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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2022

Assessing Several Non-Traditional Data Sources for Value in Aviation Safety

The NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) project and its predecessor projects have been developing Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for commercial aviation safety for many years. These algorithms have been applied to Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA); radar track data (e.g., Threaded Track); and safety reports, including Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) and Aviation Safety Action Plan (ASAP). SWS is working with partners to get access to other data that air carriers provide, such as maintenance data, and has been assisting carriers in working with other data, such as Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) data, using manual methods. However, the project has discussed whether there are other data that are not traditionally used in aviation safety analysis that may be useful. This paper discusses four sets of data and models that are not traditionally used in aviation safety but that have shown promise for such use. In the future, we plan to incorporate such data into ML algorithms to use with data that we have used before and determine the additional benefit that is actually achieved under different contexts from the inclusion of these non-traditional data sources.

Nikunj C. Oza↗
NASA NTRS1991

The role of reliability graph models in assuring dependable operation of complex hardware/software systems

The complexity of computer systems currently being designed for critical applications in the scientific, commercial, and military arenas requires the development of new techniques for utilizing models of system behavior in order to assure 'ultra-dependability'. The complexity of these systems, such as Space Station Freedom and the Air Traffic Control System, stems from their highly integrated designs containing both hardware and software as critical components. Reliability graph models, such as fault trees and digraphs, are used frequently to model hardware systems. Their applicability for software systems has also been demonstrated for software safety analysis and the analysis of software fault tolerance. This paper discusses further uses of graph models in the design and implementation of fault management systems for safety critical applications.

Patterson-Hine, F. A.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Survey of Methods for Assessing Safety Compliance of sUAS BVLOS Operations

To ensure the safety of small Unmanned Aircraft System (sUAS) Beyond Line of Sight (BVLOS) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS), the FAA offers a guideline on how sUAS operators can demonstrate compliance with FAA rules, including regulations, advisory circulars, policy statements, and acceptable means of compliance (AMOC), using a formal and top-down approach. According to FAA Advisory Circular 23.2010-1, the AMOC refers to “one method, but not the only method, to show compliance with a regulatory requirement.” It is common for regulations to include a performance and safety standard rather than a detailed design or operation requirement, which allows for flexibility in fulfilling the regulatory requirements while still achieving a predetermined level of safety. This technical report explores existing frameworks for sUAS BVLOS safety analysis. It begins by discussing how sUAS BVLOS operations can be strategically deconflicted and then discusses their hazards. The next step is to establish safety assessment methods commonly used by the aviation industry and the FAA, illustrate how these methods can be applied to several safety-critical air traffic systems, and list collision models that the FAA and industry use. This investigation documents the processes for assessing safety risks in sUAS BVLOS operations and will allow sUAS BVLOS operations to be assessed for safety compliance more efficiently.

sUAS BVLOS Operations↗
NASA NTRS2015

NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 2: System Safety Concepts, Guidelines, and Implementation Examples

This is the second of two volumes that collectively comprise the NASA System Safety Handbook. Volume 1 (NASASP-210-580) was prepared for the purpose of presenting the overall framework for System Safety and for providing the general concepts needed to implement the framework. Volume 2 provides guidance for implementing these concepts as an integral part of systems engineering and risk management. This guidance addresses the following functional areas: 1.The development of objectives that collectively define adequate safety for a system, and the safety requirements derived from these objectives that are levied on the system. 2.The conduct of system safety activities, performed to meet the safety requirements, with specific emphasis on the conduct of integrated safety analysis (ISA) as a fundamental means by which systems engineering and risk management decisions are risk-informed. 3.The development of a risk-informed safety case (RISC) at major milestone reviews to argue that the systems safety objectives are satisfied (and therefore that the system is adequately safe). 4.The evaluation of the RISC (including supporting evidence) using a defined set of evaluation criteria, to assess the veracity of the claims made therein in order to support risk acceptance decisions.

