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At least 199 records · Page 11

NVBL (National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory) Molecular Therapeutics

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Head, Martha (Marti)↗

NVBL (National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory) Viral Fate and Transport for COVID-19

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Waters, Katrina↗

NVBL (National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory): Pandemic Monitoring and Modeling

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Bhaduri, Budhu↗

Rapid Acceleration of Diagnostics: RADx (Tech + ATP)

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Tromberg, Bruce J.↗

Computing and AI for Pandemic Response: Looking Forward

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Brase, James M.↗

NVBL (National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory) Symposium Closing Remarks

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

Kung, Harriet↗

The National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory Symposium: Harnessing the unique strengths of DOE to tackle the biotechnology challenges of COVID-19, October 28, 2020

This virtual symposium was held to highlight the impact the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Virtual Biotechnology Laboratory (NVBL) has had utilizing the unique capabilities of the DOE to tackle the science and technology challenges associated with COVID-19, and to discuss areas in which the NVBL can have impact in the future. With perspectives from Chris Fall, Director, Office of Science, DOE, and William A. Bookless, Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, the event featured Presentations from lead investigators reporting progress in: Epidemiological modeling, Therapeutics, Testing, Understanding transport of the virus, and Solving issues around supply chain challenges. In addition, keynote speakers from outside the NVBL discussed the upcoming science and technology needs in computing, testing and surveillance, and vaccines. The event was aimed at the S&T community, media, and general public.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

NREL Is Strengthening the Future of Hydropower, A Cornerstone of America's Energy System

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is a leader in advancing hydropower technologies, positioning hydropower as a pillar of an affordable, reliable, and secure energy future. Through its hydropower program, NREL is conducting innovative research that reduces energy costs, drives efficiency, and supports systems integration - unlocking economic opportunities, rebuilding supply chains, and fueling America's global competitiveness.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

American Made Infrastructure: Evolution of Federal Incentives and Requirements

Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBB) represent the latest evolution of a multi-year legislative trajectory responding to national security concerns about foreign control – and particularly FEOC control – of energy infrastructure. Beginning with Executive Order 14017 (February 2021), which initiated comprehensive federal review of critical supply chain vulnerabilities in semiconductors, battery energy storage systems, and critical minerals, policymakers have progressively expanded restrictions on foreign participation. The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2019 established precedent for component-level prohibitions on foreign information and communications technology procurement, while NDAA 2024 extended these restrictions to six major People’s Republic of China (PRC) battery manufacturers. Complementary measures such as the Build America, Buy America (BABA) Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) introduced domestic content thresholds and FEOC eligibility criteria for federal funding programs. The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 2022 further operationalized FEOC restrictions through electric vehicle tax credit requirements, creating a scalable framework for excluding foreign-controlled components. Recent executive actions and state-level policies have reinforced this trajectory, reflecting sustained alignment across federal and state governments. Collectively, these developments demonstrate a bipartisan policy approach that pairs incentives for advanced energy deployment with safeguards designed to prevent subsidizing adversaries or entities that present foreign-sourcing risk.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Opportunities and challenges for the expansion of LFP battery supply chains

Global markets for energy storage are growing rapidly, with some applications transitioning from traditional LiNi x Mn y Co 1−x−y O 2 (NMC) toward LiFePO 4 (LFP) due to cost, safety, and performance advantages. Battery growth has seeded interest in critical material supplies such as high-purity lithium precursors. In contrast, challenges in securing high-purity iron and phosphorus, historically not considered critical materials, are often overlooked. Precursors must remain inexpensive to maintain LFP's current cost advantage, which leverages the low-cost (∼$\$100$ per t) FeSO 4 byproduct from titanium dioxide manufacturing and will not be available as LFP manufacturing expands. As an alternative, iron is mined primarily for steel manufacturing, for which the existing supply chain and beneficiation process is optimized. LFP batteries require small iron volumes compared to steel (0.11%), but profit margins associated with existing low-cost iron ores and high costs (∼$27 000 per t) associated with low volume high-purity iron oxides may limit interest in manufacturing small volumes of high-purity, specialized iron battery precursors. The complementary LFP precursor, phosphoric acid (H 3 PO 4 ), is primarily utilized in fertilizers. Of the current phosphate ore demand for fertilizers, 4–22.8% would be required to meet projected 2045 LFP H 3 PO 4 demand, suggesting significant supply chain planning is needed to achieve projected demand. If only higher-grade material is considered, demand jumps to 15–77% of current world production. While lithium precursor purity requirements have been evaluated (Li 2 CO 3 is commonly defined as ≥99.5%), “battery grade” iron and phosphorus precursors remain poorly defined, with no internationally accessible and widely adopted standard, further challenging expanding industry by creating manufacturing uncertainty and increasing potential costs.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Cybersecurity concerns for the energy sector in the maritime domain

