Results for “Safe Learning” — Page 11

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Early Artemis Surface Navigation: Challenges, Approaches, and Opportunities

The early Artemis missions represent the return of humanity to the surface of the Moon and provide opportunities for meeting early science and exploration goals. Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities are a fundamental element and inform operational design, flight rules, and the ability to meet these. This paper provides an overview of the needs, potential implementations, challenges, and concepts of operations in the initial human surface missions, Artemis III and IV. These early excursions are a crucial learning opportunity to gain more experience in the actual operational environment for Artemis V and beyond where exploration objectives and complexity increases. As part of the study, the team defined a threshold performance navigation requirement (including position and orientation) to meet crew safe return and assessed a breadth of navigation approaches that could be deployed to augment the crew’s baseline navigation capability. Data was collected in terms of size, mass, power, operational constraints, environment constraints, interface, and performance to define the technical metrics. Given these, the trade team conducted polling among the various Artemis Campaign elements to capture preference, integration challenges, and operational impacts. These were used to develop weightings and inform a ranked order of solutions across each of the early missions. The results of the study recommended augmenting the initial orientation capability with additional navigation sensors to provide coarse position and heading information to the crew to enable a safe contingency walk-back when out of video range. The team identified opportunities for embedding this hardware in future scenarios to provide an integrated solution. With the deployment of the LunaNet’s Lunar Augmented Navigation System, the crew will be able to maintain accurate real-time navigation knowledge with minimal physical impacts. Discussion of future testing and continued analysis is included in this paper. These forward plans and long-term architecture systems will enable a powerful navigation approach for orbiting and surface users, enabling a high level of scientific return and crew safety.

Evan Anzalone↗

NASA NTRS2005

Next Generation Launch Technology Program Lessons Learned

In November 2002, NASA revised its Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) to evolve the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) to serve as a theme for two emerging programs. The first of these, the Orbital Space Plane (OSP), was intended to provide crew-escape and crew-transfer functions for the ISS. The second, the NGLT Program, developed technologies needed for safe, routine space access for scientific exploration, commerce, and national defense. The NGLT Program was comprised of 12 projects, ranging from fundamental high-temperature materials research to full-scale engine system developments (turbine and rocket) to scramjet flight test. The Program included technology advancement activities with a broad range of objectives, ultimate applications/timeframes, and technology maturity levels. An over-arching Systems Engineering and Analysis (SE&A) approach was employed to focus technology advancements according to a common set of requirements. Investments were categorized into three segments of technology maturation: propulsion technologies, launch systems technologies, and SE&A.

Cook, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2008

Preparing Cassini Uplink Operations for Extended Mission

The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn and Titan, a joint venture between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the European Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency, is conducting a four-year, prime mission exploring the Saturnian system, including its atmosphere, rings, magnetosphere, moons and icy satellites. Launched in 1997, Cassini began its prime mission in 2004. Cassini is now preparing for a new era, a two-year extended mission to revisit many of the highlights and new discoveries made during the prime mission. Because of the light time delay from Earth to Saturn, and the time needed to coordinate the complicated science and engineering activities that take place on the spacecraft, commanding on Cassini is done in approximately 40-day intervals known as sequences. The Cassini Uplink Operations team is responsible for the final development and validation of the pointing profile and instrument and spacecraft commands that are contained in a sequence. During this final analysis prior to uplink to the spacecraft, thorough and exact evaluation is necessary to ensure there are no mistakes during commanding. In order to perform this evaluation, complete and refined processes and procedures are fundamental. The Uplink Operations team is also responsible for anomaly response during sequence execution, a process in which critical decisions often are made in real-time. Recent anomalies on other spacecraft missions have highlighted two major risks in the operations process: (1) personnel turnover and the retirement of critical knowledge and (2) aging, outdated operations procedures. If other missions are a good barometer, the Cassini extended mission will be presented with a high personnel turnover of the Cassini flight team, which could lead to a loss of expertise that has been essential to the success of the prime mission. In order to prepare the Cassini Uplink Operations Team for this possibility and to continue to develop and operate safe science and engineering sequences, a review and major update of the current documentation and operations procedures was needed. This paper will address the changes made to extended mission sequence generation processes primarily due to new restrictions in spacecraft operating capability and lessons learned from prime mission. In addition, it will address the state of the prime mission operations procedures, the philosophy changes and updates that were made to those procedures in response to process improvement, and the validation of those new procedures through the training of current and new personnel. And lastly, it will address the lessons learned throughout prime mission and how the Uplink Operations team chose to incorporate those lessons into the working documentation and team knowledge. This incorporation was necessary to facilitate the success of the extended mission with potentially all new personnel at some point prior to the end of the mission.

