SSD1351 OLED Display Driver Single Event Effects Test Report
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Single-event upset is investigated for optocouplers.
The purpose of this document is to define the radiation environment for the evaluation of degradation due to total ionizing and non-ionizing dose and of single event effects (SEES) for the Laser Interferometry Space Antenna (LISA) instruments and spacecraft. The analysis took into account the radiation exposure for the nominal five-year mission at 20 degrees behind Earth's orbit of the sun, at 1 AU (astronomical unit) and assumes a launch date in 2014. The transfer trajectory out to final orbit has not yet been defined, therefore, this evaluation does not include the impact of passing through the Van Allen belts. Generally, transfer trajectories do not contribute significantly to degradation effects; however, single event effects and deep dielectric charging effects must be taken into consideration especially if critical maneuvers are planned during the van Allen belt passes.
An integrated system mitigates the effects of a single event upset (SEU) on a reprogrammable field programmable gate array (RFPGA). The system includes (i) a RFPGA having an internal configuration memory, and (ii) a memory for storing a configuration associated with the RFPGA. Logic circuitry programmed into the RFPGA and coupled to the memory reloads a portion of the configuration from the memory into the RFPGA's internal configuration memory at predetermined times. Additional SEU mitigation can be provided by logic circuitry on the RFPGA that monitors and maintains synchronized operation of the RFPGA's digital clock managers.
Space radiation in space systems present unique failure modes and considerations for reliability engineers. Radiation effects is not a one size fits all field. Threat conditions that must be addressed for a given mission depend on the mission orbital profile, the technologies of parts used in critical functions and on application considerations, such as supply voltages, temperature, duty cycle, and redundancy. In general, the threats that must be addressed are of two types-the cumulative degradation mechanisms of total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage (DD). and the prompt responses of components to ionizing particles (protons and heavy ions) falling under the heading of single-event effects. Generally degradation mechanisms behave like wear-out mechanisms on any active components in a system: Total Ionizing Dose (TID) and Displacement Damage: (1) TID affects all active devices over time. Devices can fail either because of parametric shifts that prevent the device from fulfilling its application or due to device failures where the device stops functioning altogether. Since this failure mode varies from part to part and lot to lot, lot qualification testing with sufficient statistics is vital. Displacement damage failures are caused by the displacement of semiconductor atoms from their lattice positions. As with TID, failures can be either parametric or catastrophic, although parametric degradation is more common for displacement damage. Lot testing is critical not just to assure proper device fi.mctionality throughout the mission. It can also suggest remediation strategies when a device fails. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. (2) On the NEAR mission a functional failure was traced to a PIN diode failure caused by TID induced high leakage currents. NEAR was able to recover from the failure by reversing the current of a nearby Thermal Electric Cooler (turning the TEC into a heater). The elevated temperature caused the PIN diode to anneal and the device to recover. It was by lot qualification testing that NEAR knew the diode would recover when annealed. This paper will look at these effects on a variety of devices in a variety of applications. Single Event Effects (SEE): (1) In contrast to TID and displacement damage, Single Event Effects (SEE) resemble random failures. SEE modes can range from changes in device logic (single-event upset, or SEU). temporary disturbances (single-event transient) to catastrophic effects such as the destructive SEE modes, single-event latchup (SEL). single-event gate rupture (SEGR) and single-event burnout (SEB) (2) The consequences of nondestructive SEE modes such as SEU and SET depend critically on their application--and may range from trivial nuisance errors to catastrophic loss of mission. It is critical not just to ensure that potentially susceptible devices are well characterized for their susceptibility, but also to work with design engineers to understand the implications of each error mode. -For destructive SEE, the predominant risk mitigation strategy is to avoid susceptible parts, or if that is not possible. to avoid conditions under which the part may be susceptible. Destructive SEE mechanisms are often not well understood, and testing is slow and expensive, making rate prediction very challenging. (3) Because the consequences of radiation failure and degradation modes depend so critically on the application as well as the component technology, it is essential that radiation, component. design and system engineers work togetherpreferably starting early in the program to ensure critical applications are addressed in time to optimize the probability of mission success.
This presentation discusses the effects of ionizing radiation on single event transients (SETs) in circuits. The exposure of integrated circuits to ionizing radiation changes electrical parameters. The total ionizing dose effect is observed in both complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) and bipolar circuits. In bipolar circuits, transistors exhibit grain degradation, while in CMOS circuits, transistors exhibit threshold voltage shifts. Changes in electrical parameters can cause changes in single event upset(SEU)/SET rates. Depending on the effect, the rates may increase or decrease. Therefore, measures taken for SEU/SET mitigation might work at the beginning of a mission but not at the end following TID exposure. The effect of TID on SET rates should be considered if SETs cannot be tolerated.
Heavy ion single-event measurements on a variety of high density commercial NAND flash memories are reported. Three single event effect (SEE) phenomena are examined: single effect upsets (SEUs), single event functional interrupts (SEFIs), and catastrophic loss of ability to erase and program the device. Also, radiation results of multilevel flash technology are compared with results from single-level flash technology. These commercial high density memories appear to be much less susceptible to SEE and have better TID response compared to older generations of flash memories. The single-level devices are less sensitive to SEUs than multi-level devices. The charge pump in this study survived up to 600 krads. A new high current phenomenon in high density NAND flash memories is also discussed.
Abstract-Two types of single event effects - bit errors and single event functional interrupts - were observed during heavy-ion testing of the AD8151 crosspoint switch. Bit errors occurred in bursts with the average number of bits in a burst being dependent on both the ion LET and on the data rate. A pulsed laser was used to identify the locations on the chip where the bit errors and single event functional interrupts occurred. Bit errors originated in the switches, drivers, and output buffers. Single event functional interrupts occurred when the laser was focused on the second rank latch containing the data specifying the state of each switch in the 33x17 matrix.
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Heavy ion irradiation of a display driver integrated circuit (DDIC) was performed, and persistent visual error signatures were captured. Based on the heavy ion results, error signatures were localized to configuration registers motivate potential mitigation techniques and observations relating to single event effect susceptibility. DDICs serve as an integral component of integrated display systems that will require the development of single event effects test methodologies in anticipation of extensive use in crewed spacecrafts outside of the Earth’s geomagnetic protection.
Heavy-ion radiation can result in silicon carbide power device degradation and/or catastrophic failure. Test procedures and data interpretation must consider the impact that heavy-ion induced off-state leakage current increases will have on subsequent single-event effect susceptibility and testability. On orbit, reliable performance in the presence of increased off-state leakage currents due to cumulative ion-induced non-catastrophic single-event effects must be assured over the mission lifetime. This work presents a large body of heavy-ion test data for different diode, power MOSFET, and JFET devices. Susceptibility to single-event effects is compared between SiC and Si power devices. Initial recommendations on heavy-ion radiation test methods for silicon carbide power devices are made and radiation hardness assurance is discussed with the goal of moving one step closer to reliably getting this technology off the ground into a broad array of spacecraft and instruments that will benefit from its unique capabilities.
Two areas of radiation hardened microcircuit infrastructure will be discussed: 1) The availability and performance of radiation hardened microcircuits, and, and 2) The access to radiation test facilities primarily for proton single event effects (SEE) testing. Other areas not discussed, but are a concern include: The challenge for maintaining radiation effects tool access for assurance purposes, and, the access to radiation test facilities primarily for heavy ion single event effects (SEE) testing. Status and implications will be discussed for each area.