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Literature Review of Documented Persistent Secondary Uranium Sources at DOE LM Sites

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management (LM) has the responsibility to protect human health and the environment at 101 legacy uranium sites across the nation by implementing long-term surveillance and maintenance requirements. Included in these responsibilities is to provide for the safe and environmentally sound disposal, long-term stabilization, and control of uranium mill tailings in a manner that minimizes or eliminates radiation health hazards to the public at 21 Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act (UMTRCA) Title I sites; 6 UMTRCA Title II sites; and 9 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act/Resource Conservation and Recovery Act sites. These sites are former uranium mills (processing sites), or sites with wastes from processing sites encapsulated in engineered disposal cells (disposal sites), or sites where components of atomic weapons were manufactured. During site characterization, groundwater contamination was often discovered and evaluated or modeled for future movement with the inclusion of uranium sorption in the groundwater plume. Much of this original work did identify uranium processing wastes as the original contaminant source. However, more recent work has identified the existence and influence of persistent secondary uranium sources that may prevent uranium in groundwater from attenuating as quickly as initial evaluations or modeling indicated. By understanding these processes, better decisions can be made to choose the appropriate remediation and closure strategies, identify long-term surveillance and maintenance activities, and more accurately estimate life-cycle costs. The purpose of this report is to summarize the literature available on documented persistence secondary uranium sources at LM sites as part of the Applied Studies and Technology Persistent Secondary Contaminant Sources Project.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Double gloves reduce contamination of dry box atmosphere

Pair of encased low permeability hand gloves between which an inert gas circulates reduces dry box contamination. This innovation is applicable to dry boxes using radioactive and alkali metal compounds, submicron powders, and liquid metals.

Herbell, T. P.↗

A local recent supernova - Evidence from X-rays, Al-26 radioactivity and cosmic rays

Possible ways in which cosmic rays could have been contaminated by a local recent supernova are discussed, and ways in which this contamination may be affecting interpretation of Al-26 gamma radiation and locally observed cosmic rays as samples of the average Galactic distribution are considered. Mass spectra of cosmic rays are examined to see whether there is enrichment by a population arising from supernova preacceleration. The reinterpretation of the anomalous component in terms of a local supernova model is addressed.

Clayton, Donald D.↗

Review of Mercury Sequestration in Cementitious Waste Forms

Decontaminated salt solution from Tank 50 at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is known to contain dissolved mercury species which are present as hydroxides and oxides. These species are reported in analytical measurements as the organic cation [CH 3 Hg] + and the inorganic cation Hg 2+ . The salt solution is mixed with cementitious reagents, blast-furnace slag (BFS) and thermally beneficiated Class F fly ash in the Saltstone Processing Facility and pumped into engineered Saltstone Disposal Units, (SDUs), to produce a solidified waste form. The solidified waste form, saltstone, encapsulates and chemically stabilizes the mercury and other contaminants, sequestering them from release into the environment. With the discovery of methylmercury in the salt solution, testing was performed to determine the extent to which saltstone prepared with methylmercury (MeHg) retains mercury in the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP). Results from this testing indicated that the amount of mercury extracted remained below the regulatory limit, and that the saltstone formulation with a greater proportion of BFS performed slightly better at retaining Hg in the solid.

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Laser Cleaning for Decontamination of a Nuclear Facility - 20609

This paper describes laser cleaning of contaminated tools in a nuclear power facility in Chalk River, Ontario Canada and also the same for EnergySolutions facility in Memphis facility. For the Chalk River facility, other methods of cleaning which included dry ice blasting, disassemble and wipe clean and steam cleaning, generated secondary waste and were time consuming. Laser cleaning of the tools in facility did not create secondary waste, was more efficient and safer for the operator. The laser cleaning method was compared with other methods. For the EnergySolutions facility in Memphis, laser cleaning was compared with hands on cleaning and laser removal by applying them to a rail car, a metal plate and a metal skate. (authors)

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Development of the Mobile Systems for Conditioning of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources in Serbia - 20105

