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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Performance Risk Model (PRisM) Proof-of-Concept: An Operational Decision Support Tool to Predict Crew Performance in Space from Available Performance Tests

The Crew Health and Performance-Probabilistic Risk Assessment (CHP-PRA) team at NASA Glenn Research Center has developed a range of tools to evaluate astronaut health during spaceflight and to optimize the medical set required for missions. Among these, the Performance Risk Model (PRisM) represents a novel advancement, extending CHP-PRA’s focus beyond medical systems into the domain of human performance. Such tool could be pivotal in optimizing astronaut capabilities during space travel, thereby enhancing overall mission success. PRisM leverages data from well-established performance assessments conducted during previous crewed space missions and Earth analogs to strategically predict outcomes for planned tasks, even when direct performance testing has not been conducted for those specific tasks. To evaluate performance, PRisM references the various metrics outlined in NASA-STD-3001 and employs a methodology to integrate different performance scales. This framework analyzes the contribution of various human system task categories (HSTCs) to task execution and compares these contributions to the HSTCs’ involvement in other known tests. The model further employs a Monte Carlo simulation to sample performance scores from their distribution in operationally relevant tests such as those in Mulavara et al. (2018) and, by leveraging similarities in HSTC involvement, transfers this knowledge to actual mission tasks, such as those outlined in the "Human Exploration of Mars: Preliminary List of Crew Tasks”. The current PRisM proof-of-concept includes analyses of the impact of exercise and specific medications on astronauts’ performance, with provisions to incorporate additional countermeasures as data becomes available. Furthermore, the tool is customizable to include any system necessary to fully encompass the domain of human systems and can be adapted to evaluate performance for any spaceflight activities as requested by operational stakeholders. PRisM has the potential to assist the Human Research Program in exploring the capabilities trade space for optimized crew performance.

performance modeling↗

NASA NTRS1992

NSTS Orbiter auxiliary power unit turbine wheel cracking risk assessment

The present investigation of turbine-wheel cracking problems in the hydrazine-fueled APU turbine wheel of the Space Shuttle Orbiter's Main Engines has indicated the efficacy of systematic probabilistic risk assessment in flight certification and safety resolution. Nevertheless, real crack-initiation and propagation problems do not lend themselves to purely analytical studies. The high-cycle fatigue problem is noted to generally be unsuited to probabilistic modeling, due to its extremely high degree of intrinsic scatter. In the case treated, the cracks appear to trend toward crack arrest in a low cycle fatigue mode, due to a detuning of the resonance model.

Cruse, T. A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

NASA System Safety Handbook: System Safety Framework and Concepts for Implementation - Volume 1

