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The intent of this Technical Consultation Report is to document the finding and recommendations of the NESC Orbiter Repair Maneuver (ORM) Peer Review conducted at NASA s Johnson Space Center (JSC) with the ORM Working Group (WG) over the period 8-10 June 2005.
The ongoing Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) Propellant Tank Penetrant Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) Probability of Detection (POD) Assessment (NESC activity) has surfaced several issues associated with liquid penetrant POD demonstration testing. This presentation lists factors that may influence the transferability of POD demonstration tests. Initial testing will address the liquid penetrant inspection technique. Some of the factors to be considered in this task are crack aspect ratio, the extent of the crack opening, the material and the distance between the inspection surface and the inspector's eye.
Based on an anonymous request, an NESC Assessment Team was formed to investigate potential leakage problems from the ISS Program's Node 2 Anhydrous Ammonia System AN fittings. The Team's charter was to provide the ISS Program with a path to follow, which could include testing, to ensure the ISS Program felt confident that the AN fittings' leakage would not exceed specified limits in orbit. The findings from that assessment are contained in this document.
A request to conduct a peer review of the International Space Station (ISS) proposal to use Bayesian methodology for updating Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for ISS Orbital Replaceable Units (ORU) was submitted to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) on September 20, 2005. The results were requested by October 20, 2005 in order to be available during the process of reworking the current ISS flight manifest. The results are included in this report.
The Deep Impact spacecraft was launched on a Boeing Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) on January 12, 2005. Prior to the launch, the Director of the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OS&MA) requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) lead a team to render an independent opinion on the rationale for flight and the risk code assignments for the hazard of cracked Thick Film Assemblies (TFAs) in the E-packages of the Delta II launch vehicle for the Deep Impact Mission. The results of the evaluation are contained in this report.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) is developing the Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) as a risk-mitigation design should problems arise with the baseline Orion spacecraft launch abort design. The Max in MLAS is dedicated to Max Faget, the renowned NASA spacecraft designer. The MLAS flight test vehicle consists of boost skirt, coast skirt and the MLAS fairing which houses a full scale boilerplate Orion Crew Module (CM). The objective of the flight test is to prove that the CM can be released from the MLAS fairing during pad abort conditions without detrimental recontact between the CM and fairing, achieving performance similar to the Orion launch abort system. The boost and coast skirts provide the necessary thrust and stability to achieve the flight test conditions and are released prior to the test -- much like the Little Joe booster was used in the Apollo Launch Escape System tests. To achieve the test objective, two parachutes are deployed from the fairing to reorient the CM/fairing to a heatshield first orientation. The parachutes then provide the force necessary to reduce the total angle of attack and body angular rates required for safe release of the CM from the fairing. A secondary test objective after CM release from the fairing is to investigate the removal of the CM forward bay cover (FBC) with CM drogue parachutes for the purpose of attempting to synchronously deploying a set of CM main parachutes. Although multiple parachute deployments are used in the MLAS flight test vehicle to complete its objective, there are only two parachute types employed in the flight test. Five of the nine parachutes used for MLAS are 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachutes, and the remaining four are standard G-12 cargo parachutes. This paper presents an overview of the 27.6 ft D(sub 0) ribbon parachute system employed on the MLAS flight test vehicle for coast skirt separation, fairing reorientation, and as drogue parachutes for the CM after separation from the fairing. Discussion will include: the process used to select this design, previously proven as a spin/stall recovery parachute; descriptions of all components of the parachute system; the minor modifications necessary to adapt the parachute to the MLAS program; the techniques used to analyze the parachute for the multiple roles it performs; a discussion of the rigging techniques used to interface the parachute system to the vehicle; and a brief description of how the evolution of the program affected parachute usage and analysis. An overview of the Objective system, rationale for the MLAS approach and the future of the program will also be presented. We hope to have flight test results to report at the time of the Conference Presentation.
Severe thunderstorms with associated hail and high winds struck the STS-117 stack on February 26, 2007. Peak winds were recorded at 62 knots with hail sizes ranging from 0.3 inch to 0.8 inch in diameter. As a result of the storm, the North Carolina Foam Institute (NCFI) type 24-124 Thermal Protection System (TPS) foam on the liquid oxygen (LO2) ogive acreage incurred significant impact damage. The NCFI on the ET intertank and the liquid hydrogen (LH2) acreage sustained hail damage. The Polymer Development Laboratory (PDL)-1034 foam of the LO2 ice frost ramps (IFRs) and the Super-Lightweight Ablator (SLA) of the LO2 cable tray also suffered minor damage. NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was asked to assess the technical feasibility of repairing the ET TPS, the reasonableness of conducting those repairs with the vehicle in a vertical, integrated configuration at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vehicle Assemble Building (VAB), and to address attendant human factors considerations including worker fatigue and the potential for error. The outcome of the assessment is recorded in this document.
