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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Feasibility Study of Millimeter Wave Radars For Safeguards Applications

Containment and surveillance are fundamental measures in nuclear safeguards. Techniques such as video surveillance and laser curtain for containment provide effective monitoring in areas where maintaining continuity of knowledge is required. These systems, however, can be susceptible to loss of monitoring capabilities under certain environmental conditions such as poor visibility (i.e. low light conditions, smoke, fog, etc.) or extended power loss past the duration that the backup power system is designed for. Brookhaven National Laboratory has been investigating the feasibility of millimeter waves (mmWave) as a new perimeter seal in which radio frequency waves in the range of 60-64 GHz are used to detect and monitor objects of interest. Signals in this frequency range are not susceptible to environmental conditions. For proof-of-concept tests, mmWave sensors from Texas Instruments (TI), specificallyIWR6843, are used in a test bed at BNL's Waste Management facility to simulate the operations at nuclear facilities. The unique design of TI mmWave sensors requires less memory and power consumption compared to counterpart systems. These devices are capable of exporting 3D point-cloud data, which is visualized graphically and compared to videos recorded at the same time to validate the performance of the mmWave sensor. A set of experiments were planned to test the feasibility of the mmWave in this application, including monitoring static containers in a storage area and detecting intrusions at the boundaries of the area. In addition, the experiments also identify potential blind spots relative to sensor position and utilize multiple operating sensors simultaneously to reduce or eliminate such blind spots. The optimal positioning of multiple sensors was determined for the experimental room configuration. In this paper, we will discuss the details of this novel perimeter sealing concept and present the test results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2025

FL‐ADS: Federated learning anomaly detection system for distributed energy resource networks

Abstract With the ongoing development of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) communication networks, the imperative for strong cybersecurity and data privacy safeguards is increasingly evident. DER networks, which rely on protocols such as Distributed Network Protocol 3 and Modbus, are susceptible to cyberattacks such as data integrity breaches and denial of service due to their inherent security vulnerabilities. This paper introduces an innovative Federated Learning (FL)‐based anomaly detection system designed to enhance the security of DER networks while preserving data privacy. Our models leverage Vertical and Horizontal Federated Learning to enable collaborative learning while preserving data privacy, exchanging only non‐sensitive information, such as model parameters, and maintaining the privacy of DER clients' raw data. The effectiveness of the models is demonstrated through its evaluation on datasets representative of real‐world DER scenarios, showcasing significant improvements in accuracy and F1‐score across all clients compared to the traditional baseline model. Additionally, this work demonstrates a consistent reduction in loss function over multiple FL rounds, further validating its efficacy and offering a robust solution that balances effective anomaly detection with stringent data privacy needs.

Purohit, Shaurya [Iowa State University Ames Iowa ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security - Advanced Delay Technologies

As a new generation of reactors is developed, reducing the cost of physical security without impacting the required system effectiveness will help to make new reactors economical. This report discusses several access delay technologies available to help improve the overall effectiveness of the physical security system. These technologies include both passive and active delay elements, as well as guidance on best practices related to security by design principles.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Evaluation of material accountancy techniques for 233 Pa from thorium nuclear fuels

Thorium is a promising alternative to uranium as nuclear fuel with advantages such as higher abundance, lower production of long-lived transuranic elements, and potentially better proliferation resistance. However, thorium presents a potential pathway for proliferation where produced 233 Pa can be diverted for the clandestine production of safeguarded 233 U. To prevent this, the ability to detect and measure 233 Pa must be assessed. This paper reviews several nuclear material accountancy techniques to determine their suitability for detecting 233 Pa extracted from irradiated thorium fuel. Hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy have been found to be the best options based on technology maturity, cost, accuracy, and acquisition time. Thorium can be used in various reactor designs such as pressurized water reactors (PWRs), Canada deuterium uranium (CANDU) reactors, and molten salt reactors (MSRs). Therefore, thorium-uranium oxide fueling was modeled for three representative reactors (PWR, CANDU, MSR), burning the fuel to 47 GWd/MTHM for PWR, 19 GWd/MTHM for CANDU, and at a steady power of 52.711 MW/MTHM for MSR. Within each model, the protactinium element in the used fuel was extracted and its isotopic content analyzed. Simulated results indicated that 233 Pa can be detected using passive gamma spectroscopy in each fuel type at all decay times (0–300 days) following separation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Improved evaluation of safeguards parameters from spent fuel measurements with the Differential Die-Away (DDA) instrument

