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Design and Construction of a Loess-Cement Cushion as an Integral Component of an SL-LILW Repository - 16077

The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is planning the construction of a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste, the National Disposal Facility (NDF), adjacent to the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP). The NDF will be constructed as a reinforced concrete vault-type repository system, where prefabricated cubic waste packages (2 m on a side) will be emplaced in large reinforced concrete disposal cells. Waste emplacement operations will be conducted in three phases over a total of 60 years of operations. After the last waste packages have been disposed, an engineered multilayer cover will be installed over the site to further isolate the waste from the accessible environment. The Radiana Site where the NDF will be constructed is a sloping area located between the second and sixth loess terraces above the River Danube with elevations ranging from approximately +40 m to elevation +95 m. The unsaturated zone at the location selected for waste disposal ranges from 13 m to 16 m in thickness. After construction, the unsaturated zone will consist of a 5 m thick, engineered loess-cement cushion installed over naturally occurring Pliocene clays and sandy clayey sediments of the Brusarci Formation with a thickness above the top of groundwater ranging from 8 m to 11 m. The loess-cement cushion is a key component of the 'engineered fill' barrier as identified in the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report (ISAR) for the NDF. This barrier consists of engineered fill both below the disposal cells, i.e., the loess-cement cushion, and above the disposal cells, i.e. the final multilayer cover to be installed at closure of the facility. The loess-cement cushion component of this barrier will act to provide a geo-technically stable foundation for the disposal system. In addition, the barrier will raise the base of the disposal cells and increases the unsaturated zone thickness above the top of the groundwater table, as well as to serve as a chemical barrier that will act to sorb radionuclides thereby retarding their migration to the underlying groundwater. In addition to its assigned barrier functions the loess cement cushion also houses key embedded components required as part of the overall NDF safety concept, including systems necessary for operational and post-closure performance monitoring as well as the support foundation structures required for the mobile roofs, which are designed to handle and protect the waste during emplacement operations. The post-closure monitoring period, i.e., the period of institutional control, is given by as 300 years. While similar although less massive cushions have been previously constructed as foundations for various structures at the KNPP, the loess-cement cushion planned for construction at the NDF including the embedded structures will represent a first of its kind construction in terms of both its physical dimensioning as well as its requirements for long-term performance. This paper describes the design of the cushion, its functions and its construction as planned for the NDF as an integral component of the site safety concept. (authors)

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Development of a backfill material for LILW and HLW disposal galleries in the current Belgian geological disposal concept - 15374

In Belgium, it is planned to dispose of long-lived and high-level waste in an underground facility. After disposal of the waste, the galleries will be backfilled to provide stability to the galleries and to limit the amount of voids in the repository. To achieve those goals, the backfill material has to have a good flowability, a negligible bleeding, and a limited shrinkage. A limited grain size is also required to allow the injection of the backfill material. Despite the fact that the backfill supports the gallery lining, its strength must be low enough to enable the retrieval of the waste packages. The backfill material has to be chemically compatible with the Boom Clay and the waste packages. This means that it should not unduly perturb the clay or disposal packages. The thermal conductivity of the backfill material in the galleries containing high-level and thus heat-generating waste must be high enough to allow sufficient dissipation of the decay heat into the surrounding clay. Based on these objectives, material requirements were specified and the development of a backfill mixture was carried out. Initially, the mix composition was optimized in the laboratory. Thereafter, the backfill process of a gallery section was simulated. The investigations illustrate that this mixture can be transported via pipelines through the shaft and drifts and would fill completely the backfill sections in the galleries. Measurements of the porosity, the pore solution composition, the thermal material properties, and the strength illustrate the compliancies with the requirements and the feasibility of backfilling the disposal galleries. (authors)

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Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z Liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition

Fluor Hanford, Inc. (FH) is proud to submit the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP) 241-Z liquid Waste Treatment Facility Deactivation and Demolition (D&D) Project for consideration by the Project Management Institute as Project of the Year for 2008. The decommissioning of the 241-Z Facility presented numerous challenges, many of which were unique within the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex. The majority of the project budget and schedule was allocated for cleaning out five below-grade tank vaults. These highly contaminated, confined spaces also presented significant industrial safety hazards that presented some of the most hazardous work environments on the Hanford Site. The 241-Z D&D Project encompassed diverse tasks: cleaning out and stabilizing five below-grade tank vaults (also called cells), manually size-reducing and removing over three tons of process piping from the vaults, permanently isolating service utilities, removing a large contaminated chemical supply tank, stabilizing and removing plutonium-contaminated ventilation ducts, demolishing three structures to grade, and installing an environmental barrier on the demolition site. All of this work was performed safely, on schedule, and under budget. During the deactivation phase of the project between November 2005 and February 2007, workers entered the highly contaminated confined-space tank vaults 428 times. Each entry (or 'dive') involved an average of three workers, thus equaling approximately 1,300 individuals confined -space entries. Over the course of the entire deactivation and demolition period, there were no recordable injuries and only one minor reportable skin contamination. The 241-Z D&D Project was decommissioned under the provisions of the 'Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order' (the Tri-Party Agreement or TPA), the 'Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976' (RCRA), and the 'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980' (CERCLA). The project completed TPA Milestone M-083-032 to 'Complete those activities required by the 241-Z Treatment and Storage Unit's RCRA Closure Plan' four years and seven months ahead of this legally enforceable milestone. In addition, the project completed TPA Milestone M-083-042 to 'Complete transition and dismantlement of the 241-2 Waste Treatment Facility' four years and four months ahead of schedule. The project used an innovative approach in developing the project-specific RCRA closure plan to assure clear integration between the 241-Z RCRA closure activities and ongoing and future CERCLA actions at PFP. This approach provided a regulatory mechanism within the RCRA closure plan to place segments of the closure that were not practical to address at this time into future actions under CERCLA. Lessons learned from th is approach can be applied to other closure projects within the DOE Complex to control scope creep and mitigate risk. A paper on this topic, entitled 'Integration of the 241-Z Building D and D Under CERCLA with RCRA Closure at the PFP', was presented at the 2007 Waste Management Conference in Tucson, Arizona. In addition, techniques developed by the 241-Z D&D Project to control airborne contamination, clean the interior of the waste tanks, don and doff protective equipment, size-reduce plutonium-contaminated process piping, and mitigate thermal stress for the workers can be applied to other cleanup activities. The project-management team developed a strategy utilizing early characterization, targeted cleanup, and close coordination with PFP Criticality Engineering to significantly streamline the waste- handling costs associated with the project . The project schedule was structured to support an early transition to a criticality 'incredible' status for the 241-Z Facility. The cleanup work was sequenced and coordinated with project-specific criticality analysis to allow the fissile material waste being generated to be managed in a bulk fashion, instead of individual waste packages. This approach negated the need for real-time assay of individual waste packages, greatly improving the efficiency of the cleanup operation. The cleanup and stabilization of the 241-2 Liquid Effluent Treatment Facility reduced radiological risks to the environment and Hanford site workers. It was recognized as a success by regulatory agencies, the media, the DOE-client, and stakeholders. The 241-Z D&D Project demonstrated management excellence in adapting to significant changes in project direction, fostered a safety culture that amassed impressive results on this high-hazard job, maintained excellent communications with the client and stakeholders, and developed and implemented unique cleanup techniques.

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Quantitative comparison between PGNAA measurements and MCNP calculations in view of the characterization of radioactive wastes in Germany and France

The Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH (FZJ), together with the Aachen University Rheinisch-Westfaelische Technische Hochschule (RWTH) and the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA Cadarache) are involved in a cooperation aiming at characterizing toxic and reactive elements in radioactive waste packages by means of Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA). The French and German waste management agencies have indeed defined acceptability limits concerning these elements in view of their projected geological repositories. A first measurement campaign was performed in the new Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis (PGNAA) facility called MEDINA, at FZJ, to assess the capture gamma-ray signatures of some elements of interest in large samples up to waste drums with a volume of 200 liter. MEDINA is the acronym for Multi Element Detection based on Instrumental Neutron Activation. This paper presents MCNP calculations of the MEDINA facility and quantitative comparison between measurement and simulation. Passive gamma-ray spectra acquired with a high purity germanium detector and calibration sources are used to qualify the numerical model of the crystal. Active PGNAA spectra of a sodium chloride sample measured with MEDINA then allow for qualifying the global numerical model of the measurement cell. Chlorine indeed constitutes a usual reference with reliable capture gamma-ray production data. The goal is to characterize the entire simulation protocol (geometrical model, nuclear data, and postprocessing tools) which will be used for current measurement interpretation, extrapolation of the performances to other types of waste packages or other applications, as well as for the study of future PGNAA facilities.