The NESC consultation team participated in real-time troubleshooting of the Main Propulsion System (MPS) Engine Cutoff (ECO) sensor system failures during STS-114 launch countdown. The team assisted with External Tank (ET) thermal and ECO Point Sensor Box (PSB) circuit analyses, and made real-time inputs to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem resolution teams. Several long-term recommendations resulted. One recommendation was to conduct cryogenic tests of the ECO sensors to validate, or disprove, the theory that variations in circuit impedance due to cryogenic effects on swaged connections within the sensor were the root cause of STS-114 failures.
This paper provides a summary of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team recommendations and observations following participation with the Ares I-X Vibroacoustic (VA) Environments Panel in meetings at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in March and April 2008, respectively.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) was tasked with assessing the validity of an alternate opinion that surfaced during the investigation of recurrent failures at the Space Shuttle T-0 umbilical interface. The most visible problem occurred during the Space Transportation System (STS)-112 launch when pyrotechnics used to separate Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Hold-Down Post (HDP) frangible nuts failed to fire. Subsequent investigations recommended several improvements to the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and processing changes were implemented, including replacement of ground-half cables and connectors between flights, along with wiring modifications to make critical circuits quad-redundant across the interface. The alternate opinions maintained that insufficient data existed to exonerate the design, that additional data needed to be gathered under launch conditions, and that the interface should be further modified to ensure additional margin existed to preclude failure. The results of the assessment are contained in this report.
The NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) has been conducting an independent technical assessment to address safety concerns related to the known stress rupture failure mode of filament wound pressure vessels in use on Shuttle and the International Space Station. The Shuttle s Kevlar-49 (DuPont) fiber overwrapped tanks are of particular concern due to their long usage and the poorly understood stress rupture process in Kevlar-49 filaments. Existing long term data show that the rupture process is a function of stress, temperature and time. However due to the presence of load sharing liners and the complex manufacturing procedures, the state of actual fiber stress in flight hardware and test articles is not clearly known. Indeed nonconservative life predictions have been made where stress rupture data and lifing procedures have ignored the contribution of the liner in favor of applied pressure as the controlling load parameter. With the aid of analytical and finite element results, this paper examines the fundamental mechanical response of composite overwrapped pressure vessels including the influence of elastic plastic liners and degraded/creeping overwrap properties. Graphical methods are presented describing the non-linear relationship of applied pressure to Kevlar-49 fiber stress/strain during manufacturing, operations and burst loadings. These are applied to experimental measurements made on a variety of vessel systems to demonstrate the correct calibration of fiber stress as a function of pressure. Applying this analysis to the actual qualification burst data for Shuttle flight hardware revealed that the nominal fiber stress at burst was in some cases 23 percent lower than what had previously been used to predict stress rupture life. These results motivate a detailed discussion of the appropriate stress rupture lifing philosophy for COPVs including the correct transference of stress rupture life data between dissimilar vessels and test articles.
Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) Chief Engineer requested a risk comparison of the Integrated Landing System design developed by NASA and the design developed by Contractor- referred to as the LM 604 baseline. Based on the results of this risk comparison, the CEV Chief engineer requested that the NESC evaluate identified risks and develop strategies for their reduction or mitigation. The assessment progressed in two phases. A brief Phase I analysis was performed by the Water versus Land-Landing Team to compare the CEV Integrated Landing System proposed by the Contractor against the NASA TS-LRS001 baseline with respect to risk. A phase II effort examined the areas of critical importance to the overall landing risk, evaluating risk to the crew and to the CEV Crew Module (CM) during a nominal land-landing. The findings of the assessment are contained in this report.