Maxwell, Jennifer L.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Artemis Deep Space Habitation: Enabling a Sustained Human Presence on the Moon and Beyond

As NASA and its partners’ capabilities for human exploration of deep space continue to mature, so too does its roadmap toward a sustained crewed presence on the surface of the Moon and eventual human missions to Mars. The first launch of the Space Launch System and Orion crew vehicle, the contract award for the first demonstrations of a Human Landing System, and the beginning of construction on the initial elements of the lunar Gateway have marked major milestones toward NASA’s near-term exploration goals: a long-duration outpost in orbit around the Moon and the next footsteps on the lunar surface. At the same time, NASA is in the early phases of planning the capabilities that will be needed for long-term exploration. Among the common elements that will be required by long-duration stays on the lunar surface, transit to Mars, and Martian surface expeditions will be new habitats unlike any flown to date. NASA is currently working on development of both architectures for those habitats and on the technological advancements that will enable them, with an eye toward systems that will not only extend mission operations but also provide for living quarters that will keep the crew happy and healthy throughout their expeditions. Beyond the Gateway habitation needs, these capabilities will need to be defined and advanced to support the initial lunar surface missions and to prepare for human missions to the Mars system. The Surface Habitat is the current concept in consideration to serve as this initial surface habitat that will extend the crew mission durations. It will provide 30-to-60-day habitability for a crew of up to four allowing for the astronauts to explore farther and longer on each visit to the lunar surface. NASA is also currently reviewing opportunities to use current or near-term in-space habitation systems as proving grounds or precursors for keeping astronauts safe and healthy during future transits to Mars. Already, the International Space Station (ISS) is being used for implementation of next-generation life-support systems that will inform those used in exploration habitats, and the operations approach for ISS is providing lessons-learned for future science operations around or on the Moon.1U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright While a suite of habitation concepts is currently under study within NASA, the agency is also working closely with U.S. industry through the Next Space Technologies for Exploration Partnerships (NextSTEP) activity to understand their concepts for commercially provided habitation capabilities as well as close coordination with international partners to understand their desires for in-space and surface habitation. This paper will provide a status of these concepts and partnership activities as well as potential future technology and architecture development paths.

Habitat↗

NASA NTRS2005

AC/DC Power Systems with Applications for future Lunar/Mars base and Crew Exploration Vehicle

