Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEMS”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 199 records · Page 11

Addressing embedded digital devices in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants - 307

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the development of the approach to addressing embedded digital devices (EDD) in safety-related systems of nuclear power plants in the U.S. and around the world. In April, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) issued RIS 2016-05 to heighten awareness that EDDs might exist in procured equipment used in safety-related systems without the devices having been explicitly identified in procurement documentation. Inadequate consideration of these devices in digital technology system upgrades, component replacements, and new equipment applications could lead to an adverse safety consequence. The US NRC request was for addressees to implement early efforts to identify these devices. An area where this is being addressed is in regard to the performance of Diversity and Defense-In-Depth (D3) analyses, as addressed in US NRC Branch Technical Position 7-19. Nuclear facilities have increased their use and reliance on digital technology in systems and equipment (e.g., I and C, electrical systems, and fluid systems). In addition to digital instrumentation and control (I and C) systems, examples of safety-related equipment that may use digital technology include emergency diesel generators, pumps, valve actuators, motor control centers, breakers, priority logic modules, time-delay relays, and uninterruptible power sources. In the U.S. and around the world, engineering and licensing activities in standards and guidance have been, and are being developed to address this important consideration in protecting safety-related systems. This paper addresses development of an extended approach to evaluating common-cause failure vulnerability and mitigation in regard to equipment with an EDD. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computer security approach for Rolls-Royce spinline{sup R} safety platform - 227

The number of digital assets at commercial nuclear power plants is significant and will likely continue to increase with time. As a consequence, these plants have become potential targets for cyber-attacks. Around the world, nuclear safety authorities and national Computer and Information Security Agencies are implementing stricter regulations and inspections for critical systems in nuclear plants. There is a particular focus on instrumentation and control systems as they implement key nuclear safety functions. Rolls-Royce follows a strict computer and information security program based on general and nuclear specific norms, Rolls-Royce group processes, and proven technologies. The Spinline digital safety platform has been designed specifically for nuclear applications and features a secure development and operational environment that provides barriers against unauthorized modifications and implements design requirements promoting integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance. The Rolls-Royce secure development environment provides layers of protection utilizing physical and environmental security, human resource security, and information technology systems access control. The Spinline platform strengthens security functions by providing protection against unauthorized, unintended, and unsafe modifications to the system. The Spinline platform has design features promote integrity and reliability during operation and maintenance in the event of inadvertent operator actions or undesirable behavior of connected equipment. The Spinline technology and these computer security processes are based in a wide spectrum of international standards that were accepted as providing a secure development and operating environment by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in 2014. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

An operation verification strategy against network attack of DCS in nuclear power plant - 323

Digital Instrumentation and control (I and C) system serves as the 'senses and nervous system' of a nuclear power plant (NPP). It plays an important role in the safe and economic operation in the NPPs. Digital I and C system has a series of advantages compared with analogue ones, but the introduction of the operation system platform, the application software, and the network communication structure are causing security risk to the power plant. Different kinds of procedures have already been adopted against these risks such as the communication isolation, but the security attacks still occur from time to time in the industrial fields around the world. This paper presents two computer security methods based on the thought of software verification and validation with step-by-step operation identification. First, three scenarios of security attack are proposed according to the structure of a distributed control system (DCS). Then a method with two network bypasses and a security computer are adopted to obtain the operation commands, the actuation signal, and the operation feedback in case of the first two scenarios by identifying the consistency of the obtained data. Furthermore, the method is optimized by combining the operation procedure and the camera shot to identify the anomaly of the information flow, thus to improve the effectiveness against the computer security issues. In the end, the influence and feasibility of this method is discussed. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computerized procedure systems: procedure edition and maintenance challenges - 232

