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At least 199 records · Page 11

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗

A Modular, Reusable Latch and Decking System for Securing Payloads During Launch and Planetary Surface Transport

Efficient handling of payloads destined for a planetary surface, such as the moon or Mars, requires robust systems to secure the payloads during transport on the ground, in-space and on the planetary surface. In addition, mechanisms to release the payloads need to be reliable to ensure successful transfer from one vehicle to another. An efficient payload handling strategy must also consider the devices available to support payload handling. Cranes used for overhead lifting are common to all phases of payload handling on Earth. Similarly, both recent and past studies have demonstrated that devices with comparable functionality will be needed to support lunar outpost operations. A first generation test-bed of a new high performance device that provides the capabilities of both a crane and a robotic manipulator, the Lunar Surface Manipulation System (LSMS), has been designed, built and field tested and is available for use in evaluating a system to secure payloads to transportation vehicles. National Institute of Aerospace, Hampton Va 23662 A payload handling approach must address all phases of payload management including: ground transportation, launch, planetary transfer and installation in the final system. In addition, storage may be required during any phase of operations. Each of these phases requires the payload to be lifted and secured to a vehicle, transported, released and lifted in preparation for the next transportation or storage phase. A critical component of a successful payload handling approach is a latch and associated carrier system. The latch and carrier system should minimize requirements on the: payload, carrier support structure and payload handling devices as well as be able to accommodate a wide range of payload sizes. In addition, the latch should; be small and lightweight, support a method to apply preload, be reusable, integrate into a minimal set of hard-points and have manual interfaces to actuate the latch should a problem occur. A latching system which meets these requirements has been designed and fabricated and will be described in detail. This latching system works in conjunction with a payload handling device such as the LSMS, and the LSMS has been used to test first generation latch and carrier hardware. All tests have been successful during the first phase of operational evaluations. Plans for future tests of first generation latch and carrier hardware with the LSMS are also described.

Doggett, William R.↗

Model based verification of the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Protocol for NASA systems

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has tens of thousands of networked computer systems and applications. Software Security vulnerabilities present risks such as lost or corrupted data, information theft, and unavailability of critical systems. These risks represent potentially enormous costs to NASA. The NASA Code Q research initiative 'Reducing Software Security Risk (RSSR) Trough an Integrated Approach' offers formal verification of information technology (IT), through the creation of a Software Security Assessment Instrument (SSAI), to address software security risks.

software security↗

Concept of Operations for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Upper E Airspace

The National Airspace System undergoes continuous change including in the Upper Class E airspace involving increasingly complex operations and a widening diversity of vehicles. To secure a safe future system, the National Academies recommended an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that is extensible to Upper E. Current Air Traffic Management is not cost-effective to scale for future Upper E operations and diversity of vehicles so the Federal Aviation Administration developed an Upper E Traffic Management ConOps to safely integrate the diverse operations and vehicles having different performance characteristics and flight missions without disrupting current operations including space launch and reentry, suborbital flights, supersonic and hypersonic flights, slow moving or stationary unmanned balloons, and long endurance fixed wing vehicles that are slow, stationary, or high speed. IASMS integrates state-of-the-art predictive modeling with reactive and proactive analytics to detect hazards and mitigate risk precursors for Upper E operators. IASMS identifies emergent safety risks exposed by transformation of the NAS with new and increasingly complex operations. Safety intelligence will also expand the data available and offer insight to new approaches for implementing safety improvements to mitigate risk with more seamless “in-time” integration across the policy, risk management, safety assurance, and promotion pillars of SMS.

