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NASA NTRS2019

Overview of the PLEXIL Plan Execution Technology and its Applications in Autonomous Piloting Projects at NASA

Automated planning is a key Artificial Intelligence technology enabling Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the eminent reality of Urban Air Mobility (UAM). It produces plans, which formalize procedures often performed by humans. Plans differ from other kinds of computer programs in their ability to react and interact with a dynamically changing environment. Aviation plans must encode the procedural knowledge, reasoning capability, and capacity for multi-tasking held by competent human pilots. Correct execution of these plans (performed by software called an executive) in the dynamic airspace environment is vital to the success of each automated flight, and the safety of the vehicle and all things in its path. In the early 2000s NASA developed a plan representation language and executive called PLEXIL (Plan Execution Interchange Language) that has successfully been applied in several NASA aviation and UAS projects. Autonomy Operating System (AOS), Cockpit Hierarchical Automated Planning and Execution (CHAP-E), and ICAROUS are all projects that have used PLEXIL to help encode and automatically execute flight procedures, some normally performed by human pilots. AOS also automates a subset of pilot/Air Traffic Control communication towards enabling UAS entry into the National Airspace. PLEXIL has been open-source software since 2008 and has seen usage in a wide range of prototypical autonomy applications in academia, government, and industry. In this presentation, we describe PLEXIL and highlight its significant accomplishments in the aviation domain.

Dalal, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2012

Automating the Generation of Heterogeneous Aviation Safety Cases

A safety case is a structured argument, supported by a body of evidence, which provides a convincing and valid justification that a system is acceptably safe for a given application in a given operating environment. This report describes the development of a fragment of a preliminary safety case for the Swift Unmanned Aircraft System. The construction of the safety case fragment consists of two parts: a manually constructed system-level case, and an automatically constructed lower-level case, generated from formal proof of safety-relevant correctness properties. We provide a detailed discussion of the safety considerations for the target system, emphasizing the heterogeneity of sources of safety-relevant information, and use a hazard analysis to derive safety requirements, including formal requirements. We evaluate the safety case using three classes of metrics for measuring degrees of coverage, automation, and understandability. We then present our preliminary conclusions and make suggestions for future work.

Denney, Ewen W.↗
NASA NTRS2010

NASA UAS Update

Last year may prove to be a pivotal year for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) arena, especially in relation to routine UAS access to airspace as NASA accepted an invitation to join the UAS Executive Committee (UAS ExCom). The UAS ExCom is a multi-agency, Federal executive-level committee comprised of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and NASA with the goals to: 1) Coordinate and align efforts between key Federal Government agencies to achieve routine safe federal public UAS operations in the National Airspace System (NAS); 2) Coordinate and prioritize technical, procedural, regulatory, and policy solutions needed to deliver incremental capabilities; 3) Develop a plan to accommodate the larger stakeholder community at the appropriate time; and 4) Resolve conflicts between Federal Government agencies (FAA, DoD, DHS, and NASA), related to the above goals. The committee was formed in recognition of the need of UAS operated by these agencies to access to the National Airspace System (NAS) to support operational, training, development and research requirements. In order to meet that need, technical, procedural, regulatory, and policy solutions are required to deliver incremental capabilities leading to routine access. The formation of the UAS ExCom is significant in that it represents a tangible commitment by FAA senior leadership to address the UAS access challenge. While the focus of the ExCom is government owned and operated UAS, civil UAS operations are bound to benefit by the progress made in achieving routine access for government UAS. As the UAS ExCom was forming, NASA's Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate began to show renewed interest in UAS, particularly in relation to the future state of the air transportation system under the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). NASA made funding from the American Recovery and Revitalization Act available in order to continue addressing the issue of routine civil UAS access.

