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At least 199 records · Page 11

Timing system for firing widely spaced test nuclear detonations

The national weapons design laboratories (Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) test fire nuclear devices at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), which is spread over an area of over 1200 square miles (a bit larger than the state of Rhode island). On each test there are hundreds of high time resolution recordings made of nuclear output waveforms and other phenomena. In order to synchronize these recordings with each other, with the nuclear device, and with offsite recordings, there is a requirement that the permanent command center and the outlying temporary firing sites be time tied to each other and to UTC to permit firing the shot at a predetermined time with an accuracy of about a microsecond. The system is so designed that this can reduce to about 100 nanoseconds if it should prove necessary in the future.

Ralph E. Partridge↗

A subcellular biochemical model for T6SS dynamics reveals winning competitive strategies

Abstract The type VI secretion system (T6SS) is a broadly distributed interbacterial weapon that can be used to eliminate competing bacterial populations. Although unarmed target populations are typically used to study T6SS function in vitro, bacteria most likely encounter other T6SS-armed competitors in nature. However, the connection between subcellular details of the T6SS and the outcomes of such mutually lethal battles is not well understood. Here, we incorporate biological data derived from natural competitors of Vibrio fischeri light organ symbionts to build a biochemical model for T6SS at the single-cell level, which we then integrate into an agent-based model (ABM). Using the ABM, we isolate and experiment with strain-specific physiological differences between competitors in ways not possible with biological samples to identify winning strategies for T6SS-armed populations. Through in vitro experiments, we discover that strain-specific differences exist in T6SS activation speed. ABM simulations corroborate that faster activation is dominant in determining survival during competition. Once competitors are fully activated, the energy required for T6SS creates a tipping point where increased weapon building and firing becomes too costly to be advantageous. Through ABM simulations, we identify the threshold where this transition occurs in the T6SS parameter space. We also find that competitive outcomes depend on the geometry of the battlefield: unarmed target cells survive at the edges of a range expansion where unlimited territory can be claimed. Alternatively, competitions within a confined space, much like the light organ crypts where natural V. fischeri compete, result in the rapid elimination of the unarmed population.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Coincidence measurements of radioxenon using passive implemented planar silicon (PIPS) detector

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans nuclear weapons testing and establishes the International Monitoring System (IMS) for the purpose of treaty verification. IMS is a detector network that confirms that global nuclear activity is peaceful in nature. These detector systems use β-γcoincidence measurements to characterize atmospheric samples containing radioxenon isotopes. The goal of this work is to use the system consisting of two sodium iodide detectors and two PIPSbox detectors to characterize isotopically pure samples of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe via β, γ, and β-γ coincidence measurements.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Potential for integrated optical circuits in advanced aircraft with fiber optic control and monitoring systems

Fiber optic technology is expected to be used in future advanced weapons platforms as well as commercial aerospace applications. Fiber optic waveguides will be used to transmit noise free, high speed data between a multitude of computers as well as audio and video information to the flight crew. Passive optical sensors connected to control computers with optical fiber interconnects will serve both control and monitoring functions. Implementation of fiber optic technology has already begun. Both the military and NASA have several programs in place. A cooperative program, called FOCSI (Fiber Optic Control System Integration), between NASA Lewis and the NAVY to build, environmentally test and flight demonstrate sensor systems for propulsion and flight control systems is currently underway. Integrated Optical Circuits (IOC's) are also being given serious consideration for use in advanced aircraft systems. IOC's will result in miniaturization and localization of components to generate, detect optical signals and process them for use by the control computers. In some complex systems IOC's may be required to perform calculations optically if the technology is ready, replacing some of the electronic systems used today. IOC's are attractive because they will result in rugged components capable of withstanding severe environments in advanced aerospace vehicles. Manufacturing technology developed for microelectronic integrated circuits applied to IOC's will result in cost effective manufacturing. This paper reviews the current FOCSI program and describes the potential role of IOC's in FOCSI applications.

Robert Baumbick↗

Nuclear Targeting Terms for Engineers and Scientists Revised Edition

This is a revised version of LA-UR-17-20752, Nuclear Targeting Terms for Engineers and Scientists, March 1, 2017. The discussion of compounding for damage and compounding for reliability was reworded for clarity. The Department of Defense has a methodology for targeting nuclear weapons, and a jargon that is used to communicate between the analysts, planners, aircrews, and missile crews. The typical engineer or scientist in the Department of Energy may not have been exposed to the nuclear weapons targeting terms and methods. This report provides an introduction to the terms and methodologies used for nuclear targeting. Its purpose is to prepare engineers and scientists to participate in wargames, exercises, and discussions with the Department of Defense. Terms such as Circular Error Probable, probability of hit and damage, damage expectancy, and the physical vulnerability system are discussed. Methods for compounding damage from multiple weapons applied to one target are presented.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

A Hardware Platform for Studying Naval Power Electronic Power Distribution Systems