Sealed radioactive sources (SRS) are being used worldwide in the field of medicine, agriculture, industry and research. They can be found in mobile as well as stationary devices. SRS contains radioactive material that is (a) permanently sealed in a capsule or (b) closely bounded and in a solid form. The capsule or material of an SRS should be strong enough to maintain leak tightness under the conditions of use and purpose for which the source was designed, also in case of accidents. In this case only emitted radiation is utilized. Firstly, the hazard from external radiation has to be considered, but the possibility of contamination due to fracture of the capsule should not be disregarded. The radioactive sources are composed of the radiating isotope contained in the filling medium, the single or double isotope holder that partially or totally surrounds the filling medium, the outer cover that contains the parts mentioned above and the capsule closed airtightly by welding or using some other method. The capsule must be tested for leakage periodically. If the SRS is no longer needed (e.g. replaced by a different technique) or it becomes useless for the intended application (e.g. the activity becomes too weak, the equipment containing the source works poorly or becomes obsolete, the source is damaged or leaking) it is considered disused. Disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS) are typically conditioned and disposed if a facility is available. If the disposal option is not available, conditioned DSRS should be stored under proper conditions. In some cases, the radionuclide(s) in DSRS can be recovered/recycled or the DSRS can be repurposed for other applications. Conditioning of DSRS ensures containment of the radioactive material, provides confinement for leaking sources, provides sufficient radiation shielding, reduces storage/disposal volume by allowing consolidation of multiple sources into a single storage/disposal container, facilitates transport operations and contributes to safety and security as well. Typically, conditioning technologies are deployed either as permanently installed stationary systems in centralized or mobile on-site waste processing facilities, or in a mobile configuration. Centralized stationary facilities provide a single processing location for multiple users that requires transport of the waste to the facility. On the other hand, mobile systems may be provided for the selection and application of the optimum technology for a specific waste stream (such as DSRS) by bringing the process to the point where the waste is generated. In addition, mobile systems could offer additional flexibility by sharing equipment among multiple waste generating sites for processing campaigns that vary in duration, from very short periods to several years. The term 'mobile processing system' refers to any radioactive waste processing system or component which is designed to be transportable and which is not considered permanently installed. Two mobile system for conditioning of disused sealed radioactive sources are developed in the Public Company Nuclear Facilities of Serbia. Development of these mobile systems was supported by SRB9005 national project via Technical Cooperation of the IAEA. The first mobile system, built inside the 20 feet ISO container, will be used for conditioning of DSRS category 3 to 5. The second mobile system, built inside the 7 m long vehicle (Iveco Daily Van), will be used for dismantling of ionizing smoke detectors mostly with Am-241 sources. Designs of the mobile systems were defined in cooperation with two companies from Belgium (Belgoprocess and Leniko) and a Croatian company Ekoteh as well as with the support of the IAEA experts. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures for the mobile systems are developed. Based on safety assessment the acceptance criteria and operational limits and conditions are established. Operational procedures include: (a) equipment and material requirements, (b) assembling procedure of the mobile unit, (c) procedure for acceptance of devices for dismantling and conditioning, (d) dismantling procedure for devices to recover the DSRS, (e) characterization of DSRS, (f) encapsulation procedure of DSRS, (g) disassembling procedure of the mobile unit, and (h) keeping records, identification and traceability. In addition, radiation safety, health safety, security and emergency preparedness plans are prepared. The generic safety assessment and operational procedures could be updated with site specific requirements, DSRS inventory, and different needs for future customers. Developed mobile systems could be used in all situations when it is feasible to perform conditioning of DSRS on the spot in the county and worldwide. Development of these mobile units was just the first step to create the Reference Center for Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disused Radioactive Sources Conditioning for Small Facilities which can become a regional training center in the future, and/or as a tool for comprehensive national search and secure programmes. In the next phases development of e-learning platforms and blended learning packages as well as application for the IAEA Qualified Technical Centre (QTC) for the management of DSRS is foreseen. (authors)

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Impact of lowering potassium contamination in liquid scintillation cocktails for ultra-sensitive radiation detection

Intrinsic 40 K radioactive backgrounds from impurities of natural K in liquid scintillation cocktails have previously been demonstrated to limit their use in ultra-sensitive applications. Here, this work explores two methodologies in parallel for the reduction of 40 K backgrounds in the cocktails, and lays the groundwork for use in ultra-sensitive applications. In one method, alternative low-K liquid scintillation matrix constituents were identified and in the other, a simple purification method for single components and finished cocktails was developed. Both methods were verified via ICP-MS analysis. Liquid scintillation counting of selected purified cocktails demonstrated background reduction, improved stability, and enhanced performance. The best performing purified cocktail was also counted on a custom-built ultra-low background liquid scintillation counter, with results below the detector background.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Thermodynamic characterization of synthetic lead-arsenate apatites with different halogen substitutions