The Differential Die-Away (DDA) technique is a highly sensitive non-destructive assay method for characterizing and detecting the presence of fissile material within an item of interest. DDA utilizes a series of pulses from a neutron generator (NG) to actively interrogate an item of interest. The die-away time of the neutron population induced by this active interrogation and the integral of the total differential die-away signal can be used to characterize items such as nuclear waste drums and spent nuclear fuel assemblies. In this work, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) conceptualized, designed, and fabricated a DDA instrument that was deployed for field test measurements at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab) in Oskarshamn, Sweden. The instrument performed multiple static measurements at fixed locations and dynamic axial scans of 15 pressurized water reactor (PWR) and 10 boiling water reactor (BWR) spent fuel assemblies, collecting both passive and active measurement data. The static assays of the assemblies measured the differential die-away signal, die-away time, and total passive neutron emission rate to create calibration curves for the evaluation of assembly multiplication, burnup, initial enrichment, effective fissile mass, and total elemental plutonium mass. Each calibration curve was optimized by minimizing the relative root mean square error (RRMSE) of assembly assay results compared to declared assembly parameters. The same quantities were also measured with the axial scans, and the resulting data were applied in two ways: (1) in the creation of calibration curves to improve evaluation of the same safeguards parameters as static assays, and (2) for comparison to simulation. In most cases, across both PWR and BWR assemblies, axial scan data improved the estimation of the above parameters, quantified by decreasing the calibration curve RRMSE. These axial scan results demonstrate the ability of the DDA instrument and analysis method to characterize spent PWR and BWR fuel as well as, or better than, a static assay of the same assembly. Furthermore, the DDA instrument’s unique ability to obtain both active and passive data in a single, axial scan of an entire spent fuel assembly represents a more efficient and accurate way of assaying spent fuel for verification purposes. These results represent a significant advancement for characterizing spent nuclear fuel compared to current technologies.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2026

Deliberate Motion Analytics Applied to CUAS Sensor Fusion

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program in the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) seeks to identify new technology solutions for safeguards and security challenges associated with domestic deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Research in the ARSS program is investigating alternative physical protection system (PPS) approaches that leverage new detection technologies. This report shows test results from a new form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is called deliberate motion analytics (DMA) when used to spatially and temporally fuse active radar and passive radio frequency (RF) detection that significantly improves detection of uncrewed aircraft systems (UASs). DMA is designed to filter out false positive alarms yet provide highly reliable intrusion detection at nuclear power plants (NPPs) and advanced small modular reactor (ASMR) perimeters. This form of AI is considered to be an enabling technology for security of the future and supports the ARSS investigation of alternative PPSs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Instrumentation Testbed (AIT) - antiNeutrino Experiment One (NEO) (Q1 FY2021)

In anticipation of the planned June 2021 design review, conceptual design, costing, and documentation efforts continued. The quarter was highlighted by the completion of three significant milestones: 1) 50% conceptual design and costing of the AIT facility, 2) bottom-up cost estimates for NEO, and 3) parametric NEO performance estimates (via the Big Trade Study). Because cost estimates exceed available funding levels, the project team started (late Dec 2020) a value engineering/pivot exercise to align costs with available funds. This exercise is anticipated to consume the project team for most of Q2. The end-result expectation (of the exercise) is a programmatically feasible and scientifically relevant AIT-NEO conceptual design that is aligned with available funds.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

DRiFT - Release 2.1.0: Organic Scintillators and Gas Detectors

DRiFT (a Detector Response Function Toolkit) is LANL-developed software that post-processes output from the extensively validated radiation transport code, MCNP, and generates realistic nuclear instrumentation response. DRiFT is designed to be flexible, enabling users to specify detector type and many experimental settings, as well as accommodating the addition of their own desired features. The focus of this release is on organic scintillator, gas detector, and associated capabilities, while semiconductor features are still under development. Organic scintillators are widely used in the areas of nuclear safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. DRiFT has several diagnostic and detector physics features relevant to detailed scintillator simulations including: tracking source particle information, scintillation light production, the effects of PMT quantum efficiency and gain, and digitizer settings. Users can select responses from many scintillator and PMT types supported natively by DRiFT, or add their own by following the instructions in this document. DRiFT also has several diagnostic and detector physics features relevant to neutron gas detector simulations including: gas detector wall effects, inactive areas at the end of detector tubes, and effects of a preamplifier. We acknowledge that DRiFT is under active development, bug reports and general questions and comments should be directed to Madison Andrews, madison@lanl.gov. This manual is divided into four parts: I) An overview of DRiFT, including how to obtain and install the executable, II) A description of the detector physics related to scintillators available, III) a description of more general DRiFT features the user may find useful, and IV) a description of the test suite and examples made available with the code release.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

The National Nuclear Security Administration

The mission of NNSA, as designated by Congress, is to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; to provide naval nuclear propulsion; and to prevent, counter, and respond to threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism worldwide.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