K Ellis↗

Robotic Sample Manipulator for Handling Astromaterials Inside the Geolab Microgravity Glovebox

Future human and robotic sample return missions will require isolation containment systems with strict protocols and procedures for reducing inorganic and organic contamination. Robotic handling and manipulation of astromaterials may be required for preliminary examination inside such an isolation containment system. In addition, examination of astromaterials in microgravity will require constant contact to secure samples during manipulation. The National Space Grant Foundation exploration habitat (XHab) academic innovative challenge 2012 administered through the NASA advanced exploration systems (AES) deep space habitat (DSH) project awarded funding to the University of Bridgeport team to develop an engineering design for tools to facilitate holding and handling geological samples for analysis in a microgravity glovebox environment. The Bridgeport XHab team developed a robotic arm system with a three-finger gripper that could manipulate geologic samples within the existing GeoLab glovebox integrated into NASA's DSH called the GeoLab Robotic Sample Manipulator (see fig. 1 and 2). This hardware was deployed and tested during the 2012 DSH mission operations tests [1].

Bell, Mary S.↗

The Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project

This Summer, I worked as a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Internships and Fellowships (NIF) intern under my mentor, Jill Giles within the Software Engineering Branch. Within this project, I worked alongside the Cyber Security branch to identify a list of Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software to analyze, research, and gain insight about potential vulnerabilities within the software that could become a threat of attack. After identifying the list of COTS software, my team and I used Microsoft Excel to create a worksheet to easily organize and design a questionnaire about the software. Security reports weregiven to us to identify the software used on the machines in the firing rooms. With these reports, we created a script that would populate the database with the software information to identify potential security weaknesses of COTS software.The goal of the project was to produce a final report, summarizing the most vulnerable launch control system servers and configurations and document vulnerabilities, residual risk, likelihood, and consequence. This project is important for the Cyber Security and Information Technology branches because it will identify security weaknesses and help to mitigate risk. From the Spaceport Command and Control System Security Assessor Project, I learned how to properly identify weaknesses and vulnerabilities within software and how to mitigate the risks within the software. This project also taught me how to create databases using scripts and input files.

Destani Satora Van Arsdalen↗

Applying a Space-Based Security Recovery Scheme for Critical Homeland Security Cyberinfrastructure Utilizing the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) Based Space Network

Protection of the national infrastructure is a high priority for cybersecurity of the homeland. Critical infrastructure such as the national power grid, commercial financial networks, and communications networks have been successfully invaded and re-invaded from foreign and domestic attackers. The ability to re-establish authentication and confidentiality of the network participants via secure channels that have not been compromised would be an important countermeasure to compromise of our critical network infrastructure. This paper describes a concept of operations by which the NASA Tracking and Data Relay (TDRS) constellation of spacecraft in conjunction with the White Sands Complex (WSC) Ground Station host a security recovery system for re-establishing secure network communications in the event of a national or regional cyberattack. Users would perform security and network restoral functions via a Broadcast Satellite Service (BSS) from the TDRS constellation. The BSS enrollment only requires that each network location have a receive antenna and satellite receiver. This would be no more complex than setting up a DIRECTTV-like receiver at each network location with separate network connectivity. A GEO BSS would allow a mass re-enrollment of network nodes (up to nationwide) simultaneously depending upon downlink characteristics. This paper details the spectrum requirements, link budget, notional assets and communications requirements for the scheme. It describes the architecture of such a system and the manner in which it leverages off of the existing secure infrastructure which is already in place and managed by the NASAGSFC Space Network Project.

Cybersecurity↗

IT Security Support for the Spaceport Command Control System Development

My job title is IT Security support for the Spaceport Command & Control System Development. As a cyber‐security analyst it is my job to ensure NASA's information stays safe from cyber threats, such as, viruses, malware and denial-of-service attacks by establishing and enforcing system access controls. Security is very important in the world of technology and it is used everywhere from personal computers to giant networks ran by Government agencies worldwide. Without constant monitoring analysis, businesses, public organizations and government agencies are vulnerable to potential harmful infiltration of their computer information system. It is my responsibility to ensure authorized access by examining improper access, reporting violations, revoke access, monitor information request by new programming and recommend improvements. My department oversees the Launch Control System and networks. An audit will be conducted for the LCS based on compliance with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). I recently finished analyzing the SANS top 20 critical controls to give cost effective recommendations on various software and hardware products for compliance. Upon my completion of this internship, I will have successfully completed my duties as well as gain knowledge that will be helpful to my career in the future as a Cyber Security Analyst.