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Application of Thermoporometry to Evaluate the Mesoporosity of Cement Pastes

In the context of temporary near-surface or reversible deep geological storage of intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILW), most wastes package concepts comprise an external container made of fiber reinforced concrete, receiving several primary waste packages. Self-irradiation of encapsulating and/or embedding matrices can lead to continuous production of hydrogen which, for obvious safety reasons, must be removed from the container. Previous studies have demonstrated that gas transport depends on two interdependent factors: the water saturation and the microstructural properties of the material. Most techniques used to investigate cement paste porosity require drying of the cement paste prior to the test, which can modify the material microstructure and does not permit the localization of the aqueous phase in the material with various degrees of saturations. This paper focuses on the characterization of pores in cement paste by thermoporometry. The technique, based on the thermodynamic conditions of the melting-solidification reactions of a condensate inside a porous body, provides a simple method for determining the pore size distribution in saturated cement pastes. The results obtained on cement pastes of different formulations with different types of cement are discussed in term of material microstructure and compared with those obtained by other techniques.

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Management of historical waste from research reactors: the Dutch experience

Most radioactive waste emerges as well-defined waste streams from operating power reactors. The management of this is an on-going practice, based on comprehensive (IAEA) guidelines. A special waste category however consists of the historical waste from research reactors, mostly originating from various experiments in the early years of the nuclear era. Removal of the waste from the research site, often required by law, raises challenges: the waste packages must fulfill the acceptance criteria from the receiving storage site as well as the criteria for nuclear transports. Often the aged waste containers do not fulfill today's requirements anymore, and their contents are not well documented. Therefore removal of historical waste requires advanced characterization, sorting, sustainable repackaging and sometimes conditioning of the waste. This paper describes the Dutch experience of a historical waste removal campaign from the Petten High Flux research reactor. The reactor is still in operation, but Dutch legislation asks for central storage of all radioactive waste at the COVRA site in Vlissingen since the availability of the high- and intermediate-level waste storage facility HABOG in 2004. In order to comply with COVRA's acceptance criteria, the complex and mixed inventory of intermediate and low level waste must be characterized and conditioned, identifying the relevant nuclides and their activities. Sorting and segregation of the waste in a Hot Cell offers the possibility to reduce the environmental footprint of the historical waste, by repackaging it into different classes of intermediate and low level waste. In this way, most of the waste volume can be separated into lower level categories not needing to be stored in the HABOG, but in the less demanding LOG facility for low-level waste instead. The characterization and sorting is done on the basis of a combination of gamma scanning with high energy resolution of the closed waste canister and low-resolution localized gamma scanning inside a hot cell. A complicating factor is that the conditioning of the waste, consisting of compacting and cementing, would require such an extensive infrastructure at the Petten site, that it appeared to be more practical to have it executed by a foreign service provider. Therefore the waste packages have to comply with cross-border transport and waste acceptance criteria, and the national legislation of this service provider too. This paper describes this historical waste project, focusing on the fast and precise characterization approach, the expert system behind it, and the sorting and repackaging effort at the Petten site. (authors)

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Used fuel management system architecture and interface analyses

between at-reactor used fuel management, consolidated storage facilities, and disposal facilities, along with the development of supporting logistics simulation tools, have been initiated to provide the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other stakeholders with information regarding the various alternatives for managing used nuclear fuel (UNF) generated by the current fleet of light water reactors operating in the United States. An important UNF management system interface consideration is the need for ultimate disposal of UNF assemblies contained in waste packages that are sized to be compatible with different geologic media. Thermal analyses indicate that waste package sizes for the geologic media under consideration by the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign may be significantly smaller than the canisters being used for on-site dry storage by the nuclear utilities. Therefore, at some point along the UNF disposition pathway, there could be a need to repackage fuel assemblies already loaded and being loaded into the dry storage canisters currently in use. The implications of where and when the packaging or repackaging of commercial UNF will occur are key questions being addressed in this evaluation. The analysis demonstrated that thermal considerations will have a major impact on the operation of the system and that acceptance priority, rates, and facility start dates have significant system implications. (authors)