Safety Case↗
NASA NTRS2021

Advanced Air Mobility and Safety Management Systems

Our current air transportation system has underserved markets, including local, regional, intraregional, and urban transportation of both people and cargo. Recent advances in aviation technology such as small highly-automated vehicles, electric aircraft, and automated air traffic are enabling business opportunities in these markets. Advanced Air Mobility, or AAM, refers to a community effort to overcome the gaps in operational rules, safety analysis, and overall acceptance, so that these new operations will be possible. For full details, please see: https://www.nasa.gov/aam As we think about how we can safely introduce these new operations, fundamental questions about how the structure of Safety Management Systems can be applied to AAM, and how that structure can be used to help us overcome the necessary technical and societal obstacles arise. Two of these questions are: • How do we tailor the requirements and desired level of monitoring and assessment to achieve safety given the breadth of possible operations and the associated risk of those operations? • How do we aid innovation by rapidly evaluating the safety of novel operations without losing associated rigor? We assume that a Safety Management System that enables these future systems will incorporate knowledge of the acceptable level of risk, and will utilize data science to automate the core monitor, assess and mitigate functions that will allow us to respond to risks and hazards in time to prevent safety incidents. In 2018, the National Academies proposed an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) that would advance these goals. (https://www.nap.edu/catalog/24962/in-time-aviation-safety-management-challenges-and-research-for-an) The National Academies made a clear distinction between in-time systems, in which hazards could be identified and risks mitigated in time to prevent incidents, and real-time systems, since many hazards and risks do not need real-time data and analysis to detect and mitigate.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Assessment of a Machine Learning-Based Aircraft Emergency Braking System: A Case Study

Machine Learning (ML) is revolutionizing many technological fields, but its use in aviation remains restricted due to stringent certification requirements. Efforts by the aviation community to establish standards for certifying ML-based systems are progressing, yet challenges persist, particularly with safety assessment methods for ML-based systems. This research addresses these challenges through a case study of an autonomous emergency braking system utilizing a computer vision deep neural network (DNN). We demonstrate a safety assessment process tailored to ML-specific concerns, such as low integrity and performance variability in quantitative safety analysis. This study can serve as an illustrative example to facilitate the discussion and convergence on certification aspects for ML-based systems within the aviation community.

Safety certification↗
NASA NTRS2019

Hazards Analysis and Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) of Four Concept Vehicle Propulsion Systems

The primary objective of this research effort is to identify failure modes and hazards associated with the concept vehicles and to perform functional hazard analyses (FHA) and failure modes and effects criticality analyses (FMECA) for each. Boeing also created a Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for each of the concept vehicles, as the FTA contains the connectivity between systems and is an accepted, top-down method to analyze the safety of an air-vehicle. Conceptual design of notional powertrain configuration for each of four (4) NASA RVLT (Revolutionary Vertical Lift Technology) Concept Vehicles were developed in as much detail as was necessary to support the reliability and safety analysis for this project. Functional block diagrams from each of the conceptual powertrain configurations were created and used to order the FHA, FMECA, and FTA. Hazards were identified and the severity of each were categorized in the FHA for use in a follow-up FMECA. The FTA took inputs from the FMECA and the functional block diagrams to develop the connectivity and develop a quantitative architecture that could be used to perform sensitivity studies, as related to vehicle safety.Guidelines for reliability targets for both the air vehicle and the operation in the UAM (Urban Air Mobility) mission are discussed. An industry literature search was performed in order to assess gaps in existing government regulations and industry specifications. The industry literature search led to air-vehicle and operational reliability discussions, as related to Distributed Electric/Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (DE/HEP) system operating in the UAM role. A discussion of results and recommendations for future work is also provided.

Hazards Analysis↗
DOE OSTI2024

Verification and Demonstration of One-Dimensional Freezing Model in SAM for Salt-Cooled Reactor Analysis Applications

This work presented the development and implementation of the one-dimensional freezing model in system analysis code, SAM, as well as code verification, and code demonstration during a postulated overcooling transient, for fluoride salt-cooled high-temperature reactor (FHR) system and safety analysis applications. The paper at first summarized the freezing model, finite element numerical method, and special numerical treatment for handling phase appearance/disappearance. Analytical solutions were derived for two cases (with and without solid walls) for code verifications purpose. As expected, numerical results predicted by the SAM code agreed very well with the analytical solution. A code demonstration was then performed on a postulated protected overcooling event transient of a generic reference PB-FHR design. The code was found to successfully predict salt freezing during such a postulated event. However, due to lack of salt freezing testing data, code validation has not been performed in this work, which will be pursued in later studies when such data becomes available.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Microgreens Food Safety Evaluation

