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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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NASA NTRS2020

Cyclomatic Complexity and Basis Path Testing Study

The NASA Chief Engineer requested the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) to conduct a study to determine the benefits of cyclomatic complexity and basis path testing (BPT) for software and whether they should be required. The principal focus of the assessment was to assess the use of cyclomatic complexity and BPT on safety-critical software. The purpose was to ensure that safety-critical software is not overly complicated to the point of increasing coding errors and that verification is more robust than for non-safety-critical software. This document contains the outcome of the assessment.

Cyclomatic Complexity; NASA Engineering and Safety↗
NASA NTRS2002

Interactive Software Fault Analysis Tool for Operational Anomaly Resolution

Resolving software operational anomalies frequently requires a significant amount of resources for software troubleshooting activities. The time required to identify a root cause of the anomaly in the software may lead to significant timeline impacts and in some cases, may extend to compromise of mission and safety objectives. An integrated tool that supports software fault analysis based on the observed operational effects of an anomaly could significantly reduce the time required to resolve operational anomalies; increase confidence for the proposed solution; identify software paths to be re-verified during regression testing; and, as a secondary product of the analysis, identify safety critical software paths.

Chen, Ken↗
NASA NTRS1987

Security for safety critical space borne systems

The Space Station contains safety critical computer software components in systems that can affect life and vital property. These components require a multilevel secure system that provides dynamic access control of the data and processes involved. A study is under way to define requirements for a security model providing access control through level B3 of the Orange Book. The model will be prototyped at NASA-Johnson Space Center.

Legrand, Sue↗
NASA NTRS1991

Statistical modelling of software reliability

During the six-month period from 1 April 1991 to 30 September 1991 the following research papers in statistical modeling of software reliability appeared: (1) A Nonparametric Software Reliability Growth Model; (2) On the Use and the Performance of Software Reliability Growth Models; (3) Research and Development Issues in Software Reliability Engineering; (4) Special Issues on Software; and (5) Software Reliability and Safety.

Miller, Douglas R.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Building the Core Architecture of a Multiagent System Product Line: With an example from a future NASA Mission

The field of Software Product Lines (SPL) emphasizes building a core architecture for a family of software products from which concrete products can be derived rapidly. This helps to reduce time-to-market, costs, etc., and can result in improved software quality and safety. Current AOSE methodologies are concerned with developing a single Multiagent System. We propose an initial approach to developing the core architecture of a Multiagent Systems Product Line (MAS-PL), exemplifying our approach with reference to a concept NASA mission based on multiagent technology.

Pena, Joaquin↗
NASA NTRS2007

Robust, Flexible Motion Control for the Mars Explorer Rovers

The Mobility Flight Software, running on computers aboard the Mars Explorer Rover (MER) robotic vehicles Spirit and Opportunity, affords the robustness and flexibility of control to enable safe and effective operation of these vehicles in traversing natural terrain. It can make the vehicles perform specific maneuvers commanded from Earth, and/or can autonomously administer multiple aspects of mobility, including choice of motion, measurement of actual motion, and even selection of targets to be approached. Motion of a vehicle can be commanded by use of multiple layers of control, ranging from motor control at a low level, direct drive operations (e.g., motion along a circular arc, motion along a straight line, or turn in place) at an intermediate level to goal-position driving (that is, driving to a specified location) at a high level. The software can also perform high-level assessment of terrain and selection of safe paths across the terrain: this involves processing of the digital equivalent of a local traversability map generated from images acquired by stereoscopic pairs of cameras aboard the vehicles. Other functions of the software include interacting with the rest of the MER flight software and performing safety checks.

Maimone, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2009

Machine-Checkable Timed CSP

The correctness of safety-critical embedded software is crucial, whereas non-functional properties like deadlock-freedom and real-time constraints are particularly important. The real-time calculus Timed Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) is capable of expressing such properties and can therefore be used to verify embedded software. In this paper, we present our formalization of Timed CSP in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover, which we have formulated as an operational coalgebraic semantics together with bisimulation equivalences and coalgebraic invariants. Furthermore, we apply these techniques in an abstract specification with real-time constraints, which is the basis for current work in which we verify the components of a simple real-time operating system deployed on a satellite.

Goethel, Thomas↗
NASA NTRS2011

Safety and Mission Assurance: A NASA Perspective

Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) consists of the safety, reliability, maintainability, software assurance and quality disciplines, which are applied to reduce the probability of mishaps and ensure mission success. NASA uses a risk management process which requires various organizations to identify, analyze and mitigate/control risks associated with operations and decision making processes.

Higginbotham, Scott Alan↗
NASA NTRS2004

Formal Modeling and Analysis of a Preliminary Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS)Concept

New concepts for automating air traffic management functions at small non-towered airports raise serious safety issues associated with the software implementations and their underlying key algorithms. The criticality of such software systems necessitates that strong guarantees of the safety be developed for them. In this paper we present a formal method for modeling and verifying such systems using the PVS theorem proving system. The method is demonstrated on a preliminary concept of operation for the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) project at NASA Langley.

Carrreno, Victor A.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Fault Tree Analysis Application for Safety and Reliability

Many commercial software tools exist for fault tree analysis (FTA), an accepted method for mitigating risk in systems. The method embedded in the tools identifies a root as use in system components, but when software is identified as a root cause, it does not build trees into the software component. No commercial software tools have been built specifically for development and analysis of software fault trees. Research indicates that the methods of FTA could be applied to software, but the method is not practical without automated tool support. With appropriate automated tool support, software fault tree analysis (SFTA) may be a practical technique for identifying the underlying cause of software faults that may lead to critical system failures. We strive to demonstrate that existing commercial tools for FTA can be adapted for use with SFTA, and that applied to a safety-critical system, SFTA can be used to identify serious potential problems long before integrator and system testing.