Very few nuclear power plants are using computerized procedures to guide the control room operation. A CPS implementation consists of two processes: digitalization and computerization. The former deals with the transformation of paper-based procedure into a digital data; the latter is referred to as the addition to that data of extra information that is meaningful for decision-making. This information may include real-time data (plant parameter values and binary process values to indicate equipment states), provide access to trends and historical data, etc. In order to be efficient and to optimize the digitalization and computerization processes, these set of aids should be implemented at the same time as operating procedures are digitalized There are references of plants having successfully implemented Computerized Procedures Systems (CPS) for emergency procedures, but when questioned about normal or abnormal operating procedures, operators and plant management seem reluctant to take that step. Given that a CPS is meant, by design concept, to increase operation crew efficiency by facilitating the procedures execution and reducing human error, why are we reluctant to enjoy CPS benefits in the most common plant status (i.e. normal operation)? Although there are many answers to this question, one is shared by most of the users: CPSs are not designed for editing and maintaining procedures easily and reliably. Normal operating procedures, in opposition to the emergency procedures, are often reviewed. Nowadays, these edition activities are performed easily with a word processor software and using paper, but what is required when dealing with a CPS? (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Development of a model based assessment process for qualification of embedded digital devices in NPP applications: research approach and current status - 263

The instrumentation and control (I and C) equipment used in currently operating U.S. nuclear power plants (NPPs) is primarily based on mature analog technologies that are progressing towards obsolescence. The continued reliance on this legacy analog technology, which is also being propagated into new NPP designs, imposes performance penalties and maintenance burdens in comparison with modern digital I and C instrumentation. In many instances, currently available I and C equipment contain embedded digital devices (EDDs) such as microprocessors and programmable logic devices. Experience in other industries, such as avionics, has shown that digital I and C equipment containing EDDs can provide significant benefits over analog-based equipment in terms of performance, reliability, and maintainability. In recent years, due to the high demand for digital technologies in the industrial I and C marketplace, it is becoming increasingly difficult for NPPs to acquire instrumentation that is not equipped with an EDD. However, the nuclear power industry has been slow to adopt digital technology, especially in safety-related systems, in large part as a result of regulatory concerns about common-cause failure (CCF) vulnerabilities of equipment with EDDs. Consequently, there is a clear need to develop cost effective qualification methods to contribute to the assessment of CCF vulnerability posed by EDDs in modern instrumentation that could be used in NPPs. This paper describes the research regarding qualification methods for equipment with EDDs that is sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the current research is to develop an effective approach employing science-based methods to resolve concerns about CCF vulnerability that serve to inhibit deployment of advanced instrumentation (e.g., sensors, actuators, microcontrollers) with EDDs in nuclear power applications. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The preliminary design of bearings for the control system of a high-temperature lithium-cooled nuclear reactor

The design of bearings for the control system of a fast reactor concept is presented. The bearings are required to operate at temperatures up to 2200 F in one of two fluids, lithium or argon. Basic bearing types are the same regardless of the fluid. Crowned cylindrical journals were selected for radially loaded bearings and modified spherical bearings were selected for bearings under combined thrust and radial loads. Graphite and aluminum oxide are the materials selected for the argon atmosphere bearings while cermet compositions (carbides or nitrides bonded with refractory metals) were selected for the lithium lubricated bearings. Mounting of components is by shrink fit or by axial clamping utilizing differential thermal expansion.

Yacobucci, H. G.↗

Controlling a power output of a nuclear reactor without using control rods

A nuclear power system includes a reactor vessel that includes a reactor core that includes nuclear fuel assemblies configured to generate a nuclear fission reaction. A representative nuclear power system further includes a riser positioned above there actor core and a primary coolant flow path that extends from a bottom portion of the reactor vessel, through the reactor core, and through an annulus between the riser and the reactor vessel. A primary coolant circulates through the primary coolant flow path to receive heat from the nuclear fission reaction and release the heat to a power generation system configured to generate electric power. The nuclear power system further includes a control rod assembly system positioned in the reactor vessel and configured to position control rods in only two discrete positions.

Callaway, Allyson↗

Heat exchanger temperature response for duty-cycle transients in the NGNP/HTE.