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Status of Progress Made Toward Preliminary Design Concepts for the Inventory in Select Media for DOE-Managed HLW/SNF

As the title suggests, this report provides a summary of the status and progress for the Preliminary Design Concepts Work Package. Described herein are design concepts and thermal analysis for crystalline and salt host media. The report concludes that thermal management of defense waste, including the relatively small subset of high thermal output waste packages, is readily achievable. Another important conclusion pertains to engineering feasibility, and design concepts presented herein are based upon established and existing elements and/or designs. The multipack configuration options for the crystalline host media pose the greatest engineering challenges, as these designs involve large, heavy waste packages that pose specific challenges with respect to handling and emplacement. Defense-related Spent Nuclear Fuel (DSNF) presents issues for post-closure criticality control, and a key recommendation made herein relates to the need for special packaging design that includes neutron-absorbing material for the DSNF. Lastly, this report finds that the preliminary design options discussed are tenable for operational and post-closure safety, owing to the fact that these concepts have been derived from other published and well-studied repository designs.

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Using Robotic Manipulators for Radioactive Waste Inspection - 20090

The global nuclear industry has a growing volume of nuclear waste which needs to be scanned, sorted according to its activity and material type, then processed into the correct waste packages for long term storage and disposal. It is vital that there is a detailed understanding of the waste inventory stored in long term waste containers, as knowledge of their contents could predict or prevent any adverse effects in storage. The numerous 'scan and sort' tables which are currently used at many different facilities around the world to sort waste into their correct containers are human operated and require very slow gamma scanning procedures combined with educated guesswork to manually sort the waste. This often leads to excessive conservatisms, with placement of lower activity wastes in higher activity containers, which in turn costs significantly more to store. In the United Kingdom it costs UK Pounds 46 k per cubic meter to store intermediate level waste compared to just UK Pound 2.9 k per cubic meter to store low level waste according to a 2008 Department of Energy and Climate Change report in the UK. A proposed solution to this problem, is the use of a robotic manipulator to automatically inspect the 'scan and sort table' in order to produce an accurate 3D model of the table's waste contents and attach an overlaid radiation map. The radiation map contains spectrometry data and can in consequence be used to distinguish and locate specific radioisotopes. The 3D model should be as accurate as possible in order to allow for a second robot arm with an attached gripper to grasp the objects and place them into their designated long-term storage container. Various scanning procedures are explored in this study including basic raster scanning, adaptive raster scanning and point sampling. The optimal solution will in practice be defined by the required application and activity level of the wastes being inspected. The results presented in this study indicate that it is possible to produce a centimeter accurate 3D model of a mixed assortment of components on a nuclear waste 'scan and sort' table. In addition, it was shown that the waste objects emitting radiation could be accurately identified and located, with an overlaid radiation map. This study is applicable across the nuclear waste management sector. Many of the ideas and concepts developed in this study are applicable in other decommissioning settings for example, dismantling of legacy gloveboxes or routine inspection of nuclear waste packages in storage. (authors)

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Cementitious Grouts for ILW Encapsulation - Hydration and Continuity of Supply within the UK - 16184

In the UK the preferred route to disposal for the majority of intermediate level nuclear waste (ILW) streams is encapsulation within a cementitious matrix, accounting for 83% of waste conditioned to date (NDA, 2013). The method is well-defined and produces a waste package that is both chemically and physically stable, providing a multi-layered barrier to the release of the waste species contained within. Due to the process of treatment, facilitated via remote operation, it is necessary for the grouting matrices to meet strict performance limits in terms of their flow, setting time and avoidance of the formation of bleed water or segregation. To this end, the limits on composition of the anhydrous materials (a mixture of ordinary Portland cement [OPC] and blast furnace slag [BFS]) are tight to ensure conformity. Whilst these limits on composition are well understood, their impact upon grout hydration, and hence performance, is poorly defined. This study investigates the effects of modifying the physical and chemical composition of both the OPC and the BFS components of the matrix in order to identify the sensitivity or otherwise of the system to ensure that a continuity of supply is maintained. A number of techniques, scanning electron microscopy - image analysis (SEM-IA), chemical shrinkage (measured via dilatometry), isothermal conduction calorimetry (ICC), thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) and X-ray diffraction (XRD), have been applied to assess the rate and degree of hydration (DoH) of a range of grouts prepared with OPC and BFS with a range of chemical and physical compositions. This has been coupled with subsequent engineering performance testing, with additional analysis to understand the impact of a fire scenario within a storage or disposal facility, to provide an indication towards the resilience of the waste packages to a potential catastrophic event. (authors)