System safety assessment is defined in NPR 8715.3C, NASA General Safety Program Requirements as a disciplined, systematic approach to the analysis of risks resulting from hazards that can affect humans, the environment, and mission assets. Achievement of the highest practicable degree of system safety is one of NASA's highest priorities. Traditionally, system safety assessment at NASA and elsewhere has focused on the application of a set of safety analysis tools to identify safety risks and formulate effective controls.1 Familiar tools used for this purpose include various forms of hazard analyses, failure modes and effects analyses, and probabilistic safety assessment (commonly also referred to as probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)). In the past, it has been assumed that to show that a system is safe, it is sufficient to provide assurance that the process for identifying the hazards has been as comprehensive as possible and that each identified hazard has one or more associated controls. The NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) has made several statements in its annual reports supporting a more holistic approach. In 2006, it recommended that "... a comprehensive risk assessment, communication and acceptance process be implemented to ensure that overall launch risk is considered in an integrated and consistent manner." In 2009, it advocated for "... a process for using a risk-informed design approach to produce a design that is optimally and sufficiently safe." As a rationale for the latter advocacy, it stated that "... the ASAP applauds switching to a performance-based approach because it emphasizes early risk identification to guide designs, thus enabling creative design approaches that might be more efficient, safer, or both." For purposes of this preface, it is worth mentioning three areas where the handbook emphasizes a more holistic type of thinking. First, the handbook takes the position that it is important to not just focus on risk on an individual basis but to consider measures of aggregate safety risk and to ensure wherever possible that there be quantitative measures for evaluating how effective the controls are in reducing these aggregate risks. The term aggregate risk, when used in this handbook, refers to the accumulation of risks from individual scenarios that lead to a shortfall in safety performance at a high level: e.g., an excessively high probability of loss of crew, loss of mission, planetary contamination, etc. Without aggregated quantitative measures such as these, it is not reasonable to expect that safety has been optimized with respect to other technical and programmatic objectives. At the same time, it is fully recognized that not all sources of risk are amenable to precise quantitative analysis and that the use of qualitative approaches and bounding estimates may be appropriate for those risk sources. Second, the handbook stresses the necessity of developing confidence that the controls derived for the purpose of achieving system safety not only handle risks that have been identified and properly characterized but also provide a general, more holistic means for protecting against unidentified or uncharacterized risks. For example, while it is not possible to be assured that all credible causes of risk have been identified, there are defenses that can provide protection against broad categories of risks and thereby increase the chances that individual causes are contained. Third, the handbook strives at all times to treat uncertainties as an integral aspect of risk and as a part of making decisions. The term "uncertainty" here does not refer to an actuarial type of data analysis, but rather to a characterization of our state of knowledge regarding results from logical and physical models that approximate reality. Uncertainty analysis finds how the output parameters of the models are related to plausible variations in the input parameters and in the modeling assumptions. The evaluation of unrtainties represents a method of probabilistic thinking wherein the analyst and decision makers recognize possible outcomes other than the outcome perceived to be "most likely." Without this type of analysis, it is not possible to determine the worth of an analysis product as a basis for making decisions related to safety and mission success. In line with these considerations the handbook does not take a hazard-analysis-centric approach to system safety. Hazard analysis remains a useful tool to facilitate brainstorming but does not substitute for a more holistic approach geared to a comprehensive identification and understanding of individual risk issues and their contributions to aggregate safety risks. The handbook strives to emphasize the importance of identifying the most critical scenarios that contribute to the risk of not meeting the agreed-upon safety objectives and requirements using all appropriate tools (including but not limited to hazard analysis). Thereafter, emphasis shifts to identifying the risk drivers that cause these scenarios to be critical and ensuring that there are controls directed toward preventing or mitigating the risk drivers. To address these and other areas, the handbook advocates a proactive, analytic-deliberative, risk-informed approach to system safety, enabling the integration of system safety activities with systems engineering and risk management processes. It emphasizes how one can systematically provide the necessary evidence to substantiate the claim that a system is safe to within an acceptable risk tolerance, and that safety has been achieved in a cost-effective manner. The methodology discussed in this handbook is part of a systems engineering process and is intended to be integral to the system safety practices being conducted by the NASA safety and mission assurance and systems engineering organizations. The handbook posits that to conclude that a system is adequately safe, it is necessary to consider a set of safety claims that derive from the safety objectives of the organization. The safety claims are developed from a hierarchy of safety objectives and are therefore hierarchical themselves. Assurance that all the claims are true within acceptable risk tolerance limits implies that all of the safety objectives have been satisfied, and therefore that the system is safe. The acceptable risk tolerance limits are provided by the authority who must make the decision whether or not to proceed to the next step in the life cycle. These tolerances are therefore referred to as the decision maker's risk tolerances. In general, the safety claims address two fundamental facets of safety: 1) whether required safety thresholds or goals have been achieved, and 2) whether the safety risk is as low as possible within reasonable impacts on cost, schedule, and performance. The latter facet includes consideration of controls that are collective in nature (i.e., apply generically to broad categories of risks) and thereby provide protection against unidentified or uncharacterized risks.