Bauer, Jeffrey Ervin↗
NASA NTRS2023

Monitoring Airspace Complexity and Determining Contributing Factors

The national airspace has evolved over many years to accommodate increased traffic demand while simultaneously maintaining air travel as one of the safest forms of transportation. One of the reasons for this success is the ability of the air traffic control system and the operators to adapt and accommodate to situations that routinely disrupt normal operations. These situations may include: adverse weather, delays, early arrivals, equipment outages, and other factors that are outside the operators’ ability to control. These factors can lead to states where automation is unable to properly handle these issues, and therefore air traffic controllers and pilots have to intervene — ultimately increasing communication between operators resulting in higher workload. As controller workload increases to handle sub-optimal operating conditions, complexity increases. This is because, under these conditions humans are required to make tactical decisions in response to external factors. This results in a departure from the original strategic plan where operations would be more efficiently managed. Human operators manage airspace complexity under rigid regulations but in a constantly changing environment. The airspace is divided into sectors and the number of aircraft assigned to each controller is limited for safe handling. Some prior studies devised airspace complexity metrics in commercial aviation and related these metrics to controller workload. The upper bounds on the system load are pre-determined. Such bounds on complexity make for a safe system, but the system cannot scale and adapt to autonomous, dense, and heterogeneous traffic — including the many types of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) envisioned to be added to the operations. We hypothesize that, as traffic density and heterogeneity grow, and other key metrics change, there will be phase transitions at which the way traffic should be managed changes significantly. We offer a method for in-time detection of contributing factors that lead to phase transitions, characterized by increased complexity. To the best of our knowledge, there is no tool similar to ours that identifies such contributing factors or precursor patterns.

Precursor↗
NASA NTRS2011

In Situ Observations and Sampling of Volcanic Emissions with Unmanned Aircraft: A NASA/UCR Case Study at Turrialba Volcano, Costa Rica

Burgeoning new technology in the design and development of robotic aircraft-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)-presents unprecedented opportunities for the volcanology community to observe, measure, and sample eruption plumes and drifting volcanic clouds in situ. While manned aircraft can sample dilute parts of such emissions, demonstrated hazards to air breathing, and most particularly turbine, engines preclude penetration of the zones of highest ash concentrations. Such areas within plumes are often of highest interest with respect to boundary conditions of applicable mass-loading retrieval models, as well as Lagrangian, Eulerian, and hybrid transport models used by hazard responders to predict plume trajectories, particularly in the context of airborne hazards. Before the 2010 Ejyafyallajokull eruption in Iceland, ICAO zero-ash-tolerance rules were typically followed, particularly for relatively uncrowded Pacific Rim airspace, and over North and South America, where often diversion of aircraft around ash plumes and clouds was practical. The 2010 eruption in Iceland radically changed the paradigm, in that critical airspace over continental Europe and the United Kingdom were summarily shut by local civil aviation authorities and EURO CONTROL. A strong desire emerged for better real-time knowledge of ash cloud characteristics, particularly ash concentrations, and especially for validation of orbital multispectral imaging. UAV platforms appear to provide a viable adjunct, if not a primary source, of such in situ data for volcanic plumes and drifting volcanic clouds from explosive eruptions, with prompt and comprehensive application to aviation safety and to the basic science of volcanology. Current work is underway in Costa Rica at Turrialba volcano by the authors, with the goal of developing and testing new small, economical UAV platforms, with miniaturized instrument payloads, within a volcanic plume. We are underway with bi-monthly deployments of tethered SO2-sondes and are in the planning stages for the deployment of the SIERRA UAV to our site in March 2013. We will be conducting in situ observations simultaneously with ASTER orbital multispectral TIR data acquisitions, in order to compare in situ measurements with estimates of SO2 mass loading and dispersion derived from ASTER data. Though small UAVs are now being considered for use in active volcanic areas for in situ sampling of emissions (e.g., efforts by our group, and by our colleagues at the INGV in Italy and the Applied Science University in Dusseldorf, Germany, and others in the United Kingdom and Iceland), and also for remote sensing, much more needs to be done in the way of instrument development, and in developing small UAVs for both low altitude (tropospheric) and high altitude (stratospheric) applications. In particular, the development of all weather and day/night operational flight capabilities in close proximity to hazardous topography is crucial to a truly responsive volcano in situ measurement system. Finally, it is imperative that national civil aviation authorities recognize the unique benefits of such platforms. It is important that authorities understand that severely restricting or not deploying such tools in airspace over restless volcanoes or within eruption plumes, ostensibly because of the perceived (small) risk that such unmanned aircraft pose to manned air operations, itself poses a bigger transcendental risk to proximal populations and particularly to the aviation community, itself.