Abstract Thermodynamic parameters have been measured for synthetic analogs of the mimetite-group minerals Pb5(AsO4)3X (X = OH, Cl, Br, I) belonging to the apatite supergroup. Phases precipitated from aqueous solutions under ambient conditions with well characterized structures and compositions were studied. For each phase, dissolution enthalpy was experimentally determined by oxide melt drop solution calorimetry in a molten solvent of sodium molybdate (3Na2O·4MoO3) at 976 K. The enthalpy of formation from the elements ΔHf,elo was calculated using thermochemical cycles and was −3030.6 ± 11.5, −3026.6 ± 15.8, −2967.6 ± 25.0, and −2993.1 ± 12.2 kJ/mol for Pb5.00(AsO4)3.00OH0.86(CO3)0.07, Pb5.00(AsO4)3.00Cl0.80(CO3)0.10, Pb5.00(AsO4)3.00Br0.80(CO3)0.10, and Pb5.00(AsO4)3.00I0.45OH0.35(CO3)0.10, respectively. These ΔHf,elo values exhibit typical trends for apatites: they increased (were less negative) with the increasing molar mass and ionic radius of X and decreased with the electronegativity and ionization energy of X. The compilation and comparison of data for Ca-, Pb-, P-, and As-apatites revealed correlations indicating that thermodynamic enthalpic stability is largely influenced by chemical factors (e.g., differences in electronegativities of the elements, ionization energy, or ionic characteristics of the bonds) and to a lesser extent by physical and geometric parameters in the crystal structure related to the mass and size of the X anion. Using the correlations, it was possible to estimate the value of hitherto unknown ΔHf,elo for Pb5(AsO4)3F, −3144.3 ± 66.5 kJ/mol. The observed relationships apply to the entire apatite supergroup and can be used to predict the values of ΔHf,elo for phases that have not been studied experimentally. The new data on environmentally significant phases will contribute to the modeling of mineral-water interactions, particularly for potential use in the remediation of soils and wastes contaminated with Pb and As and in the immobilization of radioactive waste containing I-129.

Geochemistry & Geophysics↗

Crossroads Baker, "Helen of Bikini"

Test Baker, the underwater detonation of a Fat Man bomb nicknamed Helen of Bikini by an anonymous “Kilroy,” took place on July 25, 1946. Encased in a bathysphere fashioned from a submarine conning tower and suspended ninety feet below the surface of Bikini’s lagoon, Helen of Bikini was spectacular. Her energy burst through the lagoon surface at 11,000 ft. /sec pushing over two million cubic yards of radioactive seawater and sediment to a height of 4,300 feet within sixty seconds. Nine vessels were sunk and an additional five ships were physically destroyed, although still afloat. When it collapsed, the column of radioactive sediment and seawater spread over the surviving ships permanently contaminating them. Helen of Bikini destroyed the entire fleet of target vessels.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Vadose Zone Transport of Tritium and Nitrate under Ponded Water Conditions

Vadose zone transport of tritium and nitrate can be important considerations at radioactive waste sites, landfills, or areas with industrial impacts. These contaminants are of particular concern because they typically have a relatively higher mobility in the subsurface compared to other compounds. Here, we describe a semiarid site with tritium and nitrate contamination involving a manmade ponded water source above a thick unsaturated zone at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, USA. This study demonstrates the value of vadose zone flow and transport modeling for the development of field investigation plans (i.e., identifying optimal borehole locations and depths for contaminant characterization), and how a combination of modeling with isotope and geochemical measurements can provide insight into how tritium and nitrate transport in the vadose zone in semiarid environments. Modeling results suggest that at this location, tritium transport is well predicted by classical multiphase theory. Our work expands the demonstrated usefulness of a standard tritium conceptual model to sites with ponded surface conditions and agrees with previous results where a standard model was able to explain the evolution of a tritium plume at an arid waste disposal site. In addition, depth-based analyses of δ 18 O and δ 2 H of pore waters helped confirm the extent of pond infiltration into the vadose zone, and the δ 15 N of nitrate showed that the contaminant release history of the site was different than originally assumed.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