The world has seen a number of high-profile maritime disasters in recent months and years, and has felt the impact of them. At the same time, the world has also seen a number of high-profile cyberattacks. It has felt their impact, as well. And, likely no sector has been more affected by the maritime and cyber incidents than the energy sector, as fuel prices often spike or trough, and access to energy resources can become an instant source of concern, tension, or even conflict. As energy sectors—in all their forms—continue to rely on the maritime domain or even increase that reliance, they must be mindful that traditional maritime threats—like piracy, theft, and weather events—are not the only threats they face today. Maritime cybersecurity concerns are among the most potentially disruptive to energy-sector interests and, yet, are among the least understood and least addressed. This paper identifies nine areas in which the energy sector faces harmful cyber vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, to provide enough insight and examples to allow for action to be taken to reduce the risk of harm from these different vulnerabilities. The paper develops the example of offshore wind energy to model how to assess cyber considerations more fully. Ultimately, it concludes with a series of recommendations that offer policymakers, energy-sector actors, and security and law-enforcement professionals steps to minimize the exposure of the maritime energy sector to harmful cyberattacks.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Threat Hunt Guide for BESS Environments

The rapid digitalization of the electric grid - driven by the integration of inverter-based resources (IBRs), battery energy storage systems (BESS), and advanced grid control platforms - has significantly enhanced grid efficiency, visibility, and flexibility. However, this evolution also introduces new cybersecurity risks, particularly through supply chain dependencies and operational blind spots at the grid edge. To address these challenges, Idaho National Laboratory (INL), through the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) Rapid Risk initiative, conducted a series of rapid risk assessment engagements with energy organizations across the United States. Drawing on lessons learned from these engagements, INL developed the following threat hunting guide for asset owners and operators (AOOs) to enhance their cybersecurity visibility within BESS and IBR systems. The guide demonstrates how to use passive network monitoring to baseline device behavior, detect adversarial activity, and investigate anomalies without disrupting operations. By implementing these practices, energy sector stakeholders can improve coordination between cybersecurity and operations teams and strengthen the resilience of distributed energy resources (DERs) within the modern power grid. Prior to implementing any network monitoring, packet capture, or threat hunting activity described in this guide, AOOs are strongly advised to review applicable governance frameworks, legal requirements, and organizational policies. This guide is intended for informational and educational purposes only. It does not replace compliance with any federal, state, or local cybersecurity mandates or industry standards. Implementation of described configurations, technologies, or analytic workflows is performed at the discretion and responsibility of the asset owner and operator.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

Enterprise Artificial Intelligence Strategy for Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the 1984 martial arts drama film, The Karate Kid, a young Daniel LaRusso is unexpectedly placed in an adversarial environment unable to eYectively adapt to a series of new threats and limitations. Fortunately for the main character, once placed under the tutelage of a Mr. Miyagi, he finds resiliency not through the adoption of new tools, but a re-focused set of fundamentals. Much in the same way that Daniel learns waxing on and buYing oY car wax by hand has rewards for Karate, LANL is choosing the harder path of self-hosting Large Language Models (LLMs) for enterprise use instead of only relying on buying access to a hosted AI service like Azure’s OpenAI Application Programming Interface (API). We also are not willing to wait for software-as-a-service (SAAS) AI services to meet us where we need to be from a FedRAMP accreditation standpoint. Our operations regularly depend on access at CUI, UCNI, ITAR and other FIPS-199 moderate-impact data levels and hosting our own services gives us the right security and compliance posture to be useful across the broad range of our work at LANL. With the rise in threats to critical infrastructure, cloud service providers (CSPs), and supply chain attacks from both state and non-state actors, we are not placing the bet that SAAS hosted AI services will be available when we need them. Should a major event occur, we do not want our staY and operations left without a pathway for us to fix the problem and resume the use of AI tools.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Blockchain Research and Development Activities Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy and Utility Sector