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Fuel/Basket Degradation Modeling Summary

This report documents the activities in a preliminary phase of development for three models: 1) waste package breach model, 2) fuel/basket degradation model, and 3) dual-purpose canister (DPC) crush model. The waste package breach model describes the coupling of mass flow, heat transport, and canister shell deformation in response to a heat-generating (criticality) event. The fuel/basket degradation model describes potential weakening and disaggregation of the DPC structure from corrosion, possibly accelerated by seismic ground motion. Progressively degraded three-dimensional (3D) configurations of the fuel, basket, and shell are generated for future analysis of reactivity (with as-loaded DPC fuel characteristics). Another important application for the fuel/basket degradation model is validation of the two stylized degradation cases currently being used by other investigators for analysis of the as-loaded DPC inventory under disposal conditions. The DPC crush model investigates stability of a typical DPC after breach of the disposal overpack allows fluids from the repository near-field environment to penetrate and externally pressurize the canister shell. Preliminary results show that large deformation of the DPC could occur for external pressure on the order of 10 to 15 MPa, or the shell could be stable (not collapse) with pressure of 20 MPa or greater if the basket plates are fully welded at the connections.

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Logistical simulation of spent nuclear fuel disposal in a salt repository with low temperature limits

Two logistical modeling cases evaluated the relative cost, schedule, and thermal results for strategies that would limit peak salt temperature in a spent-fuel repository to 90°C and 150°C. Runs with the code CALVIN 4.0 show that these low thermal limits are logistically feasible for a salt repository using relatively small waste packages (4-PWR/9-BWR or 12-PWR/24-BWR sizes). Attainment of low-thermal goals was represented using instantaneous waste package thermal power limits at emplacement (3,200 W and 6,800 W) which came from a correlation between package power and peak salt temperature that was developed by a previous study using the finite element method.

Kalinina, Elena Arkadievna↗

The container database? life-cycle management of container inventories at the Hanford site - 15131

Since 2011 the Department of Energy (DOE) Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and their contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL) have worked together to develop a database that provides life-cycle management and control of all CH2M HILL-managed Department of Transportation (DOT) Type A and Industrial Packaging (IP) container assets at the Hanford Site. This powerful tool provides CH2M HILL with the capability to centrally manage container procurement specifications; maintenance requirements; certificates of conformance; certification and test reports; as-built drawings; and information on container status, location, and ownership; and any special characteristics of container assets. The database was originally developed to provide ready access to Type A and IP container supplier and manufacturer Certificates of Conformance (CoCs) and related certification documentation to support onsite shipments in compliance with the Hanford Site Wide Transportation Safety Document (TSD), DOE/RL-2001-0036, as well as regulatory or other requirements. The information is accessed through active links to these documents within the database itself. The database has grown to include links to external supplementary information to support onsite shipments, such as links to authorized tie downs for each package type, approved packaging and transportation commodities, and approved shipping authorizations, and packaging management procedures and checklists. The database is a living databank that is easily tailored to meet user- and site-specific needs as they are identified. It is currently being expanded to include the inventories of all Hanford contractors, as well as other packaging assets, such as specialty drums and packaging commodities. Each upgrade brings efficiencies and cost savings, not only in container inventory management, but also in the areas of work control, waste packaging, waste transportation, and regulatory compliance. (authors)

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Performance Assessment of a Generic Repository for Defense-Related HLW/SNF in Fractured Crystalline Host Rock - 17059