Control system studies were performed for the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) interfaced to the High Temperature Electrolysis (HTE) plant. Temperature change and associated thermal stresses are important factors in determining plant lifetime. In the NGNP the design objective of a 40 year lifetime for the Intermediate Heat Exchanger (IHX) in particular is seen as a challenge. A control system was designed to minimize temperature changes in the IHX and more generally at all high-temperature locations in the plant for duty-cycle transients. In the NGNP this includes structures at the reactor outlet and at the inlet to the turbine. This problem was approached by identifying those high-level factors that determine temperature rates of change. First are the set of duty cycle transients over which the control engineer has little control but which none-the-less must be addressed. Second is the partitioning of the temperature response into a quasi-static component and a transient component. These two components are largely independent of each other and when addressed as such greater understanding of temperature change mechanisms and how to deal with them is achieved. Third is the manner in which energy and mass flow rates are managed. Generally one aims for a temperature distribution that minimizes spatial non-uniformity of thermal expansion in a component with time. This is can be achieved by maintaining a fixed spatial temperature distribution in a component during transients. A general rule of thumb for heat exchangers is to maintain flow rate proportional to thermal power. Additionally the product of instantaneous flow rate and heat capacity should be maintained the same on both sides of the heat exchanger. Fourth inherent mechanisms for stable behavior should not be compromised by active controllers that can introduce new feedback paths and potentially create under-damped response. Applications of these principles to the development of a plant control strategy for the reference NGNP/HTE plant can be found in the body of this report. The outcome is an integrated plant/control system design. The following conclusions are drawn from the analysis: (1) The plant load schedule can be managed to maintain near-constant hot side temperatures over the load range in both the nuclear and chemical plant. (2) The reactor open-loop response is inherently stable resulting mainly from a large Doppler temperature coefficient compared to the other reactivity temperature feedbacks. (3) The typical controller used to manage reactor power production to maintain reactor outlet temperature at a setpoint introduces a feedback path that tends to destabilize reactor power production in the NGNP. (4) A primary loop flow controller that forces primary flow to track PCU flow rate is effective in minimizing spatial temperature differentials within the IHX. (5) Inventory control in both the primary and PCU system during ramp load change transients is an effective means of maintaining high NGNP thermal efficiency while at reduced electric load. (6) Turbine bypass control is an effective means for responding to step changes in generator load when equipment capacity limitations prevent inventory control from being effective. (7) Turbine bypass control is effective in limiting PCU shaft over speed for the loss of generator load upset event. (8) The proposed control strategy is effective in limiting time variation of the differential spatial temperature distribution in the IHX during transients. Essentially the IHX can be made to behave in a manner where each point in the IHX experiences approximately the same temperature rate of change during a transient. (9) The stability of the closed-loop Brayton cycle was found to be sensitive to where one operates on the turbo-machine performance maps. There are competing interests: more stable operation means operating on the curves at points that reduce overall cycle efficiency. Future work should address in greater detail elements that came to light in the course of this work. Specifically: (1) A stability analysis should be performed to identify the phenomena that control reactor outlet temperature stability when operating with the Reactor Outlet Temperature Controller. The goal is to identify a better performing controller. (2) Future simulations should be performed with multiple axial nodes. The single axial node model for the core used in this work gives rise to an initial core reactor outlet temperature perturbation that is a numerical artifact. (3) The tradeoffs referred to above regarding the dependence of Brayton cycle stability and efficiency on performance curve characteristics and use need to be better understood. (4) The role of xenon was neglected in this work and needs to be included in future work.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear power plant risk-informed surveillance frequency control program implementation at the Duke Catawba nuclear plant with a focus on instrumentation and control systems - 333

This paper summarizes an updated process for risk-informed surveillance frequency control program (SFCP) implementation at the Catawba Nuclear Power Plant in the past year. This program includes selection and prioritization of specific target surveillance test interval extensions; and development, review, and implementation of surveillance test risk informed documented evaluation (STRIDE) packages designed to support extension of conventional surveillance requirement test intervals, in accordance with 'Risk-Informed Technical Specifications Initiative 5b, Risk-Informed Method for Control of Surveillance Frequencies, Industry Guideline,' NEI 04-10, Revision 1 . The scope of work associated with STRIDE development includes probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) case studies, deterministic assessment (DA) evaluations, and, where required, instrument drift evaluation (IDE). The STRIDE implementation efforts have also included support of independent decision-making panel (IDP) meetings at the implementing power stations and IDP member training. The purpose of this paper is to provide a presentation of a refined process for STRIDE development with a focus on instrumentation and control systems based on author experience, which includes support for the development of multiple STRIDE packages for the Catawba Nuclear Plant. This paper outlines a framework for practical implementation of an SFCP within the context of an integrated risk-informed performance-based regulation application program with emphasis on instrumentation and control systems. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced I&C for Fault-Tolerant Supervisory Control of Small Modular Reactors