ABSTRACT The Power Systems branch at JSC faces a number of complex issues as it readies itself for the President's initiative on future space exploration beyond low earth orbit. Some of these preliminary issues - those dealing with electric power generation and distribution on board Mars-bound vehicle and that on Lunar and Martian surface may be summarized as follows: Type of prime mover - Because solar power may not be readily available on parts of the Lunar/Mars surface and also during the long duration flight to Mars, the primary source of power will most likely be nuclear power (Uranium fuel rods) with a secondary source of fuel cell (Hydrogen supply). The electric power generation source - With nuclear power being the main prime mover, the electric power generation source will most likely be an ac generator at a yet to be determined frequency. Thus, a critical issue is whether the generator should generate at constant or variable frequency. This will decide what type of generator to use - whether it is a synchronous machine, an asynchronous induction machine or a switched reluctance machine. The type of power distribution system - the distribution frequency, number of wires (3- wire, 4-wire or higher), and ac/dc hybridization. Building redundancy and fault tolerance in the generation and distribution sub-systems so that the system is safe; provides 100% availability to critical loads; continues to operate even with faulted sub-systems; and requires minimal maintenance. This report descril_es results of a summer faculty fellowship spent in the Power Systems Branch with the specific aim of investigating some of the lessons learned in electric power generation and usage from the terrestrial power systems industry, the aerospace industry as well as NASA's on-going missions so as to recommend novel surface and vehicle-based power systems architectures in support of future space exploration initiatives. A hybrid ac/dc architecture with source side and load side redundancies and including emergency generators on both ac and dc sides is proposed. The generation frequency is 400 Hz mostly because of the technology maturity at this frequency in the aerospace industry. Power will be distributed to several ac load distribution buses through solid state variable speed, constant frequency converters on the ac side. A segmented dc ring bus supplied from ac/dc converters and with the capability of connecting/disconnecting the segments will supply power to multiple de load distribution buses. The system will have the capability of reverse flow from dc to ac side in the case of an extreme emergency on the main ac generation side.

Chowdhury, Badrul H.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Spaceflight Human System Standards

NASA created a new approach for human system integration and human performance standards. NASA created two documents a standard and a reference handbook. The standard is titled NASA Space Flight Human-System Standard (SFHSS) and consists of two-volumes: Volume 1- Crew Health This volume covers standards needed to support astronaut health (medical care, nutrition, sleep, exercise, etc.) Volume 2 Human Factors, Habitability and Environmental Health This volume covers the standards for system design that will maintain astronaut performance (ie., environmental factors, design of facilities, layout of workstations, and lighting requirements). It includes classic human factors requirements. The new standards document is written in terms so that it is applicable to a broad range of present and future NASA systems. The document states that all new programs prepare system-specific requirements that will meet the general standards. For example, the new standard does not specify a design should accommodate specific percentiles of a defined population. Rather, NASA-STD-3001, Volume 2 states that all programs shall prepare program-specific requirements that define the user population and their size ranges. The design shall then accommodate the full size range of those users. The companion reference handbook, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH), was developed to capture the design consideration information from NASA-STD-3000, and adds spaceflight lessons learned, gaps in knowledge, example solutions, and suggests research to further mature specific disciplines. The HIDH serves two major purposes: HIDH is the reference document for writing human factors requirements for specific systems. HIDH contains design guidance information that helps insure that designers create systems which safely and effectively accommodate the capabilities and limitations of space flight crews.

Holubec, Keith↗

NASA NTRS2024

Lunar Site Selection

Lunar site selection is an iterative process that evolves as we learn about vehicle capabilities, objectives, and architecture use cases and functions. Selecting sites for lunar operations requires identifying locations that would enable stakeholders to address one or more of NASA’s Moon to Mars Objectives: in essence, “where we want to go,” balanced with locations where safe lunar landings can be conducted, or “where we can go.”

Jacob Elvin Bleacher↗

NASA NTRS2015

Orion Launch Abort System Performance During Exploration Flight Test 1

The Orion Launch Abort System Office is taking part in flight testing to enable certification that the system is capable of delivering the astronauts aboard the Orion Crew Module to a safe environment during both nominal and abort conditions. Orion is a NASA program, Exploration Flight Test 1 is managed and led by the Orion prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, and launched on a United Launch Alliance Delta IV Heavy rocket. Although the Launch Abort System Office has tested the critical systems to the Launch Abort System jettison event on the ground, the launch environment cannot be replicated completely on Earth. During Exploration Flight Test 1, the Launch Abort System was to verify the function of the jettison motor to separate the Launch Abort System from the crew module so it can continue on with the mission. Exploration Flight Test 1 was successfully flown on December 5, 2014 from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station's Space Launch Complex 37. This was the first flight test of the Launch Abort System preforming Orion nominal flight mission critical objectives. The abort motor and attitude control motors were inert for Exploration Flight Test 1, since the mission did not require abort capabilities. Exploration Flight Test 1 provides critical data that enable engineering to improve Orion's design and reduce risk for the astronauts it will protect as NASA continues to move forward on its human journey to Mars. The Exploration Flight Test 1 separation event occurred at six minutes and twenty seconds after liftoff. The separation of the Launch Abort System jettison occurs once Orion is safely through the most dynamic portion of the launch. This paper will present a brief overview of the objectives of the Launch Abort System during a nominal Orion flight. Secondly, the paper will present the performance of the Launch Abort System at it fulfilled those objectives. The lessons learned from Exploration Flight Test 1 and the other Flight Test Vehicles will certainly contribute to the vehicle architecture of a human-rated space launch vehicle.