Dezfuli, Homayoon↗

NASA NTRS2016

Risks from Solar Particle Events for Long Duration Space Missions Outside Low Earth Orbit

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) simulates the medical occurrences and mission outcomes for various mission profiles using probabilistic risk assessment techniques. As part of the work with the Integrated Medical Model (IMM), this project focuses on radiation risks from acute events during extended human missions outside low Earth orbit (LEO). Of primary importance in acute risk assessment are solar particle events (SPEs), which are low probability, high consequence events that could adversely affect mission outcomes through acute radiation damage to astronauts. SPEs can be further classified into coronal mass ejections (CMEs) and solar flares/impulsive events (Fig. 1). CMEs are an eruption of solar material and have shock enhancements that contribute to make these types of events higher in total fluence than impulsive events.

health↗

NASA NTRS2002

Application of Risk Assessment Tools in the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Process

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is currently implementing the Continuous Risk Management (CRM) Program developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and recommended by NASA as the Risk Management (RM) implementation approach. The four most frequently used risk assessment tools in the center are: (a) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis (HA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), and Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA). There are some guidelines for selecting the type of risk assessment tools during the project formulation phase of a project, but there is not enough guidance as to how to apply these tools in the Continuous Risk Management process (CRM). But the ways the safety and risk assessment tools are used make a significant difference in the effectiveness in the risk management function. Decisions regarding, what events are to be included in the analysis, to what level of details should the analysis be continued, make significant difference in the effectiveness of risk management program. Tools of risk analysis also depends on the phase of a project e.g. at the initial phase of a project, when not much data are available on hardware, standard FMEA cannot be applied; instead a functional FMEA may be appropriate. This study attempted to provide some directives to alleviate the difficulty in applying FTA, PRA, and FMEA in the CRM process. Hazard Analysis was not included in the scope of the study due to the short duration of the summer research project.

Paul S. Ray↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

IMPACT - Information for the Development of Human Health and Performance Systems

IMPACT is a suite of computational and systems engineering tools. Currently being developed for NASA Exploration Medical Capabilities (ExMC) and could be extended to other Human Research Program (HRP) elements. The purpose is to provide a data-driven means to inform human health and performance risk mitigation during exploration missions considering resource constraints in the medical system. IMPACT enables systematic trade studies to evaluate options. IMPACT uses Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as a systematic methodology to evaluate risks. IMPACT is currently under development to inform decision-makers the risks involved with trade-options that have likelihoods and consequences backed by scientific research in a medical evidence library. IMPACT supports multi-segment analysis to determine probabilities and risks in different mission segments. There are currently 122 medical conditions and 900 resources in the IMPACT Medical Database. IMPACT modeling is using mission segments and multiple vehicles for the NASA Artemis campaign and could support future complex missions in deep space.

IMPACT PRA↗

NASA NTRS2024

Risk of Bone Fracture due to Spaceflight-induced Changes to Bone

The Human Research Program (HRP) is taking a biomechanical approach to assessing subsequent fracture risk in active astronauts as a consequence of spaceflight exposure. Triennial testing of active and retired astronauts continues as Space Medicine monitors for a premature diagnosis of primary osteoporosis, which is associated with age-related bone loss and skeletal fragility. This updated 2023 Fracture Evidence Report has expanded the description of skeletal changes to capture the full effects of spaceflight on bone: • Recent analysis of fractures from health records of the full astronaut cohort, suggests an increased incidence rate of hip and spine fractures in astronauts following longer spaceflight duration flights compared to incident rates found in shorter duration flights. • Routine preflight-to-postflight surveillance by DXA (dual-energy x-ray absorptiometry) does not provide the full detection of loss and recovery in the long-duration (LD) astronaut nor the full recovery of hip trabecular bone. • The inclusion of hip quantitative computed tomography (QCT) in flight studies delineates effects of spaceflight, of countermeasures, and of post-flight recovery on cortical and trabecular bone parameters—some of which are verified predictors of hip fracture in the aged. • QCT detects and compares the distinct countermeasure effects of the pharmaceutical alendronate and of resistive exercise (on the Advanced Resistive Exercise Device, ARED) in specific cortical and trabecular bone sub-regions during spaceflight. • A published comparison of QCT-determined loss rates of hip trabecular bone in LD astronauts compared to terrestrial cohorts suggest that accelerated loss rates in trabecular volumetric BMD (vBMD) during spaceflight might be analogous to skeletal effects of accelerated loss rates in females due to menopause, potentially leading to disruptions in trabecular microarchitecture. • A dataset of finite element (FE) estimates of hip bone strength in aging terrestrial cohorts (spanning astronaut age-range) provides comparative context for changes in the FE of hip bone strength in LD astronauts, including comparison (force unit of newton) to percentiles (50th, 75th, and 100th) of sex-matched aged humans with hip fractures. • Risk of fracture, due to the mechanical overloading of bones, is being updated with IMPACT, the next-generation tool suite for probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for exploration missions being created by the Exploration and Medical Capability Element (ExMC) at NASA. IMPACT is currently in development and will not be included in this 2024 update. The risk for fracture necessitates understanding the relationship between applied loads to bone and the biomechanical competence of bone. The Risk for Early Onset Osteoporosis focuses on the weakened condition of bone (including development of new technologies, measurements of novel skeletal attributes, translation of multiple measures to an index of bone fragility, and interpretations of data used to reflect a weakened bone), while the Risk for Fracture assesses factors that influence the probability an astronaut would encounter applied loads exceeding the biomechanical competence of bones, resulting in fracture. This Evidence Report combines the research gaps and tasks associated with both risks.