Volcanic Ash Advisory Centers (VAACs)↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)

The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2002

Deicing and Anti-Icing Unite

With funding from Glenn's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program, Cox & Company, Inc., built an ice protection system that combines thermal anti-icing and mechanical deicing to keep airfoils (wings and other lifting surfaces) clear of ice. Cox's concept was to combine an anti-icing system with NASA's Electro-Mechanical Expulsion Deicing System, a mechanical deicer. The anti-icing element of this hybrid would reduce the aerodynamic losses associated with deicing systems. The Cox Low Power Ice Protection System is the first new aircraft ice protection system that has been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration for use on a business jet in 40 years. While the system is currently sized for Premier class aircraft, there are no apparent constraints prohibiting its use on aircraft of any size. The company is investigating further applications, such as adapting the system for unmanned aerial vehicles and other military aircraft.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2011

The Proposed Use of Unmanned Aerial System Surrogate Research Aircraft for National Airspace System Integration Research

Research is needed to determine what procedures, aircraft sensors and other systems will be required to allow Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to safely operate with manned aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS). This paper explores the use of Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Surrogate research aircraft to serve as platforms for UAS systems research, development, and flight testing. These aircraft would be manned with safety pilots and researchers that would allow for flight operations almost anywhere in the NAS without the need for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Certificate of Authorization (COA). With pilot override capability, these UAS Surrogate aircraft would be controlled from ground stations like true UAS s. It would be possible to file and fly these UAS Surrogate aircraft in the NAS with normal traffic and they would be better platforms for real world UAS research and development over existing vehicles flying in restricted ranges or other sterilized airspace. These UAS surrogate aircraft could be outfitted with research systems as required such as computers, state sensors, video recording, data acquisition, data link, telemetry, instrumentation, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). These surrogate aircraft could also be linked to onboard or ground based simulation facilities to further extend UAS research capabilities. Potential areas for UAS Surrogate research include the development, flight test and evaluation of sensors to aide in the process of air traffic "see-and-avoid". These and other sensors could be evaluated in real-time and compared with onboard human evaluation pilots. This paper examines the feasibility of using UAS Surrogate research aircraft as test platforms for a variety of UAS related research.

Howell, Charles T., III↗
NASA NTRS2015

Certification Considerations for Adaptive Systems

Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of aircraft, including those that will operate within the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), will necessarily include complex new algorithms and non-traditional software elements. These aircraft will likely incorporate adaptive control algorithms that will provide enhanced safety, autonomy, and robustness during adverse conditions. Unmanned aircraft will operate alongside manned aircraft in the National Airspace (NAS), with intelligent software performing the high-level decision-making functions normally performed by human pilots. Even human-piloted aircraft will necessarily include more autonomy. However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of new capabilities, especially for those based upon software including adaptive control (AC) and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. Current civil aviation certification processes are based on the idea that the correct behavior of a system must be completely specified and verified prior to operation. This report by Rockwell Collins and SIFT documents our comprehensive study of the state of the art in intelligent and adaptive algorithms for the civil aviation domain, categorizing the approaches used and identifying gaps and challenges associated with certification of each approach.

Bhattacharyya, Siddhartha↗
NASA NTRS2016

Air STAR Beyond Visual Range UAS Description and Preliminary Test Results

The NASA Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research Unmanned Aerial System project's capabilities were expanded by updating the system design and concept of operations. The new remotely piloted airplane system design was flight tested to assess integrity and operational readiness of the design to perform flight research. The purpose of the system design is to improve aviation safety by providing a capability to validate, in high-risk conditions, technologies to prevent airplane loss of control. Two principal design requirements were to provide a high degree of reliability and that the new design provide a significant increase in test volume (relative to operations using the previous design). The motivation for increased test volume is to improve test efficiency and allow new test capabilities that were not possible with the previous design and concept of operations. Three successful test flights were conducted from runway 4-22 at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center's Wallops Flight Facility.