McCauley, Rachel↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Human Errors and Error Mechanisms From Accident Reports Using Large Language Models

Emerging operational concepts for aviation hinge on novel paradigms for human machine interaction. Critical to their safe operation is early consideration of human error into the design process. Existing methods for consideration of human error require significant expert input, which is challenging both in early design and in novel systems for which there is little existing safety expertise. In this research, we propose a methodology for identifying human error, error producing factors, and mechanisms in early design from historical incident reports. Additionally, we hypothesize that cross-domain sharing of lessons learned can aid with early design human considerations in circumstances where data is not relevant or incomplete. This is addressed by identifying causes of human error in aviation and railway domains through applying state-of-the art natural language processing techniques to historical incident reports. Using this method, it is possible to extract extensive reports on human error from past incidents. Using the proposed approach, we identify nine human errors from railway reports and fourteen from aviation reports, with three errors common to both domains. There is at least one error producing conditions for each human error while a majority of the errors have more than one error mechanism. We also found that a majority of the human errors, error producing factors, and error mechanisms (even if they are not common between the domains) can be used to inform safe operations across domains as long as the errors are not domain specific and are interpreted and contextualized using engineering judgement.

Human Errors↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Spaceflight Food System Impacts to Nutritional Adequacy, Health, Performance, and Resources in Space Exploration

Despite high physical standards and training protocols, physiological and behavioral decrements have been documented in astronauts on both short (1-2 weeks) and long (6+ month) missions in spaceflight, including dysregulation of the immune system, cardiovascular and musculoskeletal deconditioning, ophthalmic changes, weight loss, and increased stress and fatigue. Optimizing food and nutrition intakes are key underpinnings for the proper function and performance of all physiological systems and the resulting physical and behavioral health and performance outcomes of astronauts. Much has been learned about the role of nutrition in human health on Earth over the past hundred years, from the identity and role of specific vitamins to the importance of the quantities of some nutrients to immune function. The requirements for providing adequate nutrition to astronauts seem obvious. However, providing a safe, reliable, and nutritious food system for space exploration missions remains a challenge. In fact, food is one of the greatest resource and logistical challenges, which is part of why it remains a “red” risk for Mars missions.

Grace L Douglas↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Conjunction Assessment and Deconfliction Paradigm for Co-located Satellite Constellations with On-Spacecraft “Autonomous” Flight Dynamics Control

Constellations that employ highly-automated satellite flight dynamics can operate safely from a collision avoidance (CA) perspective using current CA screening technology and communication paradigms—except when in proximity to other highly-automated constellations: there is no existing arrangement and concept of operations to allow the low-latency CA screenings, exchange of information, and assignment/acceptance of mitigation responsibility that co-location of highly-automated constellations requires. However, the serendipitous co-location of the NASA Starling mission—an autonomously-controlled technology demonstration constellation—and the SpaceX Starlink constellation has presented an opportunity (indeed, a requirement) to develop and build out a solution for safe operations of two (or more) co-located, highly-automated satellite constellations. Such a solution has been designed and constructed, including the required ground node; and it will be exercised as a dedicated, in-flight safety experiment between the two constellations from January to September 2024. Lessons learned from this experiment are expected to feed the design of the US Department of Commerce’s Tracking Control System for Space (TraCSS) space traffic coordination solution.