This article provides an in-depth analysis of blockchain research in the energy sector, focusing on projects funded by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and comparing them with industry-funded initiatives. A total of 110 funded activities within the U.S. power industry were successfully tracked and mapped into a newly developed categorization framework. This framework is designed to help research agencies to systematically understand their funded portfolio. Such characterization is expected to help them make effective investments, identify research gaps, measure impact, and advance technological progress to meet national goals. In line with this need, the proposed framework proposes a 2-D categorization matrix to systematically classify blockchain efforts within the energy sector.Under the proposed framework, the Energy System Domain serves as the primary classification dimension, categorizing use cases into 30 distinct applications. The second dimension, Blockchain Properties, captures the specific needs and functionalities provided by Blockchain technology. The aim was to capture blockchain’s applicability and functionality: where and why blockchain? Principles behind the selection of the viewpoint dimensions were carefully defined based on consensus obtained through the Blockchain for Optimized Security and Energy Management (BLOSEM) project. The mapped results show that activities within the Grid Automation, Coordination, and Control (31.8%), Marketplaces and Trading (25.5%), Foundational Blockchain Research (19.1%), and Supply Chain Management (17.3%) domains have been actively pursued to date. The three leading specific use case applications were identified as Transactive Energy Management for Marketplaces and Trading, Asset Management for Supply Chain Management, and Fundamental Blockchain for Foundational Blockchain Research. The Marketplaces and Trading and Retail Services Enablement domains stood out as being favored by industry by a factor greater than 2 (2.3 and 2.6, respectively), yet there seemed to be little to zero investment from DOE. Approximately 76% of the total projects prioritized Immutability, Identity Management, and Decentralization and/or Disintermediation compared to Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization, Automation, and Privacy and/or Anonymity. The greatest discrepancies between DOE and industry were in Asset Digitization and/or Tokenization and Automation. The industry efforts (36% in Asset Digitization/Tokenization and 22% in Automation) was 14 times and 2.4 times, respectively, more intensive than the DOE-sponsored efforts, indicating a significant discrepancy in industry versus government priorities. Overall, quantifying DOE-sponsored projects and industry activities through mapping provides clarity on portfolio investments and opportunities for future research.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hydropower Supply Chain Gap Analysis

In 2022, DOE conducted supply chain "deep dives" for renewable energy technologies, including hydropower (Uria-Martinez, Hydropower Industry Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment 2022). The deep dive identified several challenges in the current hydropower supply chain. In addition, Nguyen et. al (2022) conducted an analogous deep-dive assessment on large (> 100-MW) power transformers (LPTs), a critical component of hydropower installations, and concluded that the LPTs as well as several upstream components and materials also have domestic supply chain challenges. These deep dives were the initial high-level assessments of these supply chains and were focused on identifying the biggest issues. Both recommended further investigation. In the two years since the deep dives were published, the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) has focused on improving our understanding of the hydropower supply chain and developing strategies for addressing these challenges. Because the challenges outlined above are most acute for large hydropower systems, most of the report and specifically, this report concentrates on the larger > 100-MW hydropower systems. Early in 2023, DOE's Secretary of Energy asked the Water Power Technologies Office (WPTO) to engage the hydropower community and seek input on strategies to secure and encourage domestic manufacturing. WPTO has established three focus areas for engagement: 1) Define the market for planned rehabilitations and new construction of the domestic fleet, 2) Provide insights for policies, incentives, loan programs, and technology investments to encourage domestic content, and 3) Define the existing and required domestic hydropower manufacturing capabilities and workforce. This report summarizes these efforts and complements the earlier work by further exploring the identified challenges and identifying potential actions to address these challenges. Furthermore, we conducted a detailed gap analysis of the domestic hydropower supply chain, down to the component level. From this analysis, we then make specific, actionable recommendations for closing these gaps. Section 2 of the report summarizes recent (i.e., since 2021) legislation impacting hydropower deployment and/or its supply chain. It then describes the efforts of WPTO to assess and improve the hydropower supply chain since the publication of the deep-dive assessments. In Section 3, the report updates the earlier supply chain and market studies, identifying specific capabilities by company and location. Section 4 outlines the hydropower demand signal for both new builds due to clean energy goals as well as refurbishments and upgrading of the current domestic fleet. Section 5 is a detailed gap analysis while Section 6 provides actionable recommendations for closing the gaps. Section 7 concludes the report by linking the recommendations to the identified gaps and discusses future efforts.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Responsible Adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Electric Grid Operations