ORNLERASE - EPA COUNTS PER MINUTE CALCULATOR CONVERSION FACTORS

This database is used in the EPA's Superfund Counts Per Minute (CPM) Calculator (https://epa-cpm.ornl.gov/index.html). This database contains conversion factors used in the calculator that help users estimate the expected radiation detector reading, in counts per minute (CPM), corresponding to a measured radioactivity level reported in either pCi/cm² or pCi/g. Because surface contamination and volumetric contamination behave differently, the tool uses separate conversion processes, each based on Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP)–derived conversion factors. The CPM Calculator supports conversions for a range of common environmental media—including soil, steel, glass, drywall, concrete, and wood—to generate detector-ready CPM values. The primary goal of this tool is to enable more efficient, real-time field measurements, reducing reliance on laboratory analyses and ultimately saving both time and money during Superfund assessments.

Dolislager, Fred [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000325477921)↗

Infrastructure and DFLAW Support at Hanford - 20443

Manhattan Project era infrastructure systems are degrading at an accelerated pace across the Department of Energy's (DOE) Environmental Management complex. Revitalizing, rejuvenating and right-sizing these systems to ensure reliability for ongoing cleanup missions is a major focus at the 580-square- mile Hanford Site in southeast Washington State. The push to complete construction, commissioning, startup, and operation of facilities and systems in the Direct-Feed Low-Activity Waste (DFLAW) program at Hanford by 2023 requires considerable coordination among site contractors and a significant investment in infrastructure. The passage of time also poses a challenge. It has been about 75 years since facilities were first operated at the site, and approximately 40 years of plutonium production created a legacy of unidentified active and abandoned underground obstacles and waste sites that must be avoided when building and upgrading the infrastructure. Converting infrastructure systems originally built to support plutonium production from the 1940's to the 1980's and upgrading those systems to optimize technology is an ever-changing balance of funding profiles, available resources and execution strategies. The DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) has long recognized the need for increased investment in Hanford Site infrastructure to support the future processing of approximately 56 million gallons of waste currently stored in large underground tanks. When DFLAW is fully operational, safe and reliable infrastructure systems will be needed to ensure continuity of operations around the clock, 365 days a year. These include roadways, water, power, sewer, information technology systems and facilities. To ensure the readiness of Hanford's infrastructure to support treating tank waste in the next three years, 15 projects were identified with a combined value of $133.8 million. Through calendar year 2019, 7 infrastructure projects have been substantially completed and the remaining 8 projects, with a remaining value of $103.8 million, are scheduled to be completed by December 2023. RL and its site services/infrastructure contractor, Mission Support Alliance (MSA), regularly evaluate the needs of the DFLAW program and other Hanford Site missions to ensure the highest priority systems are addressed. In addition to a fast-approaching deadline for round-the-clock treatment operations, RL and MSA face another significant infrastructure challenge. As cleanup is being completed in a 220-square-mile area called the River Corridor, most of the cleanup operations going forward will occur in a 20-square-mile area in the center of the Hanford Site, known as the Central Plateau. Infrastructure systems are becoming more congested in an already overcrowded area. This paper/presentation will outline some of the challenges Hanford faces while executing infrastructure reliability projects. (authors)

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Panel Session 100: An Integrated Systems-Based Monitoring Approach

This panel focused on recent advancements in monitoring and remaining challenges associated with the implementing cost-effective monitoring approaches for complex DOE sites. Monitoring presents one of the largest, long-term costs for environmental remediation and site stewardship within the DOE because contamination at complex sites will likely be present for tens to hundreds of years into the future. Integration of monitoring with predictive modeling is an approach that can reduce long-term monitoring costs as well as support the effective monitoring design and data interpretation for managing a site toward closure and long-term stewardship. Panelists with presentations: Autonomous Electrical Geophysical Monitoring of Contaminated Sites (Tim Johnson); Systems Based Long-Term Monitoring for DOE Legacy Management (David Shafer); Long-Term Systems Based Monitoring (Anderson Ward)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Insulation Activation and Contamination in Low-Power Experiments