conjunction assessment↗

NASA NTRS2011

Local Leak Detection and Health Monitoring of Pressurized Tanks

An optical gas-detection sensor safely monitors pressurized systems (such as cryogenic tanks) and distribution systems for leaks. This sensor system is a fiber-coupled, solid optical body interferometer that allows for the miniaturized sensing element of the device to be placed in the smallest of recesses, and measures a wide range of gas species and densities (leaks). The deflection of the fringe pattern is detected and recorded to yield the time-varying gas density in the gap. This technology can be used by manufacturers or storage facilities with toxic, hazardous, or explosive gases. The approach is to monitor the change in the index of refraction associated with low-level gas leaks into a vacuum environment. The completion of this work will provide NASA with an enabling capability to detect gas system leaks in space, and to verify that pressurized systems are in a safe (i.e. non-leaking) condition during manned docking and transit operations. By recording the output of the sensor, a time-history of the leak can be constructed to indicate its severity. Project risk is mitigated by having several interferometric geometries and detection techniques available, each potentially leveraging hardware and lessons learned to enhance detectability.

Polzin, Kurt↗

NASA NTRS2012

CloudSat Anomaly Recovery and Operational Lessons Learned

In April 2011, NASA's pioneering cloud profiling radar satellite, CloudSat, experienced a battery anomaly that placed it into emergency mode and rendered it operations incapable. All initial attempts to recover the spacecraft failed as the resultant power limitations could not support even the lowest power mode. Originally part of a six-satellite constellation known as the "A-Train", CloudSat was unable to stay within its assigned control box, posing a threat to other A-Train satellites. CloudSat needed to exit the constellation, but with the tenuous power profile, conducting maneuvers was very risky. The team was able to execute a complex sequence of operations which recovered control, conducted an orbit lower maneuver, and returned the satellite to safe mode, within one 65 minute sunlit period. During the course of the anomaly recovery, the team developed several bold, innovative operational strategies. Details of the investigation into the root-cause and the multiple approaches to revive CloudSat are examined. Satellite communication and commanding during the anomaly are presented. A radical new system of "Daylight Only Operations" (DO-OP) was developed, which cycles the payload and subsystem components off in tune with earth eclipse entry and exit in order to maintain positive power and thermal profiles. The scientific methodology and operational results behind the graduated testing and ramp-up to DO-OP are analyzed. In November 2011, the CloudSat team successfully restored the vehicle to consistent operational collection of cloud radar data during sunlit portions of the orbit. Lessons learned throughout the six-month return-to-operations recovery effort are discussed and offered for application to other R&D satellites, in the context of on-orbit anomaly resolution efforts.

cloud profiling radar satellite↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS EVA 23 Lessons Learned

Roughly 44 minutes into EVA 23, ESA Astronaut Luca Parmitano reported water inside his helmet on the back of his head. The EVA ground team, Luca and his spacewalking partner Chris Cassidy were unable to identify the water’s source. As they continued to work, the amount of water in Luca’s helmet increased and eventually migrated from the back of his head onto his face. EVA 23 was terminated early and the crew safely returned to the Space Station. What started as a normal EVA day on ISS became one of the most serious mishaps in the history of Spacewalking.