In 2007, the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) chartered the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) to demonstrate an alternate launch abort concept as risk mitigation for the Orion project's baseline "tower" design. On July 8, 2009, a full scale and passively, aerodynamically stabilized MLAS launch abort demonstrator was successfully launched from Wallops Flight Facility following nearly two years of development work on the launch abort concept: from a napkin sketch to a flight demonstration of the full-scale flight test vehicle. The MLAS flight test vehicle was instrumented with a suite of aerodynamic sensors. The purpose was to obtain sufficient data to demonstrate that the vehicle demonstrated the behavior predicted by Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) analysis and wind tunnel testing. This paper describes development of the Air Data Boom (ADB) component of the aerodynamic sensor suite.
In 2007, the NASA Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) chartered the NASA Engineering Safety Center (NESC) to demonstrate an alternate launch abort concept as risk mitigation for the Orion project's baseline "tower" design. On July 8, 2009, a full scale, passive aerodynamically stabilized Max Launch Abort System (MLAS) pad abort demonstrator was successfully launched from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Wallops Flight Facility. Aerodynamic close-outs were required to cover openings on the MLAS fairing to prevent aerodynamic flow-through and to maintain the MLAS OML surface shape. Two-ply duct tape covers were designed to meet these needs. The duct tape used was a high strength fiber reinforced duct tape with a rubberized adhesive that demonstrated 4.6 lb/in adhesion strength to the unpainted fiberglass fairing. Adhesion strength was observed to increase as a function of time. The covers were analyzed and experimentally tested to demonstrate their ability to maintain integrity under anticipated vehicle ascent pressure loads and to not impede firing of the drogue chute mortars. Testing included vacuum testing and a mortar fire test. Tape covers were layed-up on thin Teflon sheets to facilitate installation on the vehicle. Custom cut foam insulation board was used to fill mortar hole and separation joint cavities and provide support to the applied tape covers. Flight test results showed that the tape covers remained adhered during flight.
In conjunction with a recent NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) investigation of flight worthiness of Kevlar Ovenvrapped Composite Pressure Vessels (COPVs) on board the Orbiter, two stress rupture life prediction models were proposed independently by Phoenix and by Glaser. In this paper, the use of these models to determine the system reliability of 24 COPVs currently in service on board the Orbiter is discussed. The models are briefly described, compared to each other, and model parameters and parameter error are also reviewed to understand confidence in reliability estimation as well as the sensitivities of these parameters in influencing overall predicted reliability levels. Differences and similarities in the various models will be compared via stress rupture reliability curves (stress ratio vs. lifetime plots). Also outlined will be the differences in the underlying model premises, and predictive outcomes. Sources of error and sensitivities in the models will be examined and discussed based on sensitivity analysis and confidence interval determination. Confidence interval results and their implications will be discussed for the models by Phoenix and Glaser.
The Johnson Space Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) were requested by NASA Associate Administrator for Space Operations to perform an evaluation of a proposed hydrazine/monomethylhydrazine (MMH) fuel treatment method using alpha-ketoglutaric acid (AKGA). This evaluation request was prompted by preliminary tests at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC), suggesting cost and operational benefits to NASA for the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and other hardware decontamination and decommissioning, in addition to hydrazine and MMH waste treatment activities. This paper provides the team's position on the current KSC and New Mexico Highlands University (NMHU) efforts toward implementing the AKGA treatment technology with flight hardware, ground support equipment (GSE), hydrazine and MMH spills, and vapor control. This evaluation is current to the last data examined (approximately September 2008).
A member of the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Systems Engineering Office (SEO) Technical Discipline Team (TDT) requested a SEO-managed activity to perform a gap analysis on the proposed NASA Standard 0006, "Common NASA Taxonomy for Problem Reporting, Analysis, and Resolution", and to create an input filter and set of instructions for using the data-mining/data-cleansing tool TechOasis1 with Space Shuttle Program (SSP) problem reporting data. The work that achieved these objectives and deployment of TechOasis are discussed in this report.
This final report summarizes the results of a comparative assessment of the fault tolerance and reliability of different Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) architectural approaches. This study was proactively performed by a combined Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Draper Laboratory team as a GN&C "Discipline-Advancing" activity sponsored by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC). This systematic comparative assessment of GN&C system architectural approaches was undertaken as a fundamental step towards understanding the opportunities for, and limitations of, architecting highly reliable and fault tolerant GN&C systems composed of common avionic components. The primary goal of this study was to obtain architectural 'rules of thumb' that could positively influence future designs in the direction of an optimized (i.e., most reliable and cost-efficient) GN&C system. A secondary goal was to demonstrate the application and the utility of a systematic modeling approach that maps the entire possible architecture solution space.