Microgreens have been recently identified as a new type of pick and eat salad crop that can be utilized in space crop production systems. The majority of traditionally grown leafy green crops can be grown as microgreens, in addition to crops such as legumes (e.g. pea shoots), sunflower, buckwheat, most herbs, and corn, presenting hundreds of microgreen crop options. With a wide variety of flavors, exceptional nutritional density, short growth cycles (7-14 days), and unmatched volume optimization potential, microgreens present as an interesting option for sustainable production of nutritious and flavorful crops in space. The food safety aspects of microgreens have been investigated by USDA in recent years, however, an assessment for crew consumption purposes has not yet been conducted to capture the variety of microgreen cultivar types grown in spaceflight relevant environmental conditions and hardware that could be a part of the astronaut diet. Seed sanitation methods will be developed for each microgreen cultivar to sanitize the seed coat and ensure viable germination and plant growth. Food safety analysis will be performed on 24 different fast-growing cultivars of microgreens by performing aerobic plate counts (APC), fungal counts, and select pathogen screening of edible plant tissue before and after treatment with ProSan sanitizing produce wash. Additional avenues of investigation into microgreens food safety will be undertaken to understand impacts of plant height at time of harvest (able to be manipulated by light spectrum), seed density at time of planting, and role of blue light in food safety metrics of microgreens (n=6-12 microgreen cultivars tested, depending on variable). These findings will be included in the Space Crop Production Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan. This new work is currently postponed due to Covid-19.

M E Hummerick↗
DOE OSTI2024

Status of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Software Development and Application (FY2024)

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over fifty years. It has been identified as a critical element of safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy and is utilized within industry to perform the transient safety analyses required to support the licensing of Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactors (LMFRs). This report summarizes the code development and update activities carried out during FY2024. In FY2024, programmatic activities focused on key improvements to software useability, such as enhanced user interfaces for reactivity feedback modeling, improvements in stability/useability of the Code Manual, and improvements to the acceptance testing infrastructure, including automation of acceptance testing and generation of the Acceptance Testing Report. To support end user applications, an open training was held, a semi-public forum was maintained, and a practical benchmarking and validation matrix was developed which allowed limitations of existing testing capabilities to be assessed. The existing fuel models were also enhanced with improved modeling capabilities and testing for the oxide and annular fuel models.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Monolithic Heat Pipe Microreactor Reference Plant Model

This work introduces a reference plant model for a generic monolithic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor. The model will serve as a springboard to develop future evaluation models in the licensing process of similar microreactor designs at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This model has been developed with the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle and its specifications are based on open literature publications for the eVinci TM design. BlueCRAB is the U.S. Nu- clear Regulatory Commission non-light-water reactor analysis system based on the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment framework, which can couple the Griffin, BISON, and Sockeye applications to resolve the various physics that are essential for the safety analysis of this type of reactor system. The core specifications includes tristructural isotropic fuel, graphite monolith, graphite reflectors, and drums composed of graphite and B 4 C. No moderator or burnable poison pins are used in the design. The fuel enrichment is reduced to control excess reactivity in the core. This core design is not optimized and only serves for testing purposes, since the primary objective of this work is to exercise the multiphysics coupling for this type of reactor system. A three dimensional (3D) core heterogeneous Griffin discrete ordinates (SN) transport model allows the precise calculation of the flux distribution and pin powers. Griffin transfers the power density distribution and obtains a temperature distribution to and from BISON. The BISON model com- putes the 3D core temperature distribution and is coupled to 876 Sockeye subapplications running a heat pipe model. This 3D conduction model is coupled to the various heat pipes via heat flux boundary conditions. The model includes a small gap between the heat pipe and the monolith. Convective heat transfer boundaries with either ambient temperature or condenser temperature as heat sinks are imposed at the model boundaries. The 2D Sockeye heat pipe model uses a vapor- only methodology, which provides the needed resolution for transient calculations and allows the determination of various heat pipe limits. This approach is superior to the superconductor model traditionally used in steady-state calculations. BlueCRAB computes steady-state power and temperature distributions that serve as the initial condition for a loss-of-heat-sink transient simulation. The steady-state results show significant peaking due to the position of the control drum, but this is a characteristic of the particular design used, which is not optimized at this stage. The transient results show the reactor power slowly stabilizing towards a 3% power level after the partial loss of secondary heat removal. Several recriticalities are observed due to cooling through the secondary system but the reactor is self-stabilizing and behaves as expected.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The Monolithic Heat Pipe Microreactor Reference Plant Model Updates