Wallace, Dolores R.↗
NASA NTRS2001

A Practical Approach to Modified Condition/Decision Coverage

Testing of software intended for safety-critical applications in commercial transport aircraft must achieve modified condition/decision coverage (MC/DC) of the software structure. This requirement causes anxiety for many within the aviation software community. Results of a survey of the aviation software industry indicate that many developers believe that meeting the MC/DC requirement is difficult, and the cost is exorbitant. Some of the difficulties stem, no doubt, from the scant information available on the subject. This paper provides a practical 5-step approach for assessing MC/DC for aviation software products, and an analysis of some types of errors expected to be caught when MC/DC is achieved1.

Hayhurst, Kelly J.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Requirements management at NASA

Requirements have always been acknowledged as the backbone of any system. However, in many past development efforts, requirements were paid little heed. At NASA, in recent years, the hue and cry for project development has been "Faster, Better, Cheaper and Safer". This has impacted the way we develop software; it has increased the risks to quality, safety and reliability. At NASA, the Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is working with projects to emphasize the criticality of requirements throughout development, not just in the initial phases. This emphasis is on requirements relationship to all aspects of quality, including reliability and safety. In this presentation, we will look at some of these relationships through the eyes of quality.

Requirement management↗
NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗
NASA NTRS2007

Advanced Reference Counting Pointers for Better Performance

A computer program implements reference counting pointers (RCPs) that are lock-free, thread-safe, async-safe, and operational on a multiprocessor computer. RCPs are powerful and convenient means of managing heap memory in C++ software. Most prior RCP programs use locks to ensure thread safety and manage concurrency. The present program was developed in a continuing effort to explore ways of using the C++ programming language to develop safety-critical and mission- critical software. This effort includes exploration of lock-free algorithms because they offer potential to avoid some costly and difficult verification problems. Unlike previously published RCP software, the present program does not use locks (meaning that no thread can block progress on another thread): Instead, this program implements algorithms that exploit capabilities of central-processing- unit hardware so as to avoid locks. Once locks are eliminated, it becomes possible to realize the other attributes mentioned in the first sentence. In addition to the abovementioned attributes, this program offers several advantages over other RCP programs that use locks: It is smaller (and, hence, is faster and uses less memory), it is immune to priority inversion, and there is no way for it to cause a C++ exception.

Reinholtz, William↗
NASA NTRS2012

Certification of COTS Software in NASA Human Rated Flight Systems

Adoption of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products in safety critical systems has been seen as a promising acquisition strategy to improve mission affordability and, yet, has come with significant barriers and challenges. Attempts to integrate COTS software components into NASA human rated flight systems have been, for the most part, complicated by verification and validation (V&V) requirements necessary for flight certification per NASA s own standards. For software that is from COTS sources, and, in general from 3rd party sources, either commercial, government, modified or open source, the expectation is that it meets the same certification criteria as those used for in-house and that it does so as if it were built in-house. The latter is a critical and hidden issue. This paper examines the longstanding barriers and challenges in the use of 3rd party software in safety critical systems and cover recent efforts to use COTS software in NASA s Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) project. It identifies some core artifacts that without them, the use of COTS and 3rd party software is, for all practical purposes, a nonstarter for affordable and timely insertion into flight critical systems. The paper covers the first use in a flight critical system by NASA of COTS software that has prior FAA certification heritage, which was shown to meet the RTCA-DO-178B standard, and how this certification may, in some cases, be leveraged to allow the use of analysis in lieu of testing. Finally, the paper proposes the establishment of an open source forum for development of safety critical 3rd party software.

Goforth, Andre↗
NASA NTRS2024

Historical Aerospace Software Errors Categorized to Influence Fault Tolerance

Since the first use of computers in space and aircraft, software errors have occurred. These errors can manifest as loss-of-life or less catastrophically. As the demand for automation increases, software in mission or safety-critical systems should be designed to be tolerant to the most likely software faults. This paper categorizes a set of 55 historic aerospace software error incidents from 1962 to 2023 to determine trends of how and where automation is most likely to fail, behaving unexpectedly. A distinction between software producing unexpected (erroneous) output versus no output (failsilent) is introduced. Of the historical incidents analyzed, 85% were from software producing wrong output rather than simply stopping. Rebooting was found to be ineffective to clear erroneous behavior, and not reliable to recover from silent failures. Error origin was within the code/logic itself in 58% of cases, 16% from configurable data, 15% from unexpected sensor input, and 11% from command/operator input. A substantial forty percent (40%) of unexpected software behavior was indicated by the absence of code, arising from unanticipated situations and missing requirements, and 16% of incidents were subjectively deemed “unknown-unknowns”. No incidents were found to be the result of programming language, compiler, tool, or operating system; and only sixteen percent (16%) of all incidents were considered errors traditional computer science/programming in nature. These findings indicate that for fault tolerance, erroneous automation behavior must be a primary consideration especially at critical moments, and reboot recoverability may not be viable. Special care should be taken to validate configurable data and commands prior to use. “Test-like-you-fly”, including hardware-in-the-loop combined with robust off-nominal testing should be used to uncover missing logic arising from unanticipated situations not covered by requirements alone. This study uniquely focuses on manifestations of unexpected flight software behavior, independent of ultimate root cause. We characterize software error behavior and origin to improve software design, test, and operations for resilience to the most common manifestations, and provide a rich dataset for further study.

Aerospace↗