Fracture↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploration Medical Capability Science and Research Overview and Update

The mission of the Exploration Medical Capability (ExMC) Element is to advance medical system design and risk-informed decision making for exploration beyond Low Earth Orbit to promote human health and performance in space. To accomplish this mission, ExMC focuses on several key areas: • Investigating specific risks that are relevant for human exploration spaceflight, including in-flight medical conditions, degraded or toxic medications, and renal stones • Developing medical probabilistic risk analysis tools that are integrated with systems engineering processes to inform the medical system trade space and support the development of robust requirements • Demonstrating and defining requirements for a prototype clinical decision support system • Developing and demonstrating novel medical technologies that will improve future medical capabilities in space This presentation will focus on selected scientific and technical conceptual drivers for the Element and its current and future research risks and gaps while providing an overview of the Element’s progress in 2021 and areas of focus for 2022.

Benjamin Easter↗

NASA NTRS2015

Integrated Medical Model Project - Overview and Summary of Historical Application

Introduction: The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project represents one aspect of NASA's Human Research Program (HRP) to quantitatively assess medical risks to astronauts for existing operational missions as well as missions associated with future exploration and commercial space flight ventures. The IMM takes a probabilistic approach to assessing the likelihood and specific outcomes of one hundred medical conditions within the envelope of accepted space flight standards of care over a selectable range of mission capabilities. A specially developed Integrated Medical Evidence Database (iMED) maintains evidence-based, organizational knowledge across a variety of data sources. Since becoming operational in 2011, version 3.0 of the IMM, the supporting iMED, and the expertise of the IMM project team have contributed to a wide range of decision and informational processes for the space medical and human research community. This presentation provides an overview of the IMM conceptual architecture and range of application through examples of actual space flight community questions posed to the IMM project. Methods: Figure 1 [see document] illustrates the IMM modeling system and scenario process. As illustrated, the IMM computational architecture is based on Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques. Nineteen assumptions and limitations define the IMM application domain. Scenario definitions include crew medical attributes and mission specific details. The IMM forecasts probabilities of loss of crew life (LOCL), evacuation (EVAC), quality time lost during the mission, number of medical resources utilized and the number and type of medical events by combining scenario information with in-flight, analog, and terrestrial medical information stored in the iMED. In addition, the metrics provide the integrated information necessary to estimate optimized in-flight medical kit contents under constraints of mass and volume or acceptable level of mission risk. Results and Conclusions: Historically, IMM simulations support Science and Technology planning, Exploration mission planning, and ISS program operations by supplying simulation support, iMED data information, and subject matter expertise to Crew Health and Safety and the HRP. Upcoming release of IMM version 4.0 seeks to provide enhanced functionality to increase the quality of risk decisions made using the IMM through a more accurate representation of the real world system.