In this research, we have developed a supervisory control approach to enable automated control of SMRs. By design the supervisory control system has an hierarchical, interconnected, adaptive control architecture. A considerable advantage to this architecture is that it allows subsystems to communicate at different/finer granularity, facilitates monitoring of process at the modular and plant levels, and enables supervisory control. We have investigated the deployment of automation, monitoring, and data collection technologies to enable operation of multiple SMRs. Each unit's controller collects and transfers information from local loops and optimize that unit’s parameters. Information is passed from the each SMR unit controller to the supervisory controller, which supervises the actions of SMR units and manage plant processes. The information processed at the supervisory level will provide operators the necessary information needed for reactor, unit, and plant operation. In conjunction with the supervisory effort, we have investigated techniques for fault-tolerant networks, over which information is transmitted between local loops and the supervisory controller to maintain a safe level of operational normalcy in the presence of anomalies. The fault-tolerance of the supervisory control architecture, the network that supports it, and the impact of fault-tolerance on multi-unit SMR plant control has been a second focus of this research. To this end, we have investigated the deployment of advanced automation, monitoring, and data collection and communications technologies to enable operation of multiple SMRs. We have created a fault-tolerant multi-unit SMR supervisory controller that collects and transfers information from local loops, supervise their actions, and adaptively optimize the controller parameters. The goal of this research has been to develop the methodologies and procedures for fault-tolerant supervisory control of small modular reactors. To achieve this goal, we have identified the following objectives. These objective are an ordered approach to the research: I) Development of a supervisory digital I&C system II) Fault-tolerance of the supervisory control architecture III) Automated decision making and online monitoring.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The Effects of Degraded Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems on Human-system Interfaces and Operator Performance: HFE Review Guidance and Technical Basis

New and advanced reactors will use integrated digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to support operators in their monitoring and control functions. Even though digital systems are typically highly reliable, their potential for degradation or failure could significantly affect operator performance and, consequently, impact plant safety. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) supported this research project to investigate the effects of degraded I&C systems on human performance and plant operations. The objective was to develop human factors engineering (HFE) review guidance addressing the detection and management of degraded digital I&C conditions by plant operators. We reviewed pertinent standards and guidelines, empirical studies, and plant operating experience. In addition, we conducted an evaluation of the potential effects of selected failure modes of the digital feedwater system on human-system interfaces (HSIs) and operator performance. The results indicated that I&C degradations are prevalent in plants employing digital systems and the overall effects on plant behavior can be significant, such as causing a reactor trip or causing equipment to operate unexpectedly. I&C degradations can impact the HSIs used by operators to monitor and control the plant. For example, sensor degradations can make displays difficult to interpret and can sometimes mislead operators by making it appear that a process disturbance has occurred. We used the information obtained as the technical basis upon which to develop HFE review guidance. The guidance addresses the treatment of degraded I&C conditions as part of the design process and the HSI features and functions that support operators to monitor I&C performance and manage I&C degradations when they occur. In addition, we identified topics for future research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Developmental study of advanced HIS design method for digital I and C+HMIT of PWR plant - 277

A new conceptual frame of how to design and validate a digital HIS (human interface system) on an innovative numerical simulation basis is proposed for the support of plant operators' supervisory control of various types of automated complex NPPs (nuclear power plants). The proposed conceptual framework utilizes the object-oriented software for plant DiD (defense-in depth) risk monitor with the combination of nuclear reactor accident simulation by an advanced nuclear safety analysis code RELAP5/MOD4. The conceptual frame proposed in this paper will be applied for an example practice for the SBLOCA (small break loss of coolant accident) case of passive safety PWR (pressurized water reactor) AP1000. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DC-Saturated Continuously Variable Series Reactors (CVSRs) for Power Flow Control in Power Transmission Systems