This work presents the latest improvements to, and investigations performed with, the generic monolithic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor reference plant model for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This model serves as the foundation for the future detailed design evaluation models based on license applications. This model has been developed with the Comprehensive Reactor Analysis Bundle (BlueCRAB) and its specifications are based on open literature publications for the eVinci™ design . BlueCRAB is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission non-light-water reactor analysis system based on MOOSE, the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment framework, which can couple the Griffin, BISON, and Sockeye applications to resolve the various physics that are essential for the safety analysis of this type of reactor system. The core specifications include tristructural isotropic fuel, graphite monolith, graphite reflectors, and drums composed of graphite and B 4 C.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

SCALE 6.3.3 User Manual

SCALE is a comprehensive modeling and simulation suite for nuclear safety analysis and design developed and maintained by Oak Ridge National Laboratory under contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. Department of Energy, and the National Nuclear Security Administration to perform reactor physics, criticality safety, radiation shielding, and spent fuel characterization for nuclear facilities and transportation/storage package designs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Development and Implementation of a New AI-Based Tool to Support Fast Reactor Software Model Generation and Validation

This report summarizes FY26 work to develop Maggie, an artificial intelligence-based assistant designed to support software model generation and validation activities for fast reactor analysis codes. The project established a modular, code-agnostic software architecture that separates reusable agent capabilities from code-specific knowledge and tools, with initial implementation focused on the FRP-supported fast reactor safety analysis code SAS4A/SASSYS1 (SAS). A curated SAS-specific knowledge base was assembled from the code manual, training materials, historical analysis reports, and representative input files, and was integrated through retrieval-augmented generation to ground Maggie’s responses in authoritative sources. Maggie was deployed on the internal Argonne network, where it demonstrated practical user-facing capability as a chatbot for answering natural language questions about SAS and retrieving relevant technical information. Demonstration cases also showed that Maggie can generate useful snippets of SAS input for selected modeling tasks, while highlighting current limitations in reliability and consistency for more complex input generation tasks. Overall, the FY26 effort established the technical foundation for an AI-assisted capability intended to improve the efficiency, consistency, and accessibility of fast reactor software model development at Argonne and, with further improvements, to support eventual use by the broader fast reactor community, including industry users of FRP-supported analysis tools.

Thomas, Rachel [Argonne National Laboratory (ANL),↗
NASA NTRS1972

Study of solid rocket motor for space shuttle booster, volume 2, book 2

A technical analysis of the solid propellant rocket engines for use with the space shuttle is presented. The subjects discussed are: (1) solid rocket motor stage recovery, (2) environmental effects, (3) man rating of the solid propellant rocket engines, (4) system safety analysis, (5) ground support equipment, and (6) transportation, assembly, and checkout.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2013

Evolution of International Space Station Program Safety Review Processes and Tools

The International Space Station Program at NASA is constantly seeking to improve the processes and systems that support safe space operations. To that end, the ISS Program decided to upgrade their Safety and Hazard data systems with 3 goals: make safety and hazard data more accessible; better support the interconnection of different types of safety data; and increase the efficiency (and compliance) of safety-related processes. These goals are accomplished by moving data into a web-based structured data system that includes strong process support and supports integration with other information systems. Along with the data systems, ISS is evolving its submission requirements and safety process requirements to support the improved model. In contrast to existing operations (where paper processes and electronic file repositories are used for safety data management) the web-based solution provides the program with dramatically faster access to records, the ability to search for and reference specific data within records, reduced workload for hazard updates and approval, and process support including digital signatures and controlled record workflow. In addition, integration with other key data systems provides assistance with assessments of flight readiness, more efficient review and approval of operational controls and better tracking of international safety certifications. This approach will also provide new opportunities to streamline the sharing of data with ISS international partners while maintaining compliance with applicable laws and respecting restrictions on proprietary data. One goal of this paper is to outline the approach taken by the ISS Progrm to determine requirements for the new system and to devise a practical and efficient implementation strategy. From conception through implementation, ISS and NASA partners utilized a user-centered software development approach focused on user research and iterative design methods. The user-centered approach used on the new ISS hazard system utilized focused user research and iterative design methods employed by the Human Computer Interaction Group at NASA Ames Research Center. Particularly, the approach emphasized the reduction of workload associated with document and data management activities so more resources can be allocated to the operational use of data in problem solving, safety analysis, and recurrence control. The methods and techniques used to understand existing processes and systems, to recognize opportunities for improvement, and to design and review improvements are described with the intent that similar techniques can be employed elsewhere in safety operations. A second goal of this paper is to provide and overview of the web-based data system implemented by ISS. The software selected for the ISS hazard systemMission Assurance System (MAS)is a NASA-customized vairant of the open source software project Bugzilla. The origin and history of MAS as a NASA software project and the rationale for (and advantages of) using open-source software are documented elsewhere (Green, et al., 2009).