Cunningham, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS2015

Argument-Based Airworthiness Assurance of Small UAS

Presently, there are three avenues by which Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) operations are authorized in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS): obtaining either (i) a certificate of authorization (COA), or (ii) a special airworthiness certificate (SAC) in either the experimental, or the restricted category, or (iii) an exemption from an airworthiness certificate together with a civil COA. The first is meant primarily for public entities, such as NASA; the remaining two are the only available means for civil UAS operations. Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has also proposed a regulatory framework targeted for certain small UAS, specifically those weighing 55 pounds or less, although final rulemaking remains pending. We have previously shown how an assurance case can aggregate heterogeneous reasoning and safety evidence, with application to UAS safety. In this paper, we describe how assurance cases can serve as a common framework to justify overall system safety, unifying both operational aspects and airworthiness, in particular system design assurance. We also show how this approach can coexist with, and augment, existing safety analysis processes and best-practices, by transforming the artifacts they produce into structured assurance arguments. To illustrate the applicability and utility of our approach, we have been applying it for the design assurance of an unmanned rotorcraft system, intended for precision agriculture operations, as part of the NASA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Integration in the National Airspace System (NAS) project.

Rotocraft↗
NASA NTRS2018

Detect and Avoid: Efforts from NASA's UAS Integration into the NAS Project

NASA's Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration into the National Air Space (NAS) project has been working closely with the FAA and RTCA Special Committee 228 to identify and break down barriers to UAS integration. A focus of this work is on detect and avoid (DAA) technologies. A pilot has responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and to remain "well clear," using their best judgment (Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Sec. 91.113). For UAS to perform this function, the see function is replaced by sensors to detect the other aircraft. Secondly, the pilot judgment of well clear has to be replaced by a mathematical expression. For Phase 1 of this effort, a well clear violation was defined if all three of these conditions are true: a) the horizontal clearance is less than 4000 ft., and b) the vertical clearance is less than 450 ft., and c) the time to loss of well clear is less than 35 seconds. This definition was developed with a great deal of community input and testing to ensure interoperability with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots of manned aircraft. Appropriate guidance, alerting and displays were developed to allow UAS, with the appropriate sensors, to effectively maintain well clear. This work contributed to FAA Technical Standard Orders: TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid and TSO-C212, ATAR for Traffic Surveillance. Phase 2 of this work extends the operational environment to include the terminal area and lesser capable aircraft that might not have the payload capability to carry the RADAR defined in Phase 1. This session reports on work from Phase 1 and initial work in Phase 2.

Detect and Avoid (DAA)↗
NASA NTRS2016

NH11B-1726: FrankenRaven: A New Platform for Remote Sensing

Small, modular aircraft are an emerging technology with a goal to maximize flexibility and enable multi-mission support. This reports the progress of an unmanned aerial system (UAS) project conducted at the NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) in 2016. This interdisciplinary effort builds upon the success of the 2014 FrankenEye project to apply rapid prototyping techniques to UAS, to develop a variety of platforms to host remote sensing instruments. In 2016, ARC received AeroVironment RQ-11A and RQ-11B Raven UAS from the US Department of the Interior, Office of Aviation Services. These aircraft have electric propulsion, a wingspan of roughly 1.3m, and have demonstrated reliability in challenging environments. The Raven airframe is an ideal foundation to construct more complex aircraft, and student interns using 3D printing were able to graft multiple Raven wings and fuselages into FrankenRaven aircraft. Aeronautical analysis shows that the new configuration has enhanced flight time, payload capacity, and distance compared to the original Raven. The FrankenRaven avionics architecture replaces the mil-spec avionics with COTS technology based upon the 3DR Pixhawk PX4 autopilot with a safety multiplexer for failsafe handoff to 2.4 GHz RC control and 915 MHz telemetry. This project demonstrates how design reuse, rapid prototyping, and modular subcomponents can be leveraged into flexible airborne platforms that can host a variety of remote sensing payloads and even multiple payloads. Modularity advances a new paradigm: mass-customization of aircraft around given payload(s). Multi-fuselage designs are currently under development to host a wide variety of payloads including a zenith-pointing spectrometer, a magnetometer, a multi-spectral camera, and a RGB camera. After airworthiness certification, flight readiness review, and test flights are performed at Crows Landing airfield in central California, field data will be taken at Kilauea volcano in Hawaii and other locations.