This paper proposes a novel continuously variable series reactor (CVSR) based on a dc current controller (DCC) to manage power flow in transmission systems. There are three major contributions. First, the three-dimensional electromagnetic interaction has been comprehensively analyzed to extend the understanding beyond the conventional 2D relationship. Second, a high-fidelity reluctance model of the CVSR with an improved DCC model is proposed and implemented. To overcome the fundamental concern for the system modeling, the DCC has been modeled as an ideal current source in parallel with an output impedance. Additionally, the induced back-EMF can be precisely projected which provides critical design guidelines for the DCC. Third, inspired by the theoretical analysis and modeling, a reliable high power DCC converter is designed accordingly to interface with kV-level back-EMF and supply kA-level dc current for a 115 kV/1500 A CVSR. Experiments are conducted in a practical transmission demonstration system. When the ac current in the transmission system varies from zero to 1500 A, experimental results show that the proposed CVSR can continuously regulate the reactance from 1.6 Ω to 5 Ω, validating the effectiveness of the proposed system design and modeling methodology.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Report from the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Workshop on Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems and Human-System Interface Technologies

The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development (R&D) program sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The program is operated in close collaboration with industry R&D programs to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe, and economical operation of Nuclear Power Plants that are currently in operation. The LWRS Program focus is on longer-term and higher-risk/reward research that contributes to the national policy objectives of energy and environmental security. Advanced instruments and control (I&C) technologies are needed to support the safe and reliable production of power from nuclear energy systems during sustained periods of operation up to and beyond their expected licensed lifetime. This requires that new capabilities to achieve process control be developed and eventually implemented in existing nuclear assets. It also requires that approaches be developed and proven to achieve sustainability of I&C systems throughout the period of extended operation. The strategic objective of the LWRS Program Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems Technology R&D pathway is to establish a technical basis for new technologies needed to achieve safety and reliability of operating nuclear assets and to implement new technologies in nuclear energy systems. This will be achieved by carrying out a program of R&D to develop scientific knowledge in the areas of: • Sensors, diagnostics, and prognostics to support characterization and prediction of the effects of aging and degradation phenomena effects on critical systems, structures, and components (SSCs) • Online monitoring of SSCs and active components, generation of information, and methods to analyze and employ online monitoring information • New methods for visualization, integration, and information use to enhance state awareness and leverage expertise to achieve safer, more readily available electricity generation. As an initial step in accomplishing this effort, the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Workshop on Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control Systems and Human-System Interface Technologies was held March 20–21, 2009, in Columbus, Ohio, to enable industry stakeholders and researchers in identification of the nuclear industry’s needs in the areas of future I&C technologies and corresponding technology gaps and research capabilities. Approaches for collaboration to bridge or fill the technology gaps were presented and R&D activities and priorities recommended. This report documents the presentations and discussions of the workshop and is intended to serve as a basis for the plan under development to achieve the goals of the I&C research pathway.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Risk assessment of safety-critical data communication in digital safety feature control system - 205

As one of the safety-critical systems in Advanced Power Reactor-1400 (APR-1400) nuclear power plant (NPP), the Engineered Safety Feature-Component Control System (ESF-CCS) employs safety data link and network communication for transmitting safety component actuation to effectively facilitate various safety-critical field controllers. However, data communication failure risk in the ESF-CCS has yet to be fully quantified, the probability that a safety-critical system in digitalized NPP becomes unsafe due to a network failure must be evaluated to quantify the risk of digital I and C system. In this study, a fault tree model was developed to assess the data link and data network failure-induced unavailability of a safety-critical system function used to generate an automated control signal for actuating design basis accident mitigation equipment. Especially, the risk of data communication failure in a digital safety feature control system was analyzed in consideration of interconnection between safety-critical controllers and the fault-tolerant algorithm implemented in the network configuration. Based on the developed fault tree model, case studies were performed to quantitatively assess the unavailability of ESF-CCS signal generation due to safety data link and network failure and their risk effect on safety signal generation unavailability. This study is expected to provide risk information on the safety-critical data communication in a digitalized NPP instrumentation and control system. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