safety intended DI&C systems which provides a licensing basis for nuclear plant modernization efforts.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Non-Nuclear Test Facility Development to Support Verification and Validation Needs

This study focuses on developing a non-nuclear test facility to help meet the verification and validation (V&V) requirements of a water-cooled small modular reactor (SMR) system. The scaling analysis necessary for reactor system experimentation and assessment model V&V considers various reactor system accident scenarios such as main steam line break (MSLB), steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), and containment condensation and heat transfer. The goal is to identify key physics based phenomena of interest (POI), specific figures of merit (FOMs), and the state of knowledge (SOK) by employing phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) studies. Important physics phenomena such as heat transfer, fluid dynamics, structural integrity, and material selection must be addressed when scaling a thermal-hydraulics system. Alongside these considerations, modifications to the facility may be needed to align the scaled system with the available footprint (height and space) of the facility. These modifications may include infrastructure upgrades, changes to the piping layout, implementation of safety measures, and installation of new instrumentation and control systems. The test facility aims to provide a scaled-down version of prototypic facilities for comprehensive V&V activities by overcoming these challenges and making the necessary modifications. This approach minimizes scaling distortion, simulates prototypic plant conditions, and accurately models accident event progressions. Thus, the facility will be capable of adequately modeling a scaled SMR system to support the design, development and licensing needs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