IT Security↗

Risk-Based Prioritization of Research for Aviation Security Using Logic-Evolved Decision Analysis

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is developing advanced technologies to reduce terrorist risk for the air transportation system. Decision support tools are needed to help allocate assets to the most promising research. An approach to rank ordering technologies (using logic-evolved decision analysis), with risk reduction as the metric, is presented. The development of a spanning set of scenarios using a logic-gate tree is described. Baseline risk for these scenarios is evaluated with an approximate reasoning model. Illustrative risk and risk reduction results are presented.

Eisenhawer, S. W.↗

Secure Network-Centric Aviation Communication (SNAC)

The existing National Airspace System (NAS) communications capabilities are largely unsecured, are not designed for efficient use of spectrum and collectively are not capable of servicing the future needs of the NAS with the inclusion of new operators in Unmanned Aviation Systems (UAS) or On Demand Mobility (ODM). SNAC will provide a ubiquitous secure, network-based communications architecture that will provide new service capabilities and allow for the migration of current communications to SNAC over time. The necessary change in communication technologies to digital domains will allow for the adoption of security mechanisms, sharing of link technologies, large increase in spectrum utilization, new forms of resilience and redundancy and the possibly of spectrum reuse. SNAC consists of a long term open architectural approach with increasingly capable designs used to steer research and development and enable operating capabilities that run in parallel with current NAS systems.

Communications↗

Managing Multi-Instrument Data Streams in Secure Environments

The capture and curation of all primary instrument data is a potentially valuable source of added insight into experiments or diagnostics in laboratory experiments. The data can, when properly curated, enable analysis beyond the current practice that uses just a subset of the as-measured data. Complete curated data can also be input for machine learning and other data exploration tools. Conveniently storing and accessing instrument data requires that the instruments are connected to databases and users through a networking infrastructure. This infrastructure needs to accommodate a wide array of instruments which can range from single laboratory mounted probes for environment monitoring to computers managing multiple instruments. These resources may also include mobile devices on which researchers record instrument and experiment state related notes. These varied data sources bring with them the challenges of different communications capabilities and protocols as well as the primary data typically being produced in proprietary formats. These challenges are further compounded when the instruments need to operate in secure environments such as required in national laboratories. We will discuss the SmartLab, an ongoing effort to set up a system for instrument and simulation data curation at NASA Langley Research Center. We will outline the challenges faced in managing the data sources required for ongoing research activities and the solutions that are being considered and implemented to address those challenges.

instrument data management↗

Tailoring NIST Security Controls for the Ground System: Selection and Implementation -- Recommendations for Information System Owners