The future of the grid will be powered by AI—or undermined by it. Artificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping grid operations, improving fault detection, forecasting accuracy, and real-time optimization. As AI systems move closer to operational decision loops, however, they introduce new consequence pathways: expanded attack surfaces, model integrity risks, regulatory exposure, and human-automation challenges. This talk presents a consequence-driven framework for deploying AI responsibly in the electric grid. Attendees will gain practical strategies to strengthen resilience, boost reliability, and deploy AI securely — ensuring the grid of the future is not only smarter but safer.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

Advanced Reactor Supply Chain Assessment (GAIN Report)

Several net-zero scenario evaluations predict a rapid ramp up of nuclear energy in the coming decades. If this materializes, it will most likely strain the supply chains associated with the potential advanced reactor concepts awaiting deployment. To help assess the current and potential capacities of the various advanced reactor supply chains, the Gateway for Accelerated Innovation in Nuclear (GAIN) conducted a survey of companies able to produce components for advanced reactors in the near future (namely for sodium, gas-cooled, and molten salt reactors). Using an aggressive nuclear deployment scenario, the objective was to assess the ability of the various supply chains to meet the considerable demand projections for certain key components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors) and identify potential challenges. While individual companies were unable to meet the most optimistic nuclear deployment rate projections, it was found that on aggregate, a United States-based supply chain projected that expansion could be ramped up to meet a larger future demand of these components. However, meeting projected demand for several more complex items (namely gas or salt heat exchangers) was found to be more challenging. Deploying new reactors at scale necessitates the production of more and more supply chain components, requiring a ramp up in production. Supply chain companies were surveyed, and respondents appeared less able to meet short term demand (next year) versus longer-term demand projections (5 and 10 years). This reflects the need to obtain orders with adequate lead times (can range from 3 to 30 months). Future demand will need to be met by expanding existing capacity. These expansions will require suppliers to raise capital or secure other types of support (federal loans or grants) to invest in facilities, equipment, and workforce. Individual suppliers indicated financial investments could be in the range of $\$ $100 million to $\$ $1 billion for their own facilities (depending on the type of facility). The biggest risk, according to respondents, related to general uncertainties surrounding the future nuclear industry and whether the potential demand projections will materialize into real demand that is actionable from a business perspective. Businesses do not seem willing to take investments risks without clear orders. If businesses are not able to invest to expand the supply, it will either delay the deployment of advanced nuclear technology, or the supply chain will be met by suppliers outside of the United States. This report only focuses on the domestic supply chain’s ability to meet the various projections stipulated here for the specific assessed components (vessels, heat exchangers, pumps, graphite, and sensors). The report does not cover all reactor designs or all components that may ultimately be needed for any one reactor design. It also does not address whether any specific aspect of the supply chain will be cost competitive in the global market, nor how potential state-backed entities could affect the expansion of a United States-based supply chain. The largest challenges in ramping up capacity among respondents appear to be workforce related. This includes workforce availability, experience, training, and turnover. In addition to facility investment, suppliers will also need to invest heavily in long-term workforce training to meet production goals. This issue is not nuclear-specific, and the expansion of any supply chain will likely face similar challenges. While suppliers evaluated expected normal business demand from other markets outside of nuclear, it is possible that other market segments could expand more than predicted and compete for the same suppliers. One potential market that may compete for the same supplier resources is the United States military, as many of these suppliers support both the commercial nuclear sector as well as the Navy with reactors and components. In summary, suppliers in the United States believe that there is a way to increase production in order to begin meeting the demand which will exist for advanced reactors—as long as appropriate investments can be made in the supply chain in an appropriate timeframe. Based on the capacity projections and lead times, investment will be needed to meet the 5-year and 10-year production targets. Therefore, if significant nuclear deployment is to occur in the 2030s, investment and ramp up of the advanced nuclear supply chain will need to begin in the near future for the United States to successfully deploy these advanced reactors with domestic supply chains.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