DRiFT - Release 1.1.1: Organic Scintillators

DRiFT (a Detector Response Function Toolkit) is LANL-developed software that postprocesses output from the extensively validated radiation transport code, MCNP, and generates realistic nuclear instrumentation response. DRiFT is designed to be flexible, enabling users to specify detector type and many experimental settings, as well as accommodating the addition of their own desired features. Although DRiFT development has included scintillator, gas, and semiconductor features, the focus of this release is on organic scintillator and associated capabilities. Organic scintillators are widely used in the areas of nuclear safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation efforts. DRiFT has several diagnostic and detector physics features relevant to detailed scintillator simulations including: tracking source particle information, scintillation light production, the effects of PMT quantum efficiency and gain, and digitizer settings. Users can select responses from many scintillator and PMT types supported natively by DRiFT, or add their own by following the instructions in this document. We acknowledge that DRiFT is under active development, bug reports and general questions and comments should be directed to Madison Andrews, madison@lanl.gov. This manual is divided into four parts: I) An overview of DRiFT, including how to obtain and install the executable, II) A description of the detector physics related to scintillators available, III) a description of more general DRiFT features the user may find useful, and IV) a description of the test suite and examples made available with the code release.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Puck and Puck/SAW Loop Seals (Final Report)

Tamper-indicating devices (TIDs), also known as seals, play a crucial role in various sectors including international nuclear safeguards, arms control, domestic security, and commercial products, by ensuring that monitored or high-value items are not accessed undetected. These devices do not block access but alert to unauthorized tampering. With adversaries' capabilities evolving, there's a pressing need for seals to advance in terms of effectiveness (e.g., better tamper indication and unique identification), and new technology can improve the efficiency of installation and verification. Passive loop seals, widely used in international nuclear safeguards to ensure that continuity of knowledge is maintained on declared items, face stringent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) requirements that surpass those met by commercial products. The metal cup seal (Figure 1, left), a staple IAEA seal, is robust but requires significant resources for post-use verification – specifically, the seal’s unique identity can only be verified at IAEA headquarters after removal from facilities. Further, the seal has been in use for decades and seal types should periodically be replaced to counter adversarial efforts for defeating seals. In 2020, the IAEA outlined about 40 requirements for a new passive loop seal, aiming for in-situ verification, minimal external tool use, unique identification (UID), and clear tamper indication. In response, research and development efforts focused on creating a new passive loop seal that meets these criteria and in 2022 the IAEA announced the completion of the Field Verifiable Passive Loop Seal (FVPS) (Figure 1, right). Concurrently to the IAEA’s efforts, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) designed, developed, and tested two seal versions – Puck and Puck/SAW, with Puck based on the IAEA’s requirements and including a novel visually-obvious tamper response, and Puck/SAW adding additional beneficial capabilities like the ability to receive a unique identifier from a standoff distance and monitoring the wire integrity. Puck/SAW was specifically designed and developed to address sealing applications in dry spent fuel storage facilities, where the number of sealed spent fuel containers results in heavy verification burden and inspector safety issues related to radiation exposure. These efforts are described in this Executive Summary.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Improved Nondestructive Isotopic Analysis with Practical Microcalorimeter Gamma Spectrometers

Advances in both instrumentation and data analysis software are now enabling the first ultra-high-resolution microcalorimeter gamma spectrometers designed for implementation in nuclear facilities and analytical laboratories. With approximately ten times better energy resolution than high-purity germanium detectors, these instruments can overcome important uncertainty limits. Microcalorimeter gamma spectroscopy is intended to provide nondestructive isotopic analysis capabilities with sufficient precision and accuracy to reduce the need for sampling, chemical separations, and mass spectrometry to meet safeguards and security goals. Key milestones were the development of the SOFIA instrument (Spectrometer Optimized for Facility Integrated Applications) and the SAPPY software (Spectral Analysis Program in PYthon). SOFIA is a compact instrument that combines advances in large multiplexed transition-edge sensor arrays with optimized cryogenic performance to overcome many practical limitations of previous systems. With a 256-pixel multiplexed detector array capable of 5,000 counts per second, measurement time can be comparable to high-purity germanium detectors. SAPPY was developed to determine isotopic ratios in data from SOFIA and other microcalorimeter instruments with an approach similar to the widely-used FRAM software. SAPPY provides a flexible framework with rigorous uncertainty analysis for both microcalorimeter and high purity germanium (HPGe) data, allowing direct comparison. Here, we present current results from the SOFIA instrument, preliminary isotopic analysis using SAPPY, and describe how the technology is being used to explore uncertainty limits of nondestructive isotopic characterization, inform safeguards models, and extract improved nuclear data including gamma-ray branching ratios.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2025