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) invests millions of dollars in spacecraft and ground system development, and in mission operations in the pursuit of scientific knowledge of the universe. In recent years, NASA sent a probe to Mars to study the Red Planet's upper atmosphere, obtained high resolution images of Pluto, and it is currently preparing to find new exoplanets, rendezvous with an asteroid, and bring a sample of the asteroid back to Earth for analysis. The success of these missions is enabled by mission assurance. In turn, mission assurance is backed by information assurance. The information systems supporting NASA missions must be reliable as well as secure. NASA - like every other U.S. Federal Government agency - is required to manage the security of its information systems according to federal mandates, the most prominent being the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 and the legislative updates that followed it. Like the management of enterprise information technology (IT), federal information security management takes a "one-size fits all" approach for protecting IT systems. While this approach works for most organizations, it does not effectively translate into security of highly specialized systems such as those supporting NASA missions. These systems include command and control (C&C) systems, spacecraft and instrument simulators, and other elements comprising the ground segment. They must be carefully configured, monitored and maintained, sometimes for several years past the missions' initially planned life expectancy, to ensure the ground system is protected and remains operational without any compromise of its confidentiality, integrity and availability. Enterprise policies, processes, procedures and products, if not effectively tailored to meet mission requirements, may not offer the needed security for protecting the information system, and they may even become disruptive to mission operations. Certain protective measures for the general enterprise may not be as efficient within the ground segment. This is what the authors have concluded through observations and analysis of patterns identified from the various security assessments performed on NASA missions such as MAVEN, OSIRIS-REx, New Horizons and TESS, to name a few. The security audits confirmed that the framework for managing information system security developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the federal government, and adopted by NASA, is indeed effective. However, the selection of the technical, operational and management security controls offered by the NIST model - and how they are implemented - does not always fit the nature and the environment where the ground system operates in even though there is no apparent impact on mission success. The authors observed that unfit controls, that is, controls that are not necessarily applicable or sufficiently effective in protecting the mission systems, are often selected to facilitate compliance with security requirements and organizational expectations even if the selected controls offer minimum or non-existent protection. This paper identifies some of the standard security controls that can in fact protect the ground system, and which of them offer little or no benefit at all. It offers multiple scenarios from real security audits in which the controls are not effective without, of course, disclosing any sensitive information about the missions assessed. In addition to selection and implementation of controls, the paper also discusses potential impact of recent legislation such as the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 - aimed at the enterprise - on the ground system, and offers other recommendations to Information System Owners (ISOs).

GOVERNANCE↗

New Local, National and Regional Cereal Price Indices for Improved Identification of Food Insecurity

Large price increases over a short time period can be indicative of a deteriorating food security situation. Food price indices developed by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are used to monitor food price trends at a global level, but largely reflect supply and demand conditions in export markets. However, reporting by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) indicates that staple cereal prices in many markets of the developing world, especially in surplus-producing areas, often have a delayed and variable response to international export market price trends. Here we present new price indices compiled for improved food security monitoring and assessment, and specifically for monitoring conditions of food access across diverse food insecure regions. We found that cereal price indices constructed using market prices within a food insecure region showed significant differences from the international cereals price, and had a variable price dispersion across markets within each marketshed. Using satellite-derived remote sensing information that estimates local production and the FAO Cereals Index as predictors, we were able to forecast movements of the local or national price indices in the remote, arid and semi-arid countries of the 38 countries examined. This work supports the need for improved decision-making about targeted aid and humanitarian relief, by providing earlier early warning of food security crises.

Brown, Molly E.↗

Reducing Software Security Risk Through an Integrated Approach

This paper discusses new joint work by the California Institute of Technology's Jet Propulsion Laboratory and the University of California at Davis sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to develop a security assessment instrument for the software development and maintenance life cycle.

risk matrix↗

NASA's Microgravity Science Research Program

The ongoing challenge faced by NASA's Microgravity Science Research Program is to work with the scientific and engineering communities to secure the maximum return from our Nation's investments by: assuring that the best possible science emerges from the science community for microgravity investigations; ensuring the maximum scientific return from each investigation in the most timely and cost-effective manner; and enhancing the distribution of data and applications of results acquired through completed investigations to maximize their benefits.

Source record↗

NASA Helps Design the 'Cockpit of the Future'

One of the initiatives at Langley involved the research and development of a Small Aircraft Transportation System Network (SATS-Net), which was the communications infrastructure for NASA s SATS program.The primary goal of SATS-Net was to develop secure virtual travel portals for the Nation s general aviation airports and to offer an alternative to commercial air and ground transportation through general aviation. The secondary goals were to increase mobility, reduce door-to- door travel times, and provide air transportation to underserved markets at an affordable cost. One of the specific plans was to create a network of information about the 2,000-plus non-tower, non-radar airports in the Nation. This information would be accessible from a person s home, office, PDA, or local airport. This network provides real-time information and would be a "one-stop shop" portal with dynamic access to real-time Web cameras for weather conditions, flight planning information, local lodging, restaurants, and attraction information. SATS-Net would provide membership services much like that of AAA.

Source record↗