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At least 199 records · Page 11

False Data Injection and Detection in LQG Systems: A Game Theoretic Approach

Cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to false data injection by adversaries who compromise cyber communication links. In this paper, an infinite horizon linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) system is considered wherein the control inputs transmitted over cyber links are vulnerable to compromise and false data injection by adversaries. The adversarial cyber-attack is driven to minimize the performance of the LQG system, and the controller is equipped with an intrusion detection system that monitors the sequence of internal physical states to detect adversarial input modification. The problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum game with the false alarm probability as the reward, wherein the attacker aims to achieve a target increase in controller cost while maximizing the false alarm probability, and a detector who wishes to minimize the false alarm probability while remaining consistent. It is shown that in such a game, an ε-equilibrium exists. The equilibrium attacker strategy is the one that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance between legitimate and falsified state dynamics, and the equilibrium detector strategy is the corresponding likelihood-ratio test. Numerical simulations are presented that showcase the equilibrium strategy pair and the intuitive strategies comparisons.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

AI-based Detection and Defense Against Cyberattacks in Distributed Energy Resources

This study will provide comprehensive artificial intelligence (AI)-based solution tools for network security, malware prevention, and sensor data anomaly detection for distributed energy resource (DER) research, development, and demonstration. DER technologies are energy systems (e.g., solar panels, wind turbines, and energy storage systems) that are often connected to the internet and thus vulnerable to cyberattacks. Cybersecurity should be of primary concern for DERs, which is why we propose an integrated multi-layer cyber-defense system for DERs. This system encompasses risk assessments, network security, malware prevention, and detection of anomalies in the sensor data. Implementation of a comprehensive risk assessment with an overview of the model architecture should be the primary step, and should include the potential impact of experiencing, at a given time, one or more cyberattacks on the system. The second step is to ensure that the network security includes firewalls, intrusion detection, and malware prevention. The third step is to provide solution tools that enable sensor data anomaly detection for DERs. By incorporating these considerations into DER research, development, and demonstration, organizations can help ensure the safety and security of their systems and protect against potential cyberattacks.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Evaluating lightweight unsupervised online IDS for masquerade attacks in CAN

Vehicular controller area networks (CANs) are susceptible to masquerade attacks by malicious adversaries. In masquerade attacks, adversaries silence a targeted ID and then send malicious frames with forged content at the expected timing of benign frames. As masquerade attacks could seriously harm vehicle functionality and are the stealthiest attacks to detect in CAN, recent work has devoted attention to compare frameworks for detecting masquerade attacks in CAN. However, most existing works report offline evaluations using CAN logs already collected using simulations that do not comply with the domain’s real-time constraints. Here we contribute to advance the state of the art by presenting a comparative evaluation of four different non-deep learning (DL)-based unsupervised online intrusion detection systems (IDS) for masquerade attacks in CAN. Our approach differs from existing comparative evaluations in that we analyze the effect of controlling streaming data conditions in a sliding window setting. In doing so, we use realistic masquerade attacks being replayed from the ROAD dataset. We show that although evaluated IDS are not effective at detecting every attack type, the method that relies on detecting changes in the hierarchical structure of clusters of time series produces the best results at the expense of higher computational overhead. We discuss limitations, open challenges, and how the evaluated methods can be used for practical unsupervised online CAN IDS for masquerade attacks.

Anomaly detection↗

Numerical Investigation of the Electrical Resistivity Tomography for Detecting the Waste Zone beneath an Engineered Surface