Myers, J.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger disaster was caused by an Apollo decision

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2013

Near-Earth Phase Risk Comparison of Human Mars Campaign Architectures

A risk analysis of the launch, orbital assembly, and Earth-departure phases of human Mars exploration campaign architectures was completed as an extension of a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) originally carried out under the NASA Constellation Program Ares V Project. The objective of the updated analysis was to study the sensitivity of loss-of-campaign risk to such architectural factors as composition of the propellant delivery portion of the launch vehicle fleet (Ares V heavy-lift launch vehicle vs. smaller/cheaper commercial launchers) and the degree of launcher or Mars-bound spacecraft element sparing. Both a static PRA analysis and a dynamic, event-based Monte Carlo simulation were developed and used to evaluate the probability of loss of campaign under different sparing options. Results showed that with no sparing, loss-of-campaign risk is strongly driven by launcher count and on-orbit loiter duration, favoring an all-Ares V launch approach. Further, the reliability of the all-Ares V architecture showed significant improvement with the addition of a single spare launcher/payload. Among architectures utilizing a mix of Ares V and commercial launchers, those that minimized the on-orbit loiter duration of Mars-bound elements were found to exceed the reliability of no spare all-Ares V campaign if unlimited commercial vehicle sparing was assumed

Manning, Ted A.↗

NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of Human Reliability Analysis in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

HRA is a method used to describe, qualitatively and quantitatively, the occurrence of human failures in the operation of complex systems that affect availability and reliability. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure in a PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) provides a more complete picture of the risk and risk contributions. A high quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedural, equipment design and need for automation.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Taxonomies for Searching Problem Reports and FMEAs

Many types of hazard and risk analyses are used during the life cycle of complex systems, including Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Hazard Analysis, Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Reliability Analysis and analysis of Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) databases. The success of these methods depends on the availability of input data and the analysts knowledge. Standard nomenclature can increase the reusability of hazard, risk and problem data. When nomenclature in the source texts is not standard, taxonomies with mapping words (sets of rough synonyms) can be combined with semantic search to identify items and tag them with metadata based on a rich standard nomenclature. Semantic search uses word meanings in the context of parsed phrases to find matches. The NASA taxonomies provide the word meanings. Spacecraft taxonomies and ontologies (generalization hierarchies with attributes and relationships, based on terms meanings) are being developed for types of subsystems, functions, entities, hazards and failures. The ontologies are broad and general, covering hardware, software and human systems. Semantic search of Space Station texts was used to validate and extend the taxonomies. The taxonomies have also been used to extract system connectivity (interaction) models and functions from requirements text. Now the Reconciler semantic search tool and the taxonomies are being applied to improve search in the Space Shuttle PRACA database, to discover recurring patterns of failure. Usual methods of string search and keyword search fall short because the entries are terse and have numerous shortcuts (irregular abbreviations, nonstandard acronyms, cryptic codes) and modifier words cannot be used in sentence context to refine the search. The limited and fixed FMEA categories associated with the entries do not make the fine distinctions needed in the search. The approach assigns PRACA report titles to problem classes in the taxonomy. Each ontology class includes mapping words - near-synonyms naming different manifestations of that problem class. The mapping words for Problems, Entities and Functions are converted to a canonical form plus any of a small set of modifier words (e.g. non-uniformity NOT + UNIFORM.) The report titles are parsed as sentences if possible, or treated as a flat sequence of word tokens if parsing fails. When canonical forms in the title match mapping words, the PRACA entry is associated with the corresponding Problem, Entity or Function in the ontology. The user can search for types of failures associated with types of equipment, clustering by type of problem (e.g., all bearings found with problems of being uneven: rough, irregular, gritty ). The results could also be used for tagging PRACA report entries with rich metadata. This approach could also be applied to searching and tagging failure modes, failure effects and mitigations in FMEAs. In the pilot work, parsing 52K+ truncated titles (the test cases that were available), has resulted in identification of both a type of equipment and type of problem in about 75% of the cases. The results are displayed in a manner analogous to Google search results. The effort has also led to the enrichment of the taxonomy, adding some new categories and many new mapping words. Further work would make enhancements that have been identified for improving the clustering and further reducing the false alarm rate. (In searching for recurring problems, good clustering is more important than reducing false alarms). Searching complete PRACA reports should lead to immediate improvement.