Chris Hansen↗

NASA NTRS2006

NASA Exploration Launch Projects Overview: The Crew Launch Vehicle and the Cargo Launch Vehicle Systems

The U.S. Vision for Space Exploration (January 2004) serves as the foundation for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) strategic goals and objectives. As the NASA Administrator outlined during his confirmation hearing in April 2005, these include: 1) Flying the Space Shuttle as safely as possible until its retirement, not later than 2010. 2) Bringing a new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) into service as soon as possible after Shuttle retirement. 3) Developing a balanced overall program of science, exploration, and aeronautics at NASA, consistent with the redirection of the human space flight program to focus on exploration. 4) Completing the International Space Station (ISS) in a manner consistent with international partner commitments and the needs of human exploration. 5) Encouraging the pursuit of appropriate partnerships with the emerging commercial space sector. 6) Establishing a lunar return program having the maximum possible utility for later missions to Mars and other destinations. In spring 2005, the Agency commissioned a team of aerospace subject matter experts to perform the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS). The ESAS team performed in-depth evaluations of a number of space transportation architectures and provided recommendations based on their findings? The ESAS analysis focused on a human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) for astronaut transport and a heavy lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) to carry equipment, materials, and supplies for lunar missions and, later, the first human journeys to Mars. After several months of intense study utilizing safety and reliability, technical performance, budget, and schedule figures of merit in relation to design reference missions, the ESAS design options were unveiled in summer 2005. As part of NASA's systems engineering approach, these point of departure architectures have been refined through trade studies during the ongoing design phase leading to the development phase that begins in 2008. Comprehensive reviews of engineering data and business assessments by both internal and independent reviewers serve as decision gates to ensure that systems can fully meet customer and stakeholder requirements. This paper provides the current CLV and CaLV configuration designs and gives examples of the progress being made during the first year of this significant effort. Safe, reliable, cost-effective space transportation systems are a foundational piece of America s future in space and the next step in realizing the plan for revitalizing lunar capabilities on the passageway to the human exploration of Mars. While building on legacy knowledge and heritage hardware for risk reduction, NASA will apply lessons learned from developing these new launch vehicles to the growth path for future missions. The elements for mission success and continued U.S. leadership in space have been assembled over the past year. As NASA designs and develops these two new systems over the next dozen years, visible progress, such as that reported in this paper, may sustain the national will to stay the course across political administrations and weather the inevitable trials that will be experienced during this challenging endeavor.

Snoddy, Jimmy R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Operating a Crewed Spacecraft in the Age of Commercial Space Using Private/Government Partnership

Fifty years after humans completed a large-scale United States government-funded and government-engineered effort of landing humans on the moon, human spaceflight has entered a new paradigm. Private companies are now investing their own money and taking on an ever-increasing role in human spaceflight, in partnership with the U.S. government. This paper will describe the development of one of these partnerships through the lens of its mission operations team. As part of the Commercial Crew Program (CCP), NASA selected Boeing’s CST-100 Starliner as one of the next generation of crewed vehicles. Boeing opted to partner with the US Government for their Starliner operations by contracting with NASA’s Mission Control teams in the Flight Operations Directorate (FOD) at the Johnson Space Center to create its own Mission Operations (MO) flight controllers. Partnering with FOD provided benefits to both Boeing and NASA while also creating new challenges. MO brought over 60 years of crewed spaceflight experience and infrastructure to Boeing’s new program. Within certain legal constraints, MO was able to work closely and efficiently with their FOD counterparts who were performing both integration duties and, under the auspices of the CCP, insight of the contractors, in this case Boeing. Involvement of NASA as the Boeing operations agent did lead to what management deemed a ‘healthy tension’ within FOD, challenging old processes and often creating better, more robust teamwork. Successful development of the framework and boundaries of both the legal aspects and the oversight tensions has been one of the keys to developing a successful corporate/government partnership. Due to the highly automated nature of the Starliner, the MO organization was designed to be much smaller than previous NASA’s flight control teams for past programs. NASA has learned through the decades that spacecraft design and operations need to be as flexible and forgiving as possible. NASA’s Commercial Crew Program was established to sponsor corporate development of economical vehicles that could get humans to and from low Earth orbit. These companies, of course, need to meet contractual obligations in providing a safe means of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station (ISS), but also need to do so in a manner that leads to the venture resulting in a profit at the same time. Through MO’s involvement in the development of this spaceflight paradigm shift, there are ample lessons to be conveyed to future teams and programs working to develop similar missions.

Robert C. Dempsey↗