Surface barriers are an integral part of waste site remediation that are needed to minimize further contamination spread, allow time for additional radionuclide decay, and decrease risks to workers and the environment. Depending on the type of waste, the design life of a surface barrier varies from decades to millennia. The performance and impacts of surface barriers must be monitored beyond the life of most monitoring instruments; hence, long-term monitoring technologies are needed that can non-intrusively assess barrier impacts both in the near surface and to large depths. Innovative geophysical methods such as the electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) are capable of non-intrusively detecting the distribution of soil wetness and/or contaminant plumes in the soil. However, the application of geophysical methods in monitoring a surface barrier system has been very limited because a surface barrier is often composed of multiple components made of natural (e.g., soil, rocks, asphalt) and manufactured (e.g., plastic, metal) materials. In this study, the E4D numerical simulator, developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for inverting the ERT survey data, was used to evaluate the configuration of electrodes for optimized ERT monitoring of waste zone below a surface barrier. The results indicate that, for high-quality mapping of the conditions below the surface barrier, the ERT method requires that some of the electrodes be installed either beneath the surface barrier or in boreholes around the barrier. In reality, for a surface barrier that is being constructed, some electrodes may be installed beneath the non-conductive layer of the surface barrier before or during barrier construction. For a surface barrier that has already been constructed, some electrodes can be installed in a few vertical boreholes around the barrier boundary.

Zhang, Zhuanfang↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

One-Dimensional Scanning Approach to Shock Sensing

Measurement tools for high speed air flow are sought both in industry and academia. Particular interest is shown in air flows that exhibit aerodynamic shocks. Shocks are accompanied by sudden changes in density, pressure, and temperature. Optical detection and characterization of such shocks can be difficult because the medium is normally transparent air. A variety of techniques to analyze these flows are available, but they often require large windows and optical components as in the case of Schlieren measurements and/or large operating powers which precludes their use for in-flight monitoring and applications. The one-dimensional scanning approach in this work is a compact low power technique that can be used to non-intrusively detect shocks. The shock is detected by analyzing the optical pattern generated by a small diameter laser beam as it passes through the shock. The optical properties of a shock result in diffraction and spreading of the beam as well as interference fringes. To investigate the feasibility of this technique a shock is simulated by a 426 m diameter optical fiber. Analysis of results revealed a direct correlation between the optical fiber or shock location and the beam s diffraction pattern. A plot of the width of the diffraction pattern vs. optical fiber location reveals that the width of the diffraction pattern was maximized when the laser beam is directed at the center of the optical fiber. This work indicates that the one-dimensional scanning approach may be able to determine the location of an actual shock. Near and far field effects associated with a small diameter laser beam striking an optical fiber used as a simulated shock are investigated allowing a proper one-dimensional scanning beam technique.

Tokars, Roger↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

HC-NIDS: signatures and simulations for detecting cyber-attacks aiming to cause damage against cyber-physical energy systems

Physical device safety is typically implemented locally using embedded controllers, while operations safety is primarily performed in control centers. Safe operations can be enhanced by correct design of device-level control algorithms, and protocols, procedures and operator training at the control-room level, but all can fail. Moreover, these elements exchange data and issue commands via vulnerable communication layers. In order to secure these gaps and enhance operational safety, we believe monitoring of command sequences must be combined with an awareness of physical device limitations and automata models that capture safety mechanisms. One way of doing this is by leveraging specification-based intrusion detection to monitor for physical constraint violations. The method can also verify that physical infrastructure state is consistent with monitoring information and control commands exchanged between field devices and control centers. This additional security layer enhances protection from both outsider attacks and insider mistakes. We implemented specification-based SCADA command analyzers using physical constraint algorithms directly in the Bro framework and Broccoli APIs for three separate scenarios: a water heater, an automated distribution system, and an over-current protection scheme. To accomplish this, we added low-level analyzers capable of examining control system-specific protocol packets for both Modbus TCP and DNP3, and also higher-level analyzers able to interpret device command and data streams within the context of each device's physical capabilities and present operational state. Thus the software that we are making available includes the Bro/Broccoli scripts for these three scenarios, as well as simulators, written in C, of those scenarios that generate sample traffic that is monitored by the Bro/Broccoli scripts. In addition, we have also implemented systems to directly pull cyber-physical information from the OSIsoft PI historian system. We have included the Python scripts used to perform that monitoring.