Test and Evaluation of Radiofrequency Tamper Indicating Devices for Remote Monitoring of Advanced/Small Modular Reactors

Advanced and small modular reactors (A/SMRs), due to their versatile nature, are likely to be used in remote locations to provide electrical power or other services in regions that are difficult to access or have limited transportation infrastructure. This will result in limited on-site staff, therefore driving A/SMR vendors to consider remote monitoring as a solution to support nuclear security. Maintaining Continuity of Knowledge (CoK) of nuclear material quantities and locations is vital to nuclear security, and remote monitoring of active tamper indicating devices (TIDs) has been well established as a component of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards since the early 2000s. Active TIDs, such as radiofrequency TIDs (RFTIDs), immediately alarm upon unauthorized access attempts, promoting timely detection. In contrast, passive TIDs require a surveillance regime and offer delayed detection. Active TIDs deter insiders and enable prompt detection of malicious acts. They can be used on nuclear material containers and controlled entry points like vaults and toolboxes. Therefore, the implementation of RFTIDs into security programs bolsters overall nuclear material control, and provides a visible deterrent, with primary efficacy in mitigating the insider threat and potentially allowing for Security by Design considerations. They are a strong candidate technology for maintaining nuclear security of A/SMRs but need to be evaluated for feasibility and implementation into the wider physical protection system.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Performance of 8 × 8 × 32 and 10 × 10 × 32 mm 3 CdZnTe position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid detectors for high-energy gamma ray cameras

CdZnTe (CZT) crystals with thicknesses up to 20 mm and diameters up to 75 mm have become available from Redlen Technologies, Inc. for making large-volume gamma-ray detectors. The modified growth and optimized annealing conditions allowed Redlen to minimize the dark current and improve the uniformity of CZT crystals. Two detector designs, pixelated (H3D) and position-sensitive virtual Frisch-grid (VFG), have greatly benefitted from the availability of such big crystals. Encouraging results from testing of 40×40×15 mm 3 pixelated detectors were recently reported by the University of Michigan. In this work, we evaluated the spectroscopic properties of 8×8×32 and 10×10×32 mm 3 crystals configured as position-sensitive VFG detectors. Both digitized waveforms and an analog ASIC were used to read and process the signals from the detectors and test their spectral- and spatial-resolution. The VFG design provides the flexibility to scale-up the dimensions of the detectors for the desired efficiency, while the position information allows for correcting the detectors' response non-uniformity caused by crystal defects and devices geometry, thereby reducing the instrument cost and making them more feasible for emerging applications in gamma-ray astronomy, nonproliferation, portal screening and nuclear safeguards, where large detector arrays are often required.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

DRiFT - Release 1.0.0 Organic Scintillators

DRiFT (a Detector Response Function Toolkit) is LANL-developed software that postprocesses output from the extensively validated radiation transport code, MCNP [1], and generates realistic nuclear instrumentation response. DRiFT is designed to be flexible, enabling users to specify detector type and many experimental settings, as well as accommodating the addition of their own desired features. Although DRiFT development has included scintillator [2], gas [3], and semiconductor features [4], the focus of this release is on organic scintillator and associated capabilities. Organic scintillators are widely used in the areas of nuclear safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation efforts [5, 6]. DRiFT has several diagnostic and detector physics features relevant to detailed scintillator simulations including: tracking source particle information, scintillation light production, the effects of PMT quantum efficiency and gain, and digitizer settings. Users can select responses from many scintillator and PMT types supported natively by DRiFT, or add their own by following the instructions in this document. We acknowledge that DRiFT is under active development, bug reports and general questions and comments should be directed to Madison Andrews, madison@lanl.gov. This manual is divided into four parts: I) An overview of DRiFT, including how to obtain and install the executable, II) A description of the detector physics related to scintillators available, III) a description of more general DRiFT features the user may find useful, and IV) a description of the test suite and examples made available with the code release.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2023

PRO-X Parallelization Study

The proliferation resistance optimization (PRO-X) program is actively supporting the design of nuclear systems by developing a framework to both optimize the fuel cycle infrastructure for nuclear reactor (including both advanced reactors (ARs) and research reactors (RRs)) and minimize the potential for production of weapons-usable nuclear material (Figure 1). One area of interest is in the impact a modular approach to bulk handling fuel cycle facilities could have on meeting safeguards requirements to identify future areas of growth within the proliferation resistance space. This study evaluates how changing the number of streams within a fuel cycle facility could impact a facilities ability to meet both domestic and international safeguards requirements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