Among the diverse advanced nuclear reactor concepts being developed are designs that expect to operate at much higher temperatures than conventional light-water reactors, and therefore require alternative materials for components capable of withstanding these extreme temperatures. Insulation is one such component where alternative high-temperature industrial composites are being considered. Low-power experiments can provide an opportunity for advancing our understanding of material behavior under irradiation; however, these experiments are not without occupational hazards. The focus of this paper is the potential for activation of insulating composites when exposed to neutron fluence during reactor experiments, and to discuss the subsequent contamination of the testing area. This paper will also discuss practical measures for preventing the creation and inhalation of activated particulate matter (i.e., dust), such as engineering and administrative controls and personal protective equipment. This paper evaluates the suitability of several insulation materials for use in reactor experiments based on their activation from neutron irradiation. The materials considered are Pyrogel XTE by Aspen Aerogel, Cerablanket and Kaowool by Morgan Advanced Materials, Thermo-12 Gold by Johns Manville, and Maxsil CF6-2000 by McAllister Mills. Although these materials are not yet widely used in the nuclear industry, they are common in other industries due to their thermal insulating properties. These materials produce dust while handling that can pose health and safety hazards, which could be further exacerbated by activation. The analysis presented in this paper utilizes a deterministic method developed to predict the activation source term of the provided insulation materials. The method calculates the atomic density of each element within the composites and simulates their exposure to a specified neutron flux density representative of low power experimental conditions. During the irradiation phase and throughout the extensive cooling period, neutron absorptions and nuclear decays are tracked for relevant isotopes. The residual activity within each composite is then assessed to identify the material with the lowest potential radiological hazard to workers. Dust will be created during installation and removal of insulating materials and may also be generated during the experiment. Contamination of surrounding surfaces due to dispersion is highly likely unless preventative measures are taken. The results of this analysis are used to estimate an internal dose from inhalation of activated dust, which is significantly lower than the allowable whole-body dose. However, the risk of internal exposure may increase if the dust becomes a transport vector for nuclear material. The goals of this paper are to enhance the understanding of the potential activation and contamination hazards from the use of these insulating materials in low-power nuclear experiments and to foster safer work environments through informed decision-making and strategic planning. This work ultimately contributes to a broader understanding of how new non-nuclear materials for advanced reactors impact the radiological safety of co-located workers, helping to ensure the responsible management of radioactive materials during installation and decommissioning activities.

12 - MGMT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTE↗

The Nature and State of Groundwater Contamination at the Nevada National Security Site: What Have We Learned from Decades of Groundwater Analysis? - 20337

The regulatory framework for remediating radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is based on a combination of characterization and modeling studies, monitoring, and institutional controls [1]. Currently, tritium is the largest contributor (∼90%) to the estimated 44.6 million-curie radionuclide inventory resulting from underground testing [2]. Because of its short half-life (12.32 years), its relative contribution reduces below 10% of the total radiologic inventory over the next 120 years as a result of radioactive decay. Although tritium levels are observed well above the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater, other radionuclides are well below their MCLs except within the nuclear test near-field (nuclear test cavity and chimney) environment. In fact, most device-derived radionuclides are below their MCL in groundwater even in samples collected from this near-field environment. The distribution of radionuclides following the nuclear detonation greatly influences the availability of potential contaminants for groundwater transport. Tritium is initially distributed in the gas phase, later as tritiated water in steam, and finally as liquid water, and is available to groundwater transport away from the near-field environment. Other radionuclides that are mobile in groundwater are {sup 14}C, {sup 36}Cl, {sup 99}Tc, and {sup 129}I though their radiologic inventory is small when compared to tritium. Many radionuclides (e.g. U, Pu, Am) are incorporated to a significant extent into the melt glass at the bottom of the cavity and are accessible to groundwater primarily through the slow process of glass dissolution. These radionuclides are also adsorbed to the surfaces of the crushed rock within the cavity and chimney which limits their migration in groundwater. Although colloid facilitated transport of radionuclides at the NNSS has been observed [3], radionuclide concentrations decrease with time and migration distances due to desorption and colloid filtration processes. Current studies indicate that radionuclides associated with colloids are unlikely to migrate downgradient from NNSS underground nuclear tests at concentrations above the SDWA MCL [4][5]. The results of over 50 years of sampling, along with an understanding of these post detonation processes, indicate that tritium is the only contaminant of concern downgradient of testing and that even tritium will not exceed its MCL in groundwater after ∼120 years. Although other longer-lived radionuclides may continue to be released slowly from the near-field environment they will likely never reach levels exceeding their MCLs in groundwater downgradient of the NNSS. Groundwater monitoring will continue to verify these observations. (authors)

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