Source record↗

Supporting Cyber Security of Power Distribution Systems by Detecting Differences Between Real-time Micro-Synchrophasor Measurements and Cyber-Reported SCADA (Final Report)

As modern power grids tend towards greater levels of automation and communication, the challenges of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to cyber-attacks are ones that are increasingly demanding attention. Today’s power system has evolved to form the foundational bedrock of modern society, and an attack on this infrastructure could prove disastrous. In this project we were tasked to investigate the use of distribution synchrophasors as an independent isolated sensor network with which we can corroborate, or flag potentially spoofed,Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) data. We adapted an approach to marry the underlying physical properties of power systems with the network communications used by power systems in order to offer insights unattainable by either data stream isolation. While the concept of intrusion detection systems (IDS) is well understood for monitoring network traffic and traditional IT computing systems, the approach discussed in this report is motivated by several key notions: first, current SCADA communications alone presents an incomplete view of the grid. Second, the power grid, and the equipment controlling it, is grounded by laws of physics. Given this, we leverage high-frequency physical grid measurements to understand the physical condition of the grid, and combine this with SCADA. While high-frequency physical grid measurements and SCADA communication over Internet Protocol (IP) networks are fundamentally disparate information sources, when collectively examined through appropriate lenses, they offer a much more nuanced depiction of the grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Firmware Tampering Detection in Heavy-Duty Vehicles through J1939 CAN Analysis

Modern heavy-duty vehicles rely on complex networks of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that communicate using the J1939 protocol. While this system makes it easier to update and configure vehicle components, it also opens the door to serious cybersecurity risks if not properly secured. This work investigates the potential for firmware tampering through the J1939 communication protocol, which enables ECU configuration and reprogramming over the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus. By monitoring CAN traffic during legitimate maintenance operations and reverse-engineering OEM diagnostic software, we identified common and proprietary J1939 message identifiers, authentication patterns, and vulnerabilities within Unified Diagnostic Services (UDS). These findings demonstrate that inadequate authentication mechanisms can allow malicious actors to alter ECU firmware or disable safety functions, posing severe operational and safety risks. Our analysis contributes to the development of vehicle intrusion detection systems capable of recognizing abnormal reprogramming activity and future firmware fingerprinting methods to verify software integrity across ECUs. This work highlights the importance of standardizing secure firmware authentication across manufacturers to strengthen cyber resilience in heavy-duty vehicle systems.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Summer 2024 INL Intern Poster Session Submission - Brian Schumitz

This LRS submission is my poster for the INL Intern Poster Session, Summer 2024. Abstract: The Software Engineering and Cybersecurity Lab (SECL) at Montana State University has developed PIQUE, a system for evaluating software quality. PIQUE's adaptability allows for language-specific static-analysis operations, including a model for assessing cloud microservice ecosystems. These ecosystems often rely on Docker for efficient deployment and management of containerized services. Our research focuses on evaluating the network quality within these microservice ecosystems. To automate this process, we're utilizing Snort, an open-source intrusion detection system renowned for its ability to detect and log network traffic. By leveraging Snort's customizable rules, we aim to construct comprehensive testing methods for measuring and quantifying the network quality based on traffic between Docker containers. This research aims to enhance the overall security and reliability of cloud microservice ecosystems by providing automated and robust quality evaluation mechanisms, ultimately contributing to the advancement of software engineering practices in these environments

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Commercialization of the Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR)

The Transportation-Security, Tracking, and Reporting System (T-STAR) was developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration, NA-21, Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for detection and tracking during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material. Few off-the-shelf systems for conveyance tracking offer detection of a cargo compartment breach or a removal of the cargo. Systems that do offer this capability often require permanent installation through modifying of the conveyance itself. This is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building use, storage, and transport security capacity. The development of T-STAR has moved from fielding robust prototypes deployed in countries ranging from North America, Latin America and Central Asia to a commercially produced product that can now be deployed to provide enhanced security during transit. Each prototype deployment resulted in important lessons learned, which informed the requirements for the final commercial product. T-STAR uses both cellular and Iridium satellite modems to provide redundant communications to provide the configuration, status, and alerts to a server monitoring the shipment, which is accessible using a multilanguage browser-based user interface. A wireless security system employing using Z-wave sensors for intrusion detection located in the conveyance provide low cost but effective solution for a wide range of conveyance types. Additional capabilities include the ability to monitor a vehicles’ CANBUS (Controller Area Network) system, an ethernet port for high throughput sensor information such as video cameras, and the ability to power and use advanced external sensor payloads. These features make the T-STAR a capable and expandable security gateway that can be deployed on a variety of conveyances from box trucks to open trailers. The ability to provide tracking, monitoring, and detection provide a key component in overall best practices designed to protect shipments of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000283205671)↗