remote sensing↗
NASA NTRS2017

UAS Reports (UREPs): EnablingExchange of Observation Data Between UAS Operations

As the volume of small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operations increases, the lack of weather products to support these operations becomes more problematic. One early solution to obtaining more information about weather conditions is to allow operators to share their observations and measurements with other airspace users. This is analogous to the AIREP and PIREP reporting systems in traditional aviation wherein pilots report weather phenomena they have observed or experienced to provide better situational awareness to other pilots. Given the automated nature of the small (under 55 lbs.) UAS platforms and operations, automated reporting of relevant information should also be supported. To promote automated exchange of these data, a well-defined data schema needs to be established along with the mechanisms for sending and retrieving the data. This paper examines this concept and offers an initial definition of the necessary elements to allow for immediate implementation and use.

UAS↗
NASA NTRS2021

Detection and Tracking of Aircraft in the Far-Field from Small Unmanned Aerial Systems

Onboard far-field aircraft detection is needed for safe non-cooperative traffic mitigation in autonomous small Unmanned Aerial System (sUAS) operations. Machine vision systems, based on standard optics and visible light detectors, possess the ideal size, weight, and power (SWaP) requirements for sUAS. This work presents the design and analysis of a novel aircraft detection and tracking pipeline based on optical sensing alone. Key contributions of the work include a refined range inequality model based on sensing and detection with FAA well-clear separation assurance distances between aircraft in mind, a detector fusion method to maximize the benefit of two image detectors, and a comparative analysis of Linear Kalman-filtering and Extended Kalman-filtering to seek optimal tracking performance. The pipeline is evaluated offline against multiple intruder platforms, using two types of flight encounters: multirotor sUAS vs. fixed-wing sUAS and multirotor sUAS vs. general aviation(GA)plane. Analysis is restricted to the rate-limiting head-on and departing collision volume cases vertically separated for safety. Results indicate that it is feasible to use the proposed optical spatial-temporal tracking algorithm to provide adequate alerting time to prevent penetration of well-clear separation volumes for both sUAS and GA aircraft.

Unmanned Aerial System↗
NASA NTRS2013

Security Risk Assessment Process for UAS in the NAS CNPC Architecture

This informational paper discusses the risk assessment process conducted to analyze Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) architectures for integrating civil Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) into the National Airspace System (NAS). The assessment employs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management framework to identify threats, vulnerabilities, and risks to these architectures and recommends corresponding mitigating security controls. This process builds upon earlier work performed by RTCA Special Committee (SC) 203 and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to roadmap the risk assessment methodology and to identify categories of information security risks that pose a significant impact to aeronautical communications systems. A description of the deviations from the typical process is described in regards to this aeronautical communications system. Due to the sensitive nature of the information, data resulting from the risk assessment pertaining to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks is beyond the scope of this paper.

Iannicca, Dennis C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM): Enabling Low-Altitude Airspace and UAS Operations

Many civilian applications of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) have been imagined ranging from remote to congested urban areas, including goods delivery, infrastructure surveillance, agricultural support, and medical services delivery. Further, these UAS will have different equipage and capabilities based on considerations such as affordability, and mission needs applications. Such heterogeneous UAS mix, along with operations such as general aviation, helicopters, gliders must be safely accommodated at lower altitudes. However, key infrastructure to enable and safely manage widespread use of low-altitude airspace and UAS operations therein does not exist. Therefore, NASA is exploring functional design, concept and technology development, and a prototype UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system. UTM will support safe and efficient UAS operations for the delivery of goods and services

UAV↗
NASA NTRS2019

An Improved Far-Field Small Unmanned Aerial System Optical Detection Algorithm

Onboard far-field aircraft detection is needed for safe non-cooperative traffic mitigation for autonomous small Unmanned Aerial System (sUAS) operations. This work presents an aircraft detect and track pipeline that fuses image differencing and morphological filtering detections for inputs to a Kalman-based object tracking pipeline. The pipeline is evaluated using two types of flight encounters: 1) motorcopter sUAS vs. fixed-wing sUAS 2) motorcopter sUAS vs general aviation plane.

Chester Dolph↗