Malin, Jane T.↗

NASA NTRS2024

Quantifying Risk to Improve Medical System Design for Long Duration Artemis Missions: A Demonstration of NASA's IMPACT Tradespace Analysis Tool

BACKGROUND NASA’s human exploration spaceflight missions to the Moon and Mars present unprecedented challenges for in-mission medical care. A greater distance from Earth will mean increased mission durations, communication delays, limited to no resupply opportunities, and constraints on the evacuation of ill or injured crew. Mass, volume, and power will be limited while higher demands will be placed on the crews to manage medical events. NASA’s Moon to Mars exploration strategy outlines increasingly complex Artemis missions both in terms of duration and operations. In these more challenging deep space missions, it is important to quantitatively estimate the human system risk attributable to medical conditions and use these estimates to advance medical system design. METHODS IMPACT (Informing Mission Planning via Analysis of Complex Tradespaces) is a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) and tradespace analysis tool developed by NASA to advance exploration mission medical system design. IMPACT v1.0 includes a novel evidence library baselined to exploration environments; an expanded list of 119 medical conditions; a large increase in the number of medical resources and the flexibility of their use; and the ability for rapid and iterative analysis. Medical system risk estimates include loss of crew life, consideration of the need for return to definitive care (medical evacuation), and an estimate of crew time affected due to medical conditions. A notional long duration lunar orbit and lunar surface design reference mission (DRM) was chosen with a 4-astronaut crew to mimic a foundational exploration Artemis mission. The DRM profile includes outbound transit on Orion, Gateway space station rendezvous in lunar orbit, 6 months on the Lunar surface with extravehicular activity (EVA), return rendezvous with Gateway, and transit back to Earth. RESULTS/DISCUSSION: Overall, IMPACT successfully quantified medical risk and derived an optimal medical system to support crew on a long duration lunar mission. In this DRM, the calculated loss of crew life from a medical event was 0.008 events per mission, risk of potential need for evacuation was 0.30 events per mission, and cumulative crew time affected by medical conditions was 103 days. The medical conditions that most contributed to medical risk were decompression sickness, trauma, and respiratory failure. The conditions that had the largest effects on crew performance included musculoskeletal injuries and lunar dust exposure. The IMPACT-generated medical system included resources that target the most common and highest risk conditions and performed as expected. This demonstrates the value of the IMPACT tool in medical system design for human exploration spaceflight missions.

Arian Anderson↗

NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Probabilistic Design Analysis (PDA) Approach to Determine the Probability of Cross-System Failures for a Space Launch Vehicle

Quantifying the probability of significant launch vehicle failure scenarios for a given design, while still in the design process, is critical to mission success and to the safety of the astronauts. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is chosen from many system safety and reliability tools to verify the loss of mission (LOM) and loss of crew (LOC) requirements set by the NASA Program Office. To support the integrated vehicle PRA, probabilistic design analysis (PDA) models are developed by using vehicle design and operation data to better quantify failure probabilities and to better understand the characteristics of a failure and its outcome. This PDA approach uses a physics-based model to describe the system behavior and response for a given failure scenario. Each driving parameter in the model is treated as a random variable with a distribution function. Monte Carlo simulation is used to perform probabilistic calculations to statistically obtain the failure probability. Sensitivity analyses are performed to show how input parameters affect the predicted failure probability, providing insight for potential design improvements to mitigate the risk. The paper discusses the application of the PDA approach in determining the probability of failure for two scenarios from the NASA Ares I project

Shih, Ann T.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Relative Velocity as a Metric for Probability of Collision Calculations

Collision risk assessment metrics, such as the probability of collision calculation, are based largely on assumptions about the interaction of two objects during their close approach. Specifically, the approach to probabilistic risk assessment can be performed more easily if the relative trajectories of the two close approach objects are assumed to be linear during the encounter. It is shown in this analysis that one factor in determining linearity is the relative velocity of the two encountering bodies, in that the assumption of linearity breaks down at low relative approach velocities. The first part of this analysis is the determination of the relative velocity threshold below which the assumption of linearity becomes invalid. The second part is a statistical study of conjunction interactions between representative asset spacecraft and the associated debris field environment to determine the likelihood of encountering a low relative velocity close approach. This analysis is performed for both the LEO and GEO orbit regimes. Both parts comment on the resulting effects to collision risk assessment operations.

Frigm, Ryan Clayton↗