ADVANCING THE TRANSPORTATION – SECURITY, TRACKING, AND REPORTING (T-STAR) SYSTEM

The Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System was developed by NNSA NA-21 Office of Radiological Security (ORS) to provide a transportation security system for use during transport of Category 1 and Category 2 radiological material to provide detection and tracking capability for shipments. While many off the shelf systems provide asset tracking of the conveyance, few offer detection of a breach into the cargo compartment or the removal of cargo from the conveyance. Systems that do offer such capability need to be permanently installed on the conveyance, requiring drilling of holes and running of cables throughout the conveyance itself. This means that dedicated shipping containers or vehicles are required, and this is not sustainable in many countries where ORS is building capacity for the security of radioactive materials in use, storage, and in transport. T-STAR is leveraging various ORNL technologies for improved communications capability and reduced power requirements; the multimode communications module developed by the Unmanned Aerial Systems group and the low power and extensible Authenticatable Container Tracking System (ACTS) tag developed for the US Department of Energy’s Packaging Certification Program provide a small footprint tracking system which can be installed quickly as needed. T-STAR uses a cellular and an Iridium modem to communicate configuration and alert information to a server used to monitor the shipment and incorporates a Z-wave © wireless security system allowing various intrusion detection sensors to be located in the conveyance. The Z-wave sensors are readily available, inexpensive, and power efficient, making them replaceable and low maintenance. The server software be configured as a standalone system installed on a light duty computer hosted by the competent authority, carrier, or response agency, or hosted as part of an Amazon Cloud Server (AWS) accessible via a secure login. The server has two functions, first is to handle messages to/from the T-STAR field unit, second is to host the user interface which can be accessed using a web browser on desktop or mobile device. The user interface implements roles to determine the level of access to shipment information, define geo-fences, and configure notifications. The user interface also supports multiple languages for display as well as notifications by using a simple lookup file which can be modified by the host country to ensure translations are correct and meaningful to responders receiving notifications and alerts. This paper will detail the overarching T-STAR capabilities, architecture and components, and provide insights on how it is deployed, used, and monitored during transportation of radioactive material.

Schultze, Michael↗

Using Machine Learning in Adversarial Environments.

Intrusion/anomaly detection systems are among the first lines of cyber defense. Commonly, they either use signatures or machine learning (ML) to identify threats, but fail to account for sophisticated attackers trying to circumvent them. We propose to embed machine learning within a game theoretic framework that performs adversarial modeling, develops methods for optimizing operational response based on ML, and integrates the resulting optimization codebase into the existing ML infrastructure developed by the Hybrid LDRD. Our approach addresses three key shortcomings of ML in adversarial settings: 1) resulting classifiers are typically deterministic and, therefore, easy to reverse engineer; 2) ML approaches only address the prediction problem, but do not prescribe how one should operationalize predictions, nor account for operational costs and constraints; and 3) ML approaches do not model attackers’ response and can be circumvented by sophisticated adversaries. The principal novelty of our approach is to construct an optimization framework that blends ML, operational considerations, and a model predicting attackers reaction, with the goal of computing optimal moving target defense. One important challenge is to construct a realistic model of an adversary that is tractable, yet realistic. We aim to advance the science of attacker modeling by considering game-theoretic methods, and by engaging experimental subjects with red teaming experience in trying to actively circumvent an intrusion detection system, and learning a predictive model of such circumvention activities. In addition, we will generate metrics to test that a particular model of an adversary is consistent with available data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA Tech Briefs, May 2012