Ratterman, Christian D.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Fuel Performance Evaluation of THOR-C Experiments

The Temperature Heatsink Overpower Response Commissioning (THOR-C) and THOR-Metal (THOR-M) experiments will be performed as part of an ongoing project for testing sodium fast reactor fuels with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA). The THOR-C experiments consist of fresh metallic fuel pins and have been analyzed using the ABAQUS, Ansys codes and the BISON fuel performance code. THOR-M-Loss of Flow-1 (THOR-M-LOF-1) is designed to test an EBR-II irradiated fuel pin under LOF conditions. Simulation of the THOR-MLOF-1 experiment required first simulating the base irradiation of the fuel pin in EBR-II. MFUEL module of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 [1] is a physics-based metallic fuel performance model applicable to the normal operation, transient scenarios and fuel failure modeling including scenarios with bulk fuel melting. The model has been validated using EBR-II normal operation, separate effect transient tests as well as TREAT M-Series transient tests [2]. In this study, MFUEL models has been utilized together with a new capsule heat transfer model developed in this project. The new heat transfer model was necessary due to (1) significant amount of heat losses that required 2D heat transfer, (2) the presence of a titanium heat sink, rejecting a significant amount of heat, and (3) stagnant coolant conditions, which are inconsistent with SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (SAS) heat transfer model. Updates to SAS4A/SASSYS-1 and MFUEL has been described below, followed by a preliminary validation effort using the results from THOR-C-2 fresh fuel capsule experiment. A previous study for THOR-C-2 analysis using BISON code is also utilized in this study to model this test [3]. [1] D. O’Grady, A. J. Brunett, L. Ibarra, A. Karahan, T. Kim, T. S. Sumner, R. Thomas, T. H. Fanning, “The SAS4A/SASSYS-2 Version 5.7 Safety Analysis Code System,” Argonne National Laboratory,ANL/NSE-SAS/5.7, (2023). [2] A. Karahan, T. Kim, T. Fanning, D. O’Grady, “Validation of MFUEL Metal Fuel Performance Models of SAS4A/SASSYS-1,” Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/NSE-23/11, (2023). [3] M. Mihelish, A. Zabriskie, K. Paaren, P. Medvedev, C. Jensen, “Fuel Performance Predictions for the TREAT THOR-C Experiments,” Idaho National Laboratory, INL/RPT-23-73397, Revision 0, (2023)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2003

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report. Volume Two

Volume II of the Report contains appendices that were cited in Volume I. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board produced many of these appendices as working papers during the investigation into the February 1, 2003 destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia. Other appendices were produced by other organizations (mainly NASA) in support of the Board investigation. In the case of documents that have been published by others, they are included here in the interest of establishing a complete record, but often at less than full page size. Contents include: CAIB Technical Documents Cited in the Report: Reader's Guide to Volume II; Appendix D. a Supplement to the Report; Appendix D.b Corrections to Volume I of the Report; Appendix D.1 STS-107 Training Investigation; Appendix D.2 Payload Operations Checklist 3; Appendix D.3 Fault Tree Closure Summary; Appendix D.4 Fault Tree Elements - Not Closed; Appendix D.5 Space Weather Conditions; Appendix D.6 Payload and Payload Integration; Appendix D.7 Working Scenario; Appendix D.8 Debris Transport Analysis; Appendix D.9 Data Review and Timeline Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.10 Debris Recovery; Appendix D.11 STS-107 Columbia Reconstruction Report; Appendix D.12 Impact Modeling; Appendix D.13 STS-107 In-Flight Options Assessment; Appendix D.14 Orbiter Major Modification (OMM) Review; Appendix D.15 Maintenance, Material, and Management Inputs; Appendix D.16 Public Safety Analysis; Appendix D.17 MER Manager's Tiger Team Checklist; Appendix D.18 Past Reports Review; Appendix D.19 Qualification and Interpretation of Sensor Data from STS-107; Appendix D.20 Bolt Catcher Debris Analysis.

CAIB (COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD)↗