Recently the U.S. made a policy decision to begin R and D for geologic disposal of defense-related HLW/SNF in a facility separate from commercially generated waste. A deep geologic repository for the disposal of DOE-managed HLW, and some thermally cooler DOE-managed SNF, arising from defense and DOE R and D activities, is part of a stepwise, phased approach for disposal of the Nation's nuclear waste, as recommended by the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future. The work discussed here focuses on post-closure safety (or performance) assessment for such a Defense Waste Repository (DWR), which is divided into four major activities: (1) development of generic reference cases (i.e., knowledge or technical bases for 'generic' or 'non-site-specific' deep geologic repositories); (2) features, events, and processes (FEPs) analyses and screening to support the technical bases and the performance assessment (PA) model; (3) performance evaluation of alternative EBS design concepts; and (4) post-closure safety analyses of the repository system under consideration. Using the known inventory of defense-related SNF, as well as defense-related HLW stored at the Savannah River and Hanford sites, the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Framework modeling and software system has been applied to simulate the potential performance of a DWR in crystalline host rock, resulting in a suite of single-realization (i.e., deterministic) and multi-realization (i.e., probabilistic) 3-D post-closure system analyses, over a performance period of one million years. Two types of emplacement concepts are examined, including single-canister vertical-borehole emplacement for the hotter defense SNF waste (KBS-3V concept) and multi-canister horizontal emplacement for defense HLW (similar to Yucca Mountain co-disposal waste packages). Sensitivity analyses examine the effect of key uncertain parameters on repository performance, including the effects of fracture distribution, waste package degradation rate, buffer and disturbed rock zone (DRZ) properties, and sorption parameters. Initial results indicate that a crystalline host rock with a connected fracture system may require additional safety features to ensure robustness of the isolation safety function, such as a deep unsaturated zone, a sufficiently thick sedimentary overburden, and/or a disposal overpack with a very slow corrosion rate. None of these should pose an undue obstacle for successful disposal. (authors)

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Low- and Intermediate-Active Waste Management in the Federal Republic of Germany - 16567

Waste with negligible heat generation (low- and intermediate-active waste) generated in Germany is to be emplaced in the Konrad repository. As the start of operation of the Konrad repository is expected in 2022, regulations have been developed that allow a longer storage period while keeping the same high level of safety. The guidelines for the storage of radioactive waste with negligible heat-generation have become part of the regulatory framework and its enforcement is thoroughly guided by the responsible Federal Ministry. Radioactive waste generated during the operation or the decommissioning of nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel cycle facilities has to be stored by the operator until the Konrad repository is available. In contrast, radioactive waste generated from other industrial, medical and research applications including spent nuclear sources, initially has to be delivered to a Land collecting facility and has to be registered, treated and stored there. The Land collecting facilities will deliver the resulting waste packages to the disposal facility as of 2022. While the operation of the Land Collecting Facilities is a task of the responsible Laender authorities, the operation of the repository Konrad is a federal task. The interaction of the involved different parties will be described. This paper will focus on the management of low- and intermediate-active waste. It will give an insight to the expected amounts and different kinds of waste streams. The different concepts for collecting and qualification procedures for waste packages depending on the origin of the waste will be presented. (authors)

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Performance Study of an aSi Flat Panel Detector for Fast Neutron Imaging of Nuclear Waste