Topics covered include: An "Inefficient Fin" Non-Dimensional Parameter to Measure Gas Temperatures Efficiently; On-Wafer Measurement of a Multi-Stage MMIC Amplifier with 10 dB of Gain at 475 GHz; Software to Control and Monitor Gas Streams; Miniaturized Laser Heterodyne Radiometer (LHR) for Measurements of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmospheric Column; Anomaly Detection in Test Equipment via Sliding Mode Observers; Absolute Position of Targets Measured Through a Chamber Window Using Lidar Metrology Systems; Goldstone Solar System Radar Waveform Generator; Fast and Adaptive Lossless Onboard Hyperspectral Data Compression System; Iridium Interfacial Stack - IrIS; Downsampling Photodetector Array with Windowing; Optical Phase Recovery and Locking in a PPM Laser Communication Link; High-Speed Edge-Detecting Line Scan Smart Camera; Optical Communications Channel Combiner; Development of Thermal Infrared Sensor to Supplement Operational Land Imager; Amplitude-Stabilized Oscillator for a Capacitance-Probe Electrometer; Automated Performance Characterization of DSN System Frequency Stability Using Spacecraft Tracking Data; Histogrammatic Method for Determining Relative Abundance of Input Gas Pulse; Predictive Sea State Estimation for Automated Ride Control and Handling - PSSEARCH; LEGION: Lightweight Expandable Group of Independently Operating Nodes; Real-Time Projection to Verify Plan Success During Execution; Automated Performance Characterization of DSN System Frequency Stability Using Spacecraft Tracking Data; Web-Based Customizable Viewer for Mars Network Overflight Opportunities; Fabrication of a Cryogenic Terahertz Emitter for Bolometer Focal Plane Calibrations; Fabrication of an Absorber-Coupled MKID Detector; Graphene Transparent Conductive Electrodes for Next- Generation Microshutter Arrays; Method of Bonding Optical Elements with Near-Zero Displacement; Free-Mass and Interface Configurations of Hammering Mechanisms; Wavefront Compensation Segmented Mirror Sensing and Control; Long-Life, Lightweight, Multi-Roller Traction Drives for Planetary Vehicle Surface Exploration; Reliable Optical Pump Architecture for Highly Coherent Lasers Used in Space Metrology Applications; Electrochemical Ultracapacitors Using Graphitic Nanostacks; Improved Whole-Blood-Staining Device; Monitoring Location and Angular Orientation of a Pill; Molecular Technique to Reduce PCR Bias for Deeper Understanding of Microbial Diversity; Laser Ablation Electrodynamic Ion Funnel for In Situ Mass Spectrometry on Mars; High-Altitude MMIC Sounding Radiometer for the Global Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; PRTs and Their Bonding for Long-Duration, Extreme-Temperature Environments; Mid- and Long-IR Broadband Quantum Well Photodetector; 3D Display Using Conjugated Multiband Bandpass Filters; Real-Time, Non-Intrusive Detection of Liquid Nitrogen in Liquid Oxygen at High Pressure and High Flow; Method to Enhance the Operation of an Optical Inspection Instrument Using Spatial Light Modulators; Dual-Compartment Inflatable Suitlock; Large-Strain Transparent Magnetoactive Polymer Nanocomposites; Thermodynamic Vent System for an On-Orbit Cryogenic Reaction Control Engine; Time Distribution Using SpaceWire in the SCaN Testbed on ISS; and Techniques for Solution- Assisted Optical Contacting.

Source record↗

Reinforcement Learning for feedback-enabled cyber resilience

The rapid growth in the number of devices and their connectivity has enlarged the attack surface and made cyber systems more vulnerable. As attackers become increasingly sophisticated and resourceful, mere reliance on traditional cyber protection, such as intrusion detection, firewalls, and encryption, is insufficient to secure the cyber systems. Cyber resilience provides a new security paradigm that complements inadequate protection with resilience mechanisms. A Cyber-Resilient Mechanism (CRM) adapts to the known or zero-day threats and uncertainties in real-time and strategically responds to them to maintain the critical functions of the cyber systems in the event of successful attacks. Feedback architectures play a pivotal role in enabling the online sensing, reasoning, and actuation process of the CRM. Reinforcement Learning (RL) is an important gathering of algorithms that epitomize the feedback architectures for cyber resilience. It allows the CRM to provide dynamic and sequential responses to attacks with limited or without prior knowledge of the environment and the attacker. In this work, we review the literature on RL for cyber resilience and discuss the cyber-resilient defenses against three major types of vulnerabilities, i.e., posture-related, information-related, and human-related vulnerabilities. Here we introduce moving target defense, defensive cyber deception, and assistive human security technologies as three application domains of CRMs to elaborate on their designs. The RL algorithms also have vulnerabilities themselves. We explain the major vulnerabilities of RL and present develop several attack models where the attacker target the information exchanged between the environment and the agent: the rewards, the state observations, and the action commands. We show that the attacker can trick the RL agent into learning a nefarious policy with minimum attacking effort. The paper introduces several defense methods to secure the RL-enabled systems from these attacks. However, there is still a lack of works that focuses on the defensive mechanisms for RL-enabled systems. Last but not least, we discuss the future challenges of RL for cyber security and resilience and emerging applications of RL-based CRMs.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Decentralised Reinforcement Learning for Dynamic Cyberattack Response in Microgrid Networks

Microgrids rely on communication networks for reliable operation, which makes them inherently vulnerable to cyberattacks. Such attacks can destabilise system dynamics and drive states away from their nominal operating trajectories. Although several physics-informed and machine learning-based strategies have been developed to counter these threats, the rapidly evolving cyber landscape enables adversaries to bypass static defences or rules-based mitigation approaches. This paper proposes a dynamic, online-trained and fully decentralised reinforcement learning (RL)-based cyberattack response framework to protect microgrids from evolving cyberattacks. The proposed framework deploys multiple deep Q-networks (DQNs), each associated with a distributed energy resource (DER), to enable localised and adaptive attack mitigation. In this framework, each DQN processes local voltage and frequency measurements—combined with intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts—as observations and rewards to guide decision-making. Extensive simulation studies demonstrate the robustness of the proposed framework under diverse attack scenarios and varying IDS-induced detection delays. Comparative analysis highlights its superiority over existing static or preexisting rules-based mitigation approaches. Finally, we present an analysis that shows the framework's scalability to real-life microgrids with more interacting agents.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The Medical Science DMZ

Objective We describe use cases and an institutional reference architecture for maintaining high-capacity, data-intensive network flows (e.g., 10, 40, 100 Gbpsþ) in a scientific, medical context while still adhering to security and privacy laws and regulations. Materials and Methods High-end networking, packet filter firewalls, network intrusion detection systems. Results We describe a “Medical Science DMZ” concept as an option for secure, high-volume transport of large, sensitive data sets between research institutions over national research networks. Discussion The exponentially increasing amounts of “omics” data, the rapid increase of high-quality imaging, and other rapidly growing clinical data sets have resulted in the rise of biomedical research “big data.” The storage, analysis, and network resources required to process these data and integrate them into patient diagnoses and treatments have grown to scales that strain the capabilities of academic health centers. Some data are not generated locally and cannot be sustained locally, and shared data repositories such as those provided by the National Library of Medicine, the National Cancer Institute, and international partners such as the European Bioinformatics Institute are rapidly growing. The ability to store and compute using these data must therefore be addressed by a combination of local, national, and industry resources that exchange large data sets. Maintaining data-intensive flows that comply with HIPAA and other regulations presents a new challenge for biomedical research. Recognizing this, we describe a strategy that marries performance and security by borrowing from and redefining the concept of a “Science DMZ”—a framework that is used in physical sciences and engineering research to manage high-capacity data flows. Conclusion By implementing a Medical Science DMZ architecture, biomedical researchers can leverage the scale provided by high-performance computer and cloud storage facilities and national high-speed research networks while preserving privacy and meeting regulatory requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