Abstract – Future intelligent ship system designs will likely include electric propulsion, numerous highpower sensors, and directed energy weapons. Supply and control of these large nonlinear loads will require a networked, multi-converter power electronic power distribution system. This work presents a hardware platform to emulate a microgrid power system with multiple power converters and a power data communication network. The platform is reconfigurable and can include both AC and DC power distribution zones, representative of shipboard power systems. It also allows for the study of both power control actuation and power data communication delays. Since the platform is based on electric power hardware, spatial and temporal uncertainties are inherently embedded in the system. Specifically, this work examines the control actuation of multiple pulsed power loads in a single microgrid. Several pulse load levels and operating scenarios have been implemented and measured. A framework for control parameter quantification is presented, and various metrics are explored to capture pulse signal characteristics. The sensitivity of pulse load metric parameters is analyzed. Dynamic shipboard, mission-specific load profiles coupled with pulse loads can also be emulated in the hardware platform.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

304L Can Crush Validation Studies

Accurate prediction of ductile behavior of structural alloys up to and including failure is essential in component or system failure assessment, which is necessary for nuclear weapons alteration and life extensions programs of Sandia National Laboratories. Modeling such behavior requires computational capabilities to robustly capture strong nonlinearities (geometric and material), rate- dependent and temperature-dependent properties, and ductile failure mechanisms. This study's objective is to validate numerical simulations of a high-deformation crush of a stainless steel can. The process consists of identifying a suitable can geometry and loading conditions, conducting the laboratory testing, developing a high-quality Sierra/SM simulation, and then drawing comparisons between model and measurement to assess the fitness of the simulation in regards to material model (plasticity), finite element model construction, and failure model. Following previous material model calibration, a J 2 plasticity model with a microstructural BCJ failure model is employed to model the test specimen made of 304L stainless steel. Simulated results are verified and validated through mesh and mass-scaling convergence studies, parameter sensitivity studies, and a comparison to experimental data. The converged mesh and degree of mass-scaling are the mesh discretization with 140,372 elements, and a mass scaling with a target time increment of 1.0e-6 seconds and time step scale factor of 0.5, respectively. Results from the coupled thermal-mechanical explicit dynamic analysis are comparable to the experimental data. Simulated global force vs displacement (F/D) response predicts key points such as yield, ultimate, and kinks of the experimental F/D response. Furthermore, the final deformed shape of the can and field data predicted from the analysis are similar to that of the deformed can, as measured by 3D optical CMM scans and DIC data from the experiment.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

When day is done and shadows fall, we miss the airport most of all

Both the effectiveness of pilot training and the safety of flight can be influenced by the distribution of texture in the visual scene, the distance to which the eyes accommodate, and the associated shifts in the apparent size and distance of objects in central and peripheral vision. Studies reviewed and original results presented indicate that these factors are involved in various misjudgments and illusions experienced by pilots: (1) when searching for other airborne traffic or targets, (2) when making approaches to airports over water at night, (3) when breaking out of low clouds on a final approach to a landing by reference to head-up or head-down displays, and (4) when practicing simulated approaches and landings or air-to-surface weapon deliveries by reference to synthetically generated visual systems.

Roscoe, S. N.↗

Applications of submillimeter wave technology for SDI

This paper examines the potential use of using submillimeter wave technology (actually 3 mm to 100 microns, or frequencies between 100 GHz and 3 THz) for SDI applications, especially for endo-KEW systems. The requirements and functions for a multipurpose weapon sensor are considered. The emphasis is on active sensors, but certain elements of passive sensors are mentioned that could play an important role. The rest of the paper provides information on the state-of-the-art in submillimeter wave technology, especially current component activity, and future plans.

Kile, J. N.↗

A PIPS + SrI 2 (Eu) detector for atmospheric radioxenon monitoring

The PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is a prototype atmospheric radioxenon detection system designed at Oregon State University in support of international efforts towards monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon testing activities. This detector aims to address some shortcomings found in currently deployed beta–gamma atmospheric radioxenon detection systems, such as lackluster energy resolution and memory effect, by employing modern detection materials and readout. The system uses a PIPSBox, a silicon-based gas cell, for electron detection, and a pair of ultrabright, D-shaped SrI 2 (Eu) scintillators coupled to silicon photomultipliers for photon detection. A custom eight-channel digital pulse processor equipped with a field programmable gate-array (FPGA) identifies electron–photon coincidences between the volumes in near real-time. Gas samples of the four radioxenon isotopes of interest were independently measured with the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) detection system to determine energy resolution and efficiency. Application of FPGA-based coincidence discrimination in near real-time reduced the ambient background count rate by 95.85 ± 0.04%. Using parameters from the Xenon International gas processing unit and assuming a blank sample and zero memory effect the minimum detectable concentrations (MDCs) for the isotopes were calculated to be 0.12 ± 0.03, 0.27 ± 0.05, 0.15 ± 0.02, and 1.00 ± 0.08 mBq/m 3 air for 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe, respectively. These MDC estimates compare well with other radioxenon detection systems employed in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and indicate that the PIPS–SrI 2 (Eu) is in compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO) sensitivity requirement of ≤ 1 mBq/m 3 for 133 Xe.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Design and analysis of aerospace structures at elevated temperatures

An account is given of approaches that have emerged as useful in the incorporation of thermal loading considerations into advanced composite materials-based aerospace structural design practices. Sources of structural heating encompass not only propulsion system heat and aerodynamic surface heating at supersonic speeds, but the growing possibility of intense thermal fluxes from directed-energy weapons. The composite materials in question range from intrinsically nonheat-resistant polymer matrix systems to metal-matrix composites, and increasingly to such ceramic-matrix composites as carbon/carbon, which are explicitly intended for elevated temperature operation.

Chang, C. I.↗

WRS Capabilities Booklet [Slides]

WRS is the digital backbone of the Weapons Program—delivering trusted data assets, cyber-assured software and systems, and AI-enabling software—that transform insights into decisive action. We empower physicists, engineers, researchers, and scientists to think faster, act strategically, and stay ahead in an ever-evolving threat landscape. Our efforts ensure critical nuclear weapons data remains secure, accessible, and usable—supporting mission-critical work, informed decision making, and scientific advancement at LANL and across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

High-Energy-Density Capacitors

Capacitors capable of storing energy at high densities are being developed for use in pulse-power circuits in such diverse systems as defibrillators, particle- beam accelerators, microwave sources, and weapons. Like typical previously developed energy-storage capacitors, these capacitors are made from pairs of metal/solid-dielectric laminated sheets that are wound and pressed into compact shapes to fit into cans, which are then filled with dielectric fluids. Indeed, these capacitors can be fabricated largely by conventional fabrication techniques. The main features that distinguish these capacitors from previously developed ones are improvements in (1) the selection of laminate materials, (2) the fabrication of the laminated sheets from these materials, and (3) the selection of dielectric fluids. In simplest terms, a high-performance laminated sheet of the type used in these capacitors is made by casting a dielectric polymer onto a sheet of aluminized kraft paper. The dielectric polymer is a siloxane polymer that has been modified with polar pendant groups to increase its permittivity and dielectric strength. Potentially, this polymer is capable of withstanding an energy density of 7.5 J/cm3, which is four times that of the previous state-of-the-art-capacitor dielectric film material. However, the full potential of this polymer cannot be realized at present because (1) at thicknesses needed for optimum performance (.8.0 m), the mechanical strength of a film of this polymer is insufficient for incorporation into a wound capacitor and (2) at greater thickness, the achievable energy density decreases because of a logarithmic decrease in dielectric strength with increasing thickness. The aluminized kraft paper provides the mechanical strength needed for processing of the laminate and fabrication of the capacitor, and the aluminum film serves as an electrode layer. Because part of the thickness of the dielectric is not occupied by the modified siloxane polymer, the achievable energy density must be somewhat less than the maximum value. The laminate is produced by a continuous film-casting process, using the machinery depicted schematically in the figure. The designs of the process and machinery are dictated partly by the fact that during the processing step prior to casting the polymer, the aluminized kraft paper becomes wet with water. Because the polymer resin to be cast is hydrophobic, the paper must be dried to make it possible to coat the paper uniformly, leaving no pinholes. Accordingly, an infrared heater is placed next to the paper feed roll to dry the paper prior to casting.

Slenes, Kirk↗

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A stilbene–strontium iodide based radioxenon detection system for monitoring nuclear explosions

Atmospheric measurement of noble gases has been extensively used for monitoring clandestine nuclear weapon explosions for many years. The ratios of four xenon isotopes of interest ( 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) help in discriminating regular reactor operations from nuclear tests. A new coincidence-based detection system using stilbene and strontium iodide [SrI 2 (Eu)] for electron and photon detection respectively was developed at Oregon State University to address some of the challenges of the radioxenon systems deployed in the field such as memory effect, and poor energy resolution. Silicon photomultipliers (SiPMs) were used for sensing optical photons from all scintillation media. Real-time coincidence identification was achieved using the eight-channel digital pulse processor. The detection system was evaluated using lab check sources and Oregon State TRIGA reactor irradiated radioxenon samples. A 48-hour background coincidence spectrum was collected yielding a coincidence count rate and background rejection rate of 0.0174 ± 0.0003 counts per second (cps) and 98.9% respectively. The minimum detectable concentration (MDC) of the system was evaluated to be 0.11 ± 0.01, 0.13 ± 0.02, 0.20 ± 0.02, and 0.73 ± 0.08 for 131 mXe, 133 mXe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe respectively. The memory effect of the detection system was found to be 0.069 ± 0.015%, which is almost a 70-fold reduction compared to traditional plastic scintillators. Here, the detection elements, custom-designed electronics, and the detector response to radioxenon are detailed in this work.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