Radioactive waste must be characterized to check its conformance for intermediate storage and final disposal according to national regulations. For the determination of radio-toxic and chemo-toxic contents of radioactive waste packages non-destructive analytical techniques are preferentially used. Fast neutron imaging is a promising technique to assay large and dense items providing, in complementarity to photon imaging, additional information on the presence of structures in radioactive waste packages. Therefore the feasibility of a compact Neutron Imaging System for Radioactive waste Analysis (NISRA) using 14 MeV neutrons is studied in a cooperation framework of Forschungszentrum Juelich GmbH, RWTH Aachen University and Siemens AG. However due to the low neutron emission of neutron generators in comparison to research reactors the challenging task resides in the development of an imaging detector with a high efficiency, a low sensitivity to gamma radiation and a resolution sufficient for the purpose. The setup is composed of a commercial D-T neutron generator (Genie16GT, Sodern) with a surrounding shielding made of polyethylene, which acts as a collimator and an amorphous silicon flat panel detector (aSi, 40 x 40 cm{sup 2}, XRD-1642, Perkin Elmer). Neutron detection is achieved using a general propose plastic scintillator (EJ-260, Eljen Technology) linked to the detector. The thermal noise of the photodiodes is reduced by employing an entrance window made of aluminium. Optimal gain and integration time for data acquisition are set by measuring the response of the detector to the radiation of a 500 MBq {sup 241}Am-source. Detector performance was studied by recording neutron radiography images of materials with various, but well known, chemical compositions, densities and dimensions (Al, C, Fe, Pb, W, concrete, polyethylene, 5 x 8 x 10 cm{sup 3}). To simulate gamma-ray emitting waste radiographs in presence of a gamma-ray sources ({sup 60}Co, {sup 137}Cs, {sup 241}Am) were performed. A homemade algorithm was developed to determine a value which is related to the neutron absorption of the sample with the analysis of the raw detector data. The detector was placed 42 cm away from the neutron source. Distance between detector and the samples was 0.5 cm. At the sample position the fast neutron flux was estimated to 9x10{sup 3} n cm{sup -2} s{sup -1} for a neutron emission of 10{sup 8} n s{sup -1}. The acquisition time was 15 minutes. First neutron radiographs were successfully recorded despite the low detector efficiency and low neutron emission. Analysis of the data shows a correlation between the measured signal and determined neutron absorption. Thus discrimination between different materials of same thicknesses may be achieved. The measurements and results will be presented and discussed in details.

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Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

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Thermal Neutron Die-Way-Time Studies for P and DGNAA of Radioactive Waste Drums at the MEDINA Facility

In Germany, radioactive waste with negligible heat production has to pass through a process of quality checking in order to check its conformance with national regulations prior to its transport, intermediate storage and final disposal. Additionally to its radioactive components, the waste may contain non-radioactive chemically toxic substances that can adversely affect human health and pollute the environment, especially the ground water. After an adequate decay time, the waste radioactivity will become harmless but the non-radioactive substances will persist over time. In principle, these hazardous substances may be quantified from traceability and quality controls performed during the production of the waste packages. As a consequence, a research and development program was initiated in 2007 with the aim to develop a nondestructive analytical technique for radioactive waste packages based on prompt and delayed gamma neutron activation analysis (P and DGNAA) employing a DT-neutron generator in pulsed mode. In a preliminary study it was experimentally demonstrated that P and DGNAA is suitable to determine the chemical composition of large samples. In 2010 a facility called MEDINA (Multi Element Detection based on Instrumental Neutron Activation) was developed for the qualitative and quantitative determination of nonradioactive, toxic elements and substances in 200-l steel drums. The determination of hazardous substances and elements is generally achieved measuring the prompt gamma-rays induced by thermal neutrons. Additional information about the composition of the waste matrix could be derived measuring the delayed gamma-rays from short life activation products. However a sensitive detection of these delayed gamma-rays requires that thermal neutrons have almost vanished. Therefore, the thermal neutron die-away-time has to be known in order to achieve an optimal discrimination between prompt and delayed gamma-ray spectra acquisition. Measurements Thermal neutron die-away times have been determined for the following cases: a) the empty chamber, b ) an empty 200-l steel drum, for a 200-l steel drum filled c) with concrete d) with polyethylene and e) with a mixture of polyethylene and concrete by measuring the prompt-gamma ray count rate of relevant isotopes like of {sup 1}H, {sup 10}B, {sup 12}C, {sup 28}Si, {sup 35}Cl, {sup 40}Ca and {sup 56}Fe which are emitted from different parts of the facility and the sample. Additionally, the average die-away-time was determined from the total detector count rate. The neutron generator was operated with a neutron emission of 8x10{sup 7} n.s{sup -1}, a neutron pulse with a length of 250 μs and a repetition time of 5 ms. The spectra were acquired between the neutron pulses over t{sub c}=500 μs after a pre-defined waiting time t{sub D} (multiple of 500 μs). The thermal neutron die-away time was ranging between 0.9 ms and 5 ms according to the sample composition. As an example the measured thermal neutron die-away-time Λ [μs] of a drum filled with concrete is presented. Detailed results of this study will be presented and discussed. (